DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 214 834 SO 013 965

AUTHOR Anderson, Lee
TITLE Schooling and Citizenship in a Global Age: An Exploration of the Meaning and Significance of Global Education.
INSTITUTION Indiana Univ., Bloomington. Social Studies Development Center.
SPONS AGENCY Lilly Endowment, Inc., Indianapolis, Ind.
PUB DATE 79
NOTE 498p.; Prepared for Mid-America Program for Global Perspectives in Education. Charts and descriptive materials may not reproduce clearly

EDRS PRICE MF02/PC20 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Case Studies; *Citizenship Education; Communications; Culture; Definitions; Economic Development; *Educational Change; Educational Needs; Elementary Secondary Education; Futures (of Society); *Global Approach; Human Geography; International Education; Political Socialization; Quality of Life; Social History; State of the Art Reviews; Transportation; World Affairs; World History; World Problems

ABSTRACT

The full meaning of global education and the realities which make it imperative are discussed in this work. Global education is defined as "consisting of efforts to bring about the changes in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education in order to better prepare students for citizenship in a global age." This definition contains three major propositions that have far reaching implications for education. The first proposition is: "The students now in the nation's schools are becoming citizens within the context of a global era in human history." In connection with this proposition, the author illustrates the global quality of life in the contemporary world; provides a brief historical overview of the globalization of the human condition; discusses how the history, the geography, the economics, the politics, and the sociology of the human condition have become globalized; and argues that the cumulative consequence of these developments is the creation of a global society. The second proposition is: "The demands of citizenship in a global age call for the development of competencies that have not been traditionally emphasized by the schools." In regard to this proposition, the author discusses the meaning of citizenship, indicates four ways in which citizenship has been altered by the globalization of the human condition, and outlines four kinds of competencies that appear central to the exercise of citizenship in a global age. The third proposition is "Certain changes must take place in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education if schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age." The author argues that there is a need to globalize the content of education, to personalize the methods of education, and to internationalize the social context of education. (Author/NE).

ED214834

APR 5 1982

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

SCHOOLING AND CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GLOBAL EDUCATION

by

Lee Anderson

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

James Becker

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Mid-America Program for Global Perspectives
in Education

Social Studies Development Center
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana 1979

SP013 965

© Social Studies Development Center

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD. iv

PREFACE vi

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: What Is Global Education 4

Overview 4
What Global Education is Not 4
Some Examples of Global Education in Action 6
A Definition of Global Education 15
Summary. 16

PART TWO: THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL AGE

Overview of Part Two 17

Chapter 3: The Globalization of the Human Condition 19

Overview 19
The Global Quality of Contemporary Life. 19
The Globalization of the Human Condition: A Historical Overview -- The Century of the J Curve 34
Summary and Preview 66

Chapter 4: The Transformation of World History 68

Overview 68
The Globalization of History 68
The Emergence and Growth of Global Interdependence. 74
The Emergence and Growth of Shared History or Common Fate. 83
The Emergence and Growth of Global Structures that Constrain and Shape the Flow of Sub-Global Histories 88
Summary 92

Chapter 5: The Evolution of Systems of Global Transportation and Communication 93

Overview. 93
Technological Developments 93
Institutional Developments 98
Linguistic Developments 114
Some Notes on the Significance of Global Transportation and Communication 120

Chapter 6: The Emergence and Development of Global Economy 130

Overview. 130
Origins of a Global Economy 131
The Effects of the Industrial Revolution 139
Post World War II Developments in the Global Economy 148
Summary 178

Chapter 7: The Development of a Global Political System 179

Overview. 179
The Evolution of a Single World Wide International System 179
The Structural Transformation of the International System 194
Summary and Concluding Analysis 240

Chapter 8: The Growth of Global Culture 249

Overview. 249
Some ABCs of the Human Condition 250
The Individual and the Globalization of the Human Condition 261
The Globalization of Culture 267
The Making of a Global Culture 299
Summary 316

Chapter 9: The World as a Global Society 318

Overview. 318
A Rationale for Viewing the World as a Global Society 319
The World as a System 323
The World as a Social System 327
The World as a Society. 328
Summary 334

PART THREE: CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION IN A GLOBAL AGE

Chapter 10: Citizenship and Citizen Competence in a Global Age 335

Overview. 335
The Meaning of Citizenship 335
The Effect on Citizenship of the Advent of a Global Age 339
Citizen Competencies in a Global Age 340
Summary 366

Chapter 11: Educational Change and the Development of Citizen Competence in a Global Age 368

Overview. 368
The Challenge of Globalizing the Content of Education 369
The Challenger of Personalizing Methods of Education 416
The Challenge of Internationalizing the Social Context of Education. 421
Summary 425

Chapter 12: A Look at Global Education in Action 428

Overview. 428

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 474

FOREWORD

Increasing global interrelatedness is a fact of life. Today, the realities of living in a global society are widely proclaimed. There is also a growing recognition of the need for more appropriate educational responses to the shrinking of time and space and the increase in human interactions across national and continental boundaries. Efforts to spell out the educational implications of the emergence of a global age are increasing.

Those who seek to improve and to expand the global perspectives of children and youth -- a task in which a growing number of individuals and groups in schools, colleges and universities, government agencies and private associations are engaged -- are confronted with a complex web of interrelated conceptual, normative and pragmatic issues.

What is global education? What constitutes improvements? What changes in schools will result in better programs for children and youth? What can teachers, administrators and trainers of teachers do to help bring about needed changes?

Schooling and Citizenship in a Global Age: An Exploration of the Meaning and Significance of Global Education, written by Dr. Lee Anderson for the Mid-America Program for Global Perspectives in Education, provides some maps of this very complex domain. In this book, Dr. Anderson attempts to place in perspective the full meaning of global education and the realities which make it imperative. He documents the long-term trend

toward the globalization of society and describes some of the educational changes already occurring in response to this trend -- changes that need to be encouraged in order to achieve further improvements in global education.

The Mid-America Program for Global Perspectives in Education has a long-standing interest in definitional, conceptual and strategic problems associated with improving global education. We are proud to make this imaginative, creative and much-needed work available along with our other publications and services. Major support for this book was provided by the Lilly Endowment.

James M. Becker
Mid-America Program
Social Studies Development Center
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

PREFACE

This is a revision of an earlier paper entitled "Exploring the Emergent Meaning of Global Education." I wish to thank all those who helped in the preparation of that paper and who made suggestions for revisions. Special thanks go to Charlotte Anderson, Susan Bradley, Susan Kuczmarski, Phyllis Maxey, Harold Guetzkow, Richard Snyder, Richard Remy, Gerald Marker, and James Becker. I am also grateful for the constructive suggestions made by more than 100 colleagues in education and in the social sciences. Especially included in this group are the participants in the April 24-25, 1977 conference in Bloomington, Indiana and the participants in the November 22, 1977 session in Cincinnati.

I also greatly appreciate McGraw-Hill giving permission to use material included in the final chapter of this paper. The original version of this chapter will appear in Schooling for a Global Age, to be published early in 1979.

Schooling and Citizenship in a Global Age: An Exploration of the Meaning and Significance of Global Education is one of a number of publications and services available from the Mid-America Program for Global Perspectives in Education.

Dr. Lee Anderson
Professor of Political Science and Education
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

PART ONE:

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Global education is becoming an increasingly important movement within American education as well as within the educational systems of other nations.* Its rise to visibility on the agenda of educators' concerns is indexed in a variety of ways.

Global education is the subject of a voluminous and rapidly growing body of professional literature. State departments of education have begun to issue guidelines on global education which seek to specify its place and document its importance in the work of schools. National and regional meetings of professional educational associations often include global education in their agendas of panels and workshops. Several organizations, as well as a growing number of individuals, are engaged in the development and dissemination of instructional materials related to global education. Global education has become a concern of influential educational policy makers at both the federal and state levels of government. International conferences focused upon various aspects of global education are becoming common. A growing number of schools and colleges in the United States and in other countries are involved in a variety of special projects and activities concerned with global education.

These are a few of many developments that indicate the growing visibility and influence of global education. On the whole these are recent developments. Indeed the term "global education" is itself a new

*Some people speak of "education for global perspectives" rather than "global education". The former phrase is semantically preferable for reasons that will become evident in this paper. Unfortunately, "education for global perspectives" is a grammatically cumbersome term. For this reason I use the term global education rather than education for global perspectives in this paper.

entry into the lexicon of education. Because global education is new, people naturally call for definitions. What is global education, they ask of those who talk and write about this matter.

Unfortunately, asking for a definition of global education is much easier than providing one, at least one that both asker and giver find satisfactory. The reason for this is not to be found in the intellectual inferiority or the muddleheadedness of the people who are involved in the global education movement. It may be true that we do suffer these defects of mind, but even if this be the case, it is not these deficiencies that explain the trouble we experience in responding to the inquiry: What is global education? The source of the trouble lies not in ourselves but rather in that which we seek to define. "Global education" is an abstraction whose referent is not a simple phenomenon. To the contrary, global education refers to a historically complicated and socially complex phenomenon. Given this, it is very doubtful that there is any one single and simple way of defining global education that will be universally satisfying.

However, to acknowledge the impossibility of discovering a universally perfect and eternally viable conception of global education does not make the task of trying to fashion a proximate, working definition any less important. Such definitions are vital elements in any effort to improve education in the waning decades of the Twentieth Century. Without such definitions we flounder and drift because we have no mental map on which to specify where we want to go and to locate our current position in relation to that destination.

This reference to the need for a proximate, working definition of global education points to what this paper is all about. It is an effort to fashion such a definition. I have gone about this task in the following way. In the next part of the paper, Chapter Two, I develop a working definition of global education, and identify three critical propositions inherent in this definition. These propositions are then discussed in Chapters Three through Eleven. Then in Chapter Twelve, I present a case study that is intended to illustrate in a concrete way the conception of global education developed in the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

WHAT IS GLOBAL EDUCATION?

I

Overview

In this chapter I shall set forth a definition of global education. In fashioning this definition I will do the following things. To begin, I will indicate what global education is not. Following this I will give some examples of what global education is. These examples will be used to construct a formal definition of global education. This definition will then be broken down into three basic propositions that will be elaborated in the following three chapters.

II

What Global Education is Not

It seems necessary to begin a search for a definition of global education by indicating what global education is not. This is necessary because global education is a very misleading phrase. As a term "global education" is grammatically equivalent to history education, environmental education, economic education, mathematics education, science education, and so on. Herein lies a major problem because while the terms are grammatically equivalent, semantically global education is very different from other terms. History education, economic education, science education, and so forth can be defined by identifying and describing the peculiar characteristics of the

particular discipline or the specific content and subject matter on which these various domains of education are focused. Because of grammatical congruence one is led to expect that global education can also be defined in the same way. Hence, one naturally asks: What is the content, discipline, or subject matter that is peculiar to global education and differentiates it from other domains of education? The answer to this question is: There is none. Global education is not a domain of education that can be defined in terms of a particular body of content, subject matter, or discipline as we can do in the case of history education, science education, geography education, math education, and so on.

In the past we have sometimes tried to make global education into a content-bounded domain of schooling by saying global or international education is equivalent to the study of things foreign and international. Thus, students were said to be involved in global education when they were learning about another culture, country, or geographical region of the world; or when they were studying foreign policy, international relations, or world problems.

The trouble with this conception is not that it is wrong. It is simply a too narrow and incomplete notion of global education. A student need not be studying things foreign or international, as we have conventionally thought of these terms, in order to be involved in a global education. There are ways in which a student can be studying his or her own community and be as much involved in global education as when he or she is studying a community in another part

of the world. Similarly, there are ways of studying the American Revolution in a U.S. history class that involves students in global education as much as they are when they study the Arab-Israeli conflict in a world problems or international relations course.

If global education is incapable of being defined by reference to a particular body of content or subject matter, then how can the term be defined? We can usefully begin a search for an alternative way of thinking about global education by glancing at a few examples of global education in action.

III

Some Examples of Global Education in Action

In a midwestern state, the State Department of Public Instruction mandates a new course in non-western studies to be taken by junior high students. Asked by a newspaper reporter why the Department did this, the Superintendent of Instruction replies, "Asia and Africa have become as important to the security and well-being of the United States as Europe has historically been. American citizens cannot be an informed citizenry if schools do not do more to help Americans learn about these vital areas of the world."

* * * * * * * * * *

In a Detroit school, a third grade teacher introduces into her social studies curriculum a new unit in which the children explore what all human beings have in common by comparing human beings with other living things. Asked by a parent why she has done this, the

teacher responds, "Every day my children experience racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity in the school and in this neighborhood. Throughout their lives these children will be meeting and working with many different kinds of people. They need to learn how to relate constructively to people who are different. I believe a terribly important part of their education is to learn to see what all people have in common; what makes us all members of a common humanity."

* * * * * * * * * *

In a college town in New England, a professor of geography is working with a local high school geography teacher in writing a new world geography book for secondary schools. Bringing coffee to the study one evening the professor's husband asks how the work is coming. "_____ (explitive deleted)," respond the professor and teacher in unison. "It is not easy," the professor says, "to write a book that highlights connections among the regions of the world when you have been trained to think of the world as a collection of unrelated regions. But that is not how the world is and today's students need to learn to see world geography in a new and more global way."

* * * * * * * * * *

In a secondary school in Georgia a social studies and a science teacher have completed the last day of teaching a new interdisciplinary course called "Science and Ethics of the Human

Environment." Their Principal asks them how the new course went. "Not as well as we hoped," the science teacher says. "We have a lot to learn before we can clearly show the kids that they are participants in a global eco-system and that they have a personal responsibility for the health of that system. But there is next year. We'll keep at it."

* * * * * * * * * *

In an Illinois school system many of the fifth grade students have just begun to study how their town is linked to the rest of the world. For example, some students are studying the international connections of local business firms, other students are looking at the international activities of the town's religious organizations, and still other students are studying the ethnic origins of the town's population. The social studies coordinator for the district is asked by a member of the Board of Education about the project. He responds, "By linking together local studies and global studies we do several things. The children must work hard on map skills and place name geography. They also learn that international affairs are not far away and remote from them and their own community. They soon learn that the people and places they personally know are connected to many other people and places throughout the world."

* * * * * * * * * *

In a high school in Portland, Oregon, the teacher of a world affairs course is arranging for her students after-school internships in Portland's several voluntary associations involved in

world affairs. The Rotary Club is one of these. The teacher explains to the President of the club why she thinks this is important. "In today's world active citizenship can't stop at the water's edge. My students need to learn that citizens can do more than read about and talk about international affairs. They need to learn that they can be personally active. They can best learn this by working with local people and organizations that are doing things on the world scene."

* * * * * * * * * *

In Minneapolis at a regional convention of a professional educational association, an elementary teacher from a Wisconsin school is spending a Saturday morning browsing through the display of books and other instructional materials. Asked by a representative of a publishing firm if she can help him, the teacher responds. "I teach world cultures in social studies. I am looking for case studies, stories, games, or other things that would make the study of people in other cultures more alive and meaningful to my kids."

* * * * * * * * * *

At the same time in another part of the book display area a teacher of U.S. history from a Minnesota high school is examining a new textbook in American history. "This is a great book," he tells the publisher's representative. "I have been looking for a book that sets American history in a world context. Our school will be adopting it next year. Will you send me a copy so we can examine it?"

* * * * * * * * * *

At a school board meeting in a suburb of Dallas, a member of the board notes that she has read in the local paper that one of the district's teachers had spent part of last summer in a travel and study program in Japan. "I hope," she tells the Superintendent, "that you are encouraging this sort of thing on the part of all our teachers. Given the fact that Texas is so deeply involved in international business our students need as many teachers as we can get who have some first hand acquaintance with the rest of the world."

* * * * * * * * * *

In a community near Pittsburgh a school nurse who is actively involved in the world hunger relief activities of her local church comes into health science, consumer education, and world geography classes to help the regular instructors in teaching about nutritional aspects of world hunger. Asked by one of the teachers why she is willing to go to this time and trouble, the nurse replies simply, "I am deeply bothered by the fact that I go to bed on a full stomach while millions of my brothers and sisters go to bed hungry. I hope by showing my concern to students some of them will also become concerned."

* * * * * * * * * *

In another community also near Pittsburgh a guidance counselor in one of the city's high schools has organized a new activity called "International Careers Night." Individuals from various

professions including business, banking, medicine, education, and government whose jobs involve them in international activities come and talk about their work with interested students and parents. Why did he do this? The reason, as he explained on a local TV talk show, is to sensitize students to the fact that international work is a part of an increasing number of jobs. "Hopefully some of the students will keep this in mind as they plan their high school and college work. Maybe some of them will even see a new relevance in learning foreign languages," the guidance counselor told his TV audience.

* * * * * * * * * *

In a school in Iowa the faculty advisor of the school's French Club is working hard to bring to the school an exchange student from French-speaking Africa. Asked by a fellow teacher why she is devoting so much time and energy to this endeavor, the teacher responds, "A French-speaking student in the school will spark my students' interest in learning French. Besides I think it will be good for the cross-cultural education of the whole student body."

* * * * * * * * * *

In Paris educators from several nations meet to work on a set of world history lessons that will be commonly used in schools of each of the nations represented at the conference. After his return home the representative from the United States was asked to write an article about the project for a professional journal. The article begins: "Ours is an age in which all of humankind is caught up in a universal history. There is no history of Europe that is independent

from the history of North America; no history of North American that is separate from the history of Asia or Africa. In short, there no longer are separate regional histories of the world. World history has become global history. Perhaps students will learn this better if schools in different nations start using some common instructional materials in teaching world history."

* * * * * * * * * *

In a middle school in Florida a team of teachers has developed a rich array of community resources they use when teaching world studies. Individuals from other countries residing in the city come in to their classes. Their students take field trips to companies engaged in international business, and in many other ways take advantage of out-of-school learning resources. Describing their project at a meeting of the school's PTSA, these teachers note that however good a school may be it is not rich enough in people and experience to provide the kind of world studies education children need. "For example," one of the teachers declares, "we think it is important for kids to learn something about multinational corporations. After all, many of our students will be working in multinationals when they grow up. What better way to start this learning than for them to visit and talk to the people who are working in the multinational corporations located in our city?"

* * * * * * * * * *

In a high school in Utah a teacher of European history has developed a simulation of the French Revolution designed to

highlight the fact that the French Revolution had worldwide effects. In explaining the simulation to other teachers, he notes, "In teaching Modern Europe I try to stress Europe's interrelations with the rest of the world. This can be very abstract stuff for the students, so I am trying to make it more concrete by using simulations."

* * * * * * * * * *

The events I have briefly recounted may appear to be a motley array of disparate, discrete, and unrelated episodes. But they are not. Each is an example of global education in action. By identifying the commonalities shared by these events, we can fashion a definition of global education.

First, note what all the people involved in these events are doing. The teachers, the school administrators, the curriculum developers, the educational policy-makers are all engaged in efforts to effect change in some aspect of children's or young people's education about the world.

Second, note the types or kinds of change these educators are seeking to bring about. Some, like the State Department of Public Instruction that mandated a new course on non-western studies, are trying to change the content of what students are taught about the world. The third grade teacher in Detroit, the science and social studies teachers in Georgia, and the geography textbook developers in New England are other examples of people engaged in

efforts to bring about a change in the content of students' education.

In other cases the educators are seeking to effect a change in methods of teaching students about the world. The elementary teacher from Wisconsin who was searching for case studies, stories, and games she might use to enliven and personalize her students' learning about people in other cultures is an example of this, as is the high school teacher in Utah who developed the new simulation of the French Revolution.

In still other cases, the individuals involved in these events are endeavoring to change the social context in which teaching and learning about the world takes place. The school board member who was encouraging the Superintendent to increase the numbers of teachers with experience in foreign travel and study is an example of this. The educators' meeting in Paris to develop lessons in world history to be used commonly in several nations provides another example of efforts to change the social context of teaching and learning, and so does the French Club advisor in Iowa who was working to get into her school an exchange student from French-speaking Africa.

Third, note the reasons why these people are trying to bring about change in students' education about the world. These people are in differing ways and degrees conscious of the global character of the contemporary world. They realize that students now in the nation's schools are becoming citizens in an era of history in which

individuals are progressively more involved and implicated in organizations, in social processes, and in human problems that cut across or transcend the boundaries of particular communities, nations, and cultures. They sense that citizenship in such an era demands new competencies, and to develop such competencies change is needed in how children and young people are educated about the world.

IV

A Definition of Global Education

These commonalities in the events outlined above point to a definition of global education.

> Global education consists of efforts to bring about changes in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education in order to better prepare students for citizenship in a global age.

This is a very simple definition, but inherent in it are three major propositions that have far-reaching implications for education. The first of these propositions concerns the character of the historical era in which today's children and youth have been born. This proposition can be summarized as follows:

> The students now in the nation's schools are becoming citizens within the context of a global era in human history.

The second proposition concerns the significance of the emergence of a global age for citizenship and the education of citizens. It can be stated this way:

> The demands of citizenship in a global age call for the development of competencies that have not been traditionally emphasized by schools.

The third proposition concerns the types of changes in education that seemingly must occur if schools are to become more effective agents in developing citizen competence in a global age. It can be stated as follows:

> Certain changes must take place in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education if schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age.

V

Summary

In this chapter I have set forth a definition of global education. In the next several chapters I will elaborate upon this definition by discussing each of the three propositions that make up the definition.

PART TWO

THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL AGE

Overview of Part Two

In the last chapter I put forward a definition portraying global education to be efforts to change schools in ways that hopefully make them more effective agents of citizen education in a global age. I noted that three basic propositions inhere in this definition. The first of these is: Students now in the nation's schools are becoming citizens within the context of a global era in human history.

Part Two elaborates upon this proposition. The discussion is organized around the development of a particular line of argument. The major elements of this argument may be summarized as follows:

1. The contemporary world is characterized by a historically unprecedented international or global character.

2. The global character of contemporary history reflects a long-term historical trend toward a progressively more globalized human condition.

3. Within modern history and, more particularly, within contemporary times this historical trend has substantially accelerated as a result of western expansion and the development of modern science and technology. Specifically, the first, second, third... and nth order consequences of these twin events has been to substantially globalize the history, the geography, the economics, the politics, and the sociology, of the human condition.

    a. Historically, the era of separate regional histories has ended and an era of common global history has begun.

b. Geographically, the isolating efforts of distance on human affairs has been progressively eroded by the evolution of global systems of transportation and communication.

c. Economically, local and national economics have become increasingly absorbed into a global economy.

d. Politically, the European centered nation state system has been transformed into a world-wide and an organizationally heterogeneous global political system.

e. Sociologically, increasing interrelatedness between societies combined with increasing cultural congruence among societies are creating a common global culture co-existing uneasily with the traditional array of distinctive local, national, and regional cultures.

4. The progressive globalization of the human condition has produced a social system that is larger and more inclusive than nations, and this world system can be fruitfully conceptualized as a global society.

CHAPTER THREE

THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE HUMAN CONDITION: AN OVERVIEW

I

Overview

Life in the contemporary world, at least the life of a large and growing fraction of humanity, is characterized by a historically unprecedented international or global quality. In this chapter I try to do two things. First, I illustrate the global quality of contemporary life. Second, I provide a brief historical overview of the globalization of the human condition.

II

The Global Quality of Contemporary Life

Throughout this chapter and the following chapters in Part Two I will be trying to develop a documented brief in support of the assertion that the human condition in modern history and particularly within contemporary times have become markedly globalized. But before launching into this analysis, it seems appropriate to illustrate the global quality of contemporary life. This can be done in a variety of ways. The method I have elected to use consists of giving an account of a day in my own life. This story will be presented in two versions. First, I will tell the story as it appears to an untutored eye unaccustomed to perceiving the international in the routine of daily life. Then I will

retell the same story , but under different circumstances. This time I will be accompanied by a "detector of encounters of the international kind." This detector stops the story each time I encounter or experience things international.

* * * * * * *

I awoke at 6:30 a.m. to the ringing of an alarm clock, showered, shaved, and dressed. Then I went to the kitchen to prepare breakfast. The meal consisted of bacon, toast, and Sanka coffee. After eating I filled and lit my pipe, and spent the next fifteen minutes reading the Chicago Sun Times.

Shortly before eight I left my home to drive my wife to the Northwestern train station and my children to the local high school. Leaving the high school, I drove to a local Montessori Nursery School to seek the Director's approval of a research project on children's development that one of my graduate students is beginning. Departing the nursery school I carelessly drove through a stop sign and was stopped by a friendly but firm policeman. With my ticket in hand, I drove to the campus of Northwestern University. There I loaded my car with students enrolled in my introductory education course and we proceeded to drive to an elementary school that the students were scheduled to observe. After two hours of observation we departed the school and arrived back on campus in time for me to make an eleven o'clock appointment with a student.

After the student left my office, I snapped on a radio to a local country music station and settled down to prepare for a class later in the day. While half listening to the music I did the following: Extracted a quote from an article in a journal borrowed from the library; took from my files a xerox copy of a set of statistics on world economic development; jotted notes on a sheet of paper using a mechanical pencil, read portions of a book.

At 12 o'clock I opened a brown bag and consumed a lunch consisting of a bologna and mayonnaise sandwich, a banana, three fig newtons, and a can of tapioca pudding, all of which I ate while sipping a cup of tea. While eating I glanced through this week's copy of Newsweek and Time magazine. At 12:45 I left my office and walked across campus to a classroom building. On my way I met a colleague and we stopped to remark on how warm the day was and on the remarkable visibility of the haze of pollution hanging like a shroud over the Chicago skyline 13 miles to the South.

I taught my class and upon leaving the classroom paused for a drink of water. On the way back to my office I stopped to watch a group of students peacefully picketing the University's administration building. Returning to my office I spent several minutes going through the day's mail. Among the communiques was a letter from a colleague who edits an international journal. He wrote to advise me that he needed immediately my reaction to a manuscript he had sent me to review. I wrote his telephone number on a sheet of paper and made a note to call him at 7:00 a.m. the next morning. At this point I received a call from a colleague at Northwestern asking if I would be willing to sign a petition protesting the University's decision to grant Menachin Begin of Israel an honorary degree. As I searched my conscience on this matter I remembered that I had promised my daughter to write a letter to the President of the School Board indicating that I supported one of her teachers' decision to use a video tape of the "Holocaust" in her Civics class. While writing the promised letter, I received a telephone call from the Chicago branch of Saks Fifth Avenue. A polite and friendly voice informed me that the sweater I had ordered several weeks ago as a gift for my wife's forthcoming birthday had finally arrived, but it would cost me 34 cents more than the price quoted me when I placed the order.

After completing my transactions with Saks, I finished my letter and departed for home. On the way I stopped to pick up some Scott Turf Builder at the local hardware store, some sheet music for my daughter from the music store, and a new brand of gum that she had been bugging me to try. Arriving home I retired to the living room, put on a record, poured

a glass of wine, and read "Why Husbands Lose Interest in Sex" in a recent issue of the Reader's Digest.

My son and daughter soon arrived home and informed me that their mother had called to say she would be working late and hence would not be home for dinner. I suggested we go out to McDonald's to eat. They countered with the proposal that we bring some Kentucky Fried Chicken home. After some argument the majority carried the day and my son left to fetch the chicken. While eating our chicken, wiping our fingers and drinking milk, my children and I watched "Hawaii Five-O" on television. During commercial breaks my daughter elaborately explained to me why she needed $20.00 to buy a new pair of blue jeans. After the show we settled down to an evening of home work. Later in the evening my wife arrived home and we prepared for bed. While waiting for the sleepy time bug to bite us into unconsciousness, we propped ourselves up in bed to read. My wife asked me to look at an article in Parent's Magazine on the problem of living with teenagers. I said I was too busy since I wanted to finish a chapter of a detective novel I was reading, and besides I had a headache. She kindly got me a glass of water and two aspirin tablets and soon we put out the lights, rolled over, and dropped into a deep sleep.

* * * * * * *

Now, I will review the same events but this time accompanied by a detector that stops the story whenever I encounter things international.

I awoke at 6:30 a.m. to the ringing of an alarm clock . . . .

Stop: You have encountered the international. Your clock is a product if the Sony Corporation, a Japanese-based multinational corporation. The clock was assembled in a Sony plant in Brazil from component parts produced in Japan, Mexico, and Germany. It was shipped from Brazil to the United States in a Greek owned ship manufactured in Sweden, licensed in Liberia, and staffed by a Portuguese crew.

Showered. . . .

Stop: You are soaking in the international. You are using Dial soap, a product of the Greyhound Corporation which is a large American-based multinational corporation.

Shaved . . . .

Stop: Now the international is on your face and in your hand. The razor is made by Gillette, the shaving soap by Palmolive-Colgate, and the after shave lotion by British American Industries Limited. The first two are American-based multinationals and the latter a British-based multinational corporation.

And dressed . . . .

Stop: Now you are wearing the international. Your shorts were made in Japan from cotton exported to Japan from the United States. Your socks were made in Taiwan using wool grown in Australia. You bought the socks and shorts at the Skokie, Illinois, Sears and Roebuck store, one of several thousand Sears stores located in several dozen countries. The shirt you are wearing was purchased at Montgomery Ward's, a subsidiary of Mobil Oil, one of the world's largest multinational business enterprises.

Then I went to the kitchen to prepare breakfast . . . .

Stop: Now you are experiencing the international. In your grandparent's time the preparation of meals was the responsibility of the wife in a household. Now in an increasing number of families, meal preparation is a shared responsibility. By preparing a meal you are participating in a social change in the status of women that is taking place on a world-wide scale.

The meal consisted of bacon, toast and Sanka coffee . . . .

Stop: Your stomach is full of the international. The bacon was brought to you via the same multinational that provided the soap in your shower, namely the Greyhound Corporation. The pig from which the bacon came consumed more grain than the majority of humanity eats in a year. The three calories of solar energy that your stomach is not extracting from the bacon were produced at a cost of ten other calories of solar energy, the bulk of which were derived from petroleum and petroleum byproducts imported from the Middle East. But there is much more. The bread you eat is Wonder Bread, a product of International Telephone and Telegraph, a very large and somewhat infamous multinational. The technology that heated

your bread to make it toast is a product of still another multinational, General Electric. The butter you put on the toast contains dried milk imported from Germany. The Sanka coffee comes from Africa via General Foods, a multinational food processing enterprise headquartered at White Plains, New York, but operating plans and distribution centers in a large number of nations.

After eating I filled and lit my pipe . . . .

Stop: Now you are inhaling the international. Your pipe is imported from Denmark. The pipe consists of a briar bowl that the Danes imported from Poland and a plastic stem manufactured in Italy from plastic produced by DuPont in a plant in Japan. The tobacco you are smoking is Amphoria Brand, manufactured by Douwe Egbert in Utrech, The Netherlands, from tobacco imported from Turkey and Virginia. The match you used in lighting your pipe was manufactured by Diamond International in a plant in Spain from sulphur mined in Chile and wood pulp produced in Canada.

And spent the next fifteen minutes reading the Chicago Sun Times . . . .

Stop: You are still encountering the international. Much of the news you read is about events outside of the United States and the relation of the United States to these events. Note that the article about the increasing rate of heart disease in Japan indicates that medical researchers are attributing this to the Westernization of the Japanese diet. One of the people killed in the train accident North of Rome is the mother of a Chicago woman who is now travelling to Italy to attend her mother's funeral via Italia Airlines. The article about a business merger is a story about the merger of Seamens and Allis Chalmers. Seamens is a large German-based multinational and Allis Chalmers is an American-based multinational that made the tractor you learned to drive on your father's farm. The headlines about pending war in Southern Africa are an account of the failure of an American Secretary of State's political maneuvering in Praetoria, London, Salisbury, and Moscow. But the content of the news is only part of your encounter with the international. The Chicago Sun Times derives much of the news it reports from United Press International, Associated Press International, Reuters, and Tass, all transnational information agencies. The press on which your newspaper is printed was produced by Rockwell International, the same

American-based multinational that built the presses that will print today's edition of more than two hundred newspapers around the world.

Shortly before eight I left my home to drive my wife to the Northwestern train station and my children to the local high school . . . .

Stop: Now you are riding on international while your children are worrying about matters international. Your car is a Plymouth produced by Chrysler Corporation, another multinational firm. The automobile was assembled in a Chrysler plant in Canada from components shipped to Canada from West Germany, the United States, Belgium and Italy. For example, your carburetor was manufactured by Italian workers in a German factory north of Dusseldorf. The various raw materials going into your car came from more than 70 nations. But such details are of no interest to your children this morning. Your son, Nathan, is worrying about a paper on Marx's Theory of Surplus Value soon to be due in his Economics class. Your daughter, Erica, is worrying about what she knows about the relation of Arabic scholarship to the Renaissance in Europe, a matter that she thinks will be highlighted in today's World History examination.

Leaving the high school, I drove to a local Montessori Nursery School . . . .

Stop: You have experienced another case of the international diffusion of culture. Montessori schools are educational institutions created in Italy which are now found in many other nations.

To seek the Director's approval of a research project on children's development that one of my graduate students is beginning . . . .

Stop: You, your graduate student and the school's director are participating in a transnational scientific community. The study your graduate student is doing is based on the work of Piaget, a Swiss psychologist whose genius dominates child development research the world over. The specific problem of concern to your graduate student is being worked on by researchers in the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and Columbia. Indeed, she first developed this interest while working with a scholar from China on a research project in Columbia sponsored by the World

Health Organization.

Departing the nursery school I carelessly drove through a stop sign and was stopped by a friendly but firm policeman . . . .

Stop: This time you failed to respond to the international. The stop sign on the corner of Greenwood and Grove in Evanston, Illinois, U.S.A., is part of an international language. You will see identical traffic control signs in most of the world's cities.

With my ticket in hand, I drove to the campus of Northwestern University . . . .

Stop: The place you work is an international institution. Many of the University's students came from other nations. The faculty includes professors from more than 40 nations. There are a great many courses offered on internationally related topics. The research done at the Medical School, in the Technological Institute, in the Sciences and Humanities is fed by and in turn feeds into an international community of scientists and scholars.

There I loaded my car with students enrolled in my Introductory Education course and we proceeded to drive to an elementary school that the students were scheduled to observe this morning . . . .

Stop: You and your students encountered many things international in the course of their observations. The kindergarten class you watched is an example of another transplanted institution as is the open classroom you saw one of the teachers directing. Kindergarten is an educational practice developed in Germany and the open classroom an educational practice developed in England. One of your students remarked about a group of children watching a video tape recording of "Sesame Street." The video tape technology was developed and marketed by a Japanese electronics firm. "Sesame Street" is an American educational innovation that has been widely diffused throughout the world. It is estimated that on any given day at least one half billion of the world's children are watching the Big Bird and his friends. The math lessons you

watched are lessons in an international language; the schools fire alarm system is a British product; the blackboards come from New Zealand, and the loud speaker that so rudely shattered the morning was made in Belgium by an Italian firm using capital acquired in a sale of stock to Arab capitalists.

After two hours of observation we departed the school and arrived back on campus in time for me to make an eleven o'clock appointment with a student . . . .

Stop: The student you are seeking is a foreign student from Jordan. She is an Economics major and hopes to go pursue a career in international banking. If she does, she will join an estimated 30 to 40% of college graduates who end up working in a job that professionally engages them in some type of international activity.

After the student left my office I snapped on a radio to a local country music station and settled down to prepare for a class later in the day. . . .

Stop: The first song you heard was a recording of Olivia Newton John singing "Country Roads." Olivia Newton John is Australian. Her recording of "Country Roads" sold in virtually every country in the world and grossed its producer several million dollars from non-American sales alone.

While half listening to the music I did the following: Extracted a quote from an article in a journal borrowed from the library . . . .

Stop: The quote is from an article written by a Nigerian, published in an international journal edited in Scotland.

Took from my files a xerox copy of a set of statistics on world economic development.

Stop: The statistics were produced by the United Nations and the xeroxing was done on a machine produced by another kind of transnational organization that you have been encountering all day, namely, a multinational corporation.

Jotted notes on a sheet of paper using a mechanical pencil . . . .

Stop: Once again you are a multinational consumer of your planet's natural resources. The paper comes from trees grown in Canada. The lead in your pencil comes from Chile. The aluminum in the pencil was mined in Canada, and the plastic derives from petroleum in Venezuela.

Read portions of a book . . . .

Stop: The subject of the book is the relation of political participation and economic development and is based on research done on ten nations. The researchers were an international team of scholars representing universities in five nations. The book was published by McGraw Hill Publishers, an international publishing enterprise with offices in more than a dozen countries.

At 12 o'clock I opened a brown bag and consumed a lunch consisting of a bologna and mayonnaise sandwich, a banana, three fig newtons, and a can of tapioca pudding, all of which I ate while sipping a cup of tea . . . .

Stop: Again you are eating the international. With minor exception, all the foods you consumed were supplied by multinational corporations. The paper bag was made of paper produced by the Weyerhauser Corporation; the mayonnaise on your sandwich comes from Kraft Foods; the baggie in which the sandwich was wrapped was manufactured by Mobil Oil; the banana comes from United Brands; the fig newtons from Nabisco; the tapioca pudding from General Foods and the can in which it was packaged was produced by Alco Aluminum. All of these firms are multinational corporations. The same is true of the tea you drank. It was Lipton Tea, a product of Unilever, one of the world's largest food producers with central headquarters in Great Britain.

While eating I glanced through this week's copy of Newsweek and Time magazine . . . .

Stop: Once again you have plugged yourself into the global communication system. Both of these news magazines are international in circulation. A quarter of Time's readership is abroad and the figure is close to 40 percent for Newsweek. As Newsweek promoters put it, "The world's first truly international magazine was born January 1, 1973."

At 12:45 I left my office and walked across campus to a classroom building. On my way I met a colleague and we stopped to remark on how warm the day was and on the remarkable visibility of the haze of pollution hanging like a shroud over the Chicago skyline 13 miles to the south . . . .

Stop: The international rears its head again. The colleague you met is Brazilian. His native land, like the United States, is contributing significantly to the pollution of the earth's atmosphere, The deforestization that is occurring as a result of urbanization and industrialization is contributing to an increase in the CO_2 content of the atmosphere and so is the increased burning of fossil fuels. Thus, some pollutants in the air over Chicago come from Sao Paulo just as some of the pollutants in the air over Sao Paulo come from cars and factories in Chicago. Moreover, the weather you and he are enjoying today is itself a global phenomena. Chicago's weather is part of a global weather system. The warm temperature the two of your are relishing is the result of a high pressure area that formed over northern Siberia and the polar cap forty-eight hours ago.

I taught my class and upon leaving the classroom paused for a drink of water . . . .

Stop: You just plugged into another of the world's national global systems. The water you drank is part of the planet's worldwide hydrologic system. The water you drank fell as rain on Lake Michigan two weeks ago. Three months prior to that the water was evaporating from a lake in central Asia. Two months prior to that it was part of the water a Korean mother was using to bathe her infant daughter. Now you have used it to satisfy your thirst. Two hours from now it will leave you as urine and two months later it may be part of a summer rain falling on the streets of Paris.

On the way back to my office I stopped to watch a group of students peacefully picketing the University's administration building. . . .

Stop: You are watching people self-consciously participating in the international political system. The students are trying to get Northwestern's Board of Regents to sell the stock the University owns in multinational corporations

operating in South Africa. The students believe that Northwestern's investments support the policy of apartheid in South Africa.

Returning to my office I spent several minutes going through the day's mail. Among the communiques was a letter from a colleague who edits an international journal. He wrote to advise me that he needed immediately my reaction to a manuscript he had sent me to review. I wrote his telephone number on a sheet of paper and made a note to call him at 7:00 a.m. the next morning. . . .

Stop: You keep running into global communication systems. The letter is from your colleague in the Netherlands. The telephone number you jotted down--011 31 20 234385 is his direct dial number to his office in Amsterdam. When you telephone tomorrow morning the call will cost about $5.00, less than the cost of an eight hundred mile long distance call to your mother when you were in college twenty-five years ago. The reduced cost and great ease in trans-oceanic calls results from the fact that you and your colleague in Amsterdam will be making use of a space satellite hovering several hundred miles over the Atlantic and put there by an international consortium of governments and business firms.

At this point I received a call from a colleague at Northwestern asking if I would be willing to sign a petition protesting the University's decision to grant Menachin Begin of Israel an honorary degree. As I searched my conscience on this matter I remembered that I had promised my daughter to write a letter to the President of the School Board indicating that I supported one of her teachers' decision to use a video tape of the "Holocaust" in her Civics class . . . . .

Stop: Now you are directly involved in international political activity. Whether you sign or do not sign the Begin petition, you are involved in international controversy, and when you write the President of the School Board you are stepping into a supporter role in still another international conflict.

While writing the promised letter, I received a telephone call from the Chicago branch of Saks Fifth Avenue. A polite and friendly voice informed me that the sweater I had ordered several weeks ago as a gift for my wife's forthcoming birthday had finally arrived, but it would cost me 34 cents more than the price quoted me when I placed the order . . . .

Stop: Your wife's birthday present has just collided with the monetary interdependence of the modern world. The falling value of the American dollar relative to most other major international currencies is increasing the price of imported goods including the price you must pay for a Swiss sweater that matches the color of your wife's eyes. Moreover, the American dollar you will pay Saks will eventually end up as British pounds in an account in London since Saks Fifth Avenue is an operation of the British-based multinational that you encountered earlier in the day, the British-American Tobacco Company.

After completing my transactions with Saks, I finished my letter and departed for home. On the way I stopped to pick up some Scott Turf Builder at the local hardware store, some sheet music for my daughter from the music store, and a new brand of gum that she has been bugging me to try . . . .

Stop: Multinationals, international languages, and the Japenese are all part of your fifteen minute journey from office to home. ITT is the source of your lawn's fertilizer. The sheet music your daughter reads is written in an international language. The TV ad that turned your daughter on the new brand of gum was designed by Dentsu, a Japanese advertising firm with accounts in Europe, Africa, Latin America, as well as the United States.

Arriving home I retired to the living room, put on a record, poured a glass of wine, and read "Why Husbands Lose Interest in Sex" in this month's issue of the Reader's Digest. . . .

Stop: Now you are exposing your ears, taste buds and libido to things international. The wine you are sipping is from Portugal. The music you are hearing is a Beethoven symphony played by the Moscow State Orchestra. Middle-aged males like you will be reading the same article from the Reader's Digest in fifteen languages in almost 100 nations.

My son and daughter arrived home and informed me that their mother had called to say she would be working late and hence would not be home for dinner. I suggested we go out to McDonald's to eat. They countered with the proposal that we bring some Kentucky Fried Chicken home. After some argument the majority carried the day and my son left to fetch the chicken. . . .

Stop: Regardless of whether you had opted for McDonald's or Kentucky Fried Chicken, you will be dining on America's contribution to international cuisines. McDonald's and Colonel Sanders are two leaders in a rapidly growing list of American and European fast food chains springing up all over the world.

While eating our chicken, wiping our fingers and drinking milk, my children and I watched "Hawaii Five-O" on television. During commercial breaks my daughter elaborately explained to me why she needed $20.00 to buy a new pair of blue jeans. . . .

Stop: Not only are you eating the food of a globalized pop culture you are also participating in its entertainment. Watching TV stories is the single most popular form of entertainment on the part of almost one fifth of the world's four billion plus people. Moreover, many millions of other people will have watched the same show. "Hawaii Five-O" is shown on television in more than sixty nations. Beyond your involvement in the world's popular culture, the dinner and conversations are linking you to international price structures. The reasonably low price of the milk you are drinking reflects the impact of milk imported from Austria, Germany, and Italy--a fact that your father-in-law, a dairy farmer is very upset about. On the other hand, the atrociously high price your daughter will have to pay for her blue jeans reflects the fact that Levy Strauss and other jean manufacturers have a virtually unlimited export market for their products.

After the show we settled down to an evening of homework. Later in the evening my wife arrived home and we prepared for bed. While waiting for the sleepy time bug to bite us into unconsciousness, we propped ourselves up in bed to read. My wife asked me to look at an article in Parent's Magazine on the problem of living with teenagers. I said I was too busy since I wanted to finish a chapter of a detective novel I was reading, and besides I had a headache. She kindly got me a glass of water and two aspirin tablets and soon we put out the lights, rolled over, and dropped into a deep sleep. . . .

Stop: You began the day by encountering the international and you ended it in the same way. The copy of Parent's Magazine that your wife wanted you to read is published by a German publishing firm. The detective novel comes from Bantam Books, which is controlled by an Italian multinational publishing firm. The aspirin you took for the headache comes from Bayers, a world-wide German-based pharmaceutical enterprise.

> Even in sleep you do not escape the international. You bought your mattress and bedding from Sears who in turn purchased the mattress in Belgium, the sheets in Taiwan, and the pillows in Ghana. As you begin your night of dreams you enter into a collective subconsciousness shared by all of humanity, and the sleep itself meets a need that all you human beings share with the rest of God's earthly kingdom and perhaps with all the forms of life that are scattered among the stars that twinkle outside of your bedroom window.

The day in my life that I have just recounted is not atypical of the experience of a very large number of human beings, particularly by those of us who happen to reside in the affluent and industrialized regions of the planet. Each of us is caught up in a network of international links and relationships that encircle the planet like a giant cobweb and make the "globalness" of the contemporary world a pervasive and ubiquitious element in the routines of everyday life. Indeed, the global character of our lives is like the air we breathe. It has become so commonplace that we often take it for granted and unconsciously assume that it is a natural and unchanging feature of the human condition.

But such is not the case. To the contrary throughout most of history, human beings lived out their daily lives in conditions that were decidely non-global. The markedly global character of contemporary history is a recent innovation in the human condition. To appreciate this and in turn to grasp its implications for citizenship and citizen education, we must look at humankind's historical sojourn from a pre-global past to a global present and toward what very

probably will be an even more global future. In this chapter I shall do this by sketching a historical overview of the globalization of the human condition. In subsequent chapters, I will then step back, look more analytically, and discuss in more detail selected facets of this historic process.

III.

The Globalization of the Human Condition: A Historical Overview

The Century of the J Curve

Question: Where, my child, do you live in time?

Answer: I live beyond the bend of many J curves.

These two lines are from a catechism I am writing for my children. They provide an appropriate starting point for recounting the historical story of the globalization of the human condition because we can best begin this story by locating the Twentieth Century in historic time. And when we plot this location we find our Century is situated beyond the bend of many J curves.

All of you are familiar with J curves, but at the risk of insulting your intelligence let me briefly review the essential properties of a J curve. A J curve is a graphic representation of the pattern of change in any system that grows by doubling, that is, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 .... This type of growth is geometric or exponential change. For a long time the rate of change is slow, indeed, so slow as to be hardly perceptible. Then at some point the rate of change dramatically accelerates. When this type of change is graphically plotted the result is a curve that resembles the letter J. A line that is for a long

time essentially horizontal suddenly bends and becomes almost vertical. Let me illustrate what I am talking about with two descriptions of the phenomenon of J curves -- one verbal and the other visual. The first is adapted from G. Tyler Miller, Jr. (1975).

> Let me take you around the bend on a J curve, using a very simple example. Let us double a page of this...[paper] over and over again and note the total thickness after each doubling. Assuming that the page is about 0.1 millimeter thick (about 1/254 inch), then after the first doubling up the thickness is 0.2 millimeters, then 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 3.2, and so on. After eight doublings the paper is 25.6 millimeters, or approximately 1 inch thick. Nothing much has happened. After 12 doublings it is slightly over 1 foot thick and after 20 doublings about 340 feet thick. Still very little has happned; we are at the lower part, or lag phase, of the J curve.
>
> Now let us go around the bend. If we could double this page slightly over 35 times, its approximate thickness would reach from New York to Los Angeles, some 3,000 miles. Something almost incomprehensible happened when we went around the bend of the J. Once around the bend, the thickness increases astronomically. If we double this page as few as 42 times we create a mound of paper that would stretch from the earth to the moon, some 240,000 miles away, and by doubling it slightly over 50 times a thickness reaching from here to the sun, some 93 million miles. In exponential growth, the ever-growing base eventually builds to such a large number that each future doubling represents an amazing increase in the total. (pp 8-9)

The second and visual example comes from a delightful and clear explanation of the properties of a J curve that he has devised for junior high students (B' Ann Wright, 1976).

> Imagine that you are four years old. A rich aunt wants to provide for your future. She has offered to do one of two things. Option 1: she would give you $1000 a year until you were twenty-one (seventeen years from now). Or option 2: she would give you $1 this year and if you saved your money until you were 21, she would double the amount each year.
>
> Which would you choose? Why? Which way would you have the most money when you were twenty-one?

The graph ...[below] shows how the money would grow for each option. The solid line represents option 1, $1000 every year. The dotted line represents option 2, $1 the first year and double that amount each year. Study the graph and answer the questions below it.



1. How much money would you have when you were 21 if you chose option 1? How much would you have if you chose option 2?

2. If you only received money for 10 years, with which option would you have the most money?

3. How many years would it be before you had the same amount of money with both options?

4. Why did the money in option 2 increase so rapidly after the 14th year?

5. Which line do you think would look most like the world's population growth from 1650 to 2000? Why?

Look back at question No. 5. As this question suggests, a J curve is not simply a game with numbers. To the contrary, J curves apply to many aspects of the contemporary human condition and indicate with a reasonable degree of mathematical precision where the Twentieth Century is located in historic time.

Let's rapidly walk through a few illustrations. A glance at what is probably the single most familiar graph in the world today is a good beginning.

J CURVE OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION GROWTH, PAST AND PROJECTED



Source: Miller 1975, p. 8

If this familiar account of population growth were an unusual story about a single and idiosyncratic change in the human condition, then there would be no reason to dub this, The Century of the J Curve. However, this is not the case. To the contrary, we live around the bend of many J curves. The following pages provide a few of what could be many examples.

TOTAL BOOKS PUBLISHED



Source: McHale 1972, p. 47

INCREASE IN EXPLOSIVE POWER
(IN TONS OF TNT EQUIVALENT)



Source: McHale 1972, p. 5

LIFE EXPECTANCY



Source: McHale 1972, p. 4

INCREASE IN COMMUNICATION SPEED



Source: McHale 1972, p. 3

INCREASE OF SCIENTIFIC OR TECHNICAL JOURNALS
(1800-1950)



Source: Nesbitt 1972, p. 32

PROJECTION OF ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE FROM FOSSIL FUELS
CALCULATED BY A MODEL OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE CYCLE



Source: Schneider 1976, p. 366

DESTRUCTIVE RADIUS OF WEAPONS, 1860-1960



Source: Nesbitt 1972, p. 2

WORLD CONSUMPTION OF KEY METALS



Source: Nesbitt 1972, p. 25

TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION - U.S.



Source: McHale 1972, p. 68

Deaths (including civilians) from all wars
in which there are 500 or more deaths



Source: Nesbitt 1972, p.10

WAR CASUALTIES IN EUROPE, 1500 - 1925



Source: Nesbitt 1972, p. 11

TREND OF FERTILIZER USE IN THE U.S.



Source: Schneider 1976, p. 355

ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF ONE CHLOROFLUOROCARBON



Source: Schneider 1976, p. 368

PERCENT OF CIVILIAN WAR DEATHS



Source: Nesbitt 1972, p. 13

PROJECTED CHANGES IN PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF

NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC PRODUCTS



Source: Miller 1975, p. 17

DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIBIOTICS





Source: McHale 1972, p. 42

ILLUSTRATED INCREASE IN TRAVEL SPEED



Source: McHale 1972, p. 1

The graphs on the preceeding pages are pictures. If they (and many other graphs like them) were put in color; framed and hung on the walls of a single room we would have an art gallery that might be appropriately named "Our Time in Historic Perspective." I don't know what a walk through this gallery would do for you, but I can anticipate my reactions. I would have some minor quarrels about the quality of some of the paintings. As a social scientist I might wonder about the reliability of some of the data represented in some of the paintings. As a mathematician I would realize that the term J curve, while useful, is somewhat imprecise mathematically since an "artist" can distort reality by expanding or contracting the scale of the plot. But in my identity as a human being I think I would leave the Gallery overwhelmed by a sense of involvement in "one of the great revolutionary transformations of mankind." This phrase is the historian C. E. Black's effort to characterize the current transformation that is taking place in the human condition. Black dramatizes, but probably does not exaggerate, the magnitude of this transformation in this way:

> The change in human affairs that is now taking place is of a scope and intensity that mankind has experienced on only two previous occasions, and its significance cannot be appreciated except in the context of the entire course of world history. The first revolutionary transformation was the emergence of human beings, about a million years ago, after thousands of years of evolution from primitive life.... The second great revolutionary transformation in human affairs was that from primitive to civilized societies....

While not all historians would agree that these two epochal events exhaust the periods of revolutionary transformation in human affairs, most serious students of man's contemporary condition are

likely to concede that they serve as useful analogues in our efforts to understand what is happening in the Twentieth Century. For, as Black goes on to note: "The process of change in the modern era is of the same order of magnitude as that from prehuman to human life and from primitive to civilized societies..." (Black, 1966).

The Globalization of the Human Condition

The transformation of humankind of which Black writes is a composit of the types of change, depicted in the previous graphs. These are changes in particular sectors of the human condition -- in population, in warfare, in science and technology, in resource utilization, and so on. But there is another and different kind of change also going on at an accelerating rate in the contemporary world. This is a change that cuts across all sectors of human experience. I term this change the globalization of the human condition.

Like the kinds of changes described in the last section, the globalization of the human condition also appears to follow the path of a J curve.

The Globalization of the Human Condition

The process begins with the birth of homo sapiens (perhaps more accurately with the appearance of our hominoid ancestors). In the next several millennia comprising the ninety-nine or so percent of human history we arrogantly dub "pre-history," the process of globalization proceeds, but the rate of change is so slow as to take the fine eye of God to detect any shift in the slope of the J curve.

With the agricultural revolution and the subsequent rise of the ancient civilizations the human experience becomes somewhat more globalized. In the next few millennia this process intensifies as the cultures and classical civilizations of Eurasia (including North Africa) become intermittently linked. But the histories of humankind on the planet's other continents--Sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, Australasia--largely remain unrelated to one another as well as to Eurasian history.

This began to change with Europe's expansion marking the beginning of the modern era in world history. The effect of European expansion coupled subsequently with the rise of modern science and technology was to substantially enhance the global character of the human condition as the fate of people in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Australasia become increasingly interlinked.

The process of globalization that prior to 1500 could be measured in millenia must after 1500 be measured in centuries. And after 1870 (a useful time in dating the beginning of contemporary history) the doubling time in the rate of globalization is further reduced from centuries to the life span of generations and even to

decades. Hence, in the Twentieth Century humankind rounds the bend of a J curve in respect to the global character of human existence.

In these past few paragraphs I have tried to scratch out the broad features of the J curve character of humankind's sojourn from a pre-global to a global age. Let us now look at this historical sojourn in a bit more detail. Edwin Reischauer (1973) has written such an account far more succinctly and literately than could I, so I gratefully quote him at length.

> If we glance back at history, we can discern the rapid accelerating pace at which the world is drawing together. Primitive hunting and gathering man lived not in 'one world' but in a myriad of isolated, family-like groups, which were only slightly in touch with even close neighbors and virtually unaffected by groups living at any great distance. Agriculture produced larger, more complex communities and eventually city states and small empires, which rubbed together in military conflict with their immediate neighbors and traded even further afield. There was, for example, a considerable exchange of goods between Sumer in Mesopotamia and the cities of the Indus Valley in the northwestern corner of the Indian subcontinent, even though these areas are separated by some 1,400 miles of sea routes and even more forbidding mountains and deserts. But contact between truly distant regions, such as Egypt and China, was either nonexistent or such a slow and indirect process that neither side was aware of it.
>
> Gradually interaction increased. In the centuries just before and after the time of Christ, the great classic empires of the Mediterranean area, the Indian subcontinent, and China not only brought together diverse areas and large populations under a single rule but also developed more trade and other contacts than had existed before between these far-separated islands of high civilization. Alexander the Great actually penetrated to India in 237 B.C. in his search for more worlds to conquer. As a result of the Roman demand for Chinese silk, the so-called silk road of caravan trade developed between the Mediterranean and China through Central Asia, and across it goods and influences passed in both directions. From their conquests in Cenral Asia, the Chinese were vaguely aware of Rome -- they called it Great Ch'in -- and some traders, apparently from the Roman Orient, are recorded in A.D. 166 as having come by sea to the

southern borders of the Chinese Empire in what is now Vietnam. But the classic civilizations were still essentially separate worlds. The great contemporaneous empires of Rome in the Mediterranean area, of the Maurya, Asoka, and the Kushan in the Indian area, and the two Han Dynasties in China never came into direct contact with one another.

As the 'silk road' showed, the seminomadic peoples that lived between the three great nodes of high agricultural civilization served as a trade link between them. When the great classic empires waned and these seminomads gained in military strength through cavalry tactics, they also gave the great sedentary civilizations a common strategic problem. Drawn by the wealth of the agricultural regions, the nomads repeatedly pillage these areas or settled down to rule over them. On the whole, the greater population and tighter political organization of China made it a harder region to penetrate than were the Middle East and India. In any case, the chief motion of nomad conquest was from east to west, as wave after wave of seminomads from East Asia -- Huns, Turks, and Mongols -- rolled with disastrous force westward into the histories of India, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. A return wave of religion rolled eastward through Central Asia over the same routes of trade and conquest. Buddhism in the first seven centuries of the Christian era spread from India throughout East Asia. Islam, originating in the seventh century in Arabia on the southeastern edge of the Mediterranean world, penetrated by land deep into India and through Central Asia to the northwestern corner of China.

For well over a millennium the seminomadic peoples of Central Asia served as the chief contact between the great centers of high civilization, as traders, as transmitters of religions and other cultural influences, and as conquerors. The Mongols of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, subduing China and Korea to the east and conquering deep into the Middle East and Russia to the west, ruled over a larger proportion of the world's population and its known land area than any empire before or since. The Mongol Empire also marked the high point in this phase of transcontinental contacts between the great classic areas of civilization. It was in the late thirteenth century that the Venetian Marco Polo was able to travel through the vast domains of the Mongol Khan, enter his service in Peking, and thus get his dazzling view of the glories of China, then at the height of its period of world leadership in economic wealth, technical skills, and social and political organization.

In the long run, however, ships proved much more important than caravans in bringing the world together. Coastal trading within the Mediterranean area and between it and India goes back to antiquity, and by the Christian era merchant ships had begun to venture around the long southward dangling peninsula of Southeast Asia to the southern coast of China. But large-scale oceanic trade did not commence until around the seventh and

eighth centuries. At first it was largely between the various regions of Asia, particularly between the Middle East, India, and China. It was pushed on the one side by the expansionist energies of Moslem Persians and Arabs and pulled on the other side by the lure of China's great wealth and the excellence of its manufactures, especially porcelains and silks. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it had grown to great proportions. In the early phases of the coastal Asian trade, Hinduism and Buddhism were carried by it to Southeast Asia. In the fifteenth century, it brought Islam also to this region.

At the end of the fifteenth century, the Europeans, after probing their way around Africa, broke in on this already flourishing trade along the coasts of Asia and, with their now sturdier vessels and greater firepower, quickly became masters over much of it. At almost the same time they also discovered the Americas and circumnavigated the globe. Thus by the early sixteenth century a new age was clearly dawning. The major areas of high civilization had come into direct contact with one another by sea, and man's hitherto flat habitat had curled up to form a giant ball. In these two ways the world had started to draw together into a single great community.

The next three centuries saw an increasing domination of international trade by the Europeans and their over-running of the Americas and in time the Australian continent. European nations established footholds around the globe and extended their petty rivalries at home into military contests for leadership in the Western Hemisphere and even in India and Southeast Asia. The age of European imperialism had dawned.

The bulk of the people of the world, however, still lived in isolated cultural and national compartments, little affected by what went on elsewhere in the world. Farflung conquests and trade had some impact on the economies and thought of Europe, but only as external, peripheral stimuli. The influence of these relations on the lives and thought of most of the other people was much less. Despite the growing British involvement in India, for example, Englishmen and Indians continued to live in two almost completely separate worlds. The same could be said of Dutchmen and Indonesians. The Middle East remained impotent to influence Europe and determinedly resistant to Western penetration. Except for its southern tip, Africa was almost untouched. Continental Southeast Asia still remained relatively free of Western domination. China, with close to one-quarter of all mankind, succeeded in keeping the rest of the world at arm's length, confining Western trade and residence to two tiny contact points in the deep south, at Macao and Canton. Korea was still almost entirely secluded except for its relations with China. And the Japanese, after exuberantly exchanging goods with the Europeans in the latter half of the sixteenth century, enthusiastically

adopting their military technology, and flirting with Christianity, relapsed by 1639 into a harsh and entirely effective self-isolation. At the start of the nineteenth cuntury, 'one world' was not much closer to being a reality than it had been at the beginning of the sixteenth.

The nineteenth century and particularly its second half, however, saw a rapid advance to a new stage in international relations and with it another clear shrinking of the globe. There were a variety of factors behind this change. One was the mechanization of production in the West, which suddenly gave it a great economic advantage over the rest of the world in certain types of industrial products. Another was the concomitant strengthening of the national unit in the West as a military as well as economic force. More specifically, the application of steam power to navigation greatly increased Western domination of the seas and the capacity to transport both military power and the fruits of machine production to distant shores.

Western political domination and economic exploitation of areas already colonial, such as India and Indonesia, increased greatly, and patterns of economic domination were established in polititically free but economically weak areas like Latin America. France and Britain established control over large areas in the Middle East and divided up much of continental Southeast Asia between them. Africa was carved up and, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, parceled out to voracious European imperial powers. In a series of wars and incidents, beginning in 1839, China was pried open bit by bit to Western economic, cultural, and political penetration, with ultimately disastrous consequences for the traditional economy, political system, and social order. Japan similarly was forced by Commodore Perry of the American Navy to open its doors in 1854, and Korea had to follow suit within a few decades. European rivalries and the European balance of power were spread to the whole world. A new naval port or merely a coaling station in East Asia, a more rigid treaty with a Middle Eastern ruler, a new economic concession in Latin America, or a new chunk of jungle terrain in Africa were all factored into European power rivalries, which were seen as precariously balanced around the globe.

By the early twentieth century it was clear that the world had become far more unitary than it had ever been before. It also seemed to most observers that this had been accomplished by the swallowing of the rest of the world by the West. Except for the countries of East Asia -- China, Japan, and Korea -- most of the world was under Western rule, and even the East Asian states had been forced to accommodate to a world environment determined by Western industrial power, Western culture, and Western concepts of international organization. To Occidental eyes, a world made one through Western domination seemed both inevitable and entirely right. History, however, was to prove

this concept a delusion. The world was much too big an ox to be swallowed by the Western frog, much less digested. Most people in the world were not really part of the 'one world' of Western culture and a Europe-centered balance of power.

The extension of Western power throughout the world in the second half of the nineteenth century had been paralleled by another significant development. This was the Japanese response to the Western challenge. Japan, forced by the United States in 1854 to open its closed doors, had shown itself capable of utilizing the new technology, institutions, and national solidarity of the West to build sufficient industrial and military power to preserve its independence and start to compete with the West on the latter's own terms. In 1868, Japan embarked on an amazing political and social transformation of its feudal society; slowly over the decades it became competitive with the West in one field of industry after another; by 1894-5 it had developed sufficient modern military power to defeat China and start its own empire through the seizure of Taiwan and the subsequent annexation of Korea in 1910; in 1904-5 it came into conflict with Russia, one of the greatest European powers, and emerged victorious. All this showed that the eventual 'one world' might prove to be something more than just an expanded West.

Japan's victory over Russia sent intellectual shock waves throughout Asia. There had been desultory resistance to Western political domination all along and a dogged determination to cling to old ways, but now it seemed possible that any Asian country, if it could only pull itself together as a national unit and 'modernize' its economy and institutions, as Japan had done, could regain its freedom and achieve a self-respecting place in the world community. Self-conscious nationalist movements appeared in many countries. Even though they were pitifully small and weak at first, they were to grow, until in the years following World War II they were able to sweep Western imperial domination out of all of Asia and most of Africa. The Japanese reaction to the Western challenge and the response of other non-Western nations to Japan's success were to prove a more lasting part of the emerging 'one world' than were the Western empires.

The period of the two so-called world wars and the two decades between them may be seen as another significant new stage in the evolution of a world community. The very name 'World War' for the great European conflict of 1914-18 shows the growing consciousness of a unitary world at the time, even though it really is a misnomer. The war did extend into a corner of the Middle East, because of Turkey's alliance with Germany, but this was a side show; otherwise, the spread of the war beyond Europe was only a by-product of the extension of European power around the globe in earlier years. The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, all extensions of English-speaking peoples overseas, became deeply involved by sending

troops to the battle zones in Europe and the Middle East; Asian and African colonial troops were brought to Europe; and the German colonies in Africa and the Pacific were seized by their enemies, specifically by the Japanese in the case of the German foothold in China and the islands of the North Pacific. But for most of the peoples of the world, this was not their war, and many probably remained quite oblivious to it.

Still, World War I came closer to being a truly global conflict than any previous war in history, and from it came worldwide shocks which showed that the world was indeed becoming more unitary. The sending of railway rolling stock from India to the Middle East produced a famine in the subcontinent because of the weakening of the distribution system. The disappearance of European goods from Asian markets gave a tremendous stimulus to the growth of Japan's export industries. The Russian Revolution of 1917, resulting from the collapse of the czarist regime during the war, produced waves of new ideas and aspirations that beat with varying force on most nations, Western or non-Western, throughout the whole world. Perhaps the clearest sign of the new age was the effort at its end to establish a world order through the creation of the League of Nations. Even though the concept was not an entirely new one, the understanding and abilities of the statesmen of the time proved far from adequate for the task. Still, the scale and seriousness of the attempt showed that there was a much broader realization of the needs for an organized world order than ever before.

The growing oneness of the world was demonstrated perhaps more clearly in the worldwide economic doldrums of the 1920's and the great depression that fell like a pall over the world at the end of the decade. The economic well-being of people in almost all parts of the world was becoming increasingly influenced by economic conditions elsewhere, even if most people remained only dimly aware of this growing interdependence. Economic interactions between nations and regions had existed for some centuries, but never before on a global scale or in such intensity. A simple Malayan tapper of rubber trees might find his food supply dependent on the quantity of tires Americans and Europeans would buy. American and European industrialists and workers felt threatened by cheap Japanese manufactured goods, while Japanese businessmen began to say that, if New York sneezed, Japan would catch pneumonia. The inability of the economists and statesmen of the period to find international solutions to the worldwide trade problem prolonged the agony well into the 1930's, until it gradually became a part of even more serious world tensions.

Out of the fears and frictions of the great depression emerged a determined effort by the more rapidly growing powers to achieve security for themselves and a 'place in the sun' by the creation of great <u>regional hegemonies</u>. As they saw the situation, accidents of history and geography had unfairly given

domination over the bulk of the world to certain powers -- the great sea empires of the British and French and the land empires of the Russians and Americans. They saw themselves by comparison as 'have-nots' who deserved better. The Germans aspired to domination over Western Europe, with perhaps a vassal empire left to the Italians in the Mediterranean and North Africa, while the Japanese aimed at the most populous empire the world had ever seen -- close to a billion people in what they euphemistically called the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.' The Germans and Japanese were willing, at least for the time being, to leave the broad lands of the Soviet Union to the Russians and the Americas to the United States; but neither the Americans nor the Russians could see such a regionally divided world as promising security for themselves or peace for the world, and of course the British, French, Chinese, and other proposed helots of German and Japanese rule were ready to put of a desperate resistance. War resulted, starting in East Asia in 1937, in Europe in 1939, and involving the United States in 1941.

World War II was truly a 'world war.' It was fought throughout most of Europe and deep into the heart of Russia, across the whole of North Africa, from the eastern borders of India throughout Southeast Asia and all of East Asia, and far across the vast expanses of the Pacific. Virtually all the peoples of the world were deeply affected by it in one way or another, and the closing phases showed that an entirely new era in international relations was dawning. The beginning of the nuclear age signaled another abrupt contraction of the size of the globe.

World War I had been fought, at least by some, as the 'war to end war.' World War II, through the nuclear weapons it helped develop, actually became the war that foretold the end either of war between major powers or of civilization. Suspicion and rivalry between nuclear powers became, not the old game of balance of power, but a worldwide balance of terror determining the survival of humanity. 'One world' of life or death -- a common global destiny for mankind -- had suddenly become a reality.

The fear of nuclear destruction has not been the only factor to render the world much more unified since World War II. International contacts of all sorts have expanded vastly. Trade and every other form of economic interdependence have grown by quantum jumps in most of the world. The economic interrelationships that made the great depression of the interwar years a worldwide phenomenon have multiplied many times over since then. The once thin and halting flow of communications between nations and regions has become an incessant flood. The international movement of officials, businessmen, students, laborers seeking employment, and casual tourists has grown to proportions undreamed of before.

At the close of World War II, many people showed at least a dim awareness that the world had entered a new age. The most obvious sign of this was the new and much more determined effort to achieve a world order -- this time through the United Nations. Though far from being an effective mechanism, except for peripheral and not highly controversial issues, the United Nations more than a quarter century after its birth still stays alive as a hope. By contrast the League of Nations had heard its death knell in the Manchurian Incident of 1931, only a little over a decade after its inception, and before it completed its second decade another world war had broken out.

Living as we do in the midst of a postwar age, it is difficult to see this era clearly in historical perspective. We are not sure what will prove significant and what illusory or transitory. But there can be no doubt that this is a new and very different stage in international relations. The world has once again been drastically reduced in size. Almost any statistic regarding international relations shows another huge jump upward. There has been a continued rapid acceleration of the speed at which the world is shrinking, while international relations are growing ever more massive and complex. It seems inevitable that changes over the next few decades will be far greater than the changes that have taken place during the past few decades.

It took many millenniums for mankind to move from the almost completely self-contained and isolated tiny groupings of paleolithic times to the limited indirect trade and cultural contacts of the period of the great classic empires. In the next millennium, man moved through the periods of contact by means of the nomadic peoples and early oceanic commerce to the great breakthrough of an incipient 'one world' around 1500. It took less than four centuries from then to the next breakthrough of apparent world unity through Western domination in the second half of the nineteenth century. The next phase of World War I, the League of Nations, and the world depression was a mere matter of decades. And the new phase since World War II is moving even faster.

If charted on graph paper, the history of the emerging 'one world' would show the same bold upward-sweeping curve that seems to characterize most measurable human affairs. Whether it be population, economic production, energy consumption, the constructive and destructive power at human command, the volume of world trade, or the speed and frequency of other sorts of communication between the various parts of the world, we find the same basic pattern of growth. This is not surprising, because they are all interrelated phenomena. There was a slow, almost imperceptible creep upward over the early milleniums, a decidedly more rapid rise in recent centuries, still faster growth in recent decades, and a headlong pace today, apparently headed almost straight toward an entirely impossible infinity.

IV

Summary and Preview

The Reischauer account provides a good overview of the historical globalization of the human condition. With the broad sweep of history in mind, I will now step back and examine more analytically and in greater detail some of the major ways in which the human condition has become globalized. In previewing the line of argument to be developed in Part Two, I noted that the multiple order consequences of western expansion and the rise of modern science and technology were a substantial globalization of several facets of the human condition. These include:

The history of the human condition

The geography of the human condition

The economics of the human condition

The politics of the human condition

The sociology of the human condition

In the remainder of Part Two I will briefly comment on each of these facets. But two brief points need to be made before getting on with this discussion.

First, it should be stressed that these eight categories are by no means as distinct or separate as my enumeration of them implies. To the contrary, they are all interrelated, and indeed are simply different facets of a single common reality. They are

differentiated one from another only to simplify reality, and thus make analysis and discussion possible.

Second, it should be noted that the amount of time and detail I will devote to the different categories varies a great deal. This implies no order of importance. It simply reflects the fact that I am familiar with some aspects of the relevant scholarship more than others.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD HISTORY

I

Overview

In this chapter I shall be looking at the globalization of the human condition from the perspective of history. From this perspective what we see is a dramatic transformation in the geographical structure of world history. This transformation is from a millenia long era in which the history of the world consisted of separate and isolated regional histories to an era in which world history has become increasingly global history, which is to say, history shared by all of the regions of the planet. I will first provide an overview of this transformation, and then I will argue that the globalization of history involved three fundamental types of historical change.

II

The Globalization of History

The globalization of history can be divided into two major phases. The first roughly dates from 500 B. C. to 1500 A. D. and can be labelled the Eurasian phase. The dominating characteristic of this phase was the intermittent but generally increasing volume of interactions among the classical civilization stretching across the Eurasian land

mass from Morocco to Kamchatke and from Norway to Malaya.*

The second phase of the transformation from regional to global history dates from approximately 1500 to the present and can be called the planetary phase.** As L.S. Stavrianos (1971) notes until 1500, ". . . man lived largely in regional isolation. The various racial groups had been scattered about in a pattern of virtual global segregation. Only about 1500 was there for the first time direct contact amongst them all. Not until approximately that date were they at last all brought together, whether South African Bushmen or cultivated Chinese Mandarians or primitive Patagonians" (p. 3). Stavrianos goes on to observe:

> Indeed, world history in the strict global sense did not begin until the voyages of Columbus and da Gama and Magellan. Prior to their exploits, there were relatively parallel histories of separate poeples rather than one unified history of mankind. If the monogenetic theory of the origin of man is valid, there was a unity or common genesis at the beginning of human history. But during the long millennia of the Paleolithic period, Homo sapiens gradually scattered over most of the earth's land surface. Then the ending of the Ice Age raised the level of the oceans, thereby separating Africa from Europe, the Americas from Northeast Asia, and Australia from Southeast Asia, to mention only the major disseverances.

---

*William McNeill's The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community provides a highly respected and very readable account of Eurasian history during this period and one that highlights the extensiveness and significance of interactions among the classical civilizations of Europe, the Middle East, India, China, and Japan.

**It would be interesting to speculate if we are living in a transnational era in which the planetary phase of world history is coming to an end and advent of a cosmic phase is beginning. I will resist this temptation, noting only that the often-drawn analogue between Columbus's landing on San Salvador that broke the bonds of regional isolation and the astronauts landing on the moon which broke the bonds of planetary isolation may well prove in due time to be a real historical parallel.

> Henceforth mankind lived in varying degrees of regional isolation. Some were completely cut off, such as the Australian aborigines, who had no contact with the outside world for the more than 30,0000 years between the last migrations from Southeast Asia and the appearance of Captain James Cook. Almost as isolated were the inhabitants of North and South America, the last crossings from Siberia having occurred some 10,000 years before Columbus. Norse expeditions to the northeast coast of North America and possible Polynesian landings in South America had no lasting repercussions on the Indian populations. Sub-Saharan Africa also became isolated to a considerable degree about 6,000 years ago, when the Sahara became dry enough to constitute a major barrier to human movement. (pp. 3-4)

Many of us grew up learning that the historical significance of the European voyages of discovery in the 15th and 16th centuries lay in the fact that they marked the beginnings of American history. This, of course, is not the case at all. Their significance lies rather in the fact that the voyages of discovery marked the beginning of the end of the regional isolation that had structured and shaped the history of the human species for millenia. Thus Columbus' voyages do not mark the beginning of American history; quite the opposite, they mark the end to an American history as such and the beginning of a world history part of which transpires on the continents of North and South America. The same, of course, is true of the other four inhabited continents. The European voyages of discovery conclusively demonstrated that the earth is spherical and in so doing they began to shape human history also into a sphere without edges. From 1500 on, the once separate histories of Eurasia, the Americas, the Sub-Saharan Africa, and Australasia began to be fused in a single global history. This process of fusion continued until it is now fair to say of the contemporary world that there is very little African history that is African,

but a lot of world history takes place in Africa; there is very little American history that is American but a lot of world history takes place on the American continents; there is very little European history that is European, but a lot of world history takes place in Europe, and so on.

Most world historians seem to agree that the historical process through which regional histories have become increasingly absorbed into a global history has followed the trajectory of a J curve. The initial European voyages of discovery in and of themselves had little impact upon the structure of world history. Indeed, they were totally unknown to the vast majority of humankind. Their significance is highly symbolic and was created by the flow of subsequent history. As it turned out they proved to be the beginning of a change in the structure of world history. At its onset, and for the next two centuries or so, the changing structure of world history is detectable enough in retrospect, but the bulk of humanity living at the time were not directly caught up in or substantially affected by the change. As L.S. Stavrianos (1971) observes the years between 1500 and 1763 "constitute a period of transition from the regional isolation of the pre-1500 era to the European global hegemony of the Nineteenth Century" (p. 161). David Thompson (1969) makes much the same point in a different way:

> Until some two hundred years ago even the most momentous events in one part of the world had very slight and remote repercussions, if they had any effects at all, in other parts of the world. Even the greatest upheavals in European history had no significance at all for the history of Australasia, little for Africa Africa or Asia, and often only indirect significance for the history of North or South America. The fate of the six continents was not interlocked as it is interlocked today. It was 1788 before the first English settlment took place in Australia; it was 1854 before the American, Commodore Perry, compelled Japan to end her two centuries of seclusion from the rest of the world; it is only during the last hundred years that European power in Africa has penetrated beyond the frontier outposts and coastal strips into the vast interior.
>
> It was therefore natural and proper, until recent times, to regard the history of the world as consisting of separate accounts of each continent. Except for periodic irruptions of Asiatics into Europe, or of Europeans into North Africa or America, the development of each continent was a separate story. These irruptions might, in themselves, have drastic and far-reaching consequences: as did the barbarian invasions of Europe, or the Moslem invasions of Spain, or the Spanish conquests in South America. But even the total effect of these great movements was not to create a permanent and constant interaction between developments in each continent. Such an effect is the creation of only the last two centuries of modern history: only they constitute truly 'world history'.

If, as Thompson, Stavrianos and other world historians argue, we see beginning in 1643 (or some date thereabouts) an acceleration in the globalization of world history, they also agree that it is only somewhere near the end of the next two centuries that we see that pattern of very rapid and dramatic change that I characterized earlier as "passing around the bend of a J curve." And where in time does the bend in the J curve come? Some historians, like Geoffrey Barraclough (1967) for example, might see the J curve begin to bend sharply in the years after 1870. Other historians, like David Thompson for example, might date the bend to 1914. Thompson (1969) argues that after 1914 a situation comes

about "which is novel in the history of the world."

> The essence of it is that, for the first time, the six continents of the world really matter to one another. For at least a good time to come bad harvests or economic depressions in any one of them will affect all the others; political revolutions or operative ideals in any one of them are a matter of immediate and intimate concern to all the others; and a war beginning anywhere can soon become a war which is happening everywhere. In this sense they are interdependent as they have never been before. It is interdependence in this sense, this perpetual interaction of one part of the world on all the other parts, which is the central theme of world history during the last fifty years. To explain how it has come about, what have been its main manifestations, and what have so far been its major consequences for mankind, is the essential task of the historian of world history since 1914. (p. 4)

While issues of historical dating are important matters of more than arcane interest, they need not detain us here. The important point to bear in mind is that there is substantial agreement that the globalization of world history began to accelerate markedly somewhere around the turn of the Twentieth Century. Most scholars would probably agree with Samir Amin's (1976) observation that "only at the end of the Nineteenth Century did a world-wide civilization begin to take shape," and that ". . . the first seventy years of the Twentieth Century . . . has been marked by a speeding up of the historical process . . ." (p. 9).

Let me at this point pause to review quickly the line of argument I have been developing. I began by noting that from the perspective of history the globalization of the human condition can be usefully seen as a transformation in world history from regionally specific histories into a common global history. I

then noted that this transformation has two phases, a Eurasian and a planetary phase. I argued that the historical evolution of the planetary phase appears to follow the trajectory of a J curve. From 1500 to the mid-Eighteenth Century the globalization of world history occurs slowly. The process begins to accelerate after 1763; somewhere around the turn of this century, it rounds the bend of a J curve and, has been accelerating in contemporary times at a historically unprecedented rate.

So far I have been talking of the globalization of history but not defining what this term means except in a negative sense of a reduction in the regional specificity of world history. For the most part historians do not define global history with any technical precision, and well they should not since the term is used to cover several related but analytically distinguishable changes in the human condition. Three of these are of such significance that they deserve to be singled out and commented on briefly.

We can usefully think of the globalization of history as involving three fundamental types of historical change: (1) the emergence and growth of global interdependence, (2) the emergence and growth of shared history or common fate, and (3) the emergence and growth of global social structures that constrain and shape the flow of history at regional, national, and local levels.

III

The Emergence and Growth of Global Interdependence

Since the energy crisis of the Winter of 1973-74, interdependence has become a code word in American rhetoric. It

seems that almost everybody in every walk of life is using the word. Teachers try to teach young children the term. Curriculum developers produce instructional materials whose titles make use of the word--"Teaching about Interdependence in a Peaceful World," "Interdependence: A Curriculum Aid," "Patterns for Teaching about Interdependence." And teachers of teachers eloquently characterize the interdependent character of the modern world. For example, Norman Overly and Richard Kimpston (1977) write:

> We are beginning to recognize the globe girdling tentacles of our concerns and involvements. It is already a cliche to speak of the global village. Only our own intransigence and prejudices blind us to the implications of satellite communication and instantaneous replay of far away events. Words and images are not the only things communicated with blinding speed. Disease and death splash over natural and manmade boundaries alike with remarkable ease. A sneeze in Hong Kong becomes an epidemic in London and New York; a political decision in Japan creates bloodshed in Rome or Geneva. Likewise, an atomic explosion in China creates radiation fallout in Japan and the United States; projected oil depletion in Saudi Arabia creates shock waves of inflation and unemployment throughout the world. Overpopulation in India and Latin America means a boon of cheap goods and services for the U.S. and other wealthy countries because of the abundance of cheap labor, while the consumption oriented economies of these same countries pose concomitant problems of excessive drain on resources in forms of space, food, water, and air.

Prestigious organizations in American education issue reports on Education for Global Interdependence. The State Department commissions a group of very bright and highly paid social scientists in one of the nation's most prestigious universities to produce a study entitled Analyzing Global Interdependence (1976). An equally prestigious group composed of intellectuals, business leaders, and public officials convenes

under the name of the Commission for Coping with Interdependence. Polemicists from every part of the world are joined in debates about the meaning of the term, e.g., is interdependence simply a euphemism for a new style of international imperialism. Historians and social scientists, also from virtually every part of the globe, meet to talk about global interdependence. Scholarly papers and books dealing with interdependence proliferate like rabbits in spring. But by no means is the use of the term confined to scholarly technical literatures. Newspapers, magazines, and the speeches of public officials are replete with references to global interdependence. For example, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in one of his major foreign policy addresses stated that "the traditional agenda of international affairs--the balance among major powers, the security of nations--no longer defines our perils or our possibilities. . . . Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations."*

Despite the widespread usage, or maybe because of it, "interdependence" has become a notoriously slippery concept.

---

*"A New National Partnership," speech by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at Los Angeles, January 24, 1975. News release, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, p. 1.

Lincoln Bloomfield (1974) illustrates this very well in a recent study conducted for the U.S. Department of State.

> The most striking thing about interdependence is that, measured by official rhetoric and scholarly activity, it is now upon us like fate. The second most striking thing about it is that, for a blinding truth, it is uncommonly hard to define. In fact, it seems to mean anything one wants it to mean. Interdependence is invoked by some as a virtue and by others as a besetting sin. Its name is spoken in tones of prophesy, injunction, or mortification, depending on the speaker's subjective picture of reality (p. 1).

It will probably be some time before we resolve all the semantic confusion and the political controversies, surrounding the term and obtain what Ward Morehouse (1975) has aptly called "an ideological fix on interdependence" (p. 8). But in the meantime interdependence is a good term if we keep in mind that as a technical concept "interdependence" has not one, but several related but still very distinctive meanings. One of these meanings is what historians seem to have in mind when they speak of the emergence and growth of global interdependence as one facet of the globalization of history. Oran Young (1969) provides a very good definition of this meaning of interdependence. Interdependence, he says is: "The extent to which events occurring in any one part or within any given component unit of the world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in the other parts or component units of the system" (p. 726).

This definition is well illustrated by an observation of

Raymond Platig (1966):

> Civil disturbances in the Congo and in South Viet Nam have their repercussions in New York, Moscow, and Peking; crop failure in India calls forth a response from the American midwest; nuclear explosive power unites men around the world in the fear of holocaust and the dread of environmental contamination; physical changes on the surface of the sun affect man's ability to communicate with his fellow men; complex sensors located in artificial earth satellites reveal guarded secrets concerning the capabilities of another group; a desert war east of Suez threatens to bring the industrial machinery of Europe to a grinding halt; new ideological notes struck on the taut strings of Balkan societies set up entirely new patterns of harmony and disharmony in world affairs.(pp. 2-3).

Interdependence defined in this way is not, of course, a new or recent feature of the human condition. Some kinds and levels of interdependence have always been a facet of human history, and ancient historians no less than modern ones had occasion to remark on interdependence. Polybius, for example, notes " . . . during this period, history becomes, so to speak an organic whole. What happens in Italy and in Libya is bound up with what happened in Asia and in Greece. . . ." (Quoted in L. S. Stravrianos, 1970) What distinguished interdependence in modern history and particularly within contemporary times are four things: its geographic scale, its temporal frequency, its substantive scope, and its social depth.

Geographic Scale. After the first global age in human history ended, the era which saw the migration of homo sapiens out of Africa, into Eurasia and subsequently into the Americans and Australasia, interdependence on a geographically global scale

disappeared from human history for many millenia to reappear with the onset of European expansion. The latter fact is important to keep in mind. Contemporary people, Americans in particular, sometimes talk as if we were the first generation to experience interdependence on a global scale. Of course, this is not true. In fact, it is the height of historical parochialism (and this parochialism in turn reflects the fact most of us learned history in the wrong way--a fact that I will complain about in a later chapter.) Think, for example, of the network of global interdependencies that interlinked the fate of Europeans, native Americans, and Africans in the early modern era. On the eve of European expansion into the Americas eight to 100 million Indians lived on the continents. (There are vast disparities in estimates of the pre-Columbian population.) Within a century after the beginnings of European exploration and settlement, the Indian population had declined by 90 to 95 percent for reasons directly traceable to the European intrusion--warfare, cultural disruption, and perhaps above all else the introduction of new diseases. So events that began in Europe resulted in the death of several million people in the Americas. The decimation of the Indians in the Americas in turn became linked to the fate of millions of human beings in Africa. The disappearing Indians were replaced in part by a conscripted labor force from Africa. An estimated thirty-five to forty million Africans were abducted for transportation to the Americas. Of these, only about ten million slaves actually reached the Americas,

the others having died en route in Africa or on the Atlantic. Thus, a global network of interdependencies initiated by events in Europe during the waning years of the Fifteenth Century resulted in the deaths of several millions of people in Africa and the Americas. I suspect any one of these millions of Indians or Africans would argue, if they could, that they have a much better claim to being the first discoverers of global interdependence than did Americans standing in line at gas pumps in the winter of 1973-74.

I cite this particular case study of interdependence to simply illustrate the fact that while interdependence on a global scale is a new innovation in the human condition it is not nearly as new as many Americans tend to think. Had we learned our modern history properly, every school child could cite many examples of global interdependence at work in the history of every century since the 1500s.

In emphasizing the fact that global interdependence emerged in the Sixteenth Century and has been a continuing feature of the world since then, I do not mean to imply that in the course of the last five centuries there have been no changes in the character of global interdependence. Clearly there have been substantial and significant changes. One of these can be described as a change in the frequency of global interdependence.

Frequency. Imagine that we listed for each of the past five centuries the major events occurring on each of the six inhabited continents. Next we classify these historical events into two

categories: (1) events that are linked to events on at least one other continent, and (2) events that are of only intra-continent import. Now we count the number of events in each class by century and plot the data on a graph. I strongly suspect that we would observe a pattern like the one in the following graph.



----------events of multicontinent import

_____events of only intra-continent import

We would see a marked increase over time in the frequency of historical events interlinking two or more continents and a marked decrease in the frequency of historical events of consequence to only one of the continents.

Substantive Scope. Another kind of change that has occurred is the nature of global interdependence since the 1500s in an expansion of the substantive scope of global interdependence. By this I mean the range of human activities and concerns that are effected by global interdependence. Today there is virtually no domain of human life that is left untouched by this reality. Stephen Bailey (1975) illustrates this generalization very well:

> In recent decades world interdependencies affecting all Americans have gone far beyond hereditary and cultural ties, or traditional diplomatic negotiations and distant military confrontations, and have become operationally immediate. They affect the purity of our air and water; the heat in our homes and office; the price of sugar, coffee, and gasoline; the availability of meat and fish; the level of taxes; the survival of wildlife; the size of our armed forces; the subject matter of television; the levels of employment and inflation; the tranquility of our spirits; and the image of reality of our future.
>
> Similarly, how America behaves can drastically affect commodity markets in Africa and South America; money markets in London and Zurich; unemployment in Japan and Germany; questions of life and death in the Middle East; budget allocations in China and the Soviet Union; and the stability of regimes in Chile. (p. 5)

Social Depth. This last quote points to another change in the nature of global interdependence since it initially emerged in the Sixteenth Century. This is a marked increase in the range and number of people affected by global interdependence. In the 1500s only a small fraction of humanity was directly affected by global interdependence. The size of this fraction increased in the 1600s, and has been increasing in each century since then. Today, in some degree and in some mixture of pleasure and pain, global

interdependence is part of the life of virtually all of humanity.

IV

The Emergence and Growth of Shared History or Common Fate

The emergence in the Sixteenth Century of global interdependence and its growth in the subsequent centuries is one aspect of the globalization of world history. A second facet of this process is the emergence and growth of shared history, or alternatively phrased, common fate. Shared history is related to but is distinguishable from interdependence. A simple example will illustrate the difference.

Family A and family B are neighbors. The two families plan to have dinner together at 7:00 o'clock on Friday, November 8. But the members of family A are caught in a traffic jam on their return from work necessitating a cancellation of the dinner and adjustments in family B's life. This event is an example of interdependence.

Both family A and family B have basements that flood every time there is a heavy rain. It rains hard on Friday night and the two families thus share the experience coping with flooded basements. This is an example of shared history or common fate. Note the difference in the two situations. In the first instance, an event in the life of family A affected the life of family B, but B did not share the history of A, i.e., B was not caught in a traffic jam. In the second instance, the two families share the same history, or alternatively put, the two families experience a common fate.

It is this sense that historians write of the emergence and

growth of shared history in the modern world. What are the aspects of history that become increasingly shared?

To begin with there are some events in which a very large portion of humankind becomes involved. The depression of the 1930s was a world-wide event in this sense, as was World War II. Still closer to us in time was the dramatic upswing in inflation between 1972 and 1974, an upswing from which we continue to suffer. As a recent study of the Brookings Institution (Lawrence Krause and Walter Salant, 1977) point out, the inflation of 1972-1974 was not only virulent, it was also widespread. "All advanced countries and most developing countries suffered from it. Moreover, the disease struck nearly all countries simultaneously. Thus, there was reason enough to describe the inflation as world-wide, to try to find a common source for it, and to pay increased attention to the process by which it spread among countries." (p. 5)

If the necessary data were available this aspect of the growth of shared history could probably be demonstrated more systematically. Let us imagine that we could determine the portion of humankind that was involved in a given set of events distributed over the past five centuries. It is very likely that an analysis of these data would reveal an increase in the number of events in which 20 percent of extant humanity was involved; an increase in the number of events in which 40 percent of humanity was involved; an increase in the number of events in which 60 percent of humanity was involved, and so on. This expanding scale of involvement in the same history would be particularly marked in the last few decades if we admitted

into our analysis events in which people were involved vicariously through the mass media, particularly radio and television. The size of the world audience for some athletic events and for some historical moments such as the first landing on the moon is remarkable indeed.

In addition to the expanded scale of involvement in world events, growth of shared history is also evidenced by the entry into history of a type of person we commonly call a "world figure." Individuals like Lenin, Ghandi, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Freud, Einstein, Bergson, Rutherford, Keynes, or on a more contemporary scene, Mohammed Ali, John Kennedy, and the Beatles to name but a few, have a visibility, a reputation, and a degree of influence that extend far beyond the boundaries of any particular nation or region.

The growth of shared history is evidenced in still another way. This is the fact that many ideologies and their associated political movements are shared by individuals in many different parts of the globe. Nationalism, socialism, Marxism, liberal democracy, capitalism, for example, are world-wide phenomena. The same has become true in modern history of the classical world religions. Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism--once all religions specific to particular regions--now have adherents in all parts of the world, albeit in varying number.

What is true of political ideologies and religious orientations is also true for fashions in music, clothing, dance, to name but a

few dimensions of cultural life in which a large fraction of humankind share in a bit of common history. Norman Cousins (1968) has illustrated this well:

> A new musical comedy erupts into success on Broadway and within a matter of weeks its tunes are heard all the way from London to Johannesburg, as though they had preexisted and were waiting only for a signal from the United States to spring to life. Or a new movie about the Russia of a half-century ago will be made from a book, and all over the world the theme song from Doctor Zhivago will be a request favorite of orchestras in far-off places, from Edmonton to Warsaw.
>
> Few things are more startling to Americans abroad than to see youngsters affect the same unconventionalities in dress and manner, whether in Stockholm, Singapore, or Sydney. The young girls with their flashing thighs on Carnaby Street in London or on the Ginza in Tokyo; the young males with their long hair and turtleneck sweaters (with or without beads) in Greenwich Village or the Left Bank or Amsterdam or Hong Kong--all seem to have been fashioned by the same stylists of alienation and assertion.
>
> Or a fashion designer in Paris will decide to use spikes instead of heels on women's shoes, and women across the world will wobble with the same precarious gait. Then, almost as suddenly, the designer will decide to bring women back to earth again, flattening the heels and producing square or wide toes that only a few years earlier would have been regarded as acceptable only for heavy work in the fields--and once again the world's women will conform.
>
> (p. 20)

A good deal of modern architecture and building design also stands in evidence of a shared history. Major airports the world over are pretty much the same airport. And the same is true of high rise apartments, modern office buildings, industrial factories, sports arenas, and research laboratories.

This reference to research laboratories points our attention

toward science and to its critical role in the growth of both global interdependence and shared history. The rise and diffusion of modern science are critical in at least two ways. First, science as an activity involves scientists in an internationally shared history since science is inherently transnational. Diana Crane (1970) points out:

> Basic science is an inherently international activity. Its principal goal is the production of new knowledge which is evaluated according to universal standards. In terms of membership and goals scientific communities have been international since their emergence during the seventeenth century. Basic science today consists of hundreds of research problem areas in which groups of scientists study similar problems and exchange information across national boundaries. International scientific cooperation occurs on several levels ranging from informal communication between individual researchers to multilateral agreements between governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
>
> A useful model of these different forms of international scientific cooperation has been developed by Stefan Dedijer and A. J. Longrigg. One form which they delineate consists of cooperation between individual researchers or between research laboratories and institutes. This occurs by means of communication through preprints, publications, correspondence, visits, and informal meetings. A distinct mode of organization, the so-called "invisible college," characterizes this type of communication. Leading scientists in a research area maintain continual contact with each other in order to monitor recent developments in the area and adjust their activities accordingly.
>
> In recent decades several hundred scientific international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been created. An important form of international cooperation, they engage in numerous activities from the standardization of data, units, and techniques to the organization of international conferences and symposia. Arrangements for the latter are usually handled by international professional associations. It has been estimated that each year 2000 American scientists join 10,000 scientists from other countries at such meetings.

> Other forms of international scientific cooperation involve collaboration between governments. Governments reach bilateral agreements regarding the exchange of scientific information or the conduct of joint technological or scientific projects. A few IGOs maintain research facilities at which collaborative research by scientists from several countries is conducted. Other IGOs have broader functions and engage in the organization of research programs and the development of science policy rather than the conduct of research. (pp. 235-236)

Secondly, science is critical because it is technological offsprings of modern science that have made the historical development of high levels of global interdependence and shared history physically possible. Science and science-bred technology, are in a word, the chief villains or the major heroes--depending upon one's perspective--in the globalization of history. We see this fact vividly when we contemplate the possibility of the ultimate and final expression of shared history--the destruction of the human species in thermonuclear war.

V

The Emergence and Growth of Global Structures that Constrain and Shape the Flow of Sub-Global Histories

In the past several pages I have been trying to indicate what historians have in mind when they speak of the emergence of global history. So far I have said that the globalization of history encompasses two kinds of development. One is the emergence and growth of global interdependence, and the second is the emergence and growth of shared history. There is a third development involved in the globalization of history. This is the emergence and growth of global structures that constrain and shape the flow of history. To illustrate

what I mean by this, let me return for a moment to Family A and B. Family A likes to watch detective stories on TV and hates comedies. Family B likes to watch comedy shows and hates detective stories, and the two families never discuss TV when they get together for this reason. Thus, in respect to TV watching the two families have independent and different histories. However, the private histories of both families are embedded in a larger social context that constrains and shapes both histories. Among other things decisions made by the TV networks determine the options and hence constrain the choices available to both families. However, the constraints can be very different. If a television season is dominated by detective shows and comedies are out of fashion, the TV watching history of Family A will be more pleasant than the history of Family B.

Something analogous to this is involved in the globalization of history. By no means has the whole of human experienc been absorbed into networks of global interdependecies and currents of shared history. Local communities, nations, and regions continue to have independent and separate histories in addition to interdependent and shared histories. But like the separate and independent family histories of A and B, locally, nationally, and regionally specific histories are set in a larger context that serves to constrain and shape these histories. With the advent of global history, global social structures have become increasingly important elements of the larger contexts that constrain and shape the flow of local, national, and regional histories.

What are these global structures? The international state system is one. Contrast experience of state building in Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries with state building in much of Asia and Africa after World War II. The "state builders" in early modern Europe are comparable to players in a game where the basic structure and rules of the game are created while the game is being played. In constrast the "state builders" in much of Asia and Africa after 1945 are comparable to players in a game with a long history of well established and widely acknowledged rules. Charles Tilly (1975) pinpoints the contextual difference in these two types of ball games very well:

> ...The European state-makers and a few non-European collaborators, through war, conquest, and alliance, eventually fashioned a worldwide system of states. As the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have worn on, the newcomers to the system have had less choice of the positions they would occupy in it, even down to the exact territories they would control. Among other things, that prior existence of a state system has fundamentally altered the role of the military forces in the smaller states, since their strength or weakness no longer makes the major difference in the territory controlled by the state or in its relations with other states. (p. 81)

The world capitalist system is another example of global structures that contextually condition local, national, and regional histories. Prior to the emergence and growth of this system, the world economy consisted predominantly of small scale, locally autonomous, and separated economies. Thus the economic fate of most of humanity was determined by their respective position in

a local economy together with the collective fortune of that economy which in turn was shaped by locally variable mixtures of ecological good fortune and misfortune. For example, whether individual X did or did not die from starvation was a function of: (a) his or her position in the distributional system of a local economy, and (b) the overall amount of food available to the economy collectively.

The essential elements in this equation have remained unchanged, but the context in which the economic drama takes place has radically changed. With the emergence in the Sixteenth Century of a world capitalist economy and its subsequent development over the next centuries, the economic histories of particular localities, nations, and regions became progressively less influenced by factors indigenous to them and progressively more influenced by the comparative position or location that given localities, nations and regions occupy in the global economy. Thus, to the traditional equation governing economic fate, a new and very important variable has been added. Now if individual X does or does not starve to death is a function of: (a) his or her position in the distributional system of local and national economies, (b) the amount of food collectively available to a given locality and nation. And the latter in turn is strongly shaped by its role or place in the global economy. Hence, the beggar in the streets of New Delhi and the business executive in the restaurants of New York have very different dietary histories, but underlying the two histories is a global structure that creates the fact that the executive in New York

must cope with the problems of overeating while the beggar in New Delhi must cope with the problems of undereating.

VI

Summary

In this chapter I have discussed what the globalization of the human condition looks like when viewed from the perspective of history. I have tried to make the following points:

1. World history has been transformed from an era of regional histories into an era of global history.

2. This transformation has two major phases, a Eurasian phase and a planetary phase.

3. The globalization of world history appears to follow the path of a J curve, a long period of slow change is followed by a sudden acceleration in the rate of change.

4. At least three major developments are involved in the globalization of history. They are: (a) the emergence and growth of global interdependence, (b) the emergence and growth of shared history, and (c) the emergence and growth of global structures that constrain and shape sub-global histories.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EVOLUTION OF SYSTEMS OF GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

I

Overview

Looked at from the perspective of geography the globalization of the human condition is a story of the conquest of distance. This story begins well before the advent of the modern eara, but it is only in this era, and even more particularly within contemporary history that one finds most of the actors and actions. For it is within this short time frame that systems of global transportation and communication have evolved. The evolution of these systems involves three major kinds of historical developments: (1) the development of new technologies, (2) the development of new institutions, and (3) the development of world-wide "artificial languages" and the internationalization of traditional languages.

II

Technological Developments

This is not the place for a history of the creation and development of the technologies that have made possible world-wide transportation and global communication. Nor is such a history needed by the reader of this paper since the broad contours of this technological history are familiar to all of us. Let me simply note two things.

First, most (but not all) of the technologies of global transport and communication are inventions of the past century. They are familiar to all of us: printing presses, and the newspapers, magazines, and books they make possible; telegraphs; cinema; radios; telephones; telexes; airplanes; large ships; missiles; communication satellites; motor vehicles and traanscontinental roads; trains and transcontinental rail networks; transcontinental networks of pipe lines for carrying fossil

fuels and electricity.

Second, the creation and subsequent global diffusion of these technologies have radically reduced in a short time the millenia old isolating effects on human affairs of geographical distance. The different regions of the world have become technologically interlinked. These linkages become dramatically visible by looking at a few maps.

The map on the following page shows what is one of the most elaborate and rapidly developing global communication systems in existence. This is the Intelsat satellite communication system. (The graph on the reverse side of the map indicates just how rapidly the system is growing.) The system is a network of over 400 paths that link together 150 earth stations in 80 countries. The networks provide 7700 full-time telephone circuits and several thousand circuits for television and data transmission.

Since all of us have looked at people and events thousands of miles away using the system, it is an interesting footnote to observe what is happening when we see the words, "Live via satellite," appear at the bottom of our television screen.

> From its point or origin the television signal has been transmitted by co-axial cable and microwave link through ground networks to an earth station in the Intelsat system. At the transmitting earth station the signal is modulated onto a radio-frequency carrier in the six-megahertz band. Although the band-width of the television signal is normally only about five megahertz, a wide-deviation frequency-modulated signal with three to six times the bandwidth transmits it to the satellite. The frequency modulation considerably improves the signal-to-noise ratio and satellite power is conserved. The Satellite amplifies the signal and

GLOBAL NETWORK OF INTELSAT, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, is built around eight satellites positioned in three groups 35,800 kilometers above the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, where they serve as relay stations for radio signals to and from 150 earth stations in 80 countries. The Intelsat IV's, which still provide all the service over the Pacific and Indian oceans, have two receiving and two transmitting horn antennas that cover the entire earth visible below the satellite. Each Intelsat IV also has two steerable transmitting spot beams that provide additional gain and therefore more power in certain geographical areas. In the larger and more capacious Intelsat IV-A satellites separate beams cover Europe and Africa in the Eastern Hemisphere and North and South America in the Western Hemisphere, supplementing the global beams. In the illustration operating satellites are in color and spares are in gray. In the Atlantic region one Intelsat IV-A, acting as the primary-path satellite, connects small and large users and carries some of the heavy traffic between large users. An Intelsat IV, the major-path satellite, handles the remainder of the traffic between large users. Spare transmitting tubes in each satellite are available in case of a partial failure. Spare satellites would cut in quickly in the event of a total failure.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



GROWTH OF INTELSAT SYSTEM is depicted in terms of dollars invested, circuits in operation and number of earth stations. The investment figure refers only to the outlay for space equipment, primarily satellites and the cost of launching them. Owners of the 150 earth stations at 119 locations in 80 countries have made a comparable investment. Over the past five years traffic carried by system has tripled, and growth is expected to continue at 15 percent per year.

> retransmits it to the ground in the four-gigahertz frequency band. The earth station amplifies and demodulates the television carrier and sends it on through a ground network to a local television station, where it is broadcast or sent by cable to indvidual television receivers. Often, as in news events, the Olympic games and other programs of international interest, a single television carrier is broadcast by the satellite on the global beam so that it can be received by all its earth stations. For events of global interest several satellites in different positions broadcast the signal (Edelson, 1977, p. 63).

Mappings of air and shipping routes, principal railroads, roads and pipelines further document how communication and transportation technologies have interconnected the world.

III

Institutional Developments

Technologies interlinking spacially distant parts of the earth are one element of global systems of transportation and communication. The evolution of these systems has also involved the development of new types of social institutions. This is particularly true in respect to global communications.

The development of a world-wide news media system is one of the most important of these developments. This system is made up of mass media, reporters, and the news services. As W. Phillips Davison (1965) observes; "People throughout the world receive the bulk of their ideas about events in other nations through the same sources that bring them local news, or from friends or neighbors who pay attention to these sources. The domestic media, in turn, rely mainly on national and international wire services" (p. 327).

International news services emerged in the Nineteenth Century with the growth of international telegraph and cable companies. In the early 1870s British Reuters, French Havas and German Wolff divided up the world so that every national news agency was connected with one of the transnational news agencies. This monopoly was broken in this century by emergence of American and Soviet Union-based news services. As the number of news services expanded so did the geographical scope of their operation as is illustrated by the maps on the following four pages.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



The global spread of News Agencies. News Agencies established before 1905.

Source: Cherry, Colin 1971



The global spread of News Agencies. 1917–1930, the First World War until the rise of Hitler.

Source: Cherry, Colin, 1971



The global spread of News Agencies. 1931–1955, the engulfment of Europe and the aftermath.

Source: Cherry, Colin, 1971



The global spread of News Agencies. 1956–1965, the emergence of Africa.

Source: Cherry, Colin, 1971

Today there are five news services that are considered "world agencies." These are Reuters, based in Britain; Agence France-Presse based in France; Tass based in the Soviet Union; the Associated Press and United Press International both based in the United States. In addition to these "big five" there are some 200 national or specialized news services many of which are based in the Third World.

The dominance of these five large agencies is evidenced by the numbers of local outlets they serve and the volume of news they transmit. "Directly and indirectly," Davison notes, "they provide most of the foreign information in the press of almost every country."

> The Associated Press distributes news, features, and photographs to some 7,600 newspapers and radio and television stations in more than 80 countries. By contrast, it served only 38 countries in 1944. United Press International delivers its services to over 6,500 subscribers in 111 countries and territories. Tass dominates the news media of most Communist countries, and also provides material to some media in many others. Reuters has subscribers in 110 nations and territories. Agence France-Presse serves outlets in 104 countries. All the world agencies have agreements with national or specialized news services that give their materials still wider distribution. In 1953, the International Press Institute found that 4 of the world agencies brought some 80,000 words of foreign news to the United States each day - approximately the equivalent of a 200-page book. Western Europe received about 135,000 words a day from global and national agencies combined. Four agencies provided India with approximately 32,000 words of foreign news daily. (p. 328)

In addition to newspapers, the international news agencies also service radio and television media. Not only have the latter become increasingly important sources or world news, they also are a primary means of entertainment in the contemporary world. There are a couple of points that need to be made about the place of TV and radio in the

global communication system.

One is that their world wide availability is expanding rapidly as is indicated by the following graphs. The first shows the increase of radio receivers per 1000 population in several nations from 1950 to 1960, and the second graph provides the same type of data for television.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Figure 2. Radio receivers per 1,000 population, 1950-1970., for selected countries.

Source: Frey, F. W. Communication and development. In I.S. Pool et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Communication. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Figure 2. Radio receivers per 1,000 population, 1950-1970, for selected countries.

Source: Frey, F. W. Communication and development. In I.S. Pool et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Communication. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973.

A second important point to be noted about radio and TV is that they are transnational media in several respects. To begin with radio and to a lesser degree TV broadcasts, often go beyond the borders of countries in which they originate. This is particularly true of European countries, but is by no means confined to them.

Secondly, the telecommunication industry has become in recent decades a transnational enterprise. This is well illustrated by the transnational expansion of the three major United States networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC-RCA) over the past three decades. The following table shows some of the highlights of this history.

1950s. NBC: First foreign investment in Australia, 1953. Technical assistance to Saudi Arabia television station. Assistance in Portugal, Peru, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Yugoslavia in 1958. Investments in television in Australia and Mexico in 1959.

1960s. NBC: RCA built Egypt's first station, manufacturing plant in Egypt. Investments in Argentina by NBC. Stations in France, Japan, Argentina and Mexico as programme affiliates of NBC. Programme distribution to fifty-one foreign markets. Assistance in the formation of Italy's second television network in 1961. Expansion in Africa started in 1961 (Nigeria). Broadcast systems to Sierra Leone and Sudan in 1963, supervising the construction of television in Uganda. Transmitters and microwave links to Iran in 1965. Expansion in the Middle East. Expansion to the Asian countries (Republic of South Viet-Nam, Hong Kong).

ABC: Concentration in Latin America: Ecuador's first television station followed by investments in Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua forming the Central American Television Network. Investments in Lebanese television. ABC Worldvision Network with stations in Lebanon, Argentina, Ecuador, and Australia. Investments in Japanese stations, the Philippines and Canada followed by investments in Iran, Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico. In 1963, assistance to Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan in programming and sales. By 1965 ABC had financial interests in fifty-four stations in twenty-four countries, as well as in television production centres in Mexico. Latin American Television International Network by Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile and Mexico in 1968.

CBS: Agreements for syndicating programmes to Bermuda, Guam, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru in 1959. Assistance in the formation of the second television network in the Federal Republic of Germany. Investments in television in Venezuela and Argentina. Programme distribution to forty countries. Mutual assistance agreement with Italian television in 1961. In 1962, CBS invested in a production company in Peru and in stations in Tobago and Trinidad. By 1964 CBS was syndicating programmes to 107 countries. A wholly owned subsidiary in Japan to produce Japanese programmes. With Time Inc. a production company in Venezuela. In 1966, CBS established programme production and distribution subsidiaries in Brazil and Canada. Supervised construction of television in Israel. In 1966, expansion to Africa: Ghana, Liberia, Gabon, Aden, the Ivory Coast and the Congo. Investments in a television-set manufacturing plant in Japan (later in Denmark and Sweden). Programme distribution subsidiary in Sweden.

1970s. NBC: NBC acquired international distribution rights to telefilms produced in the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Mexico, Poland, Japan and Canada. Contract to advise Ireland on cable television. In 1971, contract with China to construct a satellite earth station. In 1972 another contract to build a second satellite facility in Peking. In 1973 agreement with the Soviet Union for the exchange of radio and television programmes.

ABC: Sales of television programmes to ninety countries. Production subsidiaries in Venezuela and Brazil.

Source: Tapio Varis, 1976, pp. 816-817

Note one of the last entries in the above catalogue of events--ABC's sales of TV programs to ninety countries. This points to a significant institutional innovation in the world's communication system. This is the development of a world market for TV programs. As a result, television programming in most countries consists of some mixture of domestically produced and imported programs as the following table reveals.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Television Programming
1970-1971
(in percentages)

Country/Television Station	Imported	Domestic
Canada/CBC*	34	66
Canada/RC*	46	54
United States/16 commercial*	1	99
United States/18 noncommercial*	2	98
Argentina/Canal 9	10	90
Argentina/Canal 11	30	70
Chile*	55	45
Colombia	34	66
Dominican Republic/Canal 3/9	50	50
Guatemala*	84	16
Mexico/Telesistema	39	61
Uruguay*	62	38
West Germany/ARD	23	77
West Germany/ZDF	30	70
Finland	40	60
France	9	91
Iceland	67	33
Ireland	54	46
Italy	13	87
Netherlands	23	77
Norway	39	61
Portugal	35	65
Sweden	33	67
Switzerland/Deutsch*	24	76
United Kingdom/BBC	12	88
United Kingdom/TV*	13	87
Bulgaria	45	55
German Democratic Republic	32	68
Hungary	40	60
Poland	17	83
Rumania	27	73
Soviet Union/Cent. 1st*	5	95
Soviet Union/Estonia	12	88
Yugoslavia/Beograd	18	82
Australia	57	43
People's Republic of China/Shanghai*	1	99
Republic of China/Enterprise	22	78
Hong Kong/RTV & HK-TVB (English)*	40	60
Hong Kong/RTV & HK-TVB Guiness*	31	69
Japan/NHK General	4	96
Japan/NHK Educational	1	99
Japan/Commercial Stations	10	90
Republic of Korea/Tong-yang	31	69
Malaysia	71	29
New Zealand*	75	25
Pakistan	35	65
Philippines/ABC, CBV	29	71
Singapore*	78	22
Thailand/Army TV*	18	82
Dubai	72	28
Iraq	52	48
Israel	55	45
Kuwait	56	44
Lebanon/Telibor	40	60
Saudi Arabia/Riyadh TV*	31	69
Saudi Arabia/Aramco TV*	100	0
United Arab Republic	41	59
Yemen*	57	43
Ghana*	27	73
Uganda*	19	81
Zambia*	64	36

** This data is based on sample week(s); all other figures are based on the full year 1970-1971. Repeats are included.*

Source: William H. Read, 1975, p. 161

The United States occupies a dominant position in the international TV program market place. As a result millions of people spend their evenings watching the "creations" of New York and Hollywood. The following table shows a Saturday evening program schedule for several TV networks around the world. (The American shows are starred.)

KENYA
6.15 Mke Nyumbanu
6.45 Dick van Dyke Show *
7.15 Habari
7.30 Soccer (Man. C. v Wolves)
8.30 Theatre "Anowa"
9.30 News
9.45 Movie

NEW ZEALAND (TV 2)
6.30 News
7.00 Dick van Dyke Show *
7.30 Million Dollar Man *
8.30 News
8.35 It's in the bag.
9.05 Morgan - A Suitable Case (movie)
10.45 Edwards on Saturday

JORDAN
5.30 Walt Disney*
6.30 News (Hebrew)
7.00 News (Arabic)
7.30 Dad's Army
8.00 Variety
9.00 News
9.05 Movie

ISRAEL
6.30 Lassie *
7.00 Grand Canyon (documentary) *
7.30 News
8.30 All in the Family *
9.00 News
10.00 Music All the Way
10.45 Country Matters

BRAZIL (Globo)
6.00 Disneyland *
7.15 Bravo (serial)
8.00 News
8.30 Escalada (serial)
9.00 Kojak *
10.00 Crooks & Coronets*
12.00 Cry Rape*

SINGAPORE (Ch. 5)
7.45 Harry Secombe Show
8.35 Streets of San Francisco*
9.30 News
9.55 Gomer Pyle*
10.25 Callan
11.20 Movie*

USA (NBC)
7.30 Candid Camera
8.00 All in the Family
8.30 The Jeffersons
9.00 Mary Tyler Moore Show
9.30 Bob Newhart Show
10.00 Miss Universe
12.00 News

UK (BBC 1)
6.00 Taras Bulba (movie)*
8.00 Seaside Special
8.55 Starsky and Hutch *
9.50 News
10.00 Soccer (Leeds U. v West Brom)

CANADA (Tor. Ch. 6)
6.30 Follyfoot
7.00 Going Places
7.30 Global Newsweek
8.00 World of Wicks
8.30 Sammy Davis, Jr.*
9.30 E.S.P.

RHODESIA
6.15 Sound Out
6.45 Brady Bunch*
7.15 Nature in question
7.45 News
8.15 Perry Mason*
9.15 World of Henry Orient

MALAYSIA
7.12 Hogans Heroes*
8.08 Belejar Tulisan Javi
8.49 Peristiva
9.08 The Main Chance
10.00 News
10.16 Rencana

AUSTRALIA
6.00 News
6.30 Captain and Tenille *
7.00 Sonny & Cher *
7.30 Streets of San Francisco *
8.30 The Sweeney
9.30 Pendulum (movie)*

ALGERIA (RTA)
6.55 Ivanhoe
7.20 Puppet Festival
7.30 Regional News
8.00 News
8.25 Family Affair*
9.05 Fernandel (French movie)

ARGENTINA
6.30 El Amor de una Espia (Walter Berry movie)*
8.00 Los Consagrados
9.00 Sonrisas La Pantera Rosa
9.30 Young at Heart (Sinatra movie)*
11.30 Variety
00.30 Vieya Amistad (Bette Davis movie)*

Source: Kentucky in the World: The World in Kentucky

The recent international trade in television programs, as Thomas Guback (1974) notes, " . . . has grown along lines already traced by the circulation of theatrical motion pictures over the last half century" (p. 90). He notes that "upwards of 30 million people around the world see the average American film during its period of release . . ." (p. 92).

American film companies not only export their products, they operate subsidiaries in other nations that make, distribute, and exhibit films. Guback's data show that American motion picture companies have some 700 foreign offices employing 16,000 people. He notes that "no industry in the United States is so heavily dependent upon foreign markets as is the film industry" (p. 92). In addition, many films are now co-produced by an American company and film companies in one or more other countries. Indeed, international co-production has become a very common means of financing and producing films as all movie-goers know who read the fine print in credit lines.

Magazines provide another example of transnational media. Reader's Digest has a foreign readership of 100 million in 13 language editions. Time and Newsweek have various international editions with large non-American circulations. Times' circulation, for example, is about four million in the United States and more than five million abroad. Walt Disney Productions produces the familiar Disney comics for sale in several nations and languages. For example, a Chilean version of Donald Duck is also sold in Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina. The National Geographic Magazine has over half a million subscribers

abroad, with Playboy providing stiff competition. The London Economist circulates widely with at least ten percent of its readership in the US. An increasing number of magazines are published in one country but exclusively designed for readers in other countries. For example, the Spanish-language Vision and its Sunday supplement, Hablemos, is published in New York for circulation in several Latin American countries.

Books and scholarly journals constitute still other media of international communication. In recent decades book translation has been growing rapidly. An increasing number of international associations in the sciences, humanities, and technology produce journals for international circulation, and many scholarly journals produced in one nation have a substantial number of subscribers in other nations.

So far I have been talking about different kinds of media that make up the global communication system. Many other types of international communication channels have been developing rapidly as well. International fares and exhibitions, a very old form of international communication, are increasing in frequency. In some areas these are very important channels of transnational communication. For example, international exhibitions play important roles in the diffusion of technology. International conferences, another old form of cross-societal communication, are also increasing in number and variety.

Organizational channels of international communication are another component of the global communication systems that have been expanding. Diplomatic and intelligence networks interlinking governments have been substantially expanded in the Twentieth Century. Other organizations

besides governments also maintain well developed networks of transnational communication. Included here are many business firms, political groups, and religious organizations.

In connection with the reference to business firms it should be noted that advertising has become a very significant form of international communication. As Tapio Varis (1976) remarks, "world communication structures have been most radically influenced by the global expansion of advertising agencies . . . " (p. 828). American-based firms such as J. Walter Thompson, McCannqErickson, Ted Bates, Young and Rubican, Ogilvy and Mather, as well as a few firms in other industrialized nations design world-wide advertising campaigns promoting the sale of thousands of products most of which are produced by multinational corporations. Most students of transnational advertising conclude that one effect is to foster the growth of consumption-oriented values, sometimes with disasterous consequences for the health and well-being of people in the Third World.

In summary, not only have the technologies of international communication rapidly expanded in the course of the past century, so have the institutional mechanisms and channels of cross-national communication. Later I will be arguing that the image of the world as a Global Village is misleading in several respects, but there is no doubt that such an image captures an important feature of the geography of the contemporary human condition.

IV

Linguistic Developments

So far I have noted two types of historical developments involved

in the evolution of systems of global transportation and communication--technological developments and institutional developments. There is a third type of development which might be labelled linguistic developments. These take two forms. One has been the development of world-wide artificial languages. The following examples illustrate some of the extant world-wide artificial languages.

$$2+2=4 \qquad \sqrt[4]{256} \qquad (\sin x)' = \cos x$$

$$\Sigma < \div = \qquad f'(x) = \frac{df(x)}{dx} = \lim_{\omega \to 0} \frac{f(x+\omega)-f(x)}{\omega}$$





4km .45359243kg 10 cm^2

25.4mm .0012g/ml



Au Fe U

$NaHCO_3 + KHC_4H_4O_6$



A second kind of linguistic development that has shaped the world communication system is evidenced in these familiar artifacts of modernity.



This is the development of what Ali Mazrai (1976) has aptly termed "world languages" and "regional languages."

> World languages are: those which have not only been exported beyond their home country, but beyond their continent or immediate region. World languages are intercontinental languages and include three of the five U.N. languages-English, Spanish, and French. In addition, to qualify as a world language, a tongue must command at least 100 million speakers, or 5 percent of the population of the world, whichever is higher, and must have been adopted by at least ten states as a national language.
>
> The second category to be differentiated is that of regional languages. Regional languages, for our purposes, are international but basically intraregional and often intracontinental. Among the five U.N. languages, the most clearly regional is Russian - limited in its impact to the Soviet Union and her immediate neighbors. It is true that the Soviet Union itself traverses both Europe and Asia. But for our purposes in this analysis the Russian language is clearly intraregional, and therefore a regional rather than a world language.
>
> In addition to Russian, other regional languages are Arabic, German, and Swahili. Swahili is certainly the most international of all indigenous African languages. Curiously enough, it is even more of an export language than either English or French in terms of ratio of the racial or native speakers to non-native speakers, though of course it is not as widely exported as those two world languages. The native speakers of Swahili are perhaps little more than 350,000, yet the language is spoken at different levels of fluency by another 40 million people. In terms of distribution among different African states, Swahili is more of an international language than Hausa, its nearest indigenous rival in the continent. Swahili is both the official and national language of Tanzania, the national language of Kenya, and is widely spoken in Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi, and on the borders of Zambia and Malawi.
>
> (pp. 332-333.)

Whether for good or ill, English is becoming the most widely used of the "world languages." It is the official language of 28 nations and <u>an</u> official language in 16 more. Eighty of the UN delegations use English in their basic working documents. English has become the operating language of international business.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Most multinational corporations including those based in nations other than the United States use English as their official language. English is overwhelmingly the language of science. More than half of the world's scientific literature is in English. Add Russian and these two languages account for three-quarters of scientific literature.

V

Some Notes on the Significance of Global Transportation and Communication

So far in this chapter I have briefly discussed three historical developments that have been involved in the evolution of systems of global transportation and communication. I have not noted any of the consequences that have flowed from this evolution. It is to this matter that I now turn very briefly.

It is hard to underestimate the significance of these developments. The growth of global systems of transportation and communication were necessary conditions (although not a sufficient condition) of the globalization that has taken place in other dimensions of the human condition. Perhaps this can be best appreciated by focusing in on a few technological innovations and noting their globalizing consequences.

To begin with the globalization of history inaugurated by European overseas expansion was made possible by innovations in the technologies of shipbuilding, navigation, and naval armaments. L. S. Stavrianos (1971) provides a good overview of the innovations:

> Between 1200 and 1500 the tonnage of the average European ship doubled or trebled. Slender galleys with a burden of 150 to 200 tons gave way to round-hulled sailing ships of 600 to 800 tons. The stern rudder, adopted in the thirteenth century, rapidly displaced the older and less efficient lateral steering devices. Equally important was

the adaptation by the Portuguese in the fourteenth century of the Arab lateen rig which enabled vessels to sail more directly into the wind. These advances in the construction and rigging of ships represented a combination of features originally developed in Northern Europe, in the Mediterranean, and in the Middle East. The net result was a ship that was larger, speedier, and more maneuverable. It was also more economical because the elimination of 100 to 200 oarsmen with their food and equipment greatly increased the cargo space.

Hand in hand with these advances in shipbuilding went those in the art of navigation. The most important contributions in this field came from the Mediterranean. The Chinese appear to have possessed a magnetic compass, but it is not certain that the Europeans acquired it from them or from Arab intermediaries. It may have been developed independently by the Europeans in the twelfth century, possibly in the Italian city of Amalfi. In any case, the compass was the most useful single instrument for navigators, but it was supplemented by several others. The astrolabe, a graduated brass circle for estimating the altitude of heavenly bodies, was known before 800 but was first used in Western navigation by the Portuguese about 1485. It was an expensive instrument and soon replaced by the simpler and cheaper quadrant. The determination of longitude presented more of a problem. A rough estimate could be gained by means of an hour glass but precise reckoning had to await Galileo's discovery of the principles of the pendulum in the seventeenth century.

Navigators were also aided by compilations of nautical information and by maps. The portolani of the Mediterranean seamen were the first true maps, furnished with accurate compass bearings and explicit details concerning coastlines and harbors. The art of map-making became fairly well developed by the fourteenth century, the leading centers being at Genoa and Majorca. The portolani were refreshingly objective and matter-of-fact compared to the writings of contemporary, learned doctrinaires who debated whether human beings could survive the killing sunbeams and the boiling ocean water at the equator. The following is an example of factual and precise instructions from a fifteenth century portolano:

> As you enter the port beware of shoals. Sail close to the middle of the channel, but towards the northeastern shore, where you may anchor. Beware of sailing too close to the shoal recently discovered on the east side. Enter the port, keeping the mainland about two prows' length distant where you have six and six-and-a-half fathoms of water. . . .

> From Palamosa to the anchoring-place of Acqua Fredda, 12 miles east-northeast, quarter east. Do not approach nearer the land than one-and-a-half miles by the beacon. The landmark of this bay is a high mountain, bald and cut sheer to sea, with islands in the distance.

When the Europeans reached the highly developed and militarily powerful countries of South and East Asia, their one decisive advantage was the superiority of their naval armament. This was attained only about the time their overseas expansion began, for naval battles in the Middle Ages had consisted largely of boarding and hand-to-hand fighting on decks. During the fifteenth century, European ships were equipped with guns, but these were of small size, shooting stones weighing ounces rather than pounds. They could kill men, but could not damage ships. Accordingly, they supplemented rather than supplanted the traditional boarding tactics of naval warfare. Large guns were being used at the time on land, as the Turks demonstrated in their successful siege of Constantinople in 1453. But these guns were so heavy that they could not be hoisted on ships, let alone mounted and fired.

In the first two decades of the sixteenth century the metallurgists of Flanders and Germany, and later of England, developed techniques for casting guns that were more manageable but of equal or greater firing power. These new pieces, five to twelve feet long, could shoot round stones--and later cast iron balls--that weighed five to sixty pounds, capable of damaging a hull at a range of 300 yards. Naval tactics now shifted from boarding to broadside gunfire, and warships were redesigned so that they soon were able to carry an average of forty guns.

These developments gave the Europeans a decisive advantage that enabled them to seize and retain control of the oceans of the world.

Jumping ahead and anticipating topics that will be discussed in subsequent chapters, let us glance at railroads and some of their consequences for the political and economic life of humankind. The earliest railways were built in Great Britain, but they quickly spread to Continental Europe and then to other parts of the world. In Europe, the spread of the railway led to the formation of new nation states,

and the creation of a large market necessary for industrialization. Outside of North America and Europe, railways were extensions of colonial domination and infrastructural needs of the colonized areas. As Kenwood (1976) pointed out "the railways of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Australasia were built primarily to assist in the export of the continents agricultural and mineral products to Europe" (p. 26).

In addition to altering traditional concepts of speed and time, the railroads introduced an unprecedented growth in the volume of freight. There is a close correlation between the growth of a worldwide land transportation network and the growth of world commerce. World commerce grew in conjunction with the growth of railroads on most continents. World commerce grew from less than $2 billion in 1800 to $20 billion in 1900. Simultaneously the existing system of railroads displayed the same type of exponential growth. The chart below shows railway mileage increases from 1840 to 1910.

	1000 miles		
	1840	1870	1910
Europe	2.6	65.4	212.1
North America	2.8	55.4	265.8
Latin America	0.1	2.4	60.7
Asia	-	5.1	59.5
Africa	-	1.1	23.0
Oceania	-	1.1	19.3
World	5.5	130.5	640.4

(Source: A. G. Kenwood, 1976, p. 26)

The railroad's stimulus to world commerce is found not so much in the reduction of travel time, but more in the reduction of transportation costs. In Great Britain the cost of carrying a ton of goods in

1830 was 0.30¢. By 1840, the railway had reduced the carrying charges from 0.3 to 0.5¢. In the United States during the 1820s 12 to 17 cents per ton mile was the common quote for road transport. The earliest railway opened from Boston to Worcester in 1833 carried the goods for a little more than 0.6¢ per ton mile. Subsequent technological improvements in railroads reduced the carrying rates still further. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, railway rates in Britain and France fell by almost half, and in the United States and Germany by more than three quarters. In India, the cost of moving a ton of cotton for one mile in 1862 was estimated at 4½d carried by a bullock cart, but with the introduction of the railway, the charge had been reduced to 1½d. Similarly in Australia, the cost of moving a ton of goods by road was about 7d per mile. With the introduction of the railway, the cost was reduced to 3d per ton mile (William Woodruff, 1967, p. 225).

Clearly without the development and diffusion of railways as inexpensive modes of transport, the world economy of the Nineteenth Century would not have grown the way it did. The railroads opened new markets, and created mass markets for perishable goods. In short, railroads encouraged the development of a worldwide complex, wholesale and retail distribution system, and by so doing insured an increased economic demand which, in effect, raised the standard of living for industrializing societies.

Technological developments in ocean transportation also bore far-reaching consequences for world politics and economics. The development of steamships in the Nineteenth Century is intimately linked with

British hegemony in the world politics of this century. Supplied with ample domestic coal supplies and far-flung refueling stations, the British navy dominated the world's oceans.

World trade was also stimulated by technological innovations in ocean and transport. Harbors were improved and new machines introduced for rapid handling of cargoes. Ocean transport was also speeded up by the cutting of ship canals. The Suez Canal which opened in 1869 and the Panama Canal which opened in 1915 were the most significant of these enterprises. These two developments were very significant in linking the world closer together. In the case of the Suez Canal, the continent of Africa had in effect been eliminated as a barrier to sea trading. The distance had instantaneously been cut by several thousand miles. At the same time it also linked together the Red Sea and the Mediterranean ocean. In the case of the Panama canal, a link had been created between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, thereby cutting travel distance around the horn of South America. As William Woodruff (1967) has pointed out, "At one stroke the cutting of the Suez Canal reduced the sea journey between London and Singapore by almost one-third and between London and Bombay by more than forty percent" (p. 243). The following tables illustrate the distance and time reductions which took place with the opening of the Suez Canal and the Panama Canals.

Suez Canal

Route		In Nautical Miles		
From	To	via Cape	via Suez Canal	Distance Saved (%)
London	Bombay	10,667	6,274	41
London	Calcutta	11,900	8,803	32
London	Singapore	11,740	8,362	29
London	Hong Kong	13,180	9,799	26
London	Sydney	12,690	12,145	4

Panama Canal

Route		In Nautical Miles		
From	To	via Magellan	via Panama	Distance Saved (%)
Liverpool	San Francisco	13,502	7,836	42
New York	San Francisco	13,135	5,262	60
Liverpool	Valparaiso	8,747	7,207	18
New York	Valparaiso	8,385	4,633	45
New York	Hong Kong	16,579	11,539	30
New York	Sydney	13,000	9,332	29

(Source: William Woodruff, 1967, p. 260)

The most important economic effect of the canals was to expand intercontinental trade. The Suez Canal stimulated the development of trade between Europe and Asia. Both European and Indian trade and European and Chinese trade were substantially increased.

Although the Panama Canal did not have the same significance in terms of trade as did the Suez, it was nonetheless important in fostering the growth of trade between North America's east and west coasts and between the US and the Far East.

In the area of communications, most of us today use the telegraph so little that it is hard to imagine the far-reaching significance that this technological innovation had in the Nineteenth Century. On July 27, 1866, The Times of London published an article headed "Shrinking World." The Times observed:

> So far as human foresight can judge, the Old and the New World will be in telegraphic communication before tomorrow night. The prospect opened to the world by this achievement is so marvellous that any attempt to describe it must give only a faint and feeble picture. The two most active and energetic nations of the globe are placed in hourly communication. The Governments of England and the United States will be able to converse rapidly and freely, removing misconceptions should they arise, and transacting their affairs without the delay of a voyage during which the face of events may be changed. To the mercantile interests of both countries the gain must be immense . . . also for corresponding with British North America . . . . Indeed, now that the great enterprise is completed, there can be no doubt that in a few years the entire globe will be spanned by the telegraph wires, and the news of the planet will be given every morning in the London papers. The Atlantic makes the only great break in the continuity of the land of the globe. The three old Continents are a single mass . . . . By bridging the Atlantic these two great systems are brought into connection. It is a great work, a glory to our age and nation, and the men who have achieved it deserve to be honoured among the benefactors of their race.
>
> (Quoted in Collin Cherry, 1971, p. 103.)

The Times' prophecies were not quite on target, but neither were they very wrong. As it turned out, the coming of the telegraphic age probably affected human politics less than The Times believed it would, and probably effected human economics more than was predicted. The advent of intercontinental telegraph service was a major factor in the development of world markets with world prices.

In our time global satellite communication has had some of the

same kind of consequences as did the telegraph in the previous century. Satellites' instantaneous data transmission and telecommunication capabilities have been a significant factor in the growth of multinational corporations capable of operating very diverse enterprises in all parts of the world all under the direction of a single central headquarters. Satellite communication is also an important element in the growth of shared history. Lester Brown (1972) notes for example that:

> The Apollo 11 mission, culminating in man's first step on the moon, was seen live by several hundred million viewers, making it the most widely shared event in human history. Other events, such as the 1972 Olympic games held in Munich, Germany, the investiture of the Prince of Wales, and the American political conventions, have been televised globally. Indeed, the number of viewers of the American political conventions outside the United States exceeded those within. (p. 266)

It seems likely that the widespread television coverage of the Vietnam War was a major factor in the growth of opposition to American policy in both the United States and elsewhere in the world.

VI

Summary

This chapter has provided a brief discussion of the evolution of systems of global transportation and communication. I have tried to make two main points:

1. The evolution of global transport and communication systems involved three major kinds of historical developments:
   (a) the development of new technologies,
   (b) the development of new institutions, and
   (c) the development of world-wide "artificial languages" and the internationalization of traditional languages.

2. The globalization of the geography of the human condition is central to the globalization of other dimensions of the human condition. Without the evolution of global systems of transportation and communication the globalization of history discussed in the last chapter could not have taken place nor would the developments that I will be discussing in the next several sections.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL ECONOMY*

I

Overview

Viewing the globalization of the human condition from an economic perspective, one sees in the modern era a profound transformation in humankind's economic life. On the eve of European expansion the world's economic landscape can be characterized in the following way:

> Most economic activity (i.e., the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services) took place in small, locally based and largely self contained economic systems.
>
> Looking at the world as a whole, most of the trans-societal economic activity that did take place was confined to intercourse between local economies and their immediate neighbors.
>
> In some parts of the world, particularly in Eurasia (including North Africa) reasonably complex and sophisticated regional trading systems did exist.
>
> In Eurasia these regional trading systems were loosely interlinked by ancient network of trans-continential trading routes. However, trans-Eurasian trade was small in volume, confined mostly to luxuries such as spices, silk, precious stones, and perfumes, and of limited or no significance to the economic life of the vast majority of people.
>
> Economic intercourse among the world's continents outside of Eurasia was non-existent except for very limited trade relations between Eurasia and Sub-Saharan Africa. This is to say, the Americas and Australasia were totally isolated from one another and in turn from Eurasia and Africa, and the latter two regions were only marginally connected.

In a word, prior to the modern era humankind's economic life was decidedly non-global.

---

*This chapter, like the previous one, is co-authored with Neils Herlevsen. However, "I" rather than "we" continues to be used so as to make the section grammatically consistent with the rest of the paper.

In the Sixteenth Century, this millennia old condition began to change. During this century a rudimentary world economy came into existence. In the course of the next four centuries the embryonic world economy of the Sixteenth Century evolved into a global economy that now incorporates in varying degrees and in differing ways all of the world's local, national, and regional economies and makes the contemporary world a single economic unit.

In this chapter we shall look briefly at the origin and subsequent development of a global economy. Needless to say the discussion will be highly selective since in a few pages I will be surveying five centuries of highly complex economic history.

II

Origins of a Global Economy

As noted above, the conception of the modern global economy can be dated to the Sixteenth Century. Here we see the emergence of a primitive world economy which becomes extensively elaborated in the subsequent centuries. What is there about the Sixteenth Century that made it the birthplace of a global economy? As might be expected, historians do not provide a single, universally acknowledged answer to this question. However, there is considerable agreement that the emergence of a world economy is intimately tied to a set of interrelated events associated with the development of capitalism of Europe. These include the expansion of market systems of economic exchange, the increasing monetization of economies,

The rise of the bourgeoisie or middle class, and the subsequent political alignment of this class with the rulers of the emerging European post-feudal states.

The interaction of these events combined with the innovation in transportation and military technology that made European overseas expansion possible gave rise to the mercantile empires of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century. "These empires constituted," as Robert Gilplan (1977) observes, "the initial type of an interdependent international economy on a global scale" (p. 25).

There are two aspects of the mercantile era in the history of the development of a global economy that should be emphasized. First, it was in this era that significant change began to occur in the scope, the composition, and the volume of international trade. Second, in this era a world division of labor begins to emerge.

Change in the Scope, Composition, and Volume of World Trade

As noted above, prior to 1500 the bulk of what we now think of as international trade took place in Eurasia and consisted mostly of trade in luxuries such as spices, silks, perfumes and precious stones. During the mercantile era this limited trading system was transformed in three major ways.

To begin with, the goegraphical scale of trade became worldwide. The mercantile empires interlinked Europe, the Americas, and Africa in a reasonable complex network of trade relationships. Furthermore, the composition of the goods moving through this transcontinental trading system was very different from the traffic in luxury goods that characterized trade between Europe

and Asia in the pre-1500 era. The European colonies in the Americas began to supply Europe with many national resources: gold, silver, tobacco, sugar, furs, and later coffee, cotton, wool, and a variety of basic foods, and in turn the colonies became increasingly important consumers of European-made manufactured goods.

In addition to manufactured goods, the colonies, particularly the New World plantation economies had to import much of their labor force. The Europeans turned to Africa for this labor force, thus initiating a triangular network of intercontinetal trade of alcohol, guns, and cloth from Europe to Africa, slaves from Africa to the Americas, and bullion and raw materials from the Americas to Europe.

However, the expanding network of international trade was not limited to intercontinental trade between Europe, the Americas, and Africa. In the same era, trade within Europe was increasing particularly between Western and Eastern Europe. In this case, again Western Europe became the importer of raw materials, particularly food grains, but also meats, hides, and flax. Conversely, Poland, Hungary, Russia, and subsequently the Balkans imported from Western Europe textiles, weapons, and other manufactured products.

The expanding geographical scope and the changing composition of international trade in the mercantile era corresponded, as you would expect, with an increase in the volume of international trade. This increasing volume of world trade has become a hallmark of the modern era and one of the major historical forces in

the creation of global economy. Estimates show that the value of world trade increased fifty-fold in the period from 1750 to 1913, a rate of increase greater than population growth. From 1913 to 1970 world trade increased 460 times, or 2.47 percent per year on the average. The following graph dramatizes this long term trend in the growth of world trade.

Volume of World Trade, 1720-1971



Source: W.W. Rostow, 1978, p. 66

The Emergence of World Division of Labor

The growth of a world-wide commercial system in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries while significant in its own right, is even more significant as an indicator of a very funda-

mental structural change that began to take place in the world during the Sixteenth Century. This was the emergence of a world division of labor. L.S. Stavrianos (1971) notes of the early modern era that an "international division of labor for the first time had been achieved on a significant scale. . . . The Americas and Eastern Europe (with Siberia) produced raw materials, Africa provided manpower, Asia an assortment of luxury commodities, while Western Europe directed these global operations and increasingly concentrated on industrial output" (p. 169).

A few things need to be stressed about the world division of labor that first emerged in the Sixteenth Century and that was further developed in subsequent centuries. First, the division of labor integrated the world economically. As Stavrianos (1971) notes because of the international division of labor that emerged in the modern era, "the world was on its way to becoming an economic unit" (p. 169).

But it was not an economic unit characterized by equality in the geographical distribution of economic functions and rewards. To the contrary, the emergent global economy as Immanual Wallerstein (1974) observes, "was built on a world wide division of labor in which various zones of this

economy. . .were assigned specific economic roles, developed different class structures, used consequentially different modes of labor control, and profited unequally from the workings of the system" (p. 162).

This geographical differentiation of rewards, cost, and functions can be highlighted by looking at the composition and distribution of the labor force. Wallerstein (1974) provides a succinct overview of the situation:

> The world-economy at this time had various kinds of workers: There were slaves who worked on sugar plantations and in easy kinds of mining operations which involved skimming off the surface. There were "serfs" who worked on large domains where grain was cultivated and wood harvested. There were "tenant" farmers on various kinds of cash-crop operations (including grain), and wage laborers in some agricultural production. This accounted for 90-95% of the population in the European world-economy. There was a new class of "yeoman" farmers. In addition, there was a small layer of intermediate personnel--supervisors of laborers, independent artisans, a few skilled workmen--and a thin layer of ruling classes, occupied in overseeing large land operations, operating major institutions of the social order, and to some extent pursuing their own leisure. This last group included both the existing nobility and the patrician bourgeoisie (as well as, of course, the Christian clergy and the state bureaucracy).
>
> A moment's thought will reveal that these occupational categories were not randomly distributed either geographically or ethnically within the burgeoning world-economy. After some false starts, the picture rapidly evolved of a slave class of African origins located in the Western Hemisphere, a "serf" class divided into two segments: a major one in eastern Europe and a smaller one of American Indians in the Western Hemishpere. The peasants in western and southern Europe were for the most part "tenants." The wage-workers were almost all west Europeans. The yeoman farmers were drawn largely

> even more narrowly, principally from northwest Europe. The intermediate classes were pan-European in origin (plus mestizos and mulattoes) and distributed geographically throughout the area. The ruling classes were also pan-European, but I believe one can demonstrate disproportionately from western Europe.
> (pp. 86-87)

The long term historical significance of these facts is probably obvious. In this early world division of labor we see the historical origins of the great inequality that characterizes the geographical distribution of wealth in the contemporary global economy. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any data that enables me to present a statistical history of the growing gap between the world's rich and the world's poor prior to the middle of the Nineteenth Century. But from this point on, data are available. The historical pattern observable from 1860 to the present is very likely an extension and amplification of a trend in the distribution of the world's wealth that got underway in the Sixteenth Century.

The following figure shows a Lorenz curve for world income in 1860 and 1960. A Lorenz curve shows the degree of inequality in the distribution of a value, in this case wealth. The diagonal represents a distribution characterized by perfect equality; this is to say, a situation in which ten percent of the world population receives ten percent of the world's wealth; twenty percent of the population, twenty percent of the wealth, and so on. The more the actual curve departs from the diagonal; the greater the degree of inequality.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Source: L.J. Zimmerman (1965), p. 39.

The figure clearly reveals a very substantial increase in world inequality during the past century. The following table shows the same historical trend in more detail and with greater precision.

Trends in World Income Inequalities

(Gini index)

1860	.465	1958	.545
1880	.470	1959	.551
1900	.508	1960	.548
1913	.503	1961	.554
1929	.506	1962	.555
1952-54	.531	1963	.560
1960	.612	1964	.562
		1965	.568
		1966	.568
		1967	.567

A Gini index is a simple statistical measure of inequality, the mathematical details of which need not concern us here. In reading the table just keep in mind that the higher the index, up to a value of one, the greater the inequality in the distribution of world wealth. George Modelski (1972) provides a good interpretation of meaning of the data depicted in the table:

> The global trends are unequivocal in their decisiveness. Over a period of more than one hundred years, a clear worldwide trend of steadily rising income inequality may be observed. In 1860, world income was distributed fairly unequally, with a Gini index level of .465 which might be compared with the average level for the United States in 1959 of .439. Present-day levels of world income inequality are, by contrast, the highest on record, the nearest comparison to the high .567 for the world in 1967 being the .510 recorded for the state of Mississippi in 1959. It might be said, without much exaggeration, that in some respects the world is like Mississippi--only more so.
> (p. 342)

III

The Effects of the Industrial Revolution

While the ultimate origins of the contemporary gap between rich and poor nations can be traced to the world division of labor that emerged in the mercantile era, it was the Industrial Revolution that consolidated this division and produced the accelerating level of inequality observable in the data reported above. This was the case because the emergence of the Industrial Revolution in Britain and its subsequent spread to Europe and North America transformed the embryonic world economy of the mercantile era into the much more highly interconnected global economy characteristic of the Nineteenth Century. In the words of Gunnar Myrdal (1956), the Industrial Revolution began an

"irreversible increase in the internal and external interdependence of economic systems" (p. 32). Or as Robert Gilpin (1977) puts it, "domestically and internationally, the Industrial Revolution increased the interlocking of economic activities within and among nations through increasing functional and geographical specialization of production" (p. 32).

The heightened level of international economic interdependence characteristic of the global economy in the Nineteenth Century is evidenced in three primary ways--in a marked increase in world trade, in the growth of foreign investments, and in the development of world markets centered in Britain.

As the graph on world trade presented previously shows, the Nineteenth Century witnessed a dramatic increase in the volume of world trade. This increase reflects the emergence of an era of free trade. In 1846 Britain repealed the Corn Laws which had restricted the import of grain foods into Great Britain. The free trade movement spread to other industrializing nations. The result was a dramatic four-fold expansion of world trade between 1870 and 1913. While impressive in and of itself, the real significance of this increase lies in the fact that the relative proportion of world trade to world product increased markedly. By 1913, the volume of foreign trade per capita had grown to over 25 times what it had been in 1810, where as world output per capita had grown only 2.2 times over the same period. In short, international trade not only increased in absolute volume, its relative economic significance in humankind's overall economic life

also increased.

The latter fact is also reflected in the changes that begin to occur in the late Nineteenth Century in the regional distribution of world trade. The table below shows the regional distribution of world trade for 1876 and 1960.

Regional Distribution of World Trade, 1876-1960

	Trade as % of Total World Trade		*% Change*
	1876–80	*1960*	*1876–1960*
World	100	100	—
Europe	66·9	51·4	−23·1
N. America	9·5	18·4	+93·6
C. & S. America	5·4	7·6	+40·7
Asia	12·9	14·3	+10·3
Africa	1·9	5·5	+189·4
Oceania	3·4	2·4	−29·4

Source: J. Forbes Munroe, 1976, p. 15

In the Nineteenth Century the world trading system was clearly centered in Europe. But as the table suggests, North America, Latin America, Africa and Asia had begun to assume a greater role in the world trading system by the end of the century, a trend which was to grow in the Twentieth Century.

The increasing interdependence of the world economy in the Nineteenth Century is also evident in the growth of foreign investment. While foreign investment, in a variety of forms, can be traced back several centuries, it was only in the Nineteenth Century, and even more specifically in the last few decades of this century, that foreign investment began to become a highly significant feature of global economic interaction.

Foreign investment refer to transactions in which the residents of one country acquire assets in another. These transactions can assume a number of forms, For example, a person or institution in France may purchase securities in an American business or the bonds of an American government. Or, an American businessperson may export goods to another nation and leave the proceeds on deposit in that nation. Or, an American company may own and operate a firm in another country, or a company located in another nation may own and operate a firm in the United States.

At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century the total value of foreign investment was small. Because it was small, the economic impact on both borrowing and lending countries was slight. As A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed (1971) observe of foreign investment at this time: "It was a business activity undertaken almost exclusively by a few privileged European trading and financial organizations with foreign interests" (p. 37). They go on to note that a change began to occur at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and foreign investment began to assume a new character and a greater significance.

> This change came about for a number of reasons. The establishment and growth of specialized financial institutions in both borrowing and lending countries, such as commercial banks (operating in foreign exchange) and investment houses, made foreign investment easier and less risky, while the accumulation of savings by a middle class willing to invest them abroad supplied the funds needed for an expansion of foreign lending. The flow of funds from savers in one country to borrowers in another was also facilitated by the appear-

> ance of more sophisticated financial instruments, such as credit money and bills of exchange. In addition, capital markets, such as 'the City' in London, became more diversified in their business dealings, thereby aiding the expansion of international trade and the growth of foreign investment.
>
> From the end of the Napoleonic Wars until the mid-fifties about £20m ($2,05m.) was invested abroad. By 1870 the total value of these investments had more than trebled. But the great era of international lending occurred after 1870, with the capital outflow becoming a flood during the decade before World War I. By 1900 foreign investments totalled £4,750m. ($23,000m.), and they rose rapidly during the next few years to reach £9,500m. ($43,000m.) in 1914.
>
> (pp.39-40)

Just how markedly the volume of foreign investment increased around the turn of this century is highlighted by the fact that from 1870 to 1890 foreign investment grew at a rate of about nine percent per decade whereas from 1890 to 1913, the rate of growth was over eighty percent per decade. (Peter J. Katzenstein, 1975, p. 1024)

Europe was the origin of the bulk of foreign investment in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries as Graph 1 shows. The recipients of foreign investment included every region of the world, but with a lion's share going to North America and Europe as Graph 2 shows.

Graph 1

Distribution of Foreign Investment by Investing Region, 1914



Graph 2

Distribution of Foreign Investment by Recipeint Regions



Source: A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, 1971, p. 41, 42.

By commenting separately upon trade and investment the impression may have been left that these were separate and independent mechanisms shaping the development of the global economy in the Nineteenth Century. But such is not the case. To the contrary, as Robert Gilpin (1977) notes:

> . . . Trade and investment reinforced one another in creating an interdependent world economy. The income from trade was invested abroad to develop the production of primary products on a vast scale and to create there a market for European, especially British, manufacturers. Foreign investment opened up a vast market for machines, railroads, and other capital goods. In exchange for these goods, Britain obtained industrial metals (Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Malaya), meat (Argentina), rubber (Ceylon, Malaya), etc. Thus, the expansion of trade in the latter part of the nineteenth century was largely dependent upon the flow of investment (p. 37).

Closely linked to the expansion of trade and investment was a third hallmark of Nineteenth Century economic history. This was the growth of three types of world markets, all of which were centered in Great Britain. One was a capital or money market. This market supplied the bulk of short-term credit needed to finance the expanded volume of trade and organized much of the long-term foreign investment.

A second market was the international commodity exchange in which London played the role of middleman in the flow of commodities between producing and consuming regions of the world. It was in London that such commodities as food grains from North America, meat from Argentina, wool from Australia, and rubber from Malaya entered world markets, acquired a world price, and ultimately found their way to consumers.

The international currency market was a third kind of world market centered in London. The pound sterling was the world's principle medium of account in the Nineteenth Century, and hence the Bank of England through its interest rate policies exercised a central managerial role in the international monetary systems.

The "Nineteenth Century" World Economy in Perspective

I have been noting that in the years between 1760 (a conventionally used year in dating the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and 1913 (a year that marks the close of the Nineteenth Century as an economic era) the rudimentary world economy that had been evolving since the Sixteenth Century was elaborated upon in several ways. Let me briefly summarize these developments.

1. The Industrial Revolution built on the world division of labor that had appeared in the earlier era, and in so doing accentuated this division. The global economy became increasingly divided between industrial and non-industrial economies with a concomitant increase of inequality in the distribution of world wealth.

2. National economies became increasingly interconnected through: (a) an expanding volume of world trade, (b) the growth of foreign investments, (c) the development of world capital, commodity, and currency markets centered in Great Britain.

The outbreak of World War I marked the end of this era. Robert Gilpin writes:

> The First World War dealt a cripping blow to what in many respects was the Golden Age of an interdependent global market economy. The intensity and duration of the war revolutionized

> both domestic and international economies. The economic burden of the war had greatly weakened Great Britain and had forced her to liquidate much of her overseas investments. International markets had been disrupted and in many cases destroyed. The demands of the war effort on the major combatants, had necessitated extensive government intervention in the economy; even in Great Britain the market economy gave way to a command economy. Outside of Europe, the demand for war material and the cutoff of European goods stimulated industrialization. In short, the war profoundly altered the role of the state in the economy and the international distribution of economic power.
> (p. 47)

The years spanning World War I and World War II were marked by several developments that substantially shaped the evolution of the global economy. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the world market economy following the Bolshevik Revolution was one such development. The emergence of rival economic blocks was another. The growth of protectionist commerical policies still another.

But in many respects the Great Depression may have been the single most significant development in the interwar period. The global scale of the depression of the 1920s and 30s revealed vividly and painfully just how deeply embedded global interdependence had become in the structure of humankind's economic life.

IV

Post World War II Developments in the Global Economy

The history of the world economy since 1945 is marked by several developments. The cumulative effects of these has been to enhance the level of economic interaction among nations and to increase the complexity of global economic interdependence. I shall briefly discuss several of the most important of these developments.

The Creation of International Economic Organizations

After World War II, national governments in the Western world developed a set of international procedures and organizations to regulate important aspects of international economic interaction. These procedures and institutions are commonly known as the Bretton Woods system.

The political bases of the Bretton Woods system are to be found in the blending of three conditions: the concentration of power in a small number of states, the existence of a cluster of important interests shared by those states, and the presence of a dominant power willing and able to assume a leadership role (Joan Spero, 1977).

World War II left Europe and Japan in a state of industrial and financial destitution. While degrees of war damage to factories, railroads, harbors, and the internal economic infrastructures varied from country to country, it was universally severe. Imports were vitally needed not only to feed and clothe the populations but also to begin the process of renewing and replacing capital equipment so that domestic economic activity could be restored.

The United States, whose industrial and agricultural capacity

had been expanding during the war, was to emerge as the dominant economy at the war's conclusion. Consequently, in 1945, the United States held a position of unique and unchallenged political-military-economic power among the capitalist nations. In short, an era of U.S. hegemony had begun. Under U.S. leadership the construction of a new economic order commenced.

The new order was intended to be a system of limited management of the world economy through international organizations. Two of these international organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, known as the World Bank) were, for the first time in history, to perform central bank functions for the international economic system.

The International Monetary Fund was to be the keeper of the rules and the main instrument of public international management. Under the established system of voting, the United States exerted the dominant influence in that organization. Accordingly, the design of the International Monetary Fund aimed at establishing a system of multilateral trade and payments compatible with the maintenance of high levels of income and employment. Consistent with this purpose, the designers of IMF wanted to prevent a repetition of the so-called beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930's, when countries used trade restrictions, subsidies, and competitive depreciation of exchange rates in attempts to solve domestic unemployment problems by increasing their trade surpluses--thereby shifting their domestic unemployment problems to other countries. So an important awareness of interdependence expressed itself in this institutional arrangement. In the words of Austin Robinson "What was

Bretton Woods about if it was not the creation of a world in which countries did not close their eyes to the repercussions of their actions on others?" (Robinson, p. 19)

As it emerged from the negotiations of 1943-44 the Fund Agreement contained the following essential features: (1) Each Fund member would establish, with Fund approval, a par value for its currency and would undertake to maintain market exchange rates for its currency within one per cent of the declared value. (2) Except for transitional arrangements permitting a one-time adjustment of up to ten per cent in initial par values, members would change their par values only after having secured Fund approval. Such approval would be given only if the country's balance of payments was in "fundamental disequilibrium" (Wigglesworth, 1966, p. 675). (3) After a transitional period, currencies would be convertible in the sense that countries would undertake to redeem balances of their currencies acquired by other members; such convertibility would be either gold or the currency of the member requesting conversion. (4) The Fund would be in a position to lend to countries in deficit out of its holdings of gold and currencies arising from subscriptions by its members in relation to their quotas. These quotas were determined according to each member's size in the world economy. (5) If a country's currency became "scarce" in the Fund, the latter would authorize other countries to adopt exchange controls on imports and other current account purchases from the surplus country. So the main functions of the IMF were to lay the ground rules for the conduct of post-war international finance; to serve as an instrument of consultation, advice, and cooperation between countries and to provide short and medium-term financial assistance

to countries in external deficit.

A second organization created at Bretton Woods was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). International capital markets, already reduced during the Great Depression, practically disappeared during World War II. The World Bank was established to meet some of the need created by a profound shortage of capital.

The Bank, in accordance with this basic purpose, emphasized reconstruction loans in its early years of existence and, in the 1950s, after Europe's recovery, the Bank began to focus on loans to the developing nations. The largest portion of such loans has been for transportation and power development.

A third major international institution established at Bretton Woods was the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Its intended purpose was to provide an international mechanism for regulating international trade according to three principles. One was the principle of non-discrimination, which established the most-favored nation norm in international trade. A second principle sought to promote trade by restricting the use of quotas, export subsidies and other non-tariff means of restricting trade. A third principle emphasized the importance of international consultation in the making of trade policy. Accordingly, GATT provides an institutional framework for multilateral negotiations among the world's major trading nations.

In summary, the international economic organizations created at the conclusion of World War II sought to institutionalize the interests of the United States as the dominant economic power.

This was done by developing international institutions whose aim was to promote the growth of a world economy characterized by a free flow of trade and investment across national borders.

The Growth of Direct Foreign Investment and the Expansion of Multinational Enterprises

The international capital movements characteristic of the Nineteenth Century world economy were dominated by what economists call portfolio investment. This is the type of investment in which you would be involved if you were to purchase stock in a corporation. There is a second type of investment that economists term direct investment. Direct investment differs from portfolio investment in that the former involves direct management control. For example, if you purchased stock in British-American Tobacco Incorporated, a British-based firm, you would not exercise managerial control over the firm. On the other hand, if you were the president of an American corporation that purchased B.A.T. you would exercise managerial control over the latter.

In the post-war era, foreign investment of the portfolio type has increased substantially. However, a more significant trend has been the growth of direct foreign investment. This is illustrated by the following table that shows the growth of both direct and portfolio foreign investment on the part of Americans. (The figures are in billions of dollars.)

	1950	1960	1970	1973
Long Term:				
Direct	11.8	31.9	78.2	107.3
Portfolio	5.7	12.7	26.8	36.2

(Source: Committee on Foreign Relations, 1975, p. 11)

As the table clearly indicates, both types of investment have been growing rapidly but the growth of direct investment far outstrips portfolio investment.

Direct investment by other developed countries, though smaller than American investment, also has risen by dramatic proportions. From 1960 to 1971 the stock of direct investments by West Germany rose from $758.1 million to $7.3 billion, that of the United Kingdom rose from almost $12.0 billion to $24.0 billion, and that of Japan rose from $289.0 million to $4.5 billion (Joan Spero, 1976, p. 91).

The growth of direct foreign investment is closely linked to one of the most significant institutional changes in the world economy since 1945. This is the widespread development of a type of organization that we have come to call multinational corporations (MNC).

There is no universal definition of a multinational corporation. Some economists state that a multinational corporation is a company whose foreign sales have reached a ratio of say, 25 per cent (or some other share) of total sales. Professor Raymond Vernon of Harvard University an outstanding authority on the multinational enterprise, regards these to be any company that attempts to carry out its activities on an international scale as though there were no national boundaries.

Depending upon the definition used, there now exists between 500 to over 3000 multinational corporations. But, however many there may be, there is no question multinational corporations have become economically powerful institutions. It is estimated that some 300 multinational corporations may control 75 percent of the world's

productive capability and employ 20 percent of the world's labor force (Werner Feld, 1970, p. 10). One can readily get a sense of the significance of MNC's by comparing the gross world sales and the gross national product of nations as is done in the following table. The table shows the world's 100 largest economic units. Of these 51 are MNC's and 49 are nation states. To take one example, General Motors' gross sales exceed the gross national product of 126 of the 150 or so independent nations. Not only are these MNC's big, they are growing rapidly as is indicated in the table following the listing of MNC's and nations.

Rank	Country or Company	GNP or sales (billions)	Growth Rate 1965–70 (percent)
1	United States	$974.0	42.98
2	Soviet Union	485.7	60.10
3	Japan	196.7	32.64
4	West Germany	184.8	64.69
5	France	146.3	56.51
6	People's Republic of China	121.0	55.26
7	United Kingdom	116.3	17.23
8	Italy	91.7	61.55
9	Canada	78.0	62.33
10	India	52.5	6.66
11	Poland	46.0	50.52
12	Brazil	40.4	83.85
13	East Germany	39.6	50.57
14	Mexico	33.2	70.79
15	Australia	32.9	44.90
16	Spain	32.5	49.61
17	Czechoslovakia	32.5	47.99
18	Sweden	31.5	62.82
19	Netherlands	31.3	65.03
20	Belgium	25.0	49.72
21	Romania	24.4	64.53
22	Argentina	23.9	49.15
23	Switzerland	20.6	47.73

24	General Motors	18.8	90.44
25	Yugoslavia	18.5	118.16
26	Pakistan	17.9	60.00
27	South Africa	17.8	66.40
28	American Telephone & Telegraph	17.0	53.27
29	Standard Oil (New Jersey)	16.6	44.29
30	Denmark	15.8	57.83
31	Ford Motor	15.0	29.38
32	Indonesia	14.0	34.52
33	Austria	13.7	49.37
34	Bulgaria	11.7	74.36
35	Norway	11.2	60.15
36	Royal Dutch/Shell	10.8	50.35
37	Venezuela	10.3	34.20
38	Finland	10.2	25.64
39	Iran	10.1	70.36
40	Philippines	9.8	89.05
41	Sears Roebuck	9.3	44.94
42	Greece	9.2	65.40
43	Korea, South	8.9	206.51
44	General Electric	8.72	40.44
45	Turkey	8.68	6.87
46	Chile	8.4	96.59
47	International Business Machines	7.5	110.01
48	Mobil Oil	7.3	47.94
49	Columbia	7.07	38.6
50	Chrysler	6.99	32.07
51	Unilever	6.9	34.96
52	Thailand	6.8	76.18
53	International Telephone & Telegraph	6.4	256.92
54	Texaco	6.3	68.03
55	U.A.R. (Egypt)	6.3	34.04
56	Western Electric	5.9	74.18
57	Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea (New York)	5.7	10.37
58	Peru	5.64	31.95
59	Israel	5.59	64.67
60	China (Taiwan)	5.5	98.40
61	Gulf Oil	5.4	59.40
62	Safeway Stores (Oakland)	4.9	65.36
63	U.S. Steel	4.8	9.40
64	Volkswagenwerk	4.314	86.18
65	Westinghouse Electric	4.313	80.46
66	Standard Oil of California	4.18	71.49
67	Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken	4.16	99.76
68	J. C. Penney (New York)	4.15	81.34
69	British Petroleum	4.1	68.68
70	Nippon Steel	4.0	
71	Malaysia	3.91	36.53
72	Ireland	3.85	37.25
73	Ling-Temco-Vought	3.8	
74	Kroger (Cincinnati)	3.735	46.22
75	Standard Oil (Indiana)	3.732	51.01
76	Boeing	3.677	81.75
77	E. I. du Pont de Nemours	3.613	19.76
78	Shell Oil	3.589	40.12
79	ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries)	3.509	53.67
80	British Steel	3.495	
81	North Korea	3.5	40.00

82	General Telephone & Electronics	3.4	68.90
83	Hibachi	3.32	
84	Morocco	3.31	27.35
85	RCA	3.29	61.21
86	Siemens	3.196	78.05
87	Goodyear Tire & Rubber	3.194	43.53
88	Swift	3.1	11.81
89	Farbwerke Hoechst	3.027	
90	Union Carbide	3.026	46.60
91	Daimler-Benz	3.018	
92	Procter & Gamble	2.978	44.63
93	August Thysson-Hutte	2.956	
94	Bethlehem Steel	2.935	13.80
95	BASE	2.874	
96	Montecatini Edison	2.841	
97	Marcor (Chicago)	2.804	
98	Eastman Kodak	2.784	
99	Kraftco	2.751	
100	Greyhound	2.739	

Income in World Sales of the Twenty Largest Multinational Corporations, 1970 to 1971 (in billions of dollars)

	World Sales	
	1970	1971
1 General Motors	18.8	28.3
2 American Telephone & Telegraph	17.0	18.5
3 Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon)	16.6	18.7
4 Ford Motor	15.0	16.4
5 Royal Dutch Shell	10.8	12.7
6 Sears Roebuck	9.3	10.0
7 General Electric	8.7	9.4
8 IBM	7.5	8.3
9 Mobil Oil	7.3	8.2
10 Chrysler	7.0	8.0
11 Unilever	6.9	7.5
12 ITT	6.4	7.3
13 Texaco	6.3	7.5
14 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea	5.7	5.5
15 Gulf Oil	5.4	5.9
16 Safeway Stores	4.9	5.3
17 U.S. Steel	4.8	4.9
18 Volkswagen	4.3	5.0
19 Westinghouse Electric	4.3	4.6
20 Standard Oil of California	4.2	5.1
Total	171.2	197.1

Source: Finlay and Hovett, 1975, p. 336

The economic significance of MNC's lies not so much in their size and growth rates, but in the fact that these enterprises serve to "internationalize" the production of goods and services. Lester Brown (1972) explains what this means in the following way:

> Production of goods and services is 'international' when it combines factors of production from more than one country. It may, for example, combine capital from one country with technology from a second, labor from a third and raw materials from still other countries. The innumerable variations on this general theme can involve from two to perhaps a dozen or more countries in the manufacture of any single product. A given country may supply technology for one industry and provide raw materials for another. For a third, it may be the principal source of capital (p. 9).

The internationalization of production represents a very significant innovation in the structure of international economics. As Brown points out: "Where once economic relationships among nations were dominated by international trade, today they are increasingly dominated by international production, organized and managed by corporations whose headquarters may be in any one of them" (pp. 9-10). One bit of evidence supportive of this generalization is found in the fact that in 1970 the Gross World Product was estimated to be three trillion dollars, and of this, international production was estimated to contribute $450 billion. International production is estimated to be growing at eight percent annually which is slightly faster than the per year growth of international trade and substantially faster than the Gross World Product. To bring the matter closer to home, it is significant to note that US based MNC's production abroad is between six to seven time the total of U.S. exports. As Hayward Alker, et al. (1974) observe, the non-American production of

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

US-based MNC's is in "many ways the most important form of American involvement in the world economy" (p. 11).

What is true of the United States is also true in differing degrees of several other industrialized nations, as the following table indicates.

Major Countries' International Production and Exports, 1971
[Millions of dollars]

	Stock of Foreign Direct Investment (Book Value)	Estimated International Production	Exports	International Production as Percentage of Exports
United States	86,000	172,000	43,492	395.5
United Kingdom	24,020	48,000	22,367	214.6
France	9,540	19,100	20,420	93.5
Federal Republic of Germany	7,270	14,600	39,040	37.4
Switzerland	6,760	13,500	5,728	235.7
Canada	5,930	11,900	17,582	67.7
Japan	4,480	9,000	24,019	37.5
Netherlands	3,580	7,200	13,927	51.7
Sweden	3,450	6,900	7,465	92.4
Italy	3,350	6,700	15,111	44.3
Belgium	3,250	6,500	12,392	52.4
Australia	610	1,200	5,070	23.7
Portugal	320	600	1,052	57.0
Denmark	310	600	3,685	16.3
Norway	90	200	2,563	7.8
Austria	40	100	3,169	3.2
Total of above	159,000	318,000	237,082	133.7
Other market economies	6,000	12,000	74,818	16.0
Total	165,000	330,000	311,900	105.8

(Source: Clark A. Murdock, 1977, p. 67)

Not only is the production of goods becoming internationalized; economic services are also becoming internationalized. Banking provides one good illustration. In the 1960s, the number of multinational banks expanded rapidly. In 1965, for example, only thirteen American banks had branches abroad; but by the end of 1974, there were 125 U.S.

banks with foreign branches. The assets of foreign branches of U.S. banks rose about $9.1 billion in 1965 to over $125 billion in 1974. Concomitantly, there was an expansion of foreign banks in the United States. The number of foreign branches and agencies in New York City rose from forty-nine in 1965 to ninety-two in 1974. Total assets of these branches and agencies in the same period rose from $4.8 billion to $29.0 billion. By the end of 1974, foreign banks operating in the United States had total assets of $56 billion (Joan Spero, 1976, pp. 44-45).

A second aspect of the internationalization of banking has been the emergence of international banking consortia. Since 1964, various banks have formed international syndicates. Multinational banks can transfer funds for investment purposes but also for hedging and speculating against exchange rates.

Before leaving the topic of foreign investment and multinationals let us briefly turn to one facet of these phenomena that is becoming salient to Americans in a new way. This is the growth of foreign investment in the United States. In the Nineteenth Century the United States was a major recipient of foreign investment. In the Twentieth Century Americans have become accustomed to seeing the United States as a source of foreign investment but not a recipient. However, in recent years foreign investment in the United States has been increasing very rapidly. Part of this development is reflected in the following graph which shows the actual and projected growth of direct foreign investment in the U.S. from 1969 to the end of the 1980s.



The following table shows a more complete picture for one year—1976. It is more complete in that it shows other types of foreign investment in the United States in addition to direct investment.

Foreign Investment in the United States at the end of 1976:

$111.500	billion	(Portfolio)
29.498	billion	(Direct)
108.949	billion	(Short-term deposits, notes, and Treasury certificates in domestic U.S. banks)
141.589	billion	(Short-term deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks)
2.408	billion	(Long-term deposits in U.S. banks)
15.798	billion	(Marketable U.S. Treasury bonds and notes)
.352	billion	(Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks)
53.767	billion	(Non-marketable securities in Federal Reserve)
16.414	billion	(Gold in Federal Reserve)
$480.275	billion	TOTAL

(Source: Kenneth C. Crowe, 1978, p. 9)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Still another way of getting some sense of the scope of foreign investment in the US is to look at the extent to which "American" companies are foreign-owned. The following table provides this information for several American firms.

MAJOR U.S. COMPANIES WITH 10 PER CENT OR MORE FOREIGN OWNERSHIP[a]

U.S. COMPANY	FOREIGN OWNER/NATIONALITY	ESTIMATED 1974 SALES OF U.S. COMPANY ($ MILL.)	INDUSTRY/ PRODUCT
	(90–100 Per Cent Foreign-owned)		
1. Brown & Williamson Industries (incl. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Gimbel's, Saks Fifth Avenue, and Kohl Corp.)	British-American Tobacco, U.K.	2,300	tobacco, department stores, supermarkets
2. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons	Seagram Co., Canada	1,561	liquor
3. Ciba-Geigy Corp.	Ciba-Geigy, Switzerland	745	chemicals, plastics, pharmaceuticals
4. The Nestle Co., Inc.	Nestle Alimentana, Switzerland	722	food
5. Alcan Aluminum	Alcan, Canada	705	aluminum
6. Lever Brothers	Unilever, Netherlands and U.K.	669	detergents, soap, toothpaste, food
7. Moore Business Forms	Moore Corp., Canada	635	business forms
8. Indian Head	Thyssen-Bornemisza Group, Netherlands	615[b]	glass containers, automotive products, utility and communication products
9. International Nickel Co. Inc.	International Nickel Co., Canada	599	metals and alloys
10. American Hoechst (incl. Foster Grant)	Hoechst A. G., Germany	597[c]	chemicals, man-made fibers, plastics
11. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.	F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co., Switzerland	580	pharmaceuticals
12. MacMillan Bloedel (about 20 subsidiaries, incl. Blanchard Lumber Co.)	MacMillan Bloedel Ltd., Canada	550	forest products
13. BASF Wyandotte	BASF, Germany	517	chemicals
14. ESB, Inc.	International Nickel Co., Canada	512	batteries
15. Libby, McNeill & Libby	Nestle Alimentana Switzerland	475	food
16. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (incl. Quasar Electronics Corp.)	Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Japan	475	consumer electronics

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

17. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.	Massey-Ferguson Ltd. Canada	472	farm l construction machinery, engines
18. Hiram Walker & Sons	Hiram Walker-Gooderham & Worts, Canada	437	liquor
19. Thomas J. Lipton	Unilever, Netherlands and U.K.	437	food
20. Howmet Corporation	Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, France	416	aluminum, gas turbine components
21. Mobay Chemical	Bayer A. G., Germany	386	chemicals
22. Bowater, U.S.	Bowater Corp., U.K.	384	paper
23. Loblaw, Inc.	George Weston Ltd., Canada	372	supermarkets
24. Timex Corporation	Olsen and Lehmkuhl Families, Norway	348	watches
25. Husky Oil Company (incl. Gate City Steel and Husky Industries)	Husky Oil, Canada	334	oil, steel, briquets
26. Sony Corp. of America	Sony Corp., Japan	325	consumer electronics
27. Burmah Oil (and other U.S. subsidiaries)	Burmah Oil Co., U.K.	300	oil
28. ICI, U.S.	Imperial Chemical Industries, U.K.	297	pharmaceuticals, chemicals, plastics
29. Keebler Co.	United Biscuit, U.K.	294	food
30. Abitibi Paper Co. (several U.S. subsidiaries)	Abitibi Paper Co., Canada	260	forest products
31. Sandoz, Inc. (and other U.S. subsidiaries)	Sandoz A. G., Switzerland	234	pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food, seeds
32. TOTAL Leonard, Inc.	Total Petroleum (North America) Ltd., Canada	210	oil
33. U. S. Borax & Chemical	Rio Tinto Zinc, U.K.	205	mining, chemicals, consumer products
34. Beecham, Inc.	Beecham Group, U.K.	190	pharmaceuticals, toiletries
35. Dunlop Tire & Rubber	Dunlop Holdings, U.K.	183	tires, sporting goods
36. SKF Industries	A. B. Svenska Kullagerfabriken, Sweden[d]	181	bearings
37. Gardinier, Inc.	Sopag International, France	177	chemicals
38. R. T. French Co.	Reckett & Coleman Holdings, U.K.	175	food
39. Cominco American	Cominco Ltd., Canada	163	chemicals, metals
40. Stouffer Foods	Nestle Alimentana, Switzerland	161	food, restaurants, inns
41. Plessey, Inc.	Plessey Co. Ltd., U.K.	157	electronics, metals
42. Korf Industries	Korf Industrie und Handel GmbH, Germany	153	steel
43. National Union Electric	A. B. Electrolux, Sweden	150	electric appliances
44. Stinnes Corp.	Veba A. G., Germany	148	machine tools, machinery reconditioning, trading

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

45. Theo. H. Davies & Co.	Jardine Matheson & Co., Hong Kong	147	sugar production, heavy equipment distribution
46. Capitol Industries	EMI Ltd., U.K.	142	records and tapes
47. Grand Trunk Corp.	Canadian National Railways, Canada	141	rail transportation
48. Carling Breweries	Carling O'Keefe Ltd., Canada	142	beer
49. Burroughs-Wellcome	Wellcome Foundation, U.K.	135	pharmaceuticals
50. Davy Powergas	Davy International, U.K.	135	construction engineering
51. Olivetti Corp. of America	Ing. C. Olivetti, Italy	135	office machines
52. Coats & Clark	Coats Paton, U.K.	125	textiles
53. Ohrbach's	Brenninkmeyer Family, Netherlands	120	department stores
54. Siemens Corp.	Siemens A. G., Germany	120	medical equipment, electronics
55. Noranda Aluminum/ Norandex	Noranda Mines, Canada	115	aluminum
56. Cutter Laboratories	Bayer A. G., Germany	105	pharmaceuticals, hospital supplies
57. Matthey Bishop, Inc.	Johnson, Matthey & Co., U.K.	100	precious metals

(50–89 Per Cent Foreign-owned)

1. Shell Oil	Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Netherlands, and Shell Transport & Trading Co., U.K. (69%)	8,493	oil, chemicals
2. Grand Union	Cavenham Ltd., U.K. (51%)	1,563	supermarkets
3. National Tea	George Weston Ltd., Canada (84%)	1,404	supermarkets
4. North American Philips (incl. Magnavox)	Philips N. V., Netherlands[d] (60%)	1,379	electrical/ electronic products, instruments, chemicals, home furnishings, musical equipment
5. American Petrofina	Petrofina, S. A., Belgium (72%)	953	oil, chemicals
6. Akzona	Akzo N. V., Netherlands (65%)	754	chemicals, man-made fibers, wire and cable, food, leather
7. Conalco	Alusuisse, Switzerland (60%)	586	aluminum
8. Certain-Teed Products	St. Gobain Pont-à-Mousson, France, and Turner & Newall, U.K. (51%)	559	building products
9. Alumax	Mitsui & Co., and Nippon Steel Co., Japan (50%)	464	aluminum
10. Dow Badische	BASF, Germany (50%)	348	chemicals, man-made fibers
11. Copperweld[e]	Société Imetal, France (69%)	322	steel & other metal products

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

12. Fed-Mart	Hugo Mann, Germany (64%)	319	retail trade
13. Fiat-Allis	Fiat S.p.A. Italy (65%)	300	construction machinery
14. Kay Corp.	Bowater Corp., U.K. (72%)	273	retail jewelry stores, stockyards, trading
15. Soo Line railroad	Canadian Pacific Ltd., Canada (56%)	180	rail transportation
16. Azcon Corp.	Consolidated Gold Fields, U.K. (85%)	148	drilling equipment, wholesale steel products
17. Sears Industries	Sears Holdings, U.K. (69%)	103	linen supply, laundries, knitwear
18. Terra Chemicals International	Anglo-American, South Africa (51%)	103	chemical fertilizers
	(10–49 Per Cent Foreign-owned)		
1. Engelhard Minerals & Chemicals	Anglo-American Corp., S. Africa (30%)	5,377	trading, refining, processing of minerals, precious metals, ores
2. W. R. Grace	Friedrich Flick Group, Germany (11%)[f]	3,472	chemicals, consumer product and services, food, coal, oil
3. Standard Oil of Ohio	British Petroleum, U.K. (25%)	2,166	oil, chemicals
4. Schlumberger Ltd. (incl. Sangamo Electric)	Schlumberger Family, France (21%)	1,318[g]	oil field services, electronics, meters
5. Airco	British Oxygen Company, U.K. (35%)	760	industrial gases
6. Texasgulf	Canadian Development Corp., Canada (30%)	569	chemicals, minerals, metals
7. Fiber Industries	Imperial Chemical Industries U.K. (37.5%)	537	man-made fibers
8. Clorox	Henkel Group, Germany (11%)	538	consumer products
9. General Cable	British Insulated Calender's Cable, U.K. (20%)	519	wire, cable
10. Envirotech Corp.	Estel N. V., Netherlands (25%)	367	pollution control equipment, mining machinery
11. Laclede Steel	Ivaco Industries, Canada (18%)	209	steel
12. Alan Wood Steel	Creusot-Loire, France (15%)	186	steel
13. Dymo Industries	Pricel S. A., France (18%)	157	marking equipment
14. TFI Companies	J. Lyons & Co., U.K. (47%)	154	food
15. Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Co.	Triad Holdings, Saudi Arabia (15%)	153	agribusiness, farm machinery, engineering
16. Ronson Corp.	Liquigas, S.p.A. Italy[d] (36%)	129	lighters, appliances, hydraulic components

(Source: Kenneth C. Crowe, 1978, pp. 162-169)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

We can get still another perspective by looking at a single American state and noting the number, variety, and geographical range of foreign firms with affiliations in that state. The following table provides this data for the State of Virginia.

Foreign Firms with Affiliates in Virginia

Country	Parent Company	Product
Austria	Plasser Gesellschaft	Railroad equipment
Canada	Indal Canada, Ltd.	Die castings
	Moore Corporation	Business forms
	Niagara Wire Weaving	Wire mesh
	George Weston, Ltd.	Baking company
Denmark	The East Asiatic Co., Ltd	Wood moldings
France	Degremont, S.A.	Water treatment
	Ciments Lafarge	Cement
	Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann	Monoshell castings
	Poclain S.A.	Hydraulic excavators
	E. P. Remy & Cie.	Packaging machinery
	Soma Europe Transmissions	Heavy-duty transmissions
Italy	Olivetti & C. S.p.A.	Sales
	Poliuretani Riflex Co.	Sales and trading
Japan	Dainippon Ink & Chemical.Co.,Ltd.	Industrial polypropylene strapping
	Hamamatsu Co., Ltd.	Infra-red detectors
	Kansai Denryoku	Sales
	Nippon Electric Company	Electronic Microwave equip.
	Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.	Auto service & training
	Sumikin Bussan Kaisha Ltd.	Sales and trading
Netherlands	N.V. Optische Industrie	Medical electronic instruments
	Vicon N.V.	Farm machinery
Netherlands Antilles	BASF Overzee N.V.	Synthetic fibers
Norway	Sverre Munck A/S	Stacker cranes
Spain	Compania Espanola de Motores S.A.	Motorcycles and parts
Sweden	Arenco AB	Tobacco machinery
	Bilsom International AB	Industrial ear protectors
	ESAB (Elektriska Svetsningsaktiebolaget	Welding equipment
	Gambro AB	Artificial kidney machines
	The Kockum Group	Temperature indicators
	Sandvik AB	Hand tools
	Volvo AB	Automobile assembly plant
	Volvo Penta	Marine engines
Switzerland	Brown Boveri et Cie.	Turbine generators
	Grapha-Holding AG	Printing equipment
	Graphicart	Printing plant design and installation

Country	Parent Company	Product
United Kingdom	Ashlow Steel & Eng. Co., Ltd.	Rolling mills/ancillary equipment
	Balding Engineering, Ltd.	Turret milling machines
	Bird Group of Companies	Scrap metal processing
	Birmingham Mint Ltd.	Coins, tokens, medals
	British Aircraft Corp. Ltd.	Airplane parts
	British-American Tobacco Co.,Ltd.	Tobacco
	Cableform, Ltd.	Electronic industrial controls
	Cigarette Components, Ltd.	Cigarette filters
	Coats, Patons Ltd.	Zippers
	Consolidated Tin & Smelting Corp.	Topographic survey
	Cooper Roller Bearings Co.	Roller bearings
	Dowty Group, Ltd.	Aircraft accessories
	EMI, Ltd.	Records, Tapes, etc.
United Kingdom	Furmanite International Ltd.	Leak sealing service
	Hanson Trust Limited	Knits, yarns, etc.
	Leslie Hartridge, Ltd	Vehicle-testing equipment
	Imperial Chemical Industries,Ltd.	Polyester film
	MDA Monk & Dunston Mahon & Sears	Consultants - services
	Molins Ltd.	Tobacco machinery
	Rentokil	Wood preserving/pest control
	Rolls Royce Aero Engines	Aerospace components
	Sonicaid Ltd.	Medical instruments
	Storey Bros. & Co., Ltd.	Transfer print paper
	Tru-Lon Darts Products	Darts/sports equipment
	Unilever	Tea
West Germany	Boehringer-Ingelheim GmbH	Pharmaceutical chemicals
	Burda Druck GmbH	Rotogravure printing
	Hauni Werke, Korber KG	Tobacco machinery
	Franz Hermle & Sohn	Clock movements
	Hey'di Bauchemie	Waterproofing components
	Hoechst AG	Polystyrene manufacture
	Gebr. Hofmann KG	Balancing equipment & test machinery
	Koenig & Bauer AG	Printing presses-sales/serv.
	Hans Liebherr	Hydr. excavators & cranes
	Losenhausen Maschinen	Earth-compacting equipment
	Siegwerk Farbenfabrik	Ink manufacture
	Software AG	Data base management syst.
	Andreas Stihl Maschinenfab.	Chain saws
	Alfred Teves GmbH	Automotive brake systems
	C. A. Weidmuller KG	Electrical terminal blocks
	Carl Zeiss	Optical frames and lenses

(Source: Kentucky in the World and the World in Kentucky)

The Growth of the Eurodollar Market

International money and capital markets are markets for lending and borrowing dollars and other currencies outside their countries of origin. By far the most important of the international money markets is located in Europe and is referred to as the "Eurocurrency market." As the majority of transactions takes place in dollars, the market is usually described as the "Eurodollar" market, even though most other major currencies are traded as well. It should be noted that the term "Euro" is somewhat misleading as trading in US dollars and other currencies takes place in Canada, Lebanon, Nassau, and Japan as well as in Europe.

Eurodollars come into being when an American or foreign owner of a dollar deposit with a bank in the United States transfers these funds and places them on deposit with a foreign bank or a foreign branch of an American bank. Normally such transfers are prompted by higher interest rates on short-term deposits prevailing abroad (Kreinin, 1971, p. 45).

The Eurocurrency markets have been a major source of increasing monetary interdependency. Branches of American banks or foreign banks outside of the United States accept dollar deposits and lend those deposits in the form of dollars. Other major Eurocurrencies are primarily German Marks, British Pounds, and Swiss Francs held abroad. The Eurodollar and Eurocurrency markets originated in the late 1950s and have grown to huge proportions since that time. The market has flourished because it is under no national control mechanisms or international growth constraints. Consequently it has been able to establish highly competitive interest rate levels which have attracted vast sums of transnational funds.

The Eurocurrency market has grown at a phenomenal rate, a rate beyond the expectations of even the most far-seeing economists. Using 1957 as a base year, the approximate total claims held in the Eurodollar market was about $21.8 billion (Richard Cooper, 1968, p. 117). By 1965, the size of the market had more than doubled to an estimated $70 billion according to the Bank for International Settlements (EIS Annual Reports, 1974). The market grew exponentially as the 1960s came to a conclusion. By the first years of the 1970s, the size of the market exceeded $200 billion.

This expansion of international credit created huge international capital flows with a number of new economic agents participating in the international financial markets. These include the international banks, the treasurers of multinational corporations, and international foreign exchange dealers. To all of these agents, the combination of relatively risk free speculation and the availability of huge funds represents opportunity in terms of their economic interests. Simultaneously, these interests can conflict with the monetary policies of national governments. This conflict has proven to be a highly destabilizing element in recent monetary history.

The source of disequilibrium has been the result of huge funds within the control of diversified agents. For example, although governments may control the expansion and contraction of domestic money supplies, it has been estimated that the approximately 200 American multinational corporations control about $25 billion in cash or cash equivalent assets. They also control $100 billion of inventory and accounts receivable which can be used as collateral to raise funds. The availability of these

funds intensify monetary crisis when private interests clash with government policy. Richard Barnett (1974) points up a particularly striking illustration.

> Two days before President Nixon announced on August 15, 1971, his new economic policy to strengthen the dollar, Donald G. Robbins, Jr., the chief financial officer for Singer, added to the flood of already existing unwanted dollars by selling $20 million for Swiss Francs and British Pounds (p. 28).

Since many other multinational companies were also speculating against the dollar, several people concluded that they were the prime force behind the whole currency crisis.

Other agents include the international currency dealers. Their speculation in currency movements in recent years combined with revolutionary communications technology has created a complex international network which operates on a twenty-four hour basis. Given the high speed of telecommunications it is not surprising that economist Jane Little (1974) speaks of the formidable problem that the velocity of money creates for national banks. She refers to speculative shifts as "money races from country to country." These shifts are so swift, she says, that amounts equal to a third of the whole money supply of a country the size of Sweden "can be raised . . . almost overnight" (p. 53).

The combination of vast, unregulated pools of international funds and a complex transnational communications network has been explosive. It is the equivalent of giving the global economy a dose of amphetamines. The net effect of the new elements is

dramatized in an article by David Edwards (1978) in which he describes the operations of a currency trading room in an American bank's foreign branch.

> Traders like Hanas and Jim and their counterparts in other banks manipulate currencies in denominations of millions in transactions that take as little as ten seconds. They sit at their consoles like NASA engineers monitoring a space shot. They each have perhaps forty direct lines to Europe with automatic dialing machines. Press a button to get a quotation on the Dollar-Mark. Press another to price Norwegian krona against the South African Rand (p. 14).

The result is actions like the following:

> Jimmy begins to spit out orders: 'Look, we're going to hit the dollar again today. Henry, you take the lead, dump 20 million against the Mark, 10 against the Swiss franc and 20 against the Sterling. Duncan, let Henry kick the hell out of the dollar. Then tell the multinationals the dollar might be a little soft. By noon they'll be running into your arms.

In short, we live in a world characterized by a great deal of monetary interdependence. One monetary authority summarizes the situation succinctly: "monetary interdependence has grown faster than international management" (Joan Spero, 1976, p. 49).

Increasing monetary interdependence is but one dimension of a more general phenomenon. As a consequence of increasing trade, increasing foreign investment, and the growth of multinationals, all of the world's industrialized capitalist economies have become increasingly interdependent on several dimensions. Monetary, trade, and investment policies of one country have direct impacts upon the monetary, trade, and investment policy in other countries. Growing interdependence has the effect of limiting the capacity

of national governments to control their respective economies through the traditional means of fiscal and monetary policies. At the same time the current mechanisms of international management are incapable of controlling economic interdependence. Thus, it appears that significant cross-roads have been reached in the evolution of the world economy. As Miriam Camps (1974) puts it:

> the advanced, market-economy countries are reaching the point where they face a basic choice: either to move forward to new far-reaching forms of collective management of problems they can no longer handle separately or to put the brakes on their growing interdependence and, by more or less arbitrary measures, to bring problems once more within the span of national control. (p. 43)

The Demand for a New Economic Order

If the industrialized market economies are at a cross-roads in respect to their relations with one another, the developed Northern Hemisphere and the underdeveloped Southern Hemisphere are at another kind of cross-roads in respect to this interrelationship. The global income gap between the affluent North and poor South that has been developing since the Sixteenth Century substantially widened in the post-World War II era. This has occurred simultaneously with historically unprecedented public transfers of capital through the foreign aid programs of the developed economies. But these have had little or no effect on the maldistribution of world income. The rich have grown richer while the poor have grown poorer despite three decades of foreign aid.

This has triggered a growing awareness of the fact that since

the 1500s the northern and southern regions of the planet have become increasingly interlocked in structures of asymetrical interdependence. Neo-Marxian scholars argue that this is inherent in the developmental logic of a world capitalist system. For example, Andre Gunder Frank (1967) argues: "Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestations of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system." He continues:

> Economic development and underdevelopment are not just relative and quantitative, in that one represents more economic development than the other; economic development and underdevelopment are relational and qualitative, in that each is structurally different from, yet caused by, its relation with the other. Yet development and underdevelopment are the same in that they are the product of a single, but dialectically contradictory, economic structure and process of capitalism. (p. 9)

This may or may not be a valid interpretation of world economic history. But in either case the fact remains that the rich North and the poor South are linked by global economic structures which serve to cast the South in a relationship of dependency. This can be contrasted to the interdependence characteristic of the interrelation among the developed market economies. Here we find high levels of economic interaction accompanied by high levels of mutual sensitivity. In contrast, dependence exists when the economy of one country is highly sensitive to events or developments in the economy of another country, but the latter is little influenced or affected by events or developments in the former. Dependency, so defined, is characteristic of a good deal

of North-South economic relationships.

These dependencies assume a variety of forms. Trade dependencies is one. Most Third World economies are highly dependent upon Northern markets for the sale of their products. Thus, they are highly sensitive to both market and political factors in the North that shape the level of demand for their products. Foreign investment dependencies also exist. Important sectors of the economies of the South such as raw material production and export industries are dominated by Northern investment. Still another form is monetary dependence. Southern economies often suffer chronic balance-of-payment deficits as one of the by-products of trade dependency. They must seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund to cover these deficiencies. The IMF, in turn, can shape the domestic and foreign monetary policies of these countries through the requirements it imposes as a condition for a loan. Foreign aid can also create dependencies which reinforce both monetary and trade dependencies. Moreover, Third World countries have been excluded from membership in the major international economic organizations of the post war period--the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT.

Growing resentment on the part of the Third World of its position of structural dependency has lead to the development of what is now commonly called "the demand for a new economic order." The major events in the evolution of the Third World from a posture of quiescence to one of defiance are succinctly depicted in

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

the table below.

Major Steps in the Development of the New International Economic Order

April 1955 —	Meeting of 29 African and Asian countries in Bandung, Indonesia, to hasten independence for remaining colonial areas.
October 1960 —	OPEC formed.
September 1961 —	Meeting of 25 nonaligned nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to discuss relaxation of East-West tensions, colonialism, and neocolonialism.
March 1964 —	First meeting of UNCTAD in Geneva, Switzerland.
October 1964 —	Meeting of 47 nonaligned nations in Cairo, Egypt, to seek common platform.
February 1968 —	Second meeting of UNCTAD in New Delhi, India, leads to moderate agreement on trade expansion.
September 1970 —	Meeting of 52 nonaligned nations in Lusaka, Zambia, to discuss common political perspectives on anticolonialism and related matters.
April-May 1972 —	Third meeting of UNCTAD in Santiago, Chile, to discuss reform of international monetary system and the problems of the least developed countries.
September 1973 —	Meeting of 77 nonaligned nations in Algiers, Algeria, to discuss political liberation movements and economic liberation by means of nationalization.
November 1973 —	Arab members of OPEC embargo exports to selected industrial countries; rounds of price increases for petroleum begin.
April-May 1974 —	Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order at the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
December 1974 —	Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Twenty-ninth General Assembly of the United Nations.
February 1975 —	Lome Convention between the European Economic Community and 46 less developed countries to provide for price supports for selected basic commodities is signed.
February 1975 —	Conference of 110 developing nations in Dakar, Senegal, to draw up an action program on raw materials.
September 1975 —	Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations deals with development and international economic cooperation.
May 1976 —	Fourth meeting of UNCTAD in Nairobi, Kenya, brings confrontation between North and South countries over commodity markets.
August 1976 —	Meeting of 85 less developed nations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, to discuss the new international economic order.
1975-1977 —	Negotiations between industrialized and less developed countries over commodity markets take place in Paris.
August 1979 —	Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations deals with the question of technology transfer.

(Source: Dennis Pirages, 1978, p. 51)

While the demand for greater Third World participation in the management of the global economy and changes in the structure of world markets grows, the question of the means to bring about these changes remains unsettled. OPEC clearly presents a model of one possible strategy.

There is no point in recapitulating the familiar details of the OPEC cartel and its international financial consequences. But it is important to note that the actions of the oil coalition sharply changed the flow of economic resources across the world. Some people have characterized this as the greatest redistribution of wealth in history. The foreign earnings of the oil producing countries nearly quintupled in less than a year. Estimates by the Chase Manhattan Bank indicate that by 1984 the oil producers' reserves will reach $400 billion.

The appeal of OPEC as a model for others is obvious, and indeed stimulated producers of other commodities to act. Producer organizations in copper, bauxite, iron ore, and bananas were either formed or enlivened after October 1973. They have not come close to duplicating the success of OPEC, but the strategy of commodity cartels continues to rank high among the range of strategies open to the Third World in their continuing effort to create a new economic order. This range of strategies is nicely summarized by H. Howard Wriggens (1978).

1. Building coalitions such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), to withhold raw materials

2. Building regional coalitions, as illustrated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), or the Andean Pact

3. Building such universal coalitions as the Group of 77 and the group of "Non-Aligned" that may use the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the General Assembly, or other UN bodies or develop their own institutions, such as the Non-Aligned Council

4. Associating with a major power in such a way that the Third World state uses its dependent relationship to gain assets that bring influence to bear on behalf of its local problems or even upon its Northern patron

5. Threatening or actually precipitating a local war that draws in major powers to assist the state that pursues such a high-risk course

6. Organizing irregular violence such as national liberation movements or terrorism (p. 22).

The Partial Re-entry of Communist States into the World Economy

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 resulted in the partial withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the world market economy. Soviet economic development took place largely outside the framework of the international economy. The Soviet policy of autarky was extended after World War II to East Europe following the Soviet military domination of the area. The communist leadership that took control of China in 1948 also followed an autarkic economic policy.

In recent years this isolation of the communist economies from the world economy has been decreasing. Trade between Western and Eastern Europe has increased substantially in the 1970s. Trade between the industrial capitalist economies and the Soviet Union

also has expanded although less substantially. An increasing number of western and Japanese based multinationals are operating in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Conversely, the Soviet equivalents of the capitalist system's multinational enterprises have begun to operate in capitalist countries. In the case of China comparable developments have also begun. Trade between China, Japan and other industrialized capitalist economies is increasing, and there are a variety of joint Chinese and Western economic projects underway including joint American-Chinese oil extraction projects.

In summary, the history of the world economy since 1945 can be characterized this way:

1. Among the developed capitalist countries the system of economic interdependence that began to grow in the Nineteenth Century has substantially expanded in the post 1945 period.
2. The system of economic dependence that has characterized North-South relations for centuries has begun to be challenged.
3. The system of economic independence characteristic of the communist economies since 1917 has begun to give way to limited but increasing economic interrelationship between capitalist and socialist economies.

V

Summary

In this section I have discussed the globalization of the human condition from an economic perspective. The discussion has been chronologically organized. In summarizing I will recast the argument somewhat differently. I have argued that:

1. An embryonic global economy came into existence in the Sixteenth Century and has been growing since then.

2. The growth of a global economy is a consequent of several historical developments. They include:

   a) A long term expansion in the volume, in the geographical scope, and in the economic significance of world trade;

   b) The growth of foreign investment;

   c) The emergence of world markets for commodities, manufactured products, currencies, and capital;

   d) A world wide division of labor accompanied by increasing inequality in the distribution of the world's wealth;

   e) The emergence of international economic organizations;

   f) The increasing internationalization of production, banking, and marketing;

   g) Increasing levels of economic interdependency among the world's industrialized economies;

   h) Increasing economic dependence in North-South relations which is now stimulating a growing demand for the restructuring of the international economic order;

   i) Increasing involvement in the international economy on the part of communist economies.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

I

Overview

Viewing the globalization of the human condition from the perspective of humankind's political life what we see is the emergence during the past few centuries of a global political system. This is to say, there now exists a single global political system in which all of the world's people are involved. Four centuries ago there was no such system. In this section I shall be discussing how a global political system came into being. I shall be arguing that two kinds of historical processes were involved in the development of a global political system. One is the evolution of a single world wide international system. The other is a structural transformation of this system.

II

The Evolution of a Single World Wide International System

An international system, K. J. Holsti (1977) notes is " . . . any collection of independent political entities--tribes, city-states, nations, or empires--that interact with considerable frequency and according to regularized processes" (p. 29). The political history of the world is in no small part a story of the rise, transformations, and demise of international systems, for throughout history there have been a large number and wide variety of such systems. The modern international system, the origins of which can be dated to the Seventeenth Century, is one of the several hundred international systems that dot the landscape of

humankind's political life.

The modern international system is notably different from its historical predecessors in several ways. Geographical scale is clearly one of the most significant of these differences. The modern system is the first and only world wide international system. The evolution of this system involved three major historical processes. These are: (1) the globalization of the European state system, (2) the rise of non-European states to positions of power in the international system, and (3) the growing power of the Third World.

The Globalization of the European State System

The birth place of the modern international system is Europe and the birth time the Seventeenth Century. In fact, we can be more precise and following a convention of diplomatic history date the birth of this system to 1648. This was the year in which the Treaty of Westphalia was signed. This was actually two treaties, one consummated at Onasbruck and the other at Munster. Together they marked the end of the Thirty Years' War which had pitted Catholic against Protestant and both against the Holy Roman Emperor.

From the perspective of the development of human rights, the Peace of Westphalia is a significant event in the growth of religious toleration. Viewed from the perspective of international politics the significance of Westphalia lies in the fact it marks the end of one European international system and the beginning

of another.

As one historian puts it, the Peace of Westphalia " . . . represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world" (Leo Gross, 1971, p. 42). The old world of which Gross speaks is a Europe that was an empire, at least in theory, with all entities subordinate to the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor.

The new world is a Europe:

> . . . characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free from any external earthly authority. The idea of an authority or organization above the sovereign states is no longer. What takes its place is the notion that all states form a world-wide political system or that, at any rate, the states of Western Europe form a single political system. This new system rests on international law and the balance of power, a law operating between rather than above states and a power operating between rather than above states. (Leo Gross, 1971, p. 42)

Of course as in all such historical transformations, specific dates and events are of more symbolic significance than substantive import. As Richard Mansbach and his colleagues note:

> The Peace of Westphalia did not result in some magical and sudden transformation of Europe from an imperial form of organization into the modern state system. The transformation occurred over a period of centuries, and the state-centric model that the Peace legitimized evolved in the same time frame. (Richard W. Mansbach, et. al., 1976, pp. 8-9)

We have come to call the new type of European international system that the Treaty of Westphalia legitimated the nation state system. This is an unfortunate label in many ways since there is no necessary one to one correspondence between states and nations.

Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) rightly observes:

> The distinction between states and nations is fundamental . . . . States can exist without a nation, or with several nations, among their subjects; and a nation can be coterminous with the population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or be divided between several states. There were states long before there were nations, and there are some nations that are much older than most states which exist today. The belief that every state is a nation, or that all sovereign states are national states, has done much to obfuscate human understanding of political realities. A state is a legal and political organisation, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness. Yet in the common usage of English and of other modern languages these two distinct relationships are frequently confused. (p. 1)

Watson is right, the terms "nation state" and "nation state system" do in fact obfuscate an understanding of political realities. But unfortunately we are stuck with these terms. Since 1917 they have become so deeply rooted in the language of international politics that any attempt to weed them out of our vocabulary seems a bootless pursuit.

The nation state system that emerged in the Seventeenth Century was a European creation and it remained confined to Europe for more than a century. However, one of the twin historical forces that were destined to globalize the European nation state system by the mid-Twentieth Century was already underway when the delegates from Sweden, France, and the Empire sat down at the conference tables of Onasbruck and Munster in 1648. This was European colonization. And it would be only 128

years later that the other of these twin forces emerged. This was decolonization. I will briefly review this familiar bit of modern history highlighting how the twin forces of colonization and decolonization served to globalize the European nation state system and thus create for the first time in history a single world wide international political system.

European colonization had two distinctive faces. One consists of the Europeanization of the western hemisphere and of the southern tip of Africa. The other face is the so-called "New Imperialism" of the late Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century.

I have noted previously that the effect of European intrusion into North and South America and into Australasia was the virtual eradication of these continents' indigenous populations. The millions of American Indians and Australasian aborigines that fell victim to European guns and European germs and viruses were replaced by even more millions of people from Europe and, in the case of the Americas, from Africa. The immigrants from Europe and the enslaved immigrants from Africa carried to the western hemisphere many elements of European and African cultures.

Amongst the cultural baggage carried by the Europeans were the political values that had been legitimated in Europe by the Treaty of Westphalia. These values found their first expression in the western hemisphere in 1776 with the proclamation of the American Declaration of Independence. The American colonists'

success on the battle field in the world's first war of national liberation marked the beginning of the globalization of the European state system. In 1781, the United States, the "first new nation," became the first non-European member of the nation state system that had emerged during the previous century. A few decades later the European Empire in South America crumbled. By 1830, war in Spanish America and diplomatic concessions in Portuguese America had added fifteen new non-European states to the emerging nation state system. Subsequently, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa were added to this list although the four retained membership in the British Commonwealth.

The second face of European colonization is the so-called "New Imperialism" of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries which extended European control to vast areas of Africa and Asia. At least two things distinguish European colonization during this era from colonization in the previous two centuries. One is an increase in the rate of colonial acquisitions, and the other is an increase in the number of colonial powers.

The first of these facts is indicated in some simple historical statistics. Harry Mugdoff (1978) notes that:

> during the first seventy-five years of the Nineteenth Century European acquisition of new territory averaged about 83,000 square miles (210,000 square kilometers) a year. As against this, the colonial powers added an average of about 240,000 square miles (620,000 square kilometers) a year between the late 1870s and World War I (1914-1918). (p. 35)

During this era additional European (and two non-European nations as well, the U.S. and Japan) were added to the traditional list of European colonial powers. Russia in Asia added a half million square miles and over six million people. Germany acquired territories of almost a million square miles and over eight million people. Italy and Belgium also joined the ranks of their European neighbors. The magnitude of European expansion through colonization is revealed by the following table.

Overseas Colonial Empires in 1914 *

		Area (square miles)		*Population*	
Countries having colonies	*Number of colonies*	*Mother country*	*Colonies*	*Mother country*	*Colonies*
United Kingdom	55	120,953	12,043,806	46,052,741	391,582,528
France	29	207,076	4,110,409	39,602,258	62,350,000
Germany	10	208,830	1,230,989	64,925,993	13,074,950
Belgium	1	11,373	910,000	7,571,387	15,000,000
Portugal	8	35,500	804,440	5,960,056	9,680,000
Netherlands	8	12,761	762,863	6,102,399	37,410,000
Italy	4	110,623	591,250	35,238,997	1,396,176
TOTAL	115	707,116	20,453,757	205,453,831	530,493,654

* Including colonies and other noncontiguous territories.

Source: L. S. Stavrianos, 1971, p. 236.

Harry Mugdoff (1978) provides another statistic which helps one grasp the scale of European hegemony in the early years of this century. He notes that by " . . . 1914 as a consequence of this new expansion and conquest [since 1870] on top of that of preceding centuries, the colonial powers, their colonies, and their former colonies extended over approximately 85 per cent of the earth's surface" (p. 35).

After the end of World War I the victors carved up the col-

onies of the defeated powers. In retrospect this turned out to be a very minor episode in the history of the period. World War I marked the beginning of the end of European political dominance of the world. "The problem of the twentieth century," wrote the Black American leader W.E.B. DuBois in 1900, "is the problem of the colour line--the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea." (Colin Legum, 1962, p. 25) This was indeed a remarkably accurate prophecy. The political history of the world since 1918 is in no small measure the story of the revolt of the "coloured races" against western dominance. National liberation and independence movements began to flourish in Asia and Africa during the inter-war period. World War II intensified these, and by 1943 the era of European colonization that had begun in the Sixteenth Century was coming to a close. The old colonial empires began to shrink and were replaced by a host of new politically independent states. The following table highlights the rapidity and scope of the de-colonization of the post-World War II period.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

States That Have Gained Independence Since 1943

Country	Year of Independence	Former Colonial Status	Population
Lebanon	1943	French Mandate	2.8
Iceland	1944	Danish	0.2
Syria	1946	French Mandate	7.8
Jordan	1946	British Mandate	2.9
Philippines	1946	United States	44.3
India	1947	British Dominion	622.7
Pakistan	1947	British Dominion	74.5
Burma	1948	British	31.8
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1948	British—left British Commonwealth in 1972	14.1
Israel	1948	British Mandate	3.6
North Korea	1948	Japanese—under Soviet occupation	16.7
South Korea	1948	Japanese—under US occupation	36.9
Indonesia	1949	Dutch	136.9
Libya	1951	Italian—under British and French occupation	2.7
Cambodia	1953	French—Associated State in French Union	8.0
Laos	1953	French—Associated State in French Union	3.5
Vietnam	1953	French—Associated State in French Union	47.3
Morocco	1956	French and Spanish Protectorate	18.3
Tunisia	1956	French Protectorate	6.0
Sudan	1956	British-Egyptian Condominium	16.3
Ghana	1957	British—plus portion of former French Togo	10.4
Malaysia	1957	British	12.6
Guinea	1958	French	4.7
Cameroon	1960	French Trust Territory	6.7
Central African Republic	1960	French	1.9
Chad	1960	French	4.2
Congo (Brazzaville)	1960	French	1.4
Cyprus	1960	British	0.6
Dahomey (Benin)	1960	French	3.3
Gabon	1960	French	0.5
Ivory Coast	1960	French	7.0
Malagasy Republic	1960	French	7.9
Mali	1960	French	5.9
Mauritania	1960	French	1.4
Niger	1960	French	4.9
Nigeria	1960	British	66.6
Senegal	1960	French	5.3
Somalia	1960	Italian Trust Territory	3.4
Togo	1960	French Trust Territory	2.3
Upper Volta	1960	French	6.4

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(cont.)

Country	Year of Independence	Former Colonial Status	Population*
Zaire (Congo)	1960	Belgian	26.3
Tanzania (Tanganyika)	1961	British Trust Territory	16.0
Sierra Leone	1961	British	3.2
Kuwait	1961	British Protectorate	1.1
Algeria	1962	French	17.8
Jamaica	1962	British	2.1
Burundi	1962	Belgian Trust Territory	3.9
Rwanda	1962	Belgian Trust Territory	4.5
Uganda	1962	British	12.4
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	British	1.0
Western Samoa	1962	New Zealand Trust Territory	0.2
Kenya	1963	British	14.4
Zanzibar	1963	British—merged with Tanganyika in 1964	
Malawi	1964	British Protectorate	5.3
Malta	1964	British	0.3
Zambia	1964	British Protectorate	5.2
Gambia	1965	British	0.6
Maldives	1965	British Protectorate	0.1
Singapore	1965	Part of Malaysia	2.3
Botswana	1966	British Protectorate	0.7
Lesotho	1966	British Protectorate	1.1
Barbados	1966	British	0.2
Guyana	1966	British	0.8
South Yemen	1967	British Protectorate	1.8
Equatorial Guinea	1968	Spanish	0.3
Mauritius	1968	British	0.9
Swaziland	1968	British Protectorate	0.5
Nauru	1968	Australia-New Zealand-British Trust Territory	0.1
Fiji	1970	British	0.6
Tonga	1970	British Protectorate	0.1
Bangladesh	1971	Part of Pakistan (East Pakistan)	83.3
Bahrain	1971	British Protectorate	0.3
Qatar	1971	British Protectorate	0.1
United Arab Emirates	1971	British Protectorate	0.2
Bahamas	1973	British	10.2
Grenada	1974	British	0.1
Guinea-Bissau	1974	Portuguese	0.5
Mozambique	1975	Portuguese	9.5
Angola	1975	Portuguese dependency	6.3
Cape Verde Islands	1975	Portuguese	0.3
Comoro Islands	1975	French	0.3
Papua New Guinea	1975	Australian	2.9
Sao Tome Principe	1975	Portuguese	0.1
Surinam	1975	Netherlands	0.4
Seychelles	1976	British	0.1

Source: Dennis Pirages, 1977, pp. 27-28

Since many of us have lived through all or a good deal of post-World War II history, we naturally tend to see the events outlined in the table as commonplace and thus are insensitive to their historical significance. But Geoffrey Barraclough (1967) is probably right in noting:

> Never before in the whole of human history had so revolutionary a reversal occurred with such rapidity. The change in the position of the peoples of Asia and Africa and in their relations with Europe was the surest sign of the advent of a new era, and when the history of the first half of the twentieth century--which, for most historians, is still dominated by European wars and European problems, by Fascism and National Socialism, and by Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin--comes to be written in a longer perspective, there is little doubt that no single theme will prove to be of greater importance than the revolt against the west. (pp. 153-154)

And what makes the revolt against the west of such import? Many things. From the perspective of world politics, the decolonization of Africa and Asia that has taken place in the past thirty years completes the process of globalizing the European state system that had emerged in the Seventeenth Century. European colonization brought the modern international system first to the Americas and Australasia and then to Africa and Asia. The revolt against European domination took place within the context of this system and, thus decolonization completed a process that colonization had begun several centuries before--the world wide diffusion of the modern European state system.

The Rise of Non-European States to Positions of Power in the International System

A second historical force involved in the evolution of a single world wide international system was the rise of non-European states to positions of power in the international political system. This process has two stages. The first is the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers. The other is the subsequent erosion of this bipolarity in the distribution of world power.

Geoffrey Barraclough (1967) provides an excellent and succinct description of the political demise of Europe and the rise of the U.S. and USSR to a position of political dominance in the post-war international system.

> For anyone looking down on the world of 1960 and comparing it with the world of 1870 or 1880, nothing will probably be more striking than the change which has taken place in the structure of international relations. Seventy-five years ago the predominance of the European powers was unchallenged; the political map of Asia and Africa was drawn by statesmen in London, Paris, and Berlin, and the Russian general, Dragomirov, was only echoing the belief of his day when he haughtily announced that 'Far Eastern affairs are decided in Europe'. Today this has long ago ceased to be even approximately true. By the end of the Second World War the collapse of the old system of balance of power was evident for all to see, and it was also clear that its collapse was not simply the result of the war, but rather the consequence of a far longer process of erosion which abnormal circumstances--the isolationism of the United States after 1919 and the weakening of Soviet Russia by revolution and civil war--had masked but not halted. The structure of great power politics, and its modalities, in the age of Khrushchev were essentially different from those of the age of Bismarck. Instead of by a concert of powers, we were confronted by two great super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, whose pre-eminence was based on their quasi-monopoly

> of nuclear weapons; and although Russia has one foot in Europe, it is significant that both super-powers are great continent-spanning federal states, neither of which can realistically be classed as European. Thus in the space of half a century a multilateral system of equilibrium centered upon Europe had been displaced by a system of global bipolarity between the two great extra-European powers, the United States, and the Soviet Union. (pp. 93-94)

The roots of the United States' and Soviet Union's rise to power reach back into the Nineteenth Century and constitute an important chapter in the evolution of a world wide international system, but we need not dwell on these matters here. For our purpose, of more importance is the fact that the system of tight bipolarity that prevailed in the years immediately following World War II has given way to a more complex, decentralized and diffuse distribution of power. The most obvious manifestation of this is seen in the rise of Japan and China to a position of world power and the restoration of some of Europe's previous status. But the situation is much more complex than this. K. J. Holsti (1977) notes:

> . . . the structure of power and influence in the world is no longer polarized on all issues, for there are other problems in which quite different states are involved and where these two great powers have not assumed or appropriated leadership positions. The main states in the colonial issue subsystem are the metropolitan nations, developing countries, and remaining colonial territories (or, more specifically, their nationalist movements), with the Soviet Union and China playing only a supporting role. These are the actors that define the issues, the procedures under which they will be handled in the United Nations, and the ultimate solutions. The United States is not greatly involved in colonial issues (unless they become coupled with a perceived threat of communism) and has seldom been able to determine through its diplomatic actions the

outcome of conflicts between nationalist movements and colonial powers.

In matters of foreign trade, still another configuration of power and influence exists. Here, the main actors are the nations that purchase the bulk of the world's raw-material exports, those that sell heavy machine goods, those that can control the flow of currency between nations by their fiscal policies, and the countries dependent upon foreign trade either to sustain a tolerable standard of living or help develop a modern economy. These would include the United States, Canada, most Western European countries, Japan, and the oil-producing nations. Even today, the Soviet bloc, including China, is not a major factor in international trade relationships and has little, if any, impact on the major diplomatic decisions affecting that trade. If the world is polarized on the trade issue, it is a north-south polarity, where producers of raw materials in many developing countries--oil producers excepted--receive low income from their export products but must pay high prices for heavy manufactured goods imported from industrialized nations.

In geographic, rather than issue, subsystems (the two are, of course, related), one may also find unique structures of power and influence. The United States may be a leader in Latin American affairs; its diplomatic and economic resources can be used in such a way that most Latin countries will adjust their behavior and interests to correspond with those of the United States. But the United States is certainly unable to provide such leadership in Africa, where it has few traditional interests, has relatively little economic influence, and receives slight sympathy for its position on many international issues. In the Middle East, Egypt has attempted to create Arab unity and define policy of the Arab states against Israel. Like the United States in Latin America, Egypt has frequently faced opposition and embarrassing challenges to its preferred policies for the area, yet it may not be stretching reality to claim that Egypt dominates the Middle East subsystem. In brief, the structure of power and influence in the world is neither static nor universally definable. It appears under different configurations, depending upon the issue and geographic subsystems involved. (pp. 44-45)

The Increasing Significance of the Third World

One aspect of the decreasing polarity in the distribution of world power that deserves special note is the increasing

significance of some Third World states in international politics. For example, the oil rich Arab states on issues of monetary policy and oil supply have attained the status of great powers. Brazil seems destined to play an increasingly important role in the politics of the western hemisphere.

Let me pause here to summarize the flow of the argument up to this point. I have argued that the emergence of a single world wide international system is the result of three major historical processes. European colonization of the world coupled with decolonization resulted in the world wide diffusion of the modern European state system. Within the international system power has become increasingly decentralized. European hegemony was undermined by the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union. In turn the polarized international system was undermined by the emergence of Japan and China as major powers and by the growing autonomy of Europe. This consortium of industrialized nations is in turn being challenged by the expanding power of some of the Third World states. In short, we have seen the emergence of a world wide international system and are now witnessing a growing polycentrism in the distribution of power within this system.

III

The Structural Transformation of the International System

The evolution of a single world wide international system is one of the historical processes involved in the making of a global political system. A second historical process is a structural transformation of the international system. By this I have in mind a set of changes that have occurred in the structure of the modern international system since its emergence in the Seventeenth Century. The international system that some 80 new nations have joined since 1945 is structurally very different from the system joined by the first new nations of North and South America in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries.

In this section I will discuss some of the major structural changes in the international system that have served to globalize the political life of humankind by increasing the portion of humanity involved in world politics (often as victims) and by expanding the scope of this involvement. Since most of the changes I will be noting have occurred within the past 100 years, or at least acquired this contemporary significance within this time frame, I will organize the discussion in the following way. I will point out several major features characteristic of the international system in the mid-Nineteenth Century and then indicate how these features have undergone change since then. For convenience of discussion I will refer to the international system of the mid-Nineteenth Century as "the classical system" and the current system as the "contemporary system".

The Growth of Non-State Actors

In the classical system the actors making up the system were almost exclusively states in the sense that we use "states" when we speak of nation states; that is national governments. With the exception of the Catholic Church and an occasional alliance, no other

types of organizations were significant actors in the international system.

The emergence and proliferation of non-state actors is one of the most significant structural changes that have occurred in the international system. In the contemporary system a large number and a wide variety of organizations are involved in international relations in addition to national governments. Moreover, individuals qua individuals sometimes play significant roles in world politics. Indeed, the growth and diversification of non-state actors has been so great in contemporary history that scholars of world politics have yet to devise any one taxonomy of non-state actors which commands wide spread usage. I personally find useful a typology developed by Richard W. Mansbach and his colleagues (1976) and will use it here. They distinguish the following five types of non-state actors in international relations:

1) Interstate governmental actors
2) Interstate nongovernmental actors
3) Governmental noncentral actors
4) Intrastate nongovernmental actors
5) Individuals

Interstate governmental actors: These refer to what we conventionally call international organizations (IGOs) or supernational organizations depending on their degree of autonomy. These are organizations whose members represent two or more national governments. The United Nations and its specialized agencies are examples of international organizations. The European Common Market is an example of a supernational organization.

Interstate governmental actors have been growing in number. Indeed, the growth rate has been exponential displaying the characteristics of the familiar J curve. The following graph shows the growth in number of international organizations between 1815 when the Central Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine was established and 1960.



Source: Michael Wallace and J. David Singer, 1970, p. 272

While this particular graph ends in 1960 showing 192 IGO's in existence in that year, the growth of IGO's did not stop then. Data from the 1978 Yearbook of International Organizations indicate that by 1970 the number had increased to 242, and by 1976 to 308. (Appendix, Table 1)

International organizations come in a variety of shapes and sizes. Some are very broad in their membership; others are limited to a few states. Some have very broad functions and others have very specialized functions. The following table provides a crude typology of international organizations.

Extent of Membership—Number of States Belonging	Breadth of Functions or Concerns of International Organizations: Universal or Very Broad	Breadth of Functions or Concerns of International Organizations: Limited
Virtually Universal or Open to Most States	United Nations	Specialized Agencies such as: World Health Organization UNESCO Universal Postal Union Food and Agriculture Organization Int'l Civil Aviation Organization etc.
Limited to Certain States	Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Arab League etc.	Regional Security Organizations such as: NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization Specific Economic, Social, Scientific Organizations such as: Int'l. Whaling Commission Int'l. Sugar Council Danube Commission Inter-American Music Committee Int'l. Bureau of Weights and Measures Pan American Health Organization etc. Bilateral Organizations such as: Int'l. Halibut Commission Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission Int'l. Boundary Commission—U.S. and Canada

Source: David J. Finlay and Thomas Hovet, Jr., 1975, p. 288

The growth in number and variety of international organizations in recent decades has a number of consequences. For one thing, there is virtually no domain of human activity that has not affected in some major or minor way the activities of international organizations. This is well illustrated by the variety of resolutions adopted by each session of the U.N. General Assembly. For example, during its 27th session, resolutions were adopted dealing with the following matters.

International action for mitigation of storms
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space
Preparation for an international conference on principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting
Preparatory steps toward the convening of a world disarmament conference
Implementation of the results of a Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapons States
Question of general and complete disarmament
Question of chemical and bacteriological warfare
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear weapons tests
Implementation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
Implementation of a Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security
Reservation of the sea bed and ocean floor under the high seas for peaceful purposes only, and the convening of a conference on the law of the sea
Effects of atomic radiation
The policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa

Relief efforts for Palestine refugees
Review of efforts for peace-keeping operations
Report of a special committee investigating the practices of the Israeli government affecting the human rights of people in the Arab territories occupied by Israel
Support for victims of colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa
Nonuse of force in international relations and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons
Situation in the Middle East
Cooperation among states in the field of the human environment
Special measures related to the particular needs of landlocked developing states
Establishment of a U.N. University
Institutional and financial arrangements for international environmental cooperation
Criteria governing multilateral financing of housing and human settlements
Establishment of an international fund or financial institution for human settlements
Measures for protecting and enhancing the human environment
Problem of economic development and the environment
International prize for the most outstanding contribution in the field of the human environment
Outflow of trained personnel from developing to developed states
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources in developing states
Problem of mass poverty and unemployment in developing countries

Special measures in favor of the least developed of the developing states
Charter on economic rights and duties of states
Dissemination of information and mobilization of public opinion relative to problems of development
External debt servicing by developing countries
Multilateral trade negotiations
Program for the observance of the 25th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Exploitation of labor through illicit and clandestine trafficking
Draft Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
Protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions in areas of armed conflict
Assistance to Sudanese refugees returning from abroad
Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations
International Women's Year
Capital Punishment
Assistance in narcotics control
Narcotic drugs
United Nations Program for Drug Abuse Control
Principles of international cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition, and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity
Crime prevention and control
Channels of communication with youth and youth international organizations
Implementation of the Declaration on the Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect, and Understanding Between Peoples
Increased employment and mobility of young people in the United Nations
Status of the International Covenants on Human Rights
Freedom of information
Human rights and scientific and technological developments
Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance
United Nations conference for an international convention on adoption control
United Nations Conference on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods
International conference of plenipotentiaries on the representation of states in their relations with international organizations
Need to consider suggestions regarding the review of the charter of the United Nations
Respect for human rights in armed conflicts
Review of the role of the International Court of Justice
Measures to prevent international terrorism

Questions with respect to steps being taken to eliminate colonialism in:
- Territories under Portuguese administration
- Southern Rhodesia
- Papua New Guinea
- Spanish Sahara
- America Samoa . . .

Activities or programs of:
- International Atomic Energy Agency
- United Nations Commissioner for Zambia
- U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
- U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
- U.N. Institute for Training and Research. . . .

Source: David J. Finlay and Thomas Hovett, Jr., 1975, pp. 291-293

Also the growth of international organizations has meant a marked increase in the number of individuals who are involved in professional activities related to the work of international organizations. For example, in 1956, 2,895 experts were engaged in the U.N.'s technical assistance program. By 1963 this number had jumped to 4,683, representing a 7.1% annual increase (Robert Angle, 1969, p. 93). Looking at professionals associated with the U.N. and its specialized agencies but not involved in technical assistance programs as such, one sees a similar pattern. In 1956 there were 7,821 non-technicians employed by the U.S. By 1963 this number had increased to 11,299 (Robert Angle, 1969, p. 148). In short, an expanding pool of international civil servants is developing. While retaining their national citizenship, most of these individuals develop a loyalty to the international organization which employs them in much the same sense that civil servants in national, state, or local bureaucracies develop loyalties to their particular organizations.

As residents of one of the world's super powers living in a time when the unbecoming and unjustified arrogance of a former President and his Ambassador to the United Nations made pot shooting at the U.N. a favorite American past-time, it is easy to lose sight of the many ways our lives and

the lives of others across the globe are touched by the operations and activities of international organizations. Harry Jones, an American tourist in Europe, gives no thought to the Universal Postal Union when he confidently sends his friends and relatives postcards of Paris, London and Rome. Nor does he think of the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization when, with equal confidence, he boards an airplane for home. Mary Brown, businessperson from Chicago, travelling to tropical Africa, does not think of the activities of the World Health Organization when she leaves expecting to return to her office on La Salle Street with no more than a mild case of dissentary. Henry White, whose oldest son was killed in Korea, does not think of the U.N. when a few years later he breathes a sigh of relief when the United States and the Soviet Union did not intervene in the Congo crisis. These particular international organizations that affected the lives of these Americans are but three out of many IGO's in which the United States is a member. Indeed, U.S. membership is increasing rapidly. In 1960 the U.S. was a member of 671 IGO's, 915 in 1968, and 1212 in 1977. What is true of the United States is also true of most other nations. Membership in IGO's is increasing. (Yearbook of International Organizations, 1976, Appendix, Table 4)

In short, international organizations may not be a part of our everyday political consciousness, but this tells us more about our own political psychology than it does about political reality. The dramatic growth in number of IGO's, as K. J. Holsti (1977) observes, indicates that they "are fulfilling needs that cannot be met solely through the unilateral action of states". He goes on:

> Their variety and relative importance to international political questions varies greatly, but the important point is that many of them have a persistent and direct

> impact on the processes and issues of the contemporary global system, on the rules governing those processes, and on the foreign policies of virtually all the state actors in the system. In terms of their impact, they loom much more important than many of the smaller states in international politics. (p. 80)

Interstate nongovernmental actors: These are a second type of non-state actor in the contemporary international system. They are commonly termed transnational organizations or non-governmental international organizations (NGO's). In contrast to the interstate governmental organizations discussed above, interstate nongovernmental actors do not represent governments. Rather, they are associations of individuals or private groups in different nations who share common interests that transcend national boundaries. Examples of this type of association familiar to Americans include Rotary International, The International Red Cross, The World Council of Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, the Salvation Army, the International Council of Jewish Women, Kiwanis International, the Boy and Girl Scouts International, the YMCA and YWCA, and the World Confederation of Labor.

Like international organizations, interstate non-governmental organizations have been growing very rapidly as is evidenced by the following table.

Number of NGO's, 1860-1976

1860	5
1870	9
1880	21
1890	37
1900	69
1910	135
1920	214
1930	375
1940	477
1950	785
1960	1321
1970	2296
1976	2401

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Source: Saul H. Mendlovitz, 1975, p. 161
and Yearbook of International Organizations, 1978,
Appendix A

In terms of total number, NGO's far exceed IGO's. Moreover, their rate of growth has been even more dramatic. This reflects the fact that, "there is in contemporary world society an increasing number of systems--some basically economic, scientific, cultural, idealogical, or religious--that have little relationship to state boundaries," and "whatever significance geographically drawn boundaries had, has been and is being greatly reduced by these developments" (J. W. Burton, 1968, p. 10). This generalization is easily documented by the data presented in the following table. The table shows the number of NGO's in each of several areas of human activity for several years.

Number of NGO's by Area and Year

Bibliography, documentation, press	19	-	29	26	33	34	41	54	58	69	63	72	77
Religion, ethics	21	-	79	70	79	87	86	87	93	103	109	112	129
Social sciences, humanistic studies	10	-	38	57	55	57	57	67	80	90	95	104	133
International relations	12	-	83	61	71	92	99	106	111	125	127	144	132
Politics	3	-	12	13	14	17	15	14	15	22	22	27	30
Law, administration	13	-	31	28	30	37	42	45	48	54	54	58	45
Social welfare	10	-	52	52	53	56	64	70	76	88	95	101	120
Professions, employers	12	-	56	67	67	73	76	78	93	105	112	119	132
Trade Unions	1	-	49	48	49	54	54	59	63	70	70	70	67
Economics, finance	3	-	14	15	16	26	30	33	35	40	45	47	53
Commerce, industry	5	-	116	123	134	163	160	168	211	233	239	251	273
Agriculture	5	-	32	27	34	46	55	64	76	83	83	88	105
Transport, travel	16	-	28	40	43	57	57	63	72	76	82	89	93
Technology	8	-	34	36	50	60	63	70	83	102	113	133	147
Science	21	-	81	69	77	83	92	118	137	152	174	184	190
Health, medicine	16	-	101	100	104	123	133	150	173	214	225	256	306
Education, youth	10	-	54	56	62	68	71	83	91	105	106	116	134
Arts, literature, radio, cinema, TV	6	-	41	34	34	57	57	65	70	75	80	80	93
Sport, recreation	6	-	67	51	55	65	72	76	90	93	99	110	119

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, 1978,
Appendix, Table 1

This table clearly illustrates the wide range of human activities that have become transnational. However, this table, as well as the other data I have been citing on the number and growth of IGO's, seriously

underestimates the number of nongovernmental interstate actors in the contemporary international system. They do so because the data do not include multinational corporations nor revolutionary and terrorist groups, both of which have become very significant actors in the drama of world politics. Let us briefly look at international terrorism and then at multinationals as international actors.

Terrorists as Transnational Actors

The following table is a selective chronology of incidents of international terrorism between 1970 and 1974. It provides the reader with some sense of scale and magnitude of terrorism as a transnational activity.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1 January 1970 A Brazilian revolutionary organisation hijacked an airliner en route between Montevideo and Rio. The plane was flown to Cuba. The hijackers stated that their purpose was 'to pay homage' to the dead guerrilla leader, Che Guevera.

20 January 1970 Unknown gunmen entered the British Consulate in Guatemala City where they shot and killed the consul's bodyguard.

10 February 1970 Three Arab terrorists killed one Israeli citizen and wounded 11 other passengers in a grenade attack on a bus at the airport in Munich. Two Palestinian organisations were responsible for the attack.

21 February 1970 A sabotaged Swissair plane en route to Tel Aviv crashed on takeoff killing all 47 passengers, including 15 Israelis. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was responsible.

21 February 1970 A bomb planted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine exploded in an Austrian plane that was carrying mail to Tel Aviv. There were no casualties.

1 March 1970 A bomb was found in the luggage aboard an Ethiopian airliner in Rome. The device was placed by members of the Eritrean Liberation Front.

6 March 1970 Members of the Rebel Armed Forces kidnapped the US Labor Attaché in Guatemala. In return for his release, the kidnappers demanded the release of four prisoners held by Guatemalan authorities. The Government agreed to meet the kidnappers' demands. He was released on 8 March.

11 March 1970 Japan's Consul General in São Paulo, Brazil, was seized by members of a leftist urban guerrilla group. The kidnappers' demands included the release of five prisoners and suspension of the massive search which had been launched by the Government. The Brazilian Government promptly suspended its search and announced that it would meet the kidnappers' demands. The hostage was released unharmed, after the plane with its prisoners arrived in Mexico.

24 March 1970 The US Air Attaché in the Dominican Republic was kidnapped by six members of a group calling itself the 'United Anti-Reelection Command', a leftist group which opposed the reelection of President Balaguer. The kidnappers demanded that twenty-one prisoners be set free. The Government agreed. The Attaché was released on 26 March.

24 March 1970 The Paraguayan Consul in the border town of Ituzaingo, Argentina, was kidnapped by members of the Liberation Armed Forces. They threatened to kill him and to begin killing the managers of the American business firms if two of [illegible] ment were not released from prison. The Government refused their demands. On 28 March, the kidnappers released the Consul, unharmed for humanitarian reasons, but vowed to execute police and government officials.

27 March 1970 A right-wing terrorist group threatened to kill the Soviet Ambassador in Argentina and his family in reprisal for the kidnapping of the Paraguayan Consul.

29 March 1970 Four members of a right-wing terrorist group attempted to kidnap the Soviet Assistant Commercial Attaché.

31 March 1970 Nine members of Japan's United Red Army hijacked a Japan Air Lines plane and ordered it to be flown to Pyongyang, North Korea.

31 March 1970 Members of the Rebel Armed Forces kidnapped the West German Ambassador to Guatemala. The kidnappers threatened to execute the Ambassador unless the government released seventeen – later twenty-five – prisoners. The Guatemalan Government refused to meet the demands. A last-minute attempt at negotiations failed and on 5 April the authorities received an anonymous phone call telling them where to find the Ambassador's body.

5 April 1970 The US Consul General eluded a kidnapping attempt in Porto Allegre, Brazil.

26 April 1970 A Brazilian VASP airliner was hijacked and ordered to be flown to Cuba by a left-wing urban guerrilla leader.

4 May 1970 Two Palestinian Arabs burst into the Israeli Embassy in Asunción, Paraguay, and shot and killed the wife of the First Secretary and seriously wounded an Embassy employee. The assailants were reported to be members of Al Fatah.

13 May 1970 Eight armed nationals of the Domincan Republic took over a Dutch Antilles Airways plane and ordered it to be flown to Cuba.

22 May 1970 Eight children were killed and twenty-two wounded when a school bus in Israel was hit by three bazooka rockets fired by *fedayeen* who had crossed the border from Lebanon.

5 June 1970 A Polish airliner was hijacked to Denmark by persons seeking asylum.

7 June 1970 The US Political Secretary in Jordan was kidnapped by Palestinian guerrillas. The guerrillas demanded the release of forty prisoners held in Jordan. He was released unharmed on 8 June.

9 June 1970 Sixty foreigners were held hostage in two Amman hotels by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The guerrillas threatened to blow up the two hotels if their camps in Jordan were smashed by Jordanian army units. The hostages were released unharmed on 12 June.

10 June 1970 The US Assistant Military Attaché in Jordan was shot to death by guerrillas.

11 June 1970 The Federal German Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro by members of two leftist urban guerrilla organisations. In return for his safe return, the kidnappers demanded the release of forty prisoners and the publication of a revolutionary manifesto. The Brazilian Government agreed and the forty prisoners were flown to Algeria. The Ambassador was released unharmed on 16 June.

21 June 1970 An Iranian Boeing 727 was hijacked by three armed Iranians and flown to Baghdad. The hijackers requested political asylum in Iraq.

21 July 1970 Members of the National Liberation Army kidnapped two Federal German technicians in Bolivia. They burned the offices of an American-owned goldmining firm, stole $5,000, and fled into the jungle with their captives whom they threatened to execute unless the Bolivian Government released ten prisoners within 48 hours. The government yielded on 22 July and the two technicians were released unharmed.

22 July 1970 Six Arab guerrillas hijacked an Olympic Airways 727 over Rhodes, Greece, after it had taken off from Beirut, and ordered it to be flown to Cairo. They demanded the release of seven other Arab guerrillas being held by the Greek Government. The Greek Government promised to release the prisoners within one month, and the fifty-five passengers and crew of the aircraft were released. The Popular Struggle Front claimed credit for the operation.

31 July 1970 An American public safety adviser in Uruguay was kidnapped by the Tupamaros. The kidnappers demanded that 150 Tupamaros being held in jail be freed in return for the hostage held by the Tupamaros. When the President of Uruguay refused to negotiate with the kidnappers, the Tupamaros killed the adviser.

31 July 1970 The Brazilian Consul was kidnapped by Tupamaros. He was finally released on 21 February 1971.

31 July 1970 Tupamaros attempted to kidnap the Second Secretary to the US Embassy in Montevideo, and also the Cultural Attaché.

7 August 1970 An American agricultural adviser in Uruguay was kidnapped by the Tupamaros. During his extended captivity, the man suffered a heart attack. He was driven to a hospital and released on 2 March 1971.

6 September 1970 Members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked three airliners bound for Europe and diverted them to the Middle East. Two aircraft were flown to a landing strip in the Jordanian desert. A fourth hijacking of an El Al plane from Amsterdam was foiled when a security guard aboard the plane killed one of the hijackers and wounded another. The hijackings were announced to be in retaliation for American support of Israel and the American peace initiatives in the Middle East. The hijackers demanded the release of imprisoned Arab guerrillas in Switzerland, Great Britain and Federal Germany. On 9 September the same group hijacked a BOAC VC-10 and also had it flown to the airstrip, bringing the total number of hostages held in the desert to over 300. Negotiations were complicated by the outbreak of fighting between Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerrillas.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

On 12 September the remaining passengers (women and children had been removed earlier) were evacuated, and the three airliners were blown up. Most passengers were soon released, but the hijackers continued to hold fifty-eight hostages to exert pressure on the European governments. The remaining hostages were released in September in exchange for seven Arab guerrillas.

12 September 1970 Members of the Jewish Defence League in London announced that they had kidnapped three employees of the Egyptian Embassy and would hold them hostage until the airline passengers held in Jordan were released.

5 October 1970 The British Trade Commissioner in Quebec, Canada, was kidnapped by members of the Quebec Liberation Front. The ransom demands included the release of thirteen prisoners, the publication of a manifesto, and the payment of $500,000 in gold. On 10 October other Front members kidnapped the Minister of Labor in the Quebec Government. The kidnappers warned that they would kill him if the demands made by the kidnappers of the British diplomat were not met. The Government again rejected the demands, but offered the kidnappers a safe conduct out of the country if the two hostages were released unharmed. On 18 October the body of the Minister was found in the trunk of a car. On 3 December the kidnappers released the British diplomat unharmed and were flown to Cuba in accordance with an agreement that had been worked out earlier.

9 October 1970 An Iranian airliner was hijacked to Baghdad by Iranian terrorists seeking the release of twenty-one prisoners held in Iran.

1 November 1970 The Polish Deputy Foreign Minister was assassinated in Karachi, Pakistan, by a Pakistani truck driver who drove a truck into an airport reception line for the Polish officials.

1 December 1970 The honorary Federal German Consul in San Sebastian, Spain, was kidnapped by members of a Basque nationalist party dedicated to achieving independence for the Basque provinces in northern Spain. The kidnappers warned that his fate would depend on the sentence given to fifteen Basques accused of murdering a head of the provincial police. On 24 December the Consul was released unharmed.

7 December 1970 The Swiss Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro by leftist guerrillas. The kidnappers demanded the release of seventy prisoners, the broadcast of a revolutionary manifesto, and the immediate publication by the press of any other rebel communiques. After lengthy negotiations, the Brazilian Government agreed, on 14 January 1971, to release the prisoners. The Ambassador was released unharmed on 16 January.

8 January 1971 The British Ambassador in Uruguay was kidnapped by Tupamaros. In return for his release, the kidnappers demanded the release of 150 prisoners. The Government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The Ambassador was released on 9 September, just three days after 106 of the prisoners on the kidnappers' list escaped from jail.

8 January 1971 A bomb placed by members of the Jewish Defense League exploded in the Soviet cultural offices in Washington, D.C.

2 February 1971 Two armed Kashmiri nationalists hijacked an Indian Airlines plane to Pakistan. They demanded the release of thirty-six prisoners held in Kashmir by the Indian Government. When the Government rejected their demands, they blew up the airliner.

10 February 1971 Two Croatian emigrés seized control of the Yugoslav Consulate in Göteborg, Sweden, in an unsuccessful attempt to ransom its occupants for convicted terrorists held in Yugoslav jails.

4 March 1971 Four American servicemen stationed near Ankara were kidnapped by four members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army. The kidnappers demanded the publication of a manifesto attacking American imperialism in Turkey, and the payment of 400,000 Turkish lira. The Turkish Government captured one of the kidnappers who divulged the names of his accomplices. The kidnappers released the four airmen unharmed on 8 March.

30 March 1971 Six members of a Philippine leftist student organisation hijacked a Philippine Airlines domestic flight to Peking, China.

7 April 1971 The Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden was assassinated and two Yugoslav diplomats were wounded by Croatian terrorists in Stockholm.

17 May 1971 The Israeli Consul General in Istanbul was kidnapped by members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army. The kidnappers demanded the release of all guerrillas being detained by the Turkish Government. The Government rejected the demand and launched a house-to-house search. The Consul's body was found, shot to death, in an apartment on 23 May.

23 May 1971 The honorary British Consul in Rosario, Argentina, was kidnapped by members of the People's Revolutionary Army.

29 May 1971 Basque Nationalists attempted to kidnap the French Consul in San Sebastian, Spain. He resisted and escaped.

24 August 1971 A bomb placed by Al Fatah damaged a Jordanian airliner in Madrid, Spain.

28 November 1971 The Jordanian Prime Minister was assassinated in Egypt by members of Black September. This was the first public mention of the group. A statement by the group said that the killing was in revenge for the slaying of Palestinian guerrillas in the Jordan civil war in September 1970.

15 December 1971 Black September members attempted, unsuccessfully, to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador in London.

16 January 1971 An American nurse was killed and several persons wounded in a terrorist attack in Israeli-occupied Gaza.

26 January 1972 Croatian emigrés claimed responsibility for bombing of a Stockholm-to-Belgrade airliner which crashed, killing twenty-six.

26 January 1972 The New York offices of Sol Hurok, who manages tours by Soviet performers, were firebombed by members of the Jewish Defense League.

22 February 1972 A bomb planted by the Irish Republican Army exploded at Aldershot army base in England, killing seven and wounding five.

22 February 1972 A Lufthansa jet airliner en route from New Delhi to Athens was hijacked by five Palestinian guerrillas who described themselves as members of the 'Organisation for Victims of Zionist Occupation'. They released the passengers and crew on 23 February. Later, the Federal German Government disclosed that it had paid $5 million in ransom for the release of the hostages and airliner.

21 March 1972 The managing director of Fiat in Argentina was kidnapped by members of the People's Revolutionary Army. On 10 April police discovered the kidnappers' hideout. The kidnappers executed the victim just before they were captured.

27 March 1972 Three NATO radar technicians were kidnapped by members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army. When their hideout was surrounded, the three hostages were executed.

3 May 1972 Four Turkish students claiming to be members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army hijacked a Turkish airliner to Bulgaria.

A Belgian Sabena Airlines plane en route from Vienna to Tel Aviv was hijacked by four members of Black September who ordered the plane flown to Israel's Lod Airport. Upon their arrival they demanded the release of 317 Palestinian guerrillas held in Israel. Israel paratroopers disguised as mechanics burst through the emergency doors and killed two of the hijackers and wounded a third. Five passengers were wounded in the gunfight.

May 1972 Three Japanese gunmen attacked passengers at Israel's Lod Airport with machine-guns and hand grenades, killing twenty-five and wounding seventy-six. The gunmen, who were members of the United Red Army of Japan, were recruited by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine for the assault.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3 June 1972 A lone hijacker claiming to be a member of the Black Panther Party seized a Western Airlines jet in the United States and ordered it to be flown to Algiers after collecting $500,000 ransom.

20 June 1972 Nineteen Croatian guerrillas infiltrated into Yugoslavia. Near the town of Bugojnok, they attacked and killed thirteen local security officers before they were defeated.

30 June 1972 The president of the Buenos Aires branch of the Banco di Napoli, a leading Italian bank, was kidnapped by four armed men.

17 July 1972 The First Secretary of the Swedish Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia was shot to death by unidentified gunmen.

31 July 1972 Hijackers claiming to be sympathisers of the Black Panthers took over a Delta Air Lines jet over Florida, directing the plane to Algeria after collecting $1 million in ransom.

5 August 1972 An oil storage facility in Trieste, Italy, was set on fire by Black September terrorists. The fire caused an estimated $7 million damage.

16 August 1972 An El Al airliner was damaged by a bomb in its luggage compartment shortly after take off from Rome. A new guerrilla group calling itself 'Nationalist Youth Group for the Liberation of Palestine' claimed credit for the attack.

22 August 1972 A Southern Yemen DC-6 airplane en route from Beirut to Cairo was hijacked by three armed men who said they were members of a group called the 'Eagles of National Unity'. The plane was flown to Benghazi, Libya, where the hijackers requested asylum.

5 September 1972 Eight Palestinian guerrillas broke into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic Games in Munich, killing two Israeli athletes and taking nine others hostage. The guerrillas demanded the release of 200 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and safe passage for themselves and their hostages to another country. In a subsequent gunfight five of the terrorists and all nine of the hostages were killed. Black September claimed responsibility for the attack. (On 21 February 1973, Israel, in retaliation for Munich, raided refugee camps in Lebanon killing thirty-one. They also shot down a Libyan airliner that strayed over Sinai, killing 107 aboard.)

5 September 1972 A Dutch citizen, who headed the Philips Argentina electronic firm, was kidnapped by a Peronist urban guerrilla group.

15 September 1972 Croatian emigrés hijacked an SAS airliner and ransomed its passengers for Croatian terrorists held in Swedish jails.

19 September 1972 A letter-bomb mailed by Arab guerrillas exploded and killed a diplomat in the Israeli Embassy in London. In the next few days, nearly fifty letter-bombs addressed to officials in Israel and Israeli Embassies were intercepted throughout the world. Eight more letter-bombs were found in the first half of October. Black September claimed responsibility.

6 October 1972 Palestinian students entered the Federal German consulate in Algiers and held hostages for about an hour, demanding release of three Arab terrorists held in Munich.

22 October 1972 Four men hijacked a Turkish airliner to Bulgaria, and threatened to blow it up along with sixty-nine passengers if Turkey did not release twelve terrorist prisoners, restore the right of workers to strike, and reorganise the universities.

29 October 1972 A Lufthansa Boeing 727 en route to Ankara was taken over by two hijackers claiming to be members of Black September and was ordered to be flown to Munich. The hijackers threatened to blow up the plane unless the Federal German Government released the three Black September terrorists captured in the Munich attack.

2 November 1972 Three youths bombed the French Consulate in Zaragoza, Spain, fatally injuring the French honorary Consul and slightly injuring two others.

6 November 1972 A letter-bomb exploded in a post office in Bombay, India, wounding a post office worker.

7 November 1972 An Italian industrialist was kidnapped in Buenos Aires.

8 November 1972 Four members of the 'Armed Communist League', a small guerrilla group in Mexico, hijacked a Mexican airliner. They demanded arms, the release of five imprisoned guerrillas, a Government promise to drop charges against two fugitives who joined them, and $330,000 in ransom.

10 November 1972 A letter-bomb exploded when it was being opened by the managing director of a diamond brokers' firm in London. In the next few days, fifty-two more letter-bombs addressed to Jewish firms in Europe were intercepted in Bombay and New Delhi, and twenty more were intercepted by British authorities. Swiss authorities intercepted an additional five.

6 December 1972 A Spanish industrialist in Argentina was kidnapped by unknown persons.

8 December 1972 The chief representative of Al Fatah in Paris was killed by an explosion which destroyed his Paris apartment.

10 December 1972 The managing director of the British Vestey industrial group in Argentina was kidnapped by members of the People's Revolutionary Army.

20 December 1972 The US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, was hit by two rockets. Black September was suspected of the attack.

27 December 1972 An executive for the Argentine subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph was kidnapped.

28 December 1972 Four members of Black September took over the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and held six hostages for nineteen hours. They demanded the release of thirty-six Arab guerrillas imprisoned in Israel. Thai officials and the Egyptian Ambassador in Bangkok persuaded the guerrillas to release their hostages in return for safe conduct to Egypt.

8 January 1973 A bomb exploded destroying the offices of the Jewish Agency in Paris which arranges for the emigration of Jews to Israel. Black September claimed credit.

23 January 1973 Two Italian businessmen residing in Ethiopia were kidnapped by members of the Eritrean Liberation Front.

23 January 1973 Two armed gunmen and one woman kidnapped the US Ambassador to Haiti, and held him hostage along with the US Consul General. In return for the two hostages, the kidnappers demanded the release of thirty prisoners and a ransom of $1 million. In subsequent negotiations, they agreed to accept the release of twelve prisoners and $70,000. The kidnappers released their hostages after eighteen hours and flew with the released prisoners to Mexico.

25 January 1973 A representative of Al Fatah was killed in a hotel in Nicosia, Cyprus, by a time-bomb. Palestinians claimed that Israeli agents were responsible.

26 January 1973 Black September claimed responsibility for the assassination of an Israeli tourist in Madrid, Spain, who they claimed was an Israeli intelligence officer.

27 January 1973 The Turkish Consul General and Vice-Consul in Los Angeles, California, were murdered by a man of Armenian origin in revenge for Turkish attacks on Armenians in 1915.

20 February 1973 Three Pakistani youths attacked the Indian High Commission in London and held staff members hostage, injuring some of them. British police shot two of the gunmen and arrested the third, who said they belonged to a group called 'Black December'. They had intended to take hostages in order to obtain an audience with Prime Minister Indira Ghandi and to demand the release of Pakistani prisoners-of-war.

1 March 1973 Eight members of Black September took over the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum and seized several hostages, including the US Ambassador, the US Deputy Chief of Mission, and the Belgian Chargé. The Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires and Saudi Arabian Ambassador were also held.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Many other diplomats escaped. The terrorists demanded the release of sixty Palestinian guerrillas being held in Jordan, all Arab women detained in Israel, Sirhan Sirhan (the killer of Senator Robert Kennedy), and imprisoned members of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Federal Germany. When negotiations failed, the terrorists executed the two US diplomats and the Belgian Chargé on the night of 2 March. The terrorists then tried to bargain for safe passage to another country, but this was rejected. They surrendered on 3 March.

4 March 1973 The Greek charter ship 'Sanya' – carrying 250 American tourists bound for Haifa, Israel – sank in Beirut harbour following an explosion on board. There were no casualties.

8 March 1973 Two bombs exploded in London, killing one and injuring two hundred. The Irish Republican Army was believed to be responsible.

12 March 1973 An Israeli businessman subsequently branded by Cairo's *fedayeen* radio as a 'Zionist intelligence officer' was shot and killed on the steps of the Nicosia Palace Hotel in Cyprus. Black September claimed responsibility.

28 March 1973 The manager of the Rosario, Argentina, branch of the First National Bank of Boston was kidnapped by Argentine guerrillas.

2 April 1973 A naturalised US citizen, serving as a technical operations manager for Eastman Kodak Company in Argentina, was kidnapped on his way to work by guerrillas. He was the first American businessman kidnapped in Argentina.

8 April 1973 The president of Nobleza Tobacco Company, an Argentine subsidiary of British and American Tobacco Company, was kidnapped outside his home in Buenos Aires.

9 April 1973 A group of Arab guerrillas blew out the entrance to a Nicosia apartment building where the Israeli Ambassador resided, and escaped in an automobile. Shortly after the bomb exploded, two cars crashed through the gates of the Nicosia airport. There the guerrillas engaged in a gunfight with Cypriot police and an Israeli security guard. Three Arabs were wounded in the fight; one later died. Some reports credit Black September with the operation.

10 April 1973 Israeli commandos, in a raid on Beirut, killed seventeen, including three high-ranking Palestinian guerrilla leaders, and wounded several others.

27 April 1973 An Italian employee of El Al Airlines was shot and killed outside a department store in Rome. Police arrested a Lebanese citizen who said that he was a member of Black September and had been ordered to kill the Italian because he was an Israeli spy responsible for the killing of an Al Fatah official in Rome in October 1972.

2 May 1973 Rockets were fired at the US Ambassador's residence in Beirut.

4 May 1973 Two Soviet doctors working in Burma were kidnapped by rebel Shan tribesmen.

4 May 1973 The US Consul General in Guadalajara was kidnapped by members of the 'People's Revolutionary Armed Forces'. They demanded the release of thirty prisoners held in Mexico. Later, they asked for a ransom of $80,000. The Mexican Government acceded to all of the demands and the Consul's wife arranged for payment of the ransom. He was freed unharmed on 6 May.

18 May 1973 Four members of the 'People's Revolutionary Army (Zero Point)', a leftist guerrilla organisation, hijacked a Venezuelan airlines plane and ordered it to be flown to Mexico City. The hijackers demanded the release of seventy-nine prisoners held in Venezuela, a demand which the Venezuelan Government rejected. Mexican officials persuaded the hijackers not to destroy the plane but rather to fly to Cuba. The hijackers accepted the offer and flew to Havana.

21 May 1973 Gunmen belonging to the People's Revolutionary Army wounded an executive and another employee of Ford Motor Company, Argentina, one of whom later died. The organisation issued a communiqué on 23 May stating that the victim had been shot resisting a kidnapping attempt and warning that the kidnapping of Ford executives would continue unless the company paid $1 million ransom.

30 May 1973 A Colombian airliner was hijacked by two armed men who demanded the release of forty-seven imprisoned guerrillas and $200,000 ransom. The Colombian Government refused both demands. The hijackers accepted $50,000 instead and escaped. All passengers and crew were released and unharmed.

31 May 1973 The People's Revolutionary Army threatened to attack and kidnap top executives of Otis Elevator Company and their families unless the company made $500,000 in charitable contributions similar to those made by Ford and doubled the wages of 1,300 Otis employees in Argentina.

2 June 1973 An American military adviser in Iran was shot and killed by gunmen believed to be members of a leftist guerrilla group.

6 June 1973 A British executive of an Argentine affiliate of Britain's Acrow Steel was kidnapped by six gunmen believed to be members of the People's Revolutionary Army; but in a press conference, the group denied responsibility for the kidnapping and for the threats against Ford and Otis. The kidnappers may have been members of a splinter group. In the negotiations the kidnappers asked for $7.5 million ransom.

9 June 1973 An arms plant in West Berlin was partially destroyed by a Black September unit. The group issued a communiqué stating that it was because the company deals with Israel.

10 June 1973 A Royal Nepal Airlines plane was hijacked while on a domestic flight by three armed men, one of whom was identified as a leader of a Nepalese student organisation connected with the Nepalese Communist Party. The plane was carrying a bank shipment of approximately $400,000 which the hijackers seized. They ordered the plane to be flown to India and escaped.

18 June 1973 A Federal German clothing manufacturer in Argentina was kidnapped by guerrillas and held for $100,000 ransom.

18 June 1973 The President of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company's subsidiary in Argentina was kidnapped by members of the People's Revolutionary Army who demanded $3 million ransom.

25 June 1973 The Italian Vice-President of the Bank of Italy and Rio de la Plata was kidnapped by gunmen believed to be members of the People's Revolutionary Army. The kidnappers demanded $2 million in ransom.

28 June 1973 An Algerian supporter of *fedayeen* terrorist operations was killed in Paris by a bomb in his car.

1 July 1973 The Israeli Military Attaché in Washington, D.C., was shot to death outside his home. Arab terrorists were believed to be responsible.

2 July 1973 The assistant manager of First National City Bank of New York in Córdoba, Argentina, was kidnapped.

19 July 1973 A lone Palestinian guerrilla armed with a machine-gun and hand-grenades attempted to attack the El Al offices in Athens. He was prevented from entering the office by the closed bullet-proof inner glass doors. The terrorist then fled to a nearby hotel where he cornered seventeen hostages. Negotiations, undertaken by the Ambassadors of Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, continued for several hours. It was finally agreed to allow the terrorist to be flown to Kuwait where he vanished. The hostages were released unharmed. The man claimed to be a member of the 'Organisation of Victims of Occupied Territories'.

20 July 1973 A Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 was seized by one Japanese and three Arab hijackers shortly after it took off from Amsterdam. A fifth hijacker, a woman reported to be a Latin American, was killed shortly after the plane was taken over when a hand-grenade she was holding accidentally exploded. The three Arabs identified themselves either as members of the 'Organisation of Sons of Occupied Territories' or the 'Mount Carmel Martyrs'. The Japanese hijacker was identified as a member of the 'Japanese Red Army acting for the people of Palestine'. The hijackers ordered the plane to Lebanon where they were refused permission to land. They finally landed in Dubai. Officials at Japan Air Lines arrived there to negotiate, but the hijackers rejected negotiations and flew on to Benghazi, Libya, where the passengers were released and the aircraft destroyed with grenades and a bomb by the hijackers.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

21 July 1973 A Moroccan waiter resident in Oslo, Norway, was murdered by several persons believed to be members of the 'Wrath of God', a militant wing of the Jewish Defense League or Israeli counter-terrorist agents.

5 August 1973 Two Arabs armed with machine-guns and hand-grenades opened fire on passengers at the Athens airport. Three passengers were killed and fifty-five wounded. The terrorists then seized thirty-five hostages but later surrendered to Greek police. Later, a new group calling itself the 'Seventh Suicide Squad' claimed responsibility for the attack which it named the 'Bahr al-Bakr' operation after a Cairo suburb where Israeli planes bombed a school in 1970.

18 August 1973 Members of the Irish Republican Army of sympathisers launched a fire- and letter-bomb campaign in London, Birmingham, and Manchester. By September 28 more than forty bombs had exploded. Many others were discovered and defused. At least twenty-nine people were injured. Letter-bombs were discovered at British Embassies in Paris on 28 August, and in Lisbon on 17 September. A letter-bomb sent to the British Embassy in Zaire wounded a British official on 17 September. British officials in Gibraltar and Brussels also received letter-bombs.

22 August 1973 A US citizen and member of the military anti-Castro Cuban Revolutionary Directorate was killed in a bomb explosion in his hotel room in Avrainville, France.

27 August 1973 A British citizen and manager of Leigib's Meat Company in Paraguay was kidnapped.

5 September 1973 Five Palestinian commandos broke into the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris and seized thirteen hostages. They demanded the release of an Al Fatah leader imprisoned in Jordan. After twenty-eight hours of negotiations in which a number of Arab ambassadors participated as intermediaries, the commandos dropped this demand and asked for safe passage out of the country. They agreed to release all but four of the hostages and were allowed to board a Syrian aircraft which flew them to Kuwait. On 7 September the commandos and their hostages transferred to a Kuwaiti plane and flew over Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The commandos threatened to throw the hostages out of the aircraft unless the Saudi Arabian Government helped them obtain the release of the Al Fatah leader. When Saudi Arabian officials refused, the aircraft was ordered to return to Kuwait. On 8 September the hostages were released and the commandos surrendered. The five claimed to be members of a group called 'Punishment'.

5 September 1973 Italian military police arrested five terrorists when they said they were planning to shoot down an El Al airliner at the Rome airport. One of the terrorists possessed two Soviet portable heat seeking ground-to-air missiles.

8 September 1973 Two men and a woman were injured seriously when terrorists exploded two bombs in King's Cross and Euston railway stations in London. At least ten other persons suffered lesser injuries in the explosions. It was believed that the Irish Republican Army's Provisional urban guerrillas or some of their ultra-militants were behind the bombings.

23 September 1973 A British executive of the Nobleza Tobacco Company in Argentina was kidnapped and held for ransom in Buenos Aires.

28 September 1973 Three Jewish emigrés en route from the Soviet Union to Israel and an Austrian customs official were seized by two armed Arabs who claimed to be members of the 'Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution'. The terrorists seized their hostages aboard a train, later commandeered a car, and drove to the Vienna airport. They demanded that the Austrian Government close Schonau Castle, a transit camp for Jewish emigrés operated by the Jewish Agency. The Austrian Government agreed and the terrorists released their hostages and were flown to Libya.

4 October 1973 Two American employees of the Frontino Goldmines in Colombia were kidnapped. The kidnappers, believed to have been members of the National Liberation Army, sent a letter on 5 October to the International Mining Company which owns the mines, demanding $168,990 ransom.

10 October 1973 The honorary British Consul in Guadalajara, Mexico, was kidnapped by terrorists who demanded the release of fifty-one political prisoners and $200,000 ransom. The Mexican Government refused to release any prisoners. The Consul was released unharmed on 14 October.

20 October 1973 A Boeing 737 carrying forty-three passengers and a crew of six was seized on a flight from Buenos Aires. Four hijackers, including two women, forced the plane to fly to Tucuman, then to Bolivia. The guerrillas identified themselves as Tupamaros. An offer of safe conduct out of Bolivia, presumably to Cuba, was accepted by the terrorists in exchange for the release of the hostages they had threatened to kill.

22 October 1973 A Swissair executive in Argentina was kidnapped by the People's Revolutionary Army. A $10 million ransom was demanded.

25 October 1973 The American head of an Argentine subsidiary of Amoco International Oil Company of Chicago was kidnapped in Buenos Aires.

22 November 1973 An American executive of Ford Motor Company, Argentina, and three bodyguards were killed in Córdoba, Argentina. A terrorist group called the Peronist Armed Forces announced that it was responsible.

25 November 1973 Four Palestinian guerrillas, belonging to the Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine, hijacked a Royal Dutch KLM jumbo jet. The aircraft was forced to fly first to Damascus and then on to Nicosia, Tripoli, and Malta. The hijackers demanded that KLM cease transporting arms to Israel and that the Netherands Government change its 'pro-Israel stance' drastically and no longer render aid to the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. All 247 passengers were released unharmed on 27 November; the hijackers surrendered after getting a safe passage guarantee from Dubai.

6 December 1973 An American executive with the Exxon Company in Argentina was kidnapped by the People's Revolutionary Army. The guerrilla group demanded that $10 million in food and medicine be distributed to the poor.

12 December 1973 An American engineer was kidnapped in La Plata, Argentina. $500,000 ransom was asked for his release.

17 December 1973 Thirty-two persons died and eighteen were wounded when five Arab guerrillas attacked the Middle-East-bound Pan American World Airways jet airliner in Rome, spraying it with bombs and machine-gun fire, hurling hand-grenades into it, and setting it on fire. The guerrillas then commandeered a West German Lufthansa airliner to Athens with a number of hostages. From Athens, the hijackers flew to Kuwait, where they released their twelve remaining hostages in exchange for 'free passage' to an unknown destination. The terrorists surrendered to the Kuwait Government.

18 December 1973 Two bombs in cars and a parcel-bomb exploded in London in what is believed to have been reprisal attacks for the jailing of Irish Republican terrorists.

27 December 1973 A Federal German industrialist who is also his country's honorary Consul was kidnapped from his home in Ireland.

29 December 1973 The Director of Safrar-Peugeot, a subsidiary of Peugeot of France, was kidnapped by seven armed men in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The kidnapping has been attributed to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, but the guerrilla group denied responsibility.

31 December 1973 One of Britain's leading Zionists was shot in his London mansion. The victim was an honorary vice-president of the Zionist Federation of Britain and president of Joint Palestinian Appeal, which collects funds for welfare in Israel. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility.

31 January 1974 Two Japanese belonging to the radical Japanese Red Army and two Arabs of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine tried to blow up a Shell refinery in Singapore, then seized eight hostages aboard a ferryboat and threatened to kill themselves and the hostages unless they were given safe passage to an Arab country. On 6 February, five members took over the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, holding about twelve hostages including the Japanese Ambassador. They demanded that the Japanese Government supply an airliner to bring their comrades from Singapore to Kuwait. The airliner carrying the four guerrillas from Singapore landed in Kuwait and, after picking up the other five who had released their hostages, went on to Yemen-Aden, where it arrived on 8 February.

2 February 1974 Three members of a group called Moslem International Guerrillas seized a Greek freighter in the port of Karachi, Pakistan, and said they would blow up the ship and kill two hostages unless the Greek Government freed two Arab terrorists who had received the death sentence.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3 February 1974 A 50-pound bomb, apparently concealed in a suitcase, smashed a bus as it was travelling through Yorkshire, Great Britain, carrying soldiers and their families back from leave to their camp. Eleven were killed, fourteen were injured. Officials in London attributed the attack to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

12 February 1974 A 50-pound bomb exploded in the records section of the Latimer National Defence College in England, injuring ten persons. Authorities blamed terrorists of the Irish Republican Army.

3 March 1974 A British Airways VC-10 on its way from Bombay to London was hijacked by two Arabs after a brief stop at Beirut Airport. The guerrillas planted explosives and ordered the pilot to land at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. After freeing the ninety-two passengers and ten crew members, they blew the plane up before being taken prisoner by Dutch security forces. They had told passengers that they belonged to the Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine.

25 March 1974 The US Vice-Consul stationed in Hermosillo, Mexico, was kidnapped. A note demanding a reported $500,000 was found on the consulate floor.

26 March 1974 The Eritrean Liberation Front kidnapped five employees of Tenneco, an American-based oil company in Ethiopia. The company broke off talks after one person who was sent to retrieve the company's five employees was kidnapped and another was killed. An American nurse was then kidnapped by the same group on 27 May. The rebels planned to try three of the five Americans on charges of exploiting the national resources of Eritrea, a province in northern Ethiopia.

12 April 1974 The head of the US Information Service branch in Córdoba, Argentina, was wounded and kidnapped by the People's Revolutionary Army. The guerrillas released him the same day apparently because of the seriousness of his wounds.

12 April 1974 Eighteen people were killed and sixteen were wounded in Kiryat Shemona, Israel, by three Arab guerrillas who stormed a residential building. The guerrillas, who said they belonged to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command, died in an explosion at the end of a gun and grenade battle with Israeli troops. Israeli forces carried out retaliatory raids across the Lebanese border after the victims of the Arab terrorist raid were buried.

15 May 1974 Three Arab guerrillas belonging to the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine crossed the border from Lebanon into Israel where they attacked a van bringing Arab women home from work. Two were killed, one was wounded. The three then entered the Israeli town of Maalot where they killed three more before seizing about ninety teenagers in a school building. The guerrillas demanded the release of twenty-three jailed terrorists. Israel agreed but negotiations subsequently broke down and minutes before the deadline, Israeli security forces rushed the school. The three Arabs were killed along with one Israeli soldier and twenty children. Seventy were injured. On 16, 17, and 21 May, Israeli planes struck targets in southern Lebanon in retaliation for the Maalot killings.

19 May 1974 A bomb placed in a car exploded at London's Heathrow Airport injuring three persons and damaging fifty cars.

13 June 1974 Four Arab terrorists shot their way into an Israeli settlement killing three women before they themselves were killed. They carried leaflets from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine demanding the release of 100 prisoners, including the captured survivor of the attack at Lod Airport in May 1972.

15 June 1974 An unknown individual scratched the letters 'IRA' on the face of one of the world's most valuable masterpieces, a Rubens painting in Cambridge, Great Britain.

16 June 1974 A bomb believed to be planted by the IRA Provisionals exploded in Westminster Hall in London, injuring eleven people.

17 June 1974 A foreign executive of Mercedes Benz was kidnapped by leftist guerrillas in Argentina.

24 June 1974 Three Arab terrorists entered Israel and seized hostages in an apartment building in Nahariyya. They killed four persons and wounded eight before they were killed in a gun battle.

15 July 1974 A lone Japanese hijacked a Japan Air Lines jetliner. He demanded the release of an imprisoned Red Army member and an aircraft to fly both men to North Korea. The hijacker was captured by Japanese police.

16 July 1974 Two persons in Manchester, Great Britain, were injured by a bomb planted by the IRA.

17 July 1974 A bomb believed to have been planted by the IRA exploded in the Tower of London killing one person and injuring forty-one.

Source: Brian M. Jenkins, 1975, pp. 35-49

This is a very long list. I have included it for that reason. Its length communicates some sense of the scale and scope of international terrorism.

Another way of getting some sense of the transnational character of terrorism is to examine specific incidents. Israel's Lod Airport massacre of May 1972 is one good case study. Twenty-five people were killed and another seventy-six wounded. The three terrorists were members of the United Red Army in Japan. They had been recruited and trained through agents in North Korea. They were supported with funds from West Germany. Their final training took place in Syria and Lebanon and they were equipped with machine-guns and hand grenades in Italy. They were dispatched to the Lod Airport, a destination not known in advance, by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

A more recent case study is provided by two of my former undergraduate students (Marc Zingarini and Malcolm Jeffries, 1978). I quote sections of their paper.

> One incident which clearly exemplifies the transnational character of terrorism is the kidnapping of German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer in September of 1977 and the subsequent skyjacking of Lufthansa flight #181... The kidnappers were members of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group which is supposedly affiliated with the larger Red Army Faction. The Baader-Meinhof gang has only about 120 hard-core members. Schleyer and three of his bodyguards were brutally ambushed on the streets of Bonn by members of the gang. The three bodyguards were all killed in the attack and Schleyer was immediately reported missing. The kidnappers then issued their ultimatum to the government of Germany. They wanted eleven of their members who were currently in prison to be freed. Also they requested 100,000 marks and to be flown to a country of their choice. This small handful of terrorists were able to send the entire country into a state of panic. High government officials and other members of the industrial elite were taking extra precautions. Chancellor

Helmut Schmidt knew that immediate action had to be taken. His main priority, besides the safety of Schleyer, was that he would not give in completely to the demands of the terrorists. Schmidt was able to hold the terrorists at bay by haggling over peripheral aspects of their demands. These negotiations dragged on for weeks. In the meantime, Schmidt had ordered a massive manhunt all over Europe. When the search had just gotten underway, the Baader-Meinhof gang decided to send a message through the far-left Paris daily, Liberation. The message, which seemed to be addressed to the entire world, read: "the battle has just begun."

A few days later on October 13, it seemed as if the terrorists were backing up their words with drastic action. Lufthansa flight #181 which was en route from Majorca to Frankfurt was seized by a group of Palestinian skyjackers known as the Min Beirut. These terrorists proclaimed solidarity with the West German Baader-Meinhof kidnappers. The plane, with its 82 passengers and 5 crew members was sent to Rome for fuel. In the meantime, the terrorists sent another message; this time through the Paris daily, Figaro. They issued another warning to the world which read: "the life of every nation is at stake." Clearly, the skyjackers were expecting a world wide audience and in time their actions accomplished just that.

As Schmidt called a special meeting of the Bundistag, he let it be known that he had decided to take a firm stand. He was determined not to give into the demands of the skyjackers. He ordered a police-commando organization known as the Grenzschutzgruppe 9 to make preparations to track down the skyjackers. This is a special commando outfit which is trained in combatting terrorist groups. The leader of the group, Ulrich Wegner had taken part in the raid on Entebbe, so he was somewhat experienced at this type of manuever. The commando group, in another plane, followed flight #181, which was going by the code name Charlie Echo at this stage, to Cyprus where the skyjacked plane once again landed. From Cyprus, Charlie Echo then jumped to Bakrain in the Persian Gulf and then to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. From here, they made another quick flight to Aden in Somalia; all the time being pursued by the commando flight. While on the ground in Somalia, the skyjackers, which up until this point had been rather subdued and almost friendly, began to become more hostile to their hostages. A man who called himself Mahmoud, the professed leader of the terrorists, began to make threats to the hostages. To drive home his point, he casually pointed a gun in the face of Chief Pilot Jurgen Schumann

and killed him on the spot. The body was then disposed of by tossing it out the door onto the runway. Frankfurt became alarmed when notified of this latest development. They decided to lie to the terrorists and tell them that the prisoners whose freedom they had demanded had been freed. While Frankfurt was still in contact with the terrorists, the commando flight quietly taxied alongside the Charlie Echo flight with its lights off...The commandos attached explosives to the doors of the plane and blew the doors off; catching the skyjackers completely by surprise. The commandos were also armed with "stun grenades" which were provided by the English. These are small explosives which can immobilize the enemy with a loud sound and a blinding light. The commandos were able to rush in and save all of the hostages while only killing one skyjacker.

This commando manuever was compared to the heroic raid on Entebbe in 1976 by the Israelis. It brought praise from foreign leaders including Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin and President Carter. However, just as the commandos were receiving a hero's welcome in Germany, it was learned with great shock that four members of the Baader-Meinhof gang had attempted suicide in the maximum security section of the Stuttgart prison. Three of the prisoners; Andreas Baader, leader of the Baader-Meinhof gang, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Gudrun Ensslin were successful while the fourth, Irmgard Moller was in critical condition.

Investigations revealed that this supposedly maximum security section of the prison had served as somewhat of a terrorist base. In Baader's cell there was a hole in the wall in which was hidden an ingeniously simple but highly effective communications system. This allowed him to have some contact with fellow terrorist members outside the prison. Therefore, it is believed that when Baader had heard of the failure of the skyjackers, he and his cohorts decided to commit suicide.

When news of the suicides leaked out, the German government was attacked by leftists of all countries and accused of repressive policies. The Germans were accused of murdering these radicals. There were bombings of German automobile showrooms in Turin and Bologna, Italy. German tourist buses were set aflame in Paris. In Rome, 800 youths armed with Molotov cocktails marched towards the German embassy and Lufthansa ticket office. Also there were marches in Athens and Vienna. Clearly, the repercussions of this event cut across national borders. The entire European continent was effected in one way or another.

Schmidt was extremely worried about this also because, with the failure of the skyjacking and the suicides of the prisoners, Schleyer's position was very precarious. West German President Walter Scheel tried to appeal to the kidnappers over television by telling them, "the whole world - both East and West - is against you, please set your hostage free." In reply, a member of the Red Army Faction named Siegfried Hausner stated that, "After 43 days, we have put an end to the miserable and corrupt existence of Hanns-Martin Schleyer." In the town of Mulhouse, the police found the body of Schleyer in the trunk of a green Audi sedan. Medical examination revealed that the time of death had occurred shortly after news of the suicides came out. Schmidt ordered a massive manhunt all over Europe and also asked for the assistance of other countries. He tried to convince them that it was in the best interest of all countries to cooperate.
(pp. 1-5)

Multinational Corporations as Transnational Actors

Let us now shift attention to a brief examination of multinational corporations as non-state actors in the international system. This shift from transnational terrorism to multinationals is not without a kind of internal logic of its own since the officials of multinationals are often the targets of terrorist activities.

In the last section I noted that the dramatic rise of multinationals is a very important episode in the recent history of the development of a global economy. The increased political visability and prominence of multinational corporations is likewise dramatic. Dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been written on the political relevance of the growth of multinationals. Their role in the international system has been a topic of debate in such diverse forums as the International Labor Organization, the U.S. Senate, the U.N. General Assembly, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Political pay-offs by multinationals to public officials in virtually every arena of the globe have become common grist for news stories. For example, extensive press coverage was given to United Brand's payment of one-and-a-quarter million dollars to former Honduras President-General, Oswald Lopes Arellano, in exchange for his support of low taxes on United Brands' banana operations. Prince Bernard's $1.1 million "commission" for facilitating a contract between the Dutch government and Lockheed made headlines in newspapers around the world.

Despite the extensive analysis and debate, there is no agreement on the scope and significance of multinationals in world politics.

Some scholars see the rise of multinationals as a force that is eroding away the foundation of the nation-state system while other scholars see multinationals as playing a very limited role in world politics. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1944) has developed a simple but I believe useful typology of roles multinationals play in the international system. He argues that they "play at least these important roles in the day-to-day processes of world policies" (p. 155).

One of the three is a direct role. Multinationals occupy this role when they pursue their own private foreign policies. The efforts of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) to subvert Dr. Salvador Allende's regime in Chile during the early 1970's is one of the more dramatic illustrations of multinationals' direct role in international politics. Investigations by the sub-committee on multinational corporations of the U.S. Senate revealed that ITT had developed a rather complex strategy aimed at bringing an end to Allende. The proposed action included:

1. Continue loan restrictions in the international banks such as those the Export-Import Bank has already exhibited.
2. Quietly have large U.S. private banks do the same.
3. Confer with foreign banking sources with the same thing in mind.
4. Delay buying from Chile over the next six months. Use U.S. copper stockpile instead of buying from Chile.
5. Bring about a scarcity of U.S. dollars in Chile.
6. Discuss with CIA how it can assist the six month squeeze.

7. Get to reliable sources within the Chilean Military. Delay delivery of gasoline to Air Force and Navy. (This would have to be carefully handled, otherwise would be dangerous. However, a false delay could build up their planned discontent against Allende, thus bring about necessity of his removal).

8. Help disrupt Allende's UNCTAD plans.

9. Expropriations and nationalization of U.S. private investment without full and immediate idemnification is directly detrimental to the U.S. balance of payments. It serves to disrupt the equilibrium and faith in the dollar.

10. Chilean action against UPI should be blasted by the Inter-American Press Association and U.S. press in general. (The Washington Post even critized U.S. tough policy in Chile. They should be made to eat their editorial now that UPI has been closed).

11. "El Mercurio" of Santiago remains alive and continues criticism of Allende. Some aid should be considered for this paper.

12. U.S. taxpayer money to the Marxist government should be terminated re: money from funds in the "Aid Pipeline."

13. It is noted that Chile's annual exports to the U.S. are valued at $154 million (U.S. dollars). As many U.S. markets as possible should be closed to Chile. Likewise, any U.S. exports of special importance to Allende should be delayed or stopped.

14. The U.S. should consult with other governments whose nationals are suffering from the Chilean Marxists. This would include countries to which Chile owes money. Allende's treasury reserve is depleting rapidly and he has already suggested a moratorium on servicing his foreign debt.

(Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, March 20-April 2, 1973, p. 953.)

> by multinationals to strengthen its international monetary position. And there can be little doubt that the U.S. government has on occasion been able to use, wittingly and unwittingly, the information-gathering capacities of global corporations domiciled in America for intelligence purposes.

Multinational corporations can be used as instruments of influence by host as well as home countries. A dramatic case in point was the 1973 oil embargo. The Arab governments were able to use the multinational oil companies as a means of enforcing the oil boycott.

Of course, it is not governments alone who seek to use multinationals as a means of influence in world politics; other groups do as well. For example, pressure from Blacks in the U.S. prompted Polaroid to change company policies in South Africa. More recently, many religious organizations and universities have sought to influence South African politics by disinvesting in multinationals operating in South Africa. In short, both governments (home and host) as well as non-governmental groups, seek to use multinationals as instruments of influence. As Nye notes, "direct investment creates a transnational interdependence which groups and governments may try to manipulate for their own political purpose" (p. 159).

A third role that multinationals play in world politics Nye describes as an indirect role of setting the agenda of issues and problems to which governments must attend. He writes:

> Why some issues rather than others absorb the attention of statesmen is a question of considerable political importance that has received too little attention. Even if they had no other effect, the intentional and unintentional roles of multinational corporations in helping to set the agenda of interstate politics have been significant. Their lobbying

for particular actions by their home government toward the host country is familiar but nonetheless important, often taking the form of appeals for intervention in support of claims against host governments. As a classic example, in the 1960s the dispute between the International Petroleum Corporation and Peru became a tail that for years wagged the dog of American policy there.

In other cases, such as the lobbying of Congress by executives of multinational corporations in favor of more liberal tariff treatment of the host country by the home country, the lines of policy influence run in the other direction. Canada has benefited from such allies in a number of instances. Perhaps most intriguing, in light of supposed ideological differences, has been the recent lobbying by business executives on behalf of more liberal trade arrangements with the Soviet Union. (Nor, one might add, is there much evidence for the charge that multinational corporations form a powerful lobby for a militaristic foreign policy. With a few exceptions, American multinational--as distinct from merely large--corporations do not have a particularly strong stake in military-oriented production or activities.)

Where multinational corporations have created conflicts among states, they have more often done so unintentionally than intentionally. One can identify three major unintended effects on the political agenda. First, in the past decade, the transnational activities of such enterprises have given rise to conflicts of jurisdiction and problems of extraterritoriality in such matters as anti-trust, capital controls, trade restrictions, and taxation policy.

Second, multinationals have had major effects on the flow of trade and money. It may startle the uninitiated that production by subsidiaries of corporations outside their home countries has now grown to over twice the total value of trade among the developed countries. Moreover, a significant portion of international trade (more than a quarter of U.S. exports by some estimates) has been transformed from "arms length" to intra-enterprise transactions, between one arm of a multinational corporation and another. The result is that a variety of new trade policy questions have been put on the intergovernmental agenda and become intertwined with a broader range of industrial policy questions. Similarly, the ability of a few score corporate treasurers, thinking globally and acting rationally, to transfer vast sums with extraordinary rapidity was one of the factors that contributed to the inability of countries to maintain an international monetary system based on fixed exchange rates.

> Third, multinational corporations have unintentionally affected the agenda of interstate relations by stimulating other social groups to press for particular governmental policies. Groups such as banks, advertising agencies, and some labor groups have been stimulated to press for policies of liberalization that would permit them to emulate the transnational strategy of the multinational corporation. Other groups, particularly most of labor, which are less transnationally mobile and feel themselves threatened or disadvantaged by the activities of the corporations, have pressed their governments for protective or nationalist policies. An apt example was the recent struggle between transnationally mobile corporations and the relatively immobile labor unions over the Burke-Hartke bill, which would have sharply affected the trade and investment policies of the United States.
>
> (pp. 159-161)

While not all students of multinational corporations agree on the usefulness of Nye's typology of roles played by multinationals in world politics, there is little disagreement that multinationals have become significant organizations in world politics. In fact, many scholars argue that multinationals constitute the single most influential set of interstate nongovernmental actors. These, the reader will recall, are one of five categories of non-state actors in world politics. Let me now turn to still another category. This is governmental non-central actors.

Governmental non-central actors: These refer to governments and governmental personnel below the level of the central or national government of a society. In the case of the United States these would include state and municipal level governments. Usually, we do not associate this level of government with international relations. However, on occasion and in some issue areas provincial and municipal governments do play significant roles in international affairs. For one thing governments and governmental officials at this level are often at the

core of secessionist and separatist movements. Think of the international role of state level officials in the American South during the 1860s. More recently provincial officials were at the center of sessionist movements in the Congo and Nigeria. The role of Quebec in the French-Canadian separatist movement is a current and very visible example.

In the United States the governments of both cities and states are increasingly involved in the politics of international economic relations. At least twenty states have commercial representatives in other nations. For example, Indiana maintains trade representatives in the Netherlands, Columbia, and Venezuela. Several large cities also have official representatives who seek to promote the economic interests of their respective cities in the economy of global trade and investment.

Intrastate nongovernmental actors: This is a fourth type of non-state actor in international relations. These are groups and organizations located in one country but who engage in some type of international activity. Private foundations like the Ford Foundation, Oxfam, the Irish Republican Army, export and import business, ethnic group associations, many local and national religious organizations are examples of intrastate nongovernmental actors.

Let me illustrate the international involvement of this type of actor with one example, the United Methodist Church. The General Conference of the United Methodist Church meeting in Portland in 1976 took the following actions in regard to world hunger. The Conference granted approval of a minimum of five million additional dollars for

projects intended to alleviate world hunger and to deal with the causes of world hunger. In addition to monies for immediate relief and the support of agricultural development projects, the funds were to be used in projects designed to affect changes in life styles in the affluent world, to advance the public's education about hunger, and to lobby for new foreign policy initiatives.

Individuals: A final category of nonstate actors is individuals acting in their private capacity. As Richard Mansbach and his associates note:

> . . . individuals in their private capacity are, on occasion, able to behave autonomously in the global arena. Such "international" individuals were more common before the emergence of the nation-state, particularly as diplomatic or military mercenaries. More recently, one might think of the American industrialist Andrew Carnegie who willed ten million dollars for the "speedy abolition of war between the so-called civilized nations," the Swedish soldier Count Gustaf von Rosen who was responsible for creating a Biafran air force during the Nigerian civil war, or the Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara.
>
> (p. 41)

Let me stop at this point and summarize. I began this discussion by noting that in the classical international system states were virtually the sole international actors. One of the very important changes that has taken place in the structure of the international system is a growth in the number and variety of non-state actors. Five types of non-state actors have been briefly discussed. These were interstate governmental actors, interstate nongovernmental actors, governmental noncentral actors, intrastate nongovernmental actors, and individuals.

This lengthy discussion is not to imply that states have

ceased to be important actors in world politics. Clearly they continue to have a very important and sometimes clearly dominant role. My point is simply to indicate that the structure of world politics now includes many types of actors in addition to states. We live in a time, Edward Morse (1970) observes, when "the number and type of international actors appear to be historically unparalleled" (p. 31).

In short, the international system has become an organizationally hetrogenious system. Richard Mansbach and his associates (1977) suggest that we might think of the contemporary global system as a "complex conglomerate system." They describe such a system this way:

> The concept of "conglomerate" refers to "a mixture of various materials or elements clustered together without assimilation." In economics the term is used to describe the grouping of firms of different types under a single umbrella of corporate leadership.
>
> The principal feature of the complex conglomerate system is the formation of situationally-specific alignments of different types of actors using a variety of means to achieve complementary objectives. It is significant that many of these alignment "conglomerates" lack the formal structure of traditional alliances such as NATO and tend to be flexible and ideologically diffuse.
>
> For example, until recently one could identify conglomerate alignments that are essentially adversarial on the issue of Angolan independence. On one side were the Angolan rebel groups, the U.N. General Assembly, Black African states like Tanzania, the Soviet bloc of states, and even the World Council of Churches; on the other side were Portugal, the United States, and several major international corporations. Another illustrative pair of alignments has formed over the question of the pricing of petroleum products and the ownership of petroleum-production and exploitation facilities in the Middle East. One side in favor of the status quo are the major Western powers and the principal petroleum corporations, sometimes called "the seven sisters"; on the other side are the major oil producing states of the Middle East and elsewhere organized in a group called OPEC (Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries), along with various Palestinian liberation groups, Egypt, and the Eastern bloc of states which perceive the oil question as linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

(pp. 42-43)

The following matrix indicates the range of alignments that can make up contemporary world politics.

Alignments in a Complex Conglomerate System

	INTERSTATE GOVERNMENTAL	INTERSTATE NON-GOVERNMENTAL	NATION-STATE	GOVERNMENTAL NONCENTRAL	INTRASTATE NON-GOVERNMENTAL	INDIVIDUAL
INTERSTATE GOVERNMENTAL	UN NATO (1950)	UN International Red Cross (Palestine)	EEC Francophone African states	OAU-Biafra	Arab League-Al Fatah	Grand Mufti of Jerusalem-Arab League
INTERSTATE NONGOVERNMENTAL	UN-International Red Cross (Palestine)	Shell Oil-ESSO (1972)	USSR-Comintern (1920's)	IBM-Scotland	ITT-Allende opposition (Chile)	Sun-Yat-sen-Comintern
NATION-STATE	EEC-Francophone African states	USSR-Comintern (1920's)	"traditional alliances" (NATO)	Belgium-Katanga (1960)	North Vietnam-Viet Cong	U. S. - James Donovan
GOVERNMENTAL NONCENTRAL	OAU-Biafra	IBM-Scotland	Belgium-Katanga (1960)	N. Y. Mayor-Moscow Mayor (1973)	Algerian rebels-French Socialists (1954)	South African mercenaries-Katanga
INTRASTATE NONGOVERNMENTAL	Arab League-Al Fatah	ITT-Allende Opposition (Chile)	North Vietnam-Viet Cong	Ulster-Protestant Vanguard (1970)	Communist Party-USSR-Communist Party-German Democratic Republic	George Grivas-Greek Cypriots
INDIVIDUAL	Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Arab League	Sun-Yat-sen-Comintern	U. S. - James Donovan	South African mercenaries-Katanga (1960)	George Grivas-Greek Cypriots	Louis of Conde-Gaspard de Coligny (1562)

(Source: Richard Mansbach, 1977, p. 44)

World politics takes place, as does all of human action, in social space. The utility of this matrix lies in the fact that it provides coordinates in terms of which to locate in social space the events that make up world politics. The reader can easily discover its utility by examining the set of international events reported on in any given day by good newspapers like the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal, or The London Times. Identify in each event the status of the actors; are they national governments, international organizations, transnational organizations, and so on. Once this is done, locate the event in one of the cells of the matrix. Do this for three or four days and you will get a very clear cut image of just how organizationally heterogeneous and complex the contemporary international system is. Never again will one see the world through the lens of a state-centric framework in which national governments are the sole actors in the drama of world politics.

The Decreasing Coherence of Nation States

The matrix depicted above is useful in highlighting the growing role of nonstate actors in world politics. But it observes another important kind of change that has been taking place in the structure of the international system. In this matrix, nation states are treated as if they were coherent units or entities. This is not the case.

In the classical international system one could, without grossly distorting reality, picture the world as comprised of societies with national interests that were well understood and, if possible, acted upon by a united government through a coherent foreign policy.

Today this is not the case with most issues in world politics. Two kinds of related changes have occurred whose effect is to reduce the coherence of nation-states as actors in world politics.

First, as internal social complexity increased and interdependence expanded, the number of international issues that directly affect different individuals and groups within society have increased. But different people and different groups are affected in different ways, and thus there is no one single, unambiguous national interest on most issues. In the arena of world politics the interests of organized labor can be quite different and, indeed, conflict with the interests of the managers of multinational firms. The interests of midwest wheat farmers can be very different from the interests of urban consumers. The interests of Idaho potato farmers can be very different from the interests of Connecticut chicken breeders. The interests of California can be different from the interests of North Dakota. In short, in an increasing number of issues of international policy there exists a plurality of conflicting interests in contrast to a single national interest.

Related to the growth of interest group conflict in foreign policy is another kind of change. The days are gone when the chief executive and his foreign ministry monopolized the making and execution of foreign policy. There has been a marked expansion in the number and variety of governmental agencies involved in international relations. For example, in the United States all of the cabinet level departments in addition to states are deeply involved in international

affairs as are many other federal agencies whose titles suggest that the scope of their jurisdictions and bureaucratic interests would be purely domestic.

One can begin to get a sense of the scope of involvement in the Department of State by comparing the number of state department personnel employed overseas with the number of personnel employed overseas by all of the federal agencies. The following table provides these data for 1974.

State Department Personnel and Other Federal Civilian Employees Stationed Overseas, 1974 (U.S. citizens only)

State Department			*All U.S. Agencies*		
Rank	*Country*	*Number*	*Rank*	*Country*	*Number*
1.	Germany	832	1.	Germany	16,909
2.	India	662	2.	Philippines	16,881
3.	Vietnam	626	3.	Korea	13,380
4.	Italy	560	4.	Thailand	6,333
5.	France	543	5.	Vietnam	6,000
6.	Philippines	528	6.	Japan	5,487
7.	Mexico	527	7.	Italy	4,496
8.	Greece	464	8.	United Kingdom	3,405
9.	Japan	387	9.	China, Republic	2,097
10.	Thailand	361	10.	Turkey	1,411
11.	Brazil	352	11.	Portugal	1,385
12.	United Kingdom	343	12.	India	1,204
13.	Pakistan	315	13.	Spain	1,191
14.	Nigeria	276	14.	Laos	1,131
15.	Belgium	256	15.	Greece	1,033
16.	Canada	246	16.	Mexico	985
17.	Iran	226	17.	Cuba	960
18.	Korea	209	18.	France	946
19.	Turkey	206	19.	Canada	803
20	Austria	201	20.	Iceland	747
21.	Subtotal	8,120	21.	Subtotal	86,784
22.	Rest of World	8,082	22.	Rest of World	18,332
23.	Grand Total	16,202	23.	Grand Total	105,116

(Source: Karl W. Deutsch, 1978, p. 112)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

We can move beyond this rudimentary indicator of the scope of governmental involvement in international affairs and get a more complete picture by looking at some examples of the ways in which "domestic" agencies are involved in international activities. The following table provides this information.

Examples of transgovernmental activities of selected "domestic" bureaucracies (circa 1973–74)

Department or agency	*Intra-government collaboration*	*Inter-government collaboration*	*International organization collaboration*
Agriculture	International Grain Reserve–interagency committee (Also 14 other interagency committees)	International Wheat Council; PL 480 Food Aid Program; and informal marketing agreements	Prepublication sharing of data and analysis with FAO; and codex Alimentarius
Treasury	Foreign economic policy; coordinate economic implications of global resources (commodities, food, oil. Law of the Sea; on 24 interagency committees)	Work with Group of 20 on finance; Saudi-Arabian bilateral commission	Review and serve on the Board–IMF; World Bank, IDA, etc.
Health, Education and Welfare	US cultural programs–coordinate with State; also nutritional programs	Comparative research USSR; Japan, Poland	Delegates to and cooperation with UNESCO/WHO/OECD/NATO, e.g., detail of personnel from the Center for Disease Control to WHO ($800,000).
Interior	Interagency committee on scientific and technical exchange, Law of the Sea review	International assistance in Bureau of Mines, Fish and Wildlife, etc., Survey of Saudi Arabia; collaboration with Canada (power) Mexico (water)	Sponsored energy conference, 1975 jointly with UN; Informal leadership nongovernmental international professional associations
*ERDA***	Old AEC activities; nuclear safety; proliferation; Law of the Sea	Bilateral Energy Research Japan, UK, USSR, Poland	Strong role in IAEA and in IEA working group on long term cooperation, also NATO
Labor	With State and AID on Cultural and Technical Exchange	Technical consultation France, UK, Japan ministerial level consultation	Representation to ILO; OECD (manpower committee)
Transportation (including FAA)	Interdepartmental committees with State	Implementation of international Fishery Conventions–Uniform aviation standards; exchange of data; Canada, Germany, Japan.	Involved with ICAO
HUD	With State on UN Economic Committee	Work with France on pollution free "new towns"	UN agencies
EPA	Coordinate with State–Oceans, Environment, and Science	US–Soviet Environmental Agreement	Work with UNEP NATO–Challenges of Modern Society
Commerce	Numerous interagency committees on economics–(commercial) and weather in NOAA	East-west trade negotiations scientific bilateral exchange	With UN Industry Programs, Maritime Organizations, WMO
FEA	With staff on international energy program; setting of transfer prices for multinational firm movements of goods	Bilateral work with producing and consuming countries	With IEA; data sharing, program collaboration
*Justice****	Anti-trust coordination with State over oil and MNE activity generally	International drug suppression	UN drug and legal activities; Immigration consultation

(Source: Raymond F. Hopkins, 1976, pp. 420-421)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

We can become even a bit more precise by looking at some indicators of the scale of international involvement on the part of "domestic" agencies. The following table does this.

Indicators of amount of activity*

Department or Agency	*Number of international personnel*	*Overseas US personnel*	*Overseas travel (1972) total passengers**	*International activities budget*	*Overseas expenditures*
Agriculture	901 (in Foreign Agr. Service only; not ARS, ERS, etc.)	181	3,950	1.6 billion (If 1 billion in food aid and work in ARS, IRS, etc. is included)	24 million (excludes food aid)
Treasury	400 (approx.)	151	1,337	No estimate	11 million
Health, Education and Welfare	403 full time; 536 man years (approx. 1200 people involved)	14	4,383	31 million	427 million (includes grants)
Interior	190 man years	15	1,527	900 thousand	61 million
*ERDA***	64 (from AEC)	11	317	No estimate	8 million (likely to grow rapidly)
Labor	No estimate	(few, perhaps none)	287	No estimate	876 thousand
Transportation (including FAA)	Internat'l. Prog. office 13 people; Intl. duties 822; FAA/Coast Guard	262	809	33 million (I.P. office – 302 thousand	13 million
HUD	Office of Int. Affairs–16 people	1 in Paris	62	489 thousand	very small amounts
EPA	27	not specified	750	1 million (approx.)	2.9 million
Commerce	several hundred	58	14	not specified	9.2 million
FEA	Int'l. Affairs staff about 40	no permanent staff	not in existence	not specified	not specifiable for FY 1973 or 1974
*Justice****	–	–	5,024	–	–

(Source: Raymond F. Hopkins, 1976, pp. 422-423)

Government bureaucracies do not see eye to eye on many international issues any more than do interest groups within the society. Hence as different bureaucracies expand their involvement in international affairs, the government as a whole presents less and less of a single face to the external world. And governments become

more and more arenas for inter-agency conflict and a launching pad for the separate foreign policies of different bureaucracies. Graham Allison (1771) characterizes the situation this way: "The apparatus of each national government constitutes a complex arena for the intra-national game" (p. 114). The different departments making up large national governments bargain with one another. Each can have a very different image of the "national interest." And on occasion the different bureaucracies pursue policies that are either unknown to other agencies or at variance with the policies of other agencies. For example, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of State took contradictory positions at the 1974 U.N. World Food Conference in Rome. In the Summer of 1778 a White House-imposed restriction on the export to the U.S.S.R. of certain computer and oil drilling equipment was actively opposed by the Treasury and Commerce Departments while apparently supported by the State Department. And recent revelations make it quite clear that the Central Intelligence Agency has carried out policies that were unknown to elected officials including the President.

The Growth of Transgovernmental Relations

Linked to the increasing involvement of "domestic" agencies in international affairs and inter-bureaucracy conflict is the growth of what some scholars of international relations call transgovernmental relations. These refer to networks of communication, collaboration, and bargaining that have developed among bureaucrats from different nations who share the same functional responsibilities.

This is another new and important feature of the international

system. In the classical international system intergovernmental communication was largely confined to diplomatic transactions among the chief executives and the foreign ministeries of different nations. For example, it would have been unusual for a bureaucrat in the U.S. Department of Agriculture to communicate regularly with his counterparts in Britain, France, or Canada. Today such communications would not be unusual. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) remark: "Bureaucrats from different countries deal directly with one another at meetings and on the telephone as well as in writing" (p. 26).

One crude indicator of the growth of transgovernmental interaction is found in the statistics of international conferences in which there is official U.S. governmental participation. As the table below indicates the frequency of such conferences is increasing. Moreover, the number of delegations to these conferences is also increasing and they come from a wide range of agencies. (Note the declining proportion of State Department personnel which is another indicator of the growing involvement of other federal agencies in international affairs.)

UNITED STATES TRANSGOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS

Year	International meetings with official U S participation	Accredited government delegates to conferences and agencies: Total delegates (46 agencies)	Accredited government delegates to conferences and agencies: State department delegates as percentage of total
1946	141	–	–
1950	291	–	–
1960	394	–	–
1964	547	2,378	52
1968	588	2,137	48
1974	–	3,656[b]	44
1975	817[a]	–	–

Source: Data supplied by U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Organization.

a. 1975 as percentage of 1960: 207%

b. 1974 as percentage of 1964: 154%

(Source: Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 1977, p. 241)

The political significance of transgovernmental relations is multifaceted. Keohane and Nye (1977) observe:

> Contacts between governmental bureaucracies charged with similar tasks may not only alter their perspectives but lead to transgovernmental coalitions on particular policy questions. To improve their chances of success, government agencies attempt to bring actors from other governments into their own decision-making processes as allies. Agencies of powerful states such as the United States have used such coalitions to penetrate weaker governments in such countries as Turkey and Chile. They have also been used to help agencies of other governments penetrate the United States bureaucracies . . . transgovernmental politics frequently characterizes Canadian-American relations, often to the advantage of Canadian interests.

These scholars also argue, as do others, that the growth of transgovernmental networks have become important mechanisms in managing the political complexities generated by increasing interdependence.

For example, they note that navy-to-navy relations probably avoided a confrontation between the United States and Indonesia in respect to the Indonesian Straights. Similar transgovernmental relationships between the American and Brazilian navies probably helped to prevent an escalation in the Brazil-United States dispute over shrimp fishing in the early 1970s. They observe of the energy crisis of 1974:

> During and after the energy crisis of 1974, when Canadian curtailment of oil exports to the United States could have been the kind of visible and emotional issue that mobilizes American public demands for the punitive use of our overall power, the transgovernmental network of officials operated in managing politicization. Informal transgovernmental interactions helped to maintain potential domestic American politicization--particularly through the Congress--that might have pressed the American government to resist the Canadian change of the energy ball park. Such cooperation among officials in several agencies on both sides of the border involved decisions that would have been both too frequent and too controversial if carried out in the full glare of publicity that accompanies high-level diplomacy.
>
> (p. 215)

The Expanding Substantive Scope of International Politics

The expanding role of "domestic" bureaucracies in international affairs and the growth of transgovernmental relations are linked to another significant kind of change in the international system. In the classical international system, colonial expansion abroad and the maintenance of territorial integrity at home dominated the foreign policy agenda of many nations. These, in turn, were perceived to be intimately linked to one central and overwhelming problem of international politics.

This was the problem of maintaining military security. Thus, foreign policy was viewed as being primarily, if not solely, security policy. This did not mean that non-military issues like trade policy were deemed irrelevant. They were perceived as important but belonging to a different universe of policy. There was "high policy" which was concerned with military security and there was "low policy" that was concerned with all other types of foreign policy issues. Moreover, as their labels imply these two universes were perceived as hierarchically ordered, and hence the foreign policy agenda was hierarchically ordered in terms of the relative importance of different issues vis-a-vis their relationship to military security.

A significant change has taken place in the international system in this regard. The relative salience of many non-military issues has been increasing to the point where the traditional distinction between "high" policy of military security and "low" policy encompassing other issues is disappearing. Henry Kissinger in 1974 observed in one of his foreign policy addresses:

> The traditional agenda of international affairs--the balance among major powers, the security of nations--no longer defines our perils or our possibilities. To some extent we have mastered many of the familiar challenges of diplomacy. Yet suddenly we are witnessing a new threat to the governability of national societies and to the structure of international stability. A crisis threatens the world's economic system.

In 1975, a year later, Kissinger expanded upon the same point. He said:

> Progress in dealing with the traditional agenda is no longer enough. A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas now rank with questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.

In sum, the substantive agenda of world politics has been expanded to include a variety of new issues. Kissinger makes mention of a number of economic and ecological issues, but his list can easily expand to include other, albeit related issues, such as problems of human rights and social justice. Not only is the substantive agenda of international politics expanding, the traditional hierarchical relationship between military and non-military issues is breaking down. Economic, ecological, human rights and social justice issues are assuming a political salience and intrinsic importance independent of their relationship to issues of military security.

The Changing Character of Military Conflict

One of the factors involved in the expanding substantive agenda of international politics and the changing relationship of non-military issues to security issues is another fundamental change in the structure of the international system. This is the changing character of military conflict. Andrew Scott has succinctly summarized these changes by juxtaposing the characteristics of military conflict in the classical international system with the character of military conflict in the contemporary international system.

Classical System	Contemporary System
A. The capacity for surprise attack was limited.	A. The capacity for surprise attack is now impressive. Warning time may be minutes, seconds, or even zero time.
B. The initial blows struck against an enemy would not do catastrophic damage to the enemy nor crush its capacity to strike back or to continue the struggle.	B. The initial blows that one nation can now direct toward another may be catastrophic.
C. When attacked, a nation usually had sufficient time to organize its defenses, militarily and politically.	C. If full-scale warfare begins among the major powers, the nation attacked will have little time to ready its military and political defenses.
D. The tempo of conflict was moderate.	D. The tempo of the conflict, once begun may be extremely rapid.
E. Military weapons and skills seldom took major leaps forward. If the offense scored an advantage it was likely to be temporary, for the defense was presumed to be always capable of catching up with the offense.	E. The rate of innovation in weaponry is very high, and new developments are often of the utmost importance.
F. The more military power a nation had, the greater was the security of that nation.	F. National security can no longer be assumed to improve with each increase in the military power of a nation.
G. Although the ravages of war were acknowledged to be dreadful by all parties, they were not so dreadful that ambitious nations ruled out the possibility of war as a deliberate instrument of national policy.	G. The destructive capabilities of the major nations are staggering. Because of the damage that can be done to a nation in the event of all-out war, and because of the danger that a small conflict might escalate into a large conflict, gains/cost calculations relating to war have been radically altered. As the probable costs of war rise, the circumstances that would justify a nation in resorting to full-scale war are harder to find.

(Source: Andrew Scott, 1967, pp. 16, 25)

The Growing Obsolescence of Traditional Doctrines of International Relations

The international system legitimated by the Treaty of Westphalia was grounded in a set of basic doctrines that have been subsequently elaborated upon by international law. These are the doctrines of: (1) National sovereignty, (2) Nonintervention, and (3) National loyalty.

Andrew Scott has described these doctrines within the context of the classical international system in a very clear and succinct manner:

Nation-states were the key actors in this system and their functioning was justified by the principle of national sovereignty. The doctrine of national sovereignty taught that each nation, by virtue of being a nation, was a law unto itself and owed obedience to no lawful superior.

This principle, when generalized to all nations, served to justify and perpetuate a system in which it was deemed appropriate for national units to pursue national interests free from binding moral or legal constraints.

The doctrine of nonintervention is a corollary of the doctrine of national sovereignty. If each nation is properly sovereign and a law unto itself, then all efforts by one nation to interfere in the affairs of another nation are clearly improper.

If the nation-state was the building block of the international system, it was natural that the system ideology would emphasize the importance of loyalty to the nation. According to this ideology, the primary political loyalty of the individual was to be given to the nation-state in which he resided. This allegiance would not, of course, stand in the way of an individual's loyalty to monarch, family, or friends.

In the event of a conflict between political loyalties, it was assumed that loyalty to the nation would take precedence over all other loyalties. Failure to behave in a loyal way toward one's nation-state was treason, a crime often punishable by death.

It was assumed that there would not be competition among nation-states for the loyalty of the individual. It was also taken for granted that there were no serious competitors on the international scene for the loyalty of individuals, except nation-states.

Loyalty to the nation sometimes provided a substitute focus of attention for societies that were becoming progressively secularized.

These three doctrines were both descriptive and prescriptive. That is, they were useful in describing the functioning of the system and they also prescribed the principles in accordance with which men <u>should</u> behave in such a system. (pp. 13-14)

Scott goes on to note that in the contemporary international system the three key doctrines of the classical system have become

increasingly obsolete:

> Key doctrines associated with the nation-state system, such as those of national sovereignty, nonintervention, and national loyalty, have been undermined in important ways.
>
> The doctrine of national sovereignty ill accords with the realities of an international system characterized by:
>
> A. Political interdependence
>
> B. Economic interdependence
>
> C. Military interdependence
>
> D. The military vulnerability of individual actors
>
> E. Vast disparities in the power and influence wielded by actors
>
> F. Extensive informal access
>
> This doctrine is an important source of intellectual confusion and sometimes leads observers to mistake a legal fiction for political reality.
>
> The doctrine of nonintervention is equally out of accord with contemporary reality. It was fashioned for a world in which nations were set apart in space and did not interact significantly; a world in which there were no countries so much more powerful than others that they "intervened" simply by being and acting; a world that had not yet discovered the potentialities residing in the systematic and large-scale use of the techniques of informal penetration. The doctrine of nonintervention was designed, in short, for a world that has ceased to exist.
>
> Because of the capacity of some ideologies to influence the thinking and behavior of persons across national boundaries, men are exposed to ideological appeals in a way that was uncommon in an earlier period, though not, of course, unknown.
>
> Exposure to an alternate or competing ideology will sometimes challenge the loyalty of the individual to his nation.
>
> Established ideologies and some new ideologies have demonstrated a capacity to compete, sometimes quite successfully, in the same arena with nationalist ideologies. The transnational appeal of communism, under certain circumstances, is

one example; and the ideology of the movement for European integration is a second.

> Once serious ideological competition has developed, the nation-state in which an individual resides can no longer assume that it, and no other political entity, will automatically be the focus of the individual's loyalty. The history of World War II and of the decades since has made it clear that an individual will sometimes give his primary loyalty to other entities--nations, political movements, supranational organizations, international organizations--rather than to his own nation. (pp. 22-23)

Summary--In the last several pages I have briefly examined six changes that have occurred in the structure of the international system within the past century. These are: the growth of non-state actors, the decreasing coherence of nation states, the growth of transgovernmental relations, the expanding substantive scope of international politics, the changing character of military conflict, and the growing obsolescence of traditional doctrines on which traditional international relations rested. This particular inventory of structural changes is not exhaustive nor does it conceptually cut the cake of international history in the same way other scholars do. But hopefully the discussion serves to highlight and document the fact that significant changes have occurred in the structure of the modern international system since its emergence some three centuries ago.

IV

Summary and Concluding Analysis

In this section of the chapter I have discussed the historical development of a global political system. I have argued that:

1. The contemporary global political system is a result of two historical processes: (a) the evolution of a single world wide international system, and (b) structural changes within this system.

2. The evolution of a single world wide political system is a product of three historical trends: (a) the globalization of the European state system that emerged in the Seventeenth Century, (b) the emergence of non-European states to position of power in the system, and (c) the growing power of the Third World.

3. Six major types of changes have occurred in the structure of the international system: (a) the growth of nonstate actors, (b) the decreasing coherence of nation states, (c) the growth of transgovernmental relations, (d) the expanding substantive scope of international politics, (e) the changing character of military conflict, and (f) the growing obsolescence of traditional doctrines of international relations.

The cumulative consequence of these changes is a substantial globalization of the political life of humankind. In concluding this analysis I will indicate the three principal ways in which human politics have become globalized.

First, from a geographical perspective the political life of humankind has been globalized as a result of the disappearance of a plurality of separate and unrelated international systems and the historical emergence of one single world wide international system. Diagrammatically, this change might be represented in the following way.

The International Structure of the World in the 1400s



The International Structure of the World in the Late 1900s

These diagrams oversimplify and hence distort the international structure of both the past and present worlds. For example, the structure of international relations in Euroasia in the 1400s were substantially more complex than is indicated by the above diagram. Similarly, the structure of international relations in the late 1900s evidences much more complexity than the diagram communicates. As the previous discussion in this section suggests, the world wide international system is divisable into both geographically bounded and issue bounded subsystems of international politics. However, if the contrasts of the 1400s and the 1900s are seen as "ideal types" the change between the two serves to highlight the fact that the geography of international relations has been dramatically globalized in the course of the past few centuries.

Second, from the perspective of political systems the traditional boundaries between the international systems and domestic systems are being eroded. James Ronenau (1967) in reviewing several events in recent history observes:

> Strange things seem to be happening on the political landscape. An American President declares he is a Berliner. A Soviet Premier sees himself as supplying the crucial 200,000 votes that elected the same American President. The Parliament of New Zealand engages in a heated debate over the characteristics and aspirations of United States citizens. While the British Labour Party is fractionated by differences over the policies of the United States as well as those of the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia's only political party, the Communist led Socialist Alliance of Working People, is torn by the role of the CIA in Yugoslavian life. Soviet authors believe that their freedom to write is highly dependent on the prevailing degree of international tension. The United States Secretary of State

> appoints a Special Assistant for Liaison with the Governors and gives him responsibility for "presenting their (the Governors') views in connection with . . . the many problems they have in their states as related to other nations."
> . . . Politics everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe. (pp. 1-2)

Former Senator Fulbright made much the same kind of point when he noted: "If ever a line could be drawn between domestic and foreign affairs, it is now wholly erased" (J. W. Fulbright, 1959, p. 19). Edward Morris (1976) writes, "the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs that was basic to classical statecraft has broken down." Other scholars speak of the internationalization of domestic affairs and the domestication of international affairs. In short, there is a growing linkage between domestic and foreign affairs, or, alternatively stated, the international political system and domestic political system have become increasingly fused.

This point can be diagramatically represented in the following way. In the era of classical international politics, events could be located reasonably well in a social space where distinctions between "us" and "them" constituted lines of latitude, and distinctions between the "domestic" and the "international" constituted lines of longitude.

	Domestic	International
Us	1	3
Them	2	4

Equipped with this map one could easily locate the position of different events in social space. For example, an election in the United States could be located in quadrant 1 if one were an American and in quadrant 2 if one were a citizen of another nation. Conversely, an election in France could be located in quadrant 1 if you were a citizen of France and in quadrant 2 if you were a citizen of another nation. In either case, American and French elections were domestic affairs and thus belonged to quadrants 1 or 2 but never to quadrants 3 or 4.

For the American citizen a war between the United States and Spain fell in quadrant 3. Whereas, for a citizen of Japan such an event belonged in quadrant 4. Conversely, for the Japanese a war between Japan and Russia fell in quadrant 3 and for Americans in quadrant 4. But again in either case these were international matters falling in quadrants 3 or 4 in contrast to quadrants 1 and 2.

In short, social space could be divided into a northern hemisphere constituted by one's own nation and a southern hemisphere comprised of all other nations. It could also be divided into a western hemisphere comprising the domestic affairs of nations (one's own or others) and an eastern hemisphere comprising international affairs (both affairs in which one's own nation was involved and the international affairs of other nations).

In the contemporary world the traditional boundary between "our politics" and "their politics" and the traditional boundary between the politics of "domestic affairs" and the politics of "international affairs" are disappearing. A sharply demarcated political

space is being replaced by an unbounded political space. The difference between the two political universes can be diagramatically represented in this way.

The Political Universe of the Classical International System

	Domestic Politics	International Politics
Our Politics		
Their Politics		

The Political Universe of the Contemporary International System

Again let me add the caveat that these diagrams by oversimplifying reality distort reality. The boundaries of classical international system were never as sharp and impermeable as the diagram suggests. On the other hand, the contemporary system is not as unbounded as the diagram indicates. But keeping this in mind the diagrams do point up an important change in the structure of world politics, namely, an increasing fusion of international and domestic political systems.

This creates a politics that Keohane and Nye (1977) characterize as a politics of "complex interdependence." They note that such a politics has three main characteristics:

> 1. Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through telecommunications); and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channels can be summarized as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realists. Transgovernmental applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units.
> 2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. Many issues arise from what used to be considered domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes blurred. These issues are considered in several government department (not just foreign offices), and at several levels. Inadequate policy coordination on these issues involves significant costs. Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not stop at the waters' edge.
> 3. Military force is not used by governments toward

> other governments within the region, or on issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these governments' relations with governments outside that region, or on other issues. Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for that alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc. For the former relationships this condition of complex interdependence would be met; for the latter, it would not. (pp. 24-25)

Third, viewed from the perspective of individuals the emergence of a global political system has at least three major consequences. First, there is an expanding portion of humanity whose lives are directly affected for good or ill by world politics. Very often the effect is negative. Individuals become subjugated by the structures of world politics and victimized by the processes.

Second, the size of the world's political elite is growing. This is to say, that there is a growing number of individuals who are involved in the management of the global political system by virtue of their roles in governmental institutions, international organizations, transnational organizations, and other types of organizations that engage in international activities.

Third, opportunities for selfconscious and deliberate citizen involvement in world affairs are increasing. Chadwick Alger (1977) sees at least thirteen avenues for international participation on the part of the citizen. These are depicted in the figure below.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Routes to International Participation



Alger writes:

> As the citizen searches for the relevant unit for a specific problem, she might have a mental picture of options something like this figure. She can participate through international organizations, national organizations, state (or regional) organizations, and city organizations, or she may choose direct individual activity. With respect to any of the four territorial units, she may choose to (1) influence government directly, (2) work through a nongovernmental organization to influence government, or (3) work through a nongovernmental organization to have direct international impact. This roadmap offers the citizen 13 avenues for international participation. (p. 312)

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE GROWTH OF GLOBAL CULTURE

I

Overview

We have been looking at what the globalization of the human condition looks like when this phenomenon is examined from different intellectual perspectives or vantage points. I have said that from the perspective of history we see a transformation of world history from a regional era to a global era. From the perspective of geography we see the ancient effects of spacial distance in human affairs being reduced by the evolution of systems of global transportation and communication. Looked at from an economic perspective we observe the emergence and growth of a global ecomony. And when we take a political perspective we witness the transformation of a European state system into a world-wide and organizationally heterogeneous global political system.

In this chapter I direct your attention to the globalization of the human condition when viewed from still another intellectual vantage point. This is a sociological/anthropological perspective. The final point I shall be making is that viewed from this perspective what we see developing is a global culture co-existing in uneasy relationships with traditional sub-global cultures. But to get to this point I need to first review some elemental facts, some ABCs of the human condition.

II

Some ABCs of the Human Condition

Any form of life has nutrient, protection and reproduction needs that must be gratified if the species is to survive, and no living system is self-contained. The resources needed to gratify survival needs lie outside of the system. Hence, every living thing is dependent upon a three dimensional environment. One dimension consists of other members of the same species. We conventionally call this dimension the social environment. A second dimension, consisting of members of other species of life, we are coming to call the biotic environment. The third dimension consists of non-living matter and energy. We traditionally term this the physical environment.

While all forms of living things share common dependencies on social, biotic, and physical environments, there is wide variation among species in their interrelationship with these environments. For example, on the whole animals are more mobile in respect to their physical environment than are plants. The biotic environment of some animals is restricted to a few plants. The biotic environment of others include a wide range of both consumable animals and plants. Or, in respect to social environment, the social life of many species is limited to occasional sexual encounters; in other species it extends to include parental care of infants. In still other species the social environment contains various kinds of protective associations, e.g., salmon schools, baboon troops, ant colonies, etc.

If we slice into history at a given point in time, inter-specie variation in environment/organism relationships can be related to inter-specie differences in anatomical structure or physiological form. Take

an obvious example. Compare on the one hand the anatomical structure of worms and of birds and on the other hand their respective degrees of spacial mobility.

But a slice of history is not the whole of history. The world is a dynamic interdependent system in which change in one thing leads to change in something else and that change in turn to other change and so on; so we have a planet that is a kind of perpetual motion machine. Among the things that change are the environments on which given species depend for survival. Given enough change in a species' eco-systems one of three things happens. The single most common consequence of very rapid or extensive environmental change is the death of a species. The vast majority of the planet's life forms have become the casualties of change.

Species that do not succumb to change adapt to change in the form of alteration in one or more of their anatomical structures or physiological characteristics. Thus the species survive the trauma of change but in altered form.

A third thing can happen as a result of environmental change. Diversity <u>within</u> a species sharply increases. Once these intra-species variation reach a certain point some members of the species can no longer breed with other members. When this occurs a new species is born. On occasion this is a kind of multiple birth process. The parental species will give birth to two or more "children" who resemble one another but who are sufficiently different in basic structure so as to be prevented by nature's in-built incest taboo from interbreeding. Thus, the "Children" go their separate ways. They retain throughout their lives many

common birth marks but they also take on new, differentiating characteristics as they respond to the changing eco-system that envelops them.

The story I have been telling is of course the "saga of the primate family" as far as we now understand it. While many branches of the original family are now dead including all of humankind's immediate ancestors and our first and second cousins, we have been one of the several branches of the family that has survived.

In the course of adapting to a changing planet our species acquired an unusual combination of attributes -- stereoscopic color vision, bipedalism, an opposing thumb on each hand, and a larger, more complex brain. Taken by themselves no one of these seems particularly remarkable. So we can see the wonderful world of color; other primates also see in color. So human beings are creatures that move through space on two legs; birds can do this and in addition they can fly. So our species has a relatively large and complex brain; porpoises probably outdistance us in this regard. So you and I have hands whose thumbs can touch each of the other four fingers; that seems a rather trivial motor skill compared to the agility of a mountain goat.

The significance of these anatomical attributes lies in the fact that in humankind they come together in a complex web of interrelationships. For example, bipedal structure freed man's hands to use tools and the opposing thumb of these freed hands made possible the manipulation of a vast array of objects with a dexterity and skill displayed by no other animal. Bipedalism also had special consequences for the female members of the species. It reduced the size of the birth canal, while "at the same time" human brain size had increased. Thus, human

infants are expelled from the benign environment of their mother's womb long before their brains, senses and muscles have developed to a point where they can cope with the new environment into which they are cast. Having sexual intercourse is among the many things humans cannot do until long after birth (long in comparison with other animals). Thus, for the human species to meet one of life's survival needs -- reproduction -- adult members of the species must nurture and protect their offspring at least until boys and girls are old enough to make love. This means, of course, a far longer childhood for human beings than is true of any other species. In turn a long childhood when combined with other things has a number of far reaching consequences. For example, long childhood combined with a big and complex brain gives to humans an opportunity and at the same time a capacity to indulge themselves in a period of learning that is freed from immediate survival needs. Thus, Johnny Jones can "play" tracker, hunter, or root collector long before he must do these things as "work." Johnny can also spend a lot of time playing with things and with sounds. The latter is a very important kind of play. Through playful trial and error the human infant learns that certain sounds go with certain things, and he is on his way to mastering one of the most complex systems in the universe; namely, human language.

This reference to language brings the discussion around to one of the things that makes homo sapiens human beings. To be human is to create and use culture. What is "culture"?

There are more than one hundred definitions of culture that circulate through the behavioral science literatures. To my way of thinking one of the most useful conceptions is found in a book that social

scientists and educators sometimes allude to but rarely footnote in our professional discourse. This is the book of Genesis. You will recall that the first chapter of this book contains a somewhat personalized case study of evolution's decision to make one species of life human and that the account of this decision is followed by what political scientists call an impact study of the decision.

Specifically, you will remember that, in eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, Adam and Eve acquired a power unique among God's creatures. This is the power to create environments as well as adapt to them. Until Adam and Eve's decision, the only environmental engineer on Planet Earth was God. Or to put the point in the jargon of my discipline, God had granted to living things the power to react but retained for Himself the power to initiate. Pine trees, toads, roses, and cats were an integral part of nature but they, like all living things, were powerless either to add to or to take away from the rest of nature. The decision of our ancestors to become a culture-creating animal changed all of this. Now the planet's biogram contained one species that could add things to the rest of nature as well as adapt to it.

This decision to challenge God's monopoly of the creation business had a profound and far-reaching impact, as well you know. God expelled us from our ancestral home and placed at the gate of the Garden a flaming sword that turns in all directions. Thus, as a species we human beings are forever banned from experiencing nature as the rest of nature experiences itself.

To illustrate what I mean, let me compare the sex life of two organisms. One is me and other is our family cat, Hunter. Comparing

ourselves to plant life, Hunter and I have a good deal in common by virtue of our shared memberships. We both are animals. He is a vertebrate and so am I. I am a mammal and so is he, and we are both males. Moreover, we have similar tastes. Hunter likes female cats. I like female human beings. But our respective ways of relating to females is quite different. By virtue of the fact that his species never elected to go into the culture-making business, Hunter can relate to female cats simply as females. In contrast, by virtue of the fact that my species did go into the business of making culture, there is no possible way (even in fantasy) that I can relate to female human beings simply as females.

Intervening between me and every female is the flaming sword God placed at the gate of the Garden. This sword is an environment of human creation which controls, structures, and in countless ways mediates our interactions. Among the various elements making up this mediating environment are institutionally-defined roles such as husband and wife, lover and mistress, prostitute and trick, rapist and victim, old man and young girl, intimate friends and casual acquaintances. Also, that environment contains a myriad of beliefs in the form of images, values, and attitudes. These beliefs serve to make some things right and other things wrong; some things attractive and other things unattractive; some things, socially forbidden and other things, socially mandatory.

Interacting with social institutions and beliefs is a set of complex languages through which females and I transmit information to one another, distribute rewards and punishments, and control the actions and feelings of one another. Needless to say, Hunter and the females in his

life also communicate, but as far as I can see the repertoire of languages available to him is much more limited than mine. I can tell a woman, "I love you," through a variety of languages that make differentiated and complex use of sounds, sights, touch, smells, and taste. This, of course, does not make me superior to Hunter, only different. Human languages, like the rest of culture, are a curse as often as they are a blessing. In many ways Hunter is better off than I; for one thing, he can tell and be told fewer pain-inducing lies.

Finally, the crust of culture mediating between me and female human beings contains an array of tools. Mentally inventory the range of tools that can come into play during the biologically simple act of intercourse: beds, lights, pills, diaphragms, condoms, perfumes, mirrors, and cars as movable boudoirs. These are but a few of the many bits and pieces of technology that help to transmute a simple biological act into an event in cultural history.

This sojourn into comparative sexology was intended to illustrate a general point so I will drop the illustration and take up the generalization. As noted previously surrounding and sustaining every organism -- whether it be a geranium, a prairie dog, a plankton, or a human being -- is a three-dimensional natural environment. One dimension we call an organism's social environment. This consists of other members of the organism's own species. Thus, other human beings comprise my social environment, other cats Hunter's social environment, and other pine trees the social environment of a pine tree.

A second dimension of the natural environment is an organism's biotic environment. This consists of members of other species. For

Hunter, Charlotte and I along with our children are elements of his biotic environment and rank only below tuna fish and birds in importance. Hunter in turn is part of the biotic environment of the Andersons together with the micro-organisms that alternately keep us alive and make us ill, the carrots and radishes and pigs and birds that we eat, the plants that we use to decorate our living room, and the trees from which come the paper on which I am writing.

The physical environment is a third dimension of an organism's environment. This consists of inorganic systems of matter and energy. The ground on which we move, the water and air around us, and the sun in the sky are parts of the physical environment the Anderson family shares with the plants and animals that cluster around our household.

With minor exceptions, in nature-minus-man the interaction between an organism and its social, biotic, and physical environments is direct and unmediated by anything that the organism itself or its species in general has created. In contrast, the way you and I relate to other human beings, to other species of life, and to inanimate matter and energy is always mediated. I can illustrate the difference by a simple comparative map of Hunter and his natural environment and me and my natural environment.





Hunter's interaction with his natural environments occur through doors that directly link organism and environment. In my case, there are no points of direct entry and exit. All traffic between me as an organism and my natural environments passes through a zone of culture.

Three brief caveats are in order at this point. One: as I have stated the matter here, I have undoubtedly stereotyped and inadvertently exaggerated human/nonhuman differences. For one thing, social institutions, languages, beliefs, and technology -- the major components of culture -- have roots in the planet's biogram that are much older than homo sapiens.

Two: I should not imply, as I have done, a uniformity in the depth of the crust of culture either among different groups or between different settings. For example, my interaction with the atmosphere is less mediated when I am standing on top of Pike's Peak than when I am

flying over Pike's Peak in an airplane. Similarly, the curst of culture between an Eskimo and the organisms he or she consumes as food is "less thick" than the crust between me and the organisms I normally eat, at least in respect to the number and complexity of social institutions and technologies involved.

Three: I do not mean to imply that culture does not affect other species' ways of living. Obviously it does. Hunter's way of living as a domesticated cat in the midst of human culture is different from that of his counterpart in an environment free of human culture. But the important thing here is not that cats and all other living things are affected by culture but rather that cats do not create culture while humans do.

I will try to summarize what I am suggesting. I began with the question: What is culture? Culture, I have said, is a human-made environment. Where do you find culture? Culture is found at points of interaction between people and people, people and other living things, and people and their physical environment. What do you see when you see culture? You see:

-- technologies (i.e., tools and skills to use tools).

-- social institutions (i.e., regularized, learned patterns of action)

-- languages (i.e., symbols and signs)

-- beliefs (i.e., images of what is true, good, beautiful, and right).

And of course you see these basic elements of culture combined in different ways in different settings to form the various systems of culture observable at picnics, on battlefields, on freeways, in schools, on farms,

at construction sites, at births, marriages, and funerals -- in a word, at all points where one finds human beings relating to one another, to other life, and to inorganic matter and energy. Culture is a human-invented cocoon that envelops each of us and from which we cannot escape. As I learned in Sunday school, in Adam, all mankind sinned.

If it is true that we cannot escape from culture, it is also true that we cannot escape from the world of nature. God, you recall, banned us from the Garden, but he did not banish us from the planetary home we humans share with the rest of God's creation. This gives to the human condition a fundamental and profound duality. We are simultaneously and irrevocably both in nature and apart from nature. As Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos (1972) put it:

> Man inhabits two worlds. One is the natural world of plants and animals, of soil and airs and waters which preceded him by billions of years and of which he is a part. The other is the world of social institutions and artifacts he builds for himself, using his tools and engines, his science and his dreams to fashion an environment obedient to human purpose and direction. (p. 1)

At this point I shall shift gears and try to answer a question that should be, if it is not, on your mind: What in God's creation does all of this have to do with the globalization of the human condition? The answer is two fold. First, this formulation of the ABCs of the human condition points to what the globalization of the human condition consists of when it is seen in microscopic perspective. This is the perspective of you and me as we experience this phenomenon as individuals. Second, the formulation points to a macroscopic explanation of why we experience what we do.

III

The Individual and the Globalization of the Human Condition

From the perspective of the individual as a unit of analysis, to assert that the human condition is becoming more globalized is to assert that the scale of the social, the biotic, and the physical environments surrrounding most individuals are becoming increasingly global or world wide. While simple, this assertion reflects a very profound change in the life space of human beings. Let us imagine we had the necessary data and could map the spacial size of the social, the biotic, and the physical environments surrounding an "average" human being in different centuries of human history. What might such maps look like? I have pretended that I have the pertinent information for one of my ancestors who lived 100 generations ago in the area we now call Scandinavia. I call him Uncle Lief.

The Scale of Uncle Lief's Environment



+ = other human beings
0 = plants and animals
□ = physical objects and events

As the diagram indicates the geographical scale of Uncle Lief's environment was small. Most of the people, most of the animals and plants, and most of the physical events and processes that impacted upon his life were within a twenty mile radius of his home. The next band -- the world within a forty mile radius -- is populated by a few people, other things and events that influenced him, but they are far fewer in number and were generally of only peripheral import. The next band -- a hundred mile radius -- contains still fewer relevant people, plants, animals, and physical events. For all practical purposes Uncle Lief's social, biotic, and physical environment ended at this point. (This, of course, ignores the fact that the air he breathed, the water he drank, and the land on which he walked were then as they still are part of the planet's global atmosphere, hydrosphere, and lithisphere. But this is not terribly important. Even if Uncle Lief had known this he could have afforded to ignore these facts.)

Now mentally contrast Uncle Lief's social, biotic, and physical environments to the world that surrounds you and me. Our environments in contrast with his are global or world-wide in scale. This makes a big difference in what we do, what we think, and what we feel. Let me illustrate this by taking a few events that have occurred in my life-time and compare my reactions to them with Uncle Lief's reation to comparable events that might have happened in his life-time.

Event	My Reaction	Uncle Lief's Reaction
War breaks out on Pacific Islands four thousand miles from home.	I buy War stamps, sing patriotic songs, and learn to hate the "Japs."	None: the Pacific Ocean and its islands are not part of his physical environment and the Japanese are not part of his social environment.
A small group of political leaders in a capital city in East Asia misperceive the meaning of an American Secretary of State's address to a press club luncheon and order a military assault on their neighbor to the South	I worry about being drafted, think about dying a lot, and study hard to keep my grades high and hope the draft board notices.	None: Asia and the Americas are not part of his physical environment and the people who live there are not part of his social environment.
A severe drought takes place in Africa.	I send a check to Care	None: Africans and the weather in Africa are not part of his social and physical environment.
Simultaneously, bad weather occurs in South America and a civil war breaks out in Africa.	I grumble about sharply increased price of coffee.	None: Plants growing in Africa and South America are not part of his biotic environment.
A new musical group forms in England.	I buy a new record and play it to impress my children with my "cool".	None: People in England and the things they do are not part of his social environment.
The sale of cars in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America increases.	The CO_2 concentration in the air I breathe increases.	None: People elsewhere in the world could not do anything to affect the air Uncle Lief breathes.

A new strain of virus evolves in South Asia.	I get sick. My family gets sick. We stay at home and grate on one another's nerves.	None: Uncle Lief stays healthy. Viruses in East Asia never become part of his biotic environment and hence never affect his relations with wife and children.

What has changed to produce the differences between Uncle Lief and me? Certainly not human nature. Uncle Lief and I are basically the same. His emotions are my emotions. My needs are his needs. His concerns are my concerns. And it is certainly not our planet. The earth's continents and islands and the people who live on them were there in Uncle Lief's life-time just as they are in mine. What then explains the difference in the scale of our social, biotic, and physical environment? It is the size of the cocoon of culture in which I live and in which Uncle Lief lived. I will try to explain.

I spoke earlier of culture as a human-created environment that mediates or intervenes between human beings and our surrounding natural environment. In this sense, as Charlotte Anderson (1977) observes, culture is "a crust that separates humans from direct involvement in the environment." She goes on to note:

> I am sitting here inside a cocoon of clothes and building removed from direct interaction with the physical and much of my biotic environment. The air I need comes to me through the ventilation system at a standardized rate and temperature. The rain that is falling does not reach me at all. If I need to wash or want a drink, I satisfy these desires by using human-created technology that brings me treated water from a distant point. When I am hungry, I don't grab a passing caterpillar as a robin does. I open my brown bag, take out a plastic encased sandwich of whole wheat and bologna.
>
> Culture is a crust, but it is a porous crust permeated with linkage systems. The technology of the ventilation system links

me not only to a vital component of the physical environment -- air--but it also links me to the social environment, specifically, to the multitude of other human beings who provided this technology for me. My lunch is only one small element in a whole system of cultural linkages I became a part of in order to satisfy my hunger. Through it I am linked in complex ways to the physical, biotic, and social environments.

The crust of culture has become so thick and the linkage systems so complex it would undoubtedly take more human technology and knowledge than I have at hand to sort out all these links. Superficially, however, I am aware that I used technology--a car--to take me to one type of institution--a grocery store. There I used language to locate and purchase my lunch bag and sandwich ingredients. My belief in the relatively more nutritional qualities of whole wheat bread led me to choose that over white bread. Through this simple chain of events human culture linked me to food resources in the natural and biotic environment that are probably far removed from me in both space and time. And, further, this culture linked me to literally a multitude of other humans in my social environment. These include the scientist who perfected the hybrid strain of wheat, the farmers who planted it, the grain elevator operators who stored the wheat, the baker..., the wrapper..., the delivery truck driver....

When culture is looked at in this way, that is, as a human created environment, it is easy to see that culture functions as a linkage mechanism between individuals and their non-human made environments. This perspective seems to be facilitated by thinking of culture in terms of its specific elements or components... technologies, institutions, languages, and beliefs. Let's take another brief look at these components as linkage mechanisms.

A transportation technology such as the highway system links me to people, plants and animals, and countless inanimate natural entities in such diverse places as Seattle, Ontario, Santa Fe, Mexico City, and Pekin, Illinois. My commitment to belief in sexual equality links me to women and men sharing this ideology whether they live down the street or 10,000 miles away. The import shop where I purchase things for my home is an institution that links me to the producers of goods in many different nations. The international traffic signs that control my movement around Evanston are an international language that links me to drivers in countless cities across the globe.

When we think of culture as a linkage mechanism then the difference in the scale of Uncle Lief's social, biotic, and physical environment is readily explainable. We can construct two simple syllogisms, each of

which has a common major premise but differing minor premises and, therefore, different conclusions.

Syllogism A

Major Premise: The scale of a human being's social, biotic, and physical environment is directly proportionable to the scale of his or her cultural environment.

Minor Premise: The scale of Uncle Lief's cultural environment (i.e., technologies, institutions, beliefs, and languages) was local.

Conclusion: Therefore, the scale of Uncle Lief's social, biotic, and physical environment was local.

Syllogism B

Major Premise: The scale of a human being's social, biotic, and physical environment is directly proportionable to the scale of his or her cultural environment.

Minor Premise: The scale of Lee's cultural environment (i.e., technologies, institutions, beliefs, and languages) is global.

Conclusion: Therefore, the scale of Lee's social, biotic, and physical environment is global.

You may wish to quarrel about the major premise in respect to details, and you should. Clearly the simple generalization masks complexities in the inter-relation of nature and culture that are worthy of being noticed and explored. However, it is the minor premise and subsequently the conclusion that I want to deal with here.

IV

The Globalization of Culture

Implicit in the minor premise is an image of the historical development or evolution of culture. In its most simple formulation this image is captured in the following diagram designed to depict the structure of the cultural universe at two different points in time.



The diagram on the left depicts an era in which human culture was an aggregation of local cultures each of which was linked to a particular territorial space and were unrelated to one another. The diagram on the right depicts an era in which the structure of the cultural universe has dramatically changed. Now we observe a global culture whose territorial base is the whole planet and, indeed, to be accurate that territorial base extends beyond the gravitational boundaries of the planet Earth to encompass a small segment of cosmic space.

This diagrammatic representation of the emergence of the global culture is excessively simplified and later I will try to correct some

of the distortions produced by my oversimplifications. But for my purpose here the diagram hopefully makes the point I wish to make. This point is that today most human beings live out their lives in a cocoon of culture whose circumference equals the circumference of the globe. In a word there is a global culture. I now want to turn to another question: What are the historical trends and associated social processes that are producing a global culture? There appear to be two. One is increasing "interrelatedness" between societies. The other is increasing "congruence" among societies.

Increasing Interrelatedness Between Societies

Throughout this chapter I have spoken many times of the ways in which societies in the modern world have become increasingly interrelated to one another. Some of my references have been to general and abstract phenomena such as global interdependence and shared history. Other references have been to concrete and specific phenomena like foreign investment, trade, and membership in international organizations. Now I will try to explicate the concept of "interrelatedness" in a more systematic manner. To do this I will make use of a set of concepts borrowed from Alex Inkeles. (1975) These are the concepts of: autarky, interconnectedness, dependence, interdependence, integration and hegemony.

I will briefly indicate how Inkeles defines each term. Autarky he defines this way:

> Autarky exists when a set of people share a more or less completely self-contained and self-sustaining sociocultural system. The condition does not necessarily assume physical isolation, although such isolation is often associated with autarky. Rather,

to meet the test of autarky, a system should be such that if all other forms of human and social life were suddenly to disappear, the remaining system would have a high probability of continuing to propagate itself in much the same form it had before the cataclysm overtook everyone else. This condition is most easily met by small and isolated communities--for example, tribes living on isolated Pacific atolls or high mountains. Mere isolation, however, is not enough to guarantee the condition of autarky. A particular type of social structure and economy is essential. A group which depended on other tribes for a basic commodity of life such as salt, or an indispensable and unsubstitutable instrument for gathering food such as a trap, or which was obliged regularly to come together with others to permit exogamous marriages, would to that degree be less able to satisfy the requirement of autarky. Thus, an Eskimo family wandering in a full isolation for months across the arctic wastes in search of food is not an autarky, since functions critical to maintaining the long-term system of action of the group require that its members periodically come together with other similar physically isolated families to exchange brides and perform certain religious and communal services essential to the continuation of the sociocultural system of the tribe. An Eskimo tribe as a whole, however, might well qualify as an autarkic social system.

Although amall and isolated groups with simple social systems and primitive economies may predominate among autarkies, such systems are also found at the other end of the scale of size. Units at the level of the nation-state may achieve a high degree of autarky. Thus, Japan, Soviet Russia, and Communist China, at various periods in their history more or less totally sealed their borders and strove to achieve complex goals of social reorganization while relying almost exclusively on resources and ideas internal to their respective sociopolitical systems. (p. 469)

"Interconnectedness", he says,

refers to the volume of frequency of communication, interaction, or exchange between two sociocultural systems. It is most often expressed in the exchange of goods and services, i.e., in trade, as when tribes living in the hills may grow tea which they exchange in regular markets for rice grown by culturally distinct tribes living in the lowland valleys. (pp. 469-470)

Dependence, Inkeles defines,

as reliance on an item of exchange which is more or less indispensable to the survival of the system or systems engaging in the exchange. A system experiencing such dependence would to that degree be unable to achieve or maintain autarky.

You may recall in discussing the globalization of history I noted that interdependence as a technical concept has not one but several meanings. Inkeles uses interdependence in a different way than I used it both in discussing growing global interdependence as one dimension of the globalization of history and in discussing complex interdependence as a characteristic of the global political system. He takes off from his definition of dependence and notes:

> In a system of exchange, however, the implications of the exchange are not the same for all the units participating. The salt given by system A in exchange for the jade beads of system B may be vital to the physical continuity of B, whereas the beads may easily be replaced in A by some other means of ornamenting the dress used in tribal dances. A and B are therefore interconnected, but not interdependent. B is dependent on A, but A is not dependent on B.

Were A and B mutually dependent upon one another a condition of interdependence would exist.

Inkeles characterizes integration in this way:

> Integration is a step beyond interdependence. It represents a condition in which formerly autonomous units have more or less permanently surrendered vital functions to another, more extended unit while still retaining a substantial number of other vital functions. Integration may therefore apply to only a given institution, to a subset of institutions such as the economic or political, or to a series of major institutional complexes. Thus, two neighboring states may adopt a joint custom arrangement with regard to third parties and suspend such formalities for all goods passing between the two states, while each yet maintains a separate parliament, executive, police force, tax system, and the like. For example, the princely states of India after independence were largely, although not totally, integrated into the new national state while retaining some degree of distinctness. In time we may expect this integration to become complete, and these units of the system will become indistinguishable from all the other subdivisions of the Indian state. (p. 471)

Inkeles defines hegemony within the context of his definition of integration. He states:

> Integration may, of course, be either voluntary or imposed. Thus, the total integration of the colonies in the former British Empire was, with few exceptions, a result of the imposition of force, whereas the participation of most of the ex-colonies in the Commonwealth was largely voluntary, perhaps because it involved a lesser degree of integration. Integration imposed by force may be treated as a special case, designated as hegemony. It was the predominant mode of integration in the past, and its history has not yet run its course, although we may hope that voluntary integration will be the predominant mode in the future. (p. 471)

These six concepts I take to refer to six dimensions of the overarching concept of interrelatedness as is illustrated below.

Interrelatedness
- Autarky
- Interconnectedness
- Dependence
- Interdependence
- Integration
- Hegemony

This schema provides a means of viewing (and given the necessary data, of measuring) the degree or extent of interrelatedness characteristic of human societies during different periods or eras of history. Inkeles in fact uses the schema in just this way. He examines the social structure of the world in so-called pre-historic times, and on the basis of our extant knowledge of the global sociology of pre-history, Inkeles concludes that the world's social structure in this era can be characterized as follows:

Autarky was high

Interconnectedness was minimal

Dependence was extremely limited

Interdependence was virtually nonexistent

Integration was virtually nonexistent

Hegemony was minimal and sporadic.

Inkeles also applies the same schema to the contemporary era. I will do the same thing. In so doing I will make use of some of Inkeles' data. Also I will make use of some of his impressions, interpretations, and conclusions, while in other instances my analysis departs from his.

Autarky. Autarky in the contemporary era of history is very low. Indeed, both ecological and cultural autarky is virtually nonexistent.

Ecological autarky exists if a society has within its own territorial boundaries all of the natural resources necessary to sustain its population at the currently prevailing standard of living. No country in the contemporary world meets this condition totally, although there are substantial variations among nations in their relative degree of autarky. Contrast, for example, the Netherlands and Bangladesh. The Netherlands imports most of its food and almost all of its cotton, iron ore, bauxite, copper, gold, nickel, tin, zinc, phosphate fertilizers as well as many other important commodities. In contrast, the standard of living in Bangladesh is much lower than the standard of living in the Netherlands, but Bangladesh is much more ecologically self sufficient. As Dennis Pirages (1978) observes;

> If the world trade system were suddenly to disintegrate, the Netherlands would suffer an economic and demographic catastrophe of great magnitude, while Bangladesh would escape with minor economic damage. (pp. 16-17)

This contrast points to a significant generalization. On the whole, one of the long term effects of industrialization has been to reduce ecological autarky. This is most evident in the case of industrialized nations. Examine the following table that shows the comparative import dependence of the U.S., Europe, and Japan in respect to the critical industrial minerals. The United States is the single most richly endowed nation in regard to mineral resources, but even so it is highly dependent upon the import of several critical resources. A more extensive analysis shows that: "Of the 74 nonenergy mineral commodities essential to modern industry, the United States is now highly dependent on foreign sources for 22" (Lincoln P. Bloomfield, 1974, p. 12).

Comparative Import Dependence, 1972

	United States		OECD Europe		Japan	
	Import Volume (Thousands of Tons)	Imports as a Percentage of Consumption	Import Volume (Thousands of Tons)	Imports as a Percentage of Consumption	Import Volume (Thousands of Tons)	Imports as a Percentage of Consumption
Bauxite and Alumina	13389	88	3726	51	4996	100
Copper and Copper Ore	383	17	2439	93	2511	90
Iron Ore	36334	32	75307	37	111519	94
Lead and Lead Ore	314	19	789	75	204	76
Nickel and Nickel Ore	140	90	240	89	3179	100
Zinc and Zinc Ore	715	55	1863	61	1123	80
Tin and Tin Ores	56	100	116	96	32	97
Tungsten Ore	3	42	22	100	2	100
Manganese Ore	733	95	3696	98	2921	90
Chromium Ore	408	100	970	100	875	100

Source: Dennis Pirages, 1978, p. 150

As the table clearly indicates the United States is much better off than other industrialized economies. Note the very high level of Japanese

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

dependence. Taken as a whole, Europe is between the U.S. and Japan but closer to Japan than to the U.S.

What is true of nonfuel minerals is also true of energy. The following table shows the relative energy self-sufficiency of the major industrial nations in 1965 and 1975.

Energy Self-Sufficiency in Industrial Countries

	1965*	1975*
Denmark	.04	.01
Finland	.10	.07
Japan	.35	.09
Belgium	.43	.15
Italy	.22	.16
Sweden	.17	.17
Switzerland	.19	.21
France	.48	.23
Austria	.57	.39
West Germany	.74	.50
Great Britain	.69	.62
Hungary	.76	.62
East Germany	.84	.70
United States	.91	.87
Romania	1.18	1.00
Poland	1.15	1.13
Soviet Union	1.12	1.17
Canada	.89	1.19
Australia	.74	1.27
Norway	.49	1.28
Netherlands	.40	1.42

*Production/Consumption.

Source: Dennis Pirages, 1978, p. 124

These figures cover energy from all sources--fossil fuels, hydroelectric, nuclear, and nonconventional. Dennis Pirages (1978) observes of these data:

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

> These data highlight the plight of most Western European countries and Japan, all countries that have witnessed a steady erosion of their energy self-sufficiency. One-half of the industrial countries now produce less than 50 percent of the energy consumed domestically from their own sources. Denmark meets virtually none of its energy requirements from domestic sources, Japan only 9 percent, and France 23 percent. In relation to these energy-deficient countries, the United States is in relatively good shape, producing 87 percent of the energy used from domestic fuels.
>
> Some of the industrial countries listed in table 4-4 actually improved their energy self-sufficiency over the ten-year period. Norway experienced a substantial improvement because of petroleum discoveries in the North Sea and may soon be a small net energy exporter. The Netherlands has been blessed with a similar offshore discovery of natural gas, which changed it from a large net importer of energy in 1965 to a significant exporter in 1973. But this bonanza will come to an end in the early 1990s. (p. 123)

A comparable but more complex pattern of ecological dependence also characterizes another type of energy, namely food. Many countries are heavily dependent upon food imports. The following table provides data on the "super importers" of agricultural commodities. These fourteen countries are the largest food importers in the world.

Major Food-Deficient Nations

	Net Agricultural Imports (Thousands of Dollars)		Net Imports Per Capita (Dollars)	
	1973	1974	1973	1974
Libya	314,435	325,720	146	138.8
West Germany	8,253,120	8,080,250	133	130.2
Great Britain	6,378,413	7,561,650	114	135.1
Norway	366,553	464,270	93	116.5
Belgium	807,614	1,008,485	83	103.2
Japan	8,577,047	10,543,110	79	96.1
Austria	531,762	528,690	71	70.1
Finland	207,158	295,730	44	63.1
Lebanon	128,383	179,600	43	64.5
Portugal	380,892	692,390	42	79.3
Chile	413,768	608,170	41	60.4
Israel	125,970	251,380	39	76.2
Trinidad-Tobago	40,097	49,630	38	—
Jordan	80,176	103,110	32	39.4

Source: Dennis Pirages, 1978, p. 86

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Note that more than one half of these food dependent countries are industrialized nations. The pattern of import dependence among Third World nations is complex as the following table indicates. There are many points that could be made about this complexity, but two stand out. One, overall there is extensive dependence, albeit not as great as in the case of some industrialized nations like West Germany and Great Britain. Two, the complexity of the pattern strongly suggests that contrary to some popular beliefs American food does not constitute a "power resource" that could be easily used in dealing with the Third World. The pattern of western dependence upon OPEC oil is very different from the pattern of dependence of the Third World on United States produced food.

Import Dependence

Country	Wheat		Rice		Corn	
	% imported (or trade status)	% of calories	% imported (or trade status)	% of calories	% imported (or trade status)	% of calories
Afghanistan	3	54	ss	7	ss	18
Algeria	44	60	70		80	
Angola	85	5	uex	2	e	21
Argentina	e	33	3		e	
Bangladesh[1]	94	14	4	32		4
Bolivia	72	18	ss	4	mss	25
Brazil	66	8	e	18		18
Burma	37	1	ss	72	e	
Burundi	100	1			ss	14
Cameroon	100	2			ss	15
Cen. African Rep.	100	2		1		8
Chad			ss	3		2
Chile	45	47	48	3	39	
Colombia	87	6	uex	22	uex	20
Costa Rica	100	14	uex	14	46	14
Cuba	100	27	60	16		
Dahomey				1	mss	32
Dominican Rep.	100	6	mss	15	41	3
Ecuador	69	8	uex	16	uex	12
Egypt	63	10	e	13	8	
El Salvador	100	6	uex	3		37
Ethiopia	70	10			mss	13
Gabon	100	6		2		2
Gambia	100	2	32	36		

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Country	Wheat		Rice		Corn	
	% imported (or trade status)	% of calories	% imported (or trade status)	% of calories	% imported (or trade status)	% of calories
Ghana	100	3	48	4		22
Guatemala	66	1	uex		5	56
Guinea	100	2	10	32		22
Guyana		21	mss	35		
Haiti	100	5		3	uex	24
Honduras	98	5	36		mss	49
India	10	14	uex	32	3	4
Indonesia	100		8	46	uex	14
Iran	17	49	19	12	65	
Iraq	30	39	uex	9		
Ivory Coast	100	5	41	20	mss	16
Jamaica	100	25	94	8	94	6
Jordan	50	49	100	5		
Kenya	uex	3			uex	46
Khmer Rep			uex	73		
Korea (S)	89	9	12	47	89	
Laos			11	85		3
Lebanon	86	45	100	4	95	
Liberia	100	1	28	53		
Libya	85	11				
Madagascar				64		
Malawi	100	1			mss	84
Malaysia (west)	100	10	10	46	99	
Mali		1	16	9	mss	8
Mauritania		4		5		2
Mexico	24	9	uex	2	uex	43
Morocco	29	40	ss		6	6
Mozambique	91	3	uex	4	uex	20
Nicaragua	100	5	e	9	12	34
Niger				1		
Nigeria			1	2	1	-
Pakistan	14	20	e	47	99	2
Peru	85	16	uex	9	23	9
Philippines	100	6	8	44	5	12
Rwanda						7
Saudi Arabia	67	27	99	13		
Senegal	100	4	72	30	41	5
Sierra Leone	100	3	4	52		2
Singapore	100	11	100	35	100	
Somalia	100	3		7		22
Sri Lanka	100	10	29	48		
Sudan	53	5				
Syria	uex	49	99	3		
Tanzania	44	2	uex	4	uex	23
Thailand			e	72		
Tunisia		54			100	
Turkey	uex	30	mss	2	mss	1
Uganda		2			mss	7
Uruguay	uex	29		3		
Venezuela						
Vietnam (S)	100	3	9	76	60	
Zambia	100	3			uex	60
Zaire	98	?	15	2	25	2

key

ss = self-sufficient (production with neither imports nor exports)
uex = uncertain exporter (exports alternating with imports or no net trade)
e = exporter (steady exporter)
mss = marginally self-sufficient (imports alternating with years of self-sufficiency)

Source: Cheryl Christensen, 1977, pp. 300-301

So far I have been discussing ecological autarky and noting that it is nonexistent, although there are substantial variations among countries in the nature and degree of external dependence upon raw materials, energy, and food. Another kind of autarky is cultural. This refers to the extent of a society's cultural self sufficience.

In the most basic historical sense it is highly doubtful that any human society since the Paleolithic era has experienced total cultural autarky with the possible exception of the Australian Aborigines. Most societies have had some contact with other societies and have borrowed some elements of their culture from the culture of other societies. As Milton Singer (1967) notes, "every culture has incorporated within itself some part of all the cultures it has met". (p. 7)

In the contemporary world all societies depend in different ways and degrees upon a "world bank of human culture" whose capital has been accumulating for millenia from contributions made to the bank by peoples in all ages and from all parts of the planet. The dependence of the United States in the world culture bank is well illustrated by A. L. Kroeber's famous characterization of American culture.

> We speak an Anglo-Saxon form of a Germanic language that contains more original Latin than English words. Our religion is Palestinian, with its specific formulations into denominations made chiefly in Rome, Germany, England, Scotland, and Holland. Our Bible is translated partly from Hebrew, partly from Greek. We drink coffee first grown in Ethiopia and adopted in Arabia, tea discovered in China, beer first brewed in ancient Mesopotamia or Egypt, hard liquor invented in mediaeval Europe. Our bread, beef, and other meats are from plants and animals first domesticated in Asia; our potatoes, corn, tomatoes, and beans were first used by the American Indians; likewise tobacco. We write an Etruscan-Roman variant of a Greek form of an alphabet invented in or near Phoenicia by a Semitic people on the basis of nonalphabetic writing in still more ancient cultures; its first printing took place in Germany, on paper devised in China. It is needless to extend the catalogue. (p. 258)

Kroeber goes on to make the point that the polyglot character of American culture is not particularly unique:

> . . . so far as we can tell such a condition is typical of all cultures. If ancient Egypt, Sumer, India, or China seems less flooded with import and more original, it is only because historical record fails, and we get no more than occasional indications of the alien and still more ancient sources of their culture content. (p. 258)

There is not to my knowledge any way of "measuring" degrees of cultural dependence in the same way degrees of ecological dependence can be crudely measured. The United Nations and other organizations do not publish statistics on the cultural exports and imports of different countries. But one way of getting some crude notion of the level of cultural dependence characteristic of the contemporary world system is to take a particular dimension of culture and look at the level of self sufficience characteristic of the most autarkic nations in respect to that dimension. In the case of science and technology the United States may well be the single most self sufficient nation so let us look briefly at the level of American dependence upon external science and technology. Karl Deutsch (1978) does this in part:

> A great leader of American science, the physicist Karl T. Compton, once reminded us that only three of the 12 basic discoveries that permitted the release of atomic energy were made by Americans. That one-quarter of this world-changing discovery was contributed by one-eighteenth of the world's population (which is, as we recall, the share of the American people) may well be reason for national pride, but that we depended upon foreigners for three-quarters of this crucial knowledge may well help us to see ourselves in better perspective.
>
> No country could keep many of its own people alive without the help of foreigners. In our hospitals and doctors' offices, thousands of lives are saved daily by the application of discoveries and medicines developed by scientists in other countries. In the last half-century, penicillin was discovered in England, sulfa drugs in Germany, radioactive isotopes in

> France, insulin in Canada. If all our packages of medicines were brightly labeled with the names and countries of their discoverers, we would get a course in world citizenship at every prescription counter; and if tomorrow all remedies developed by foreigners should lose their power, the number of dead in our streets would be appalling.
> (pp. 3-4)

Interconnectedness. The level of interconnectedness among societies is historically unprecedented and has been increasing. Inkeles uses several indicators of this trend. I will cite his findings and where possible update the data.

> University-level students abroad: The number of students studying outside their own country approximately doubled in number between 1960 and 1969, rising from 239,000 to 477,000. This continued a pattern which had been in evidence at least since 1950. Over that longer period of time, the annual increase in the number of students studying abroad was in excess of 7 percent a year.
> (p.477)

During the 1970's the per year growth rate of foreign study declined somewhat. Data from the recent United Nations Statistical Yearbook shows us a growth rate of 4 percent per year between 1970 and 1977. This decline probably reflects among other things the slower rate of world economic growth in the 1970's and the increasing availability of institutions of higher education in parts of the Third World.

> Foreign mail: Between 1938 and 1970 the volume of foreign mail sent and received by 40 reporting countries increased almost seven times. The annual rate of increase was some 6 percent per year.
> (p. 477)

The volume of foreign mail increased 35 percent between 1970 and 1977.

> International telephonic and telegraphic communication: Closely paralleling the pattern manifested by the mails, a marked increase is shown in the frequency of electronic communication across national boundaries. The number of telegrams sent abroad in 1970 was more than two and a half times that for 1938, indicating an annual increase rate of 3 percent per year. Moreover, there was a much higher rate of increase in the frequency of international telephone calls, conservatively estimated at 15 percent per year in the decade of the sixties.
> (p. 478)

Since 1970 the total volume of telegraphic communication increased by 9 percent. The volume of telephonic communication increased by 28 percent.

> International tourist travel: From 1954 to 1970, the 26 main tourist-receiving countries experienced a surge from 26 to 106 million visits, indicating an increase of about 8.7 percent per year. This did not come about merely because the affluent were flooding the more exotic corners of the globe. For example, in this same period the interchange between Europe and the United States, accounting for a large part of all tourism, also increased at a rate in excess of 7 percent per year.
> (p. 478)

During the 1970's there was some slackening of international tourist trade. It increased 5.6 percent per year between 1970 and 1976.

> World Trade: Commerce between nation-states increased tenfold between 1938 and 1969. In each of the three decades it approximately doubled, indicating an annual increase of approximately 7 percent. Increases expressed in value terms, as these are, should perhaps be discounted to allow for inflation. But even expressing the value of world trade in constant 1963 prices, the three-decade period still yields an annual rate of increase of about 5 percent.
> (p. 478)

As noted previously in discussing the development of a global economy, the volume of world trade in the 1970's continued to increase.

> Direct capital investment abroad: United States data, the most readily abailable, show a change in the rate of investment, from about 1 or 2 billion dollars from 1946-52 to 3 billion by 1963, and then to 8 billion by 1971. Even allowing for inflation, the amount of such investment clearly at least doubled within the last decade. Data on the rest of the world, still being studied, are expected to show comparable patterns.
> (pp. 478-479)

Also as indicated previously, the volume of foreign investment has continued to grow.

> International nongovernmental organizations (INGO's): From around 1850, when some 5 or 10 INGO's were founded in each quinquenniad, the number founded rose to over 300 per quinquenniad by 1950. From 1954 to 1968, the rate of increase in the total number of such organizations was about 5 percent per year. Moreover, a study of the congresses and conferences sponsored by these organizations would presumably show an equal and more likely

> a higher rate of participation by groups and individuals than is indicated when participation is measured on the basis of the number of "organizations" involved.
>
> International governmental organizations (IGO's): In general, membership in such organizations increased substantially after World War II. In the United Nations, for example, the rate of membership increase from 1945 to 1970 was 3.6 percent per annum per annum; for UNESCO it was 6.4 percent. Some of the specialized o organizations, such as GATT, experienced an annual membership increase of over 10 percent.
> (p. 479)

Here too the data presented previously in the discussion of the development of a global political system shows a continued increase in the number of both IGO's and NGO's during the 1970's.

Inkeles summarized the growth of interconnectedness in the following way. On the whole the updating of his data trends to support the conclusions he reached.

> The pattern manifested in these figures is unmistakable and indeed rather remarkable in its consistency. Over a wide range of systems of exchange we find evidence of rapid acceleration in the development of ties linking nations, their institutional components, and the individuals who populate them. The abundance and complexity of the networks which interconnect the world's population are, and have been for some time, growing at a phenomenal rate. With some variation according to the specific indicator used, recent decades reveal a general tendency for many forms of human interconnectedness across national boundaries to be doubling every ten years.
> (p. 479)

Interdependence. Transactional data of the kind reported above has been often taken as measures of interdependence. But as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) note "interconnectedness is not the same as interdependence" (p. 9). Similarly Inkeles observes:

> Interconnectedness may suggest, but does not necessarily define, interdependence. Dependence exists where a service, commodity, or resource obtained from abroad is relatively vital and not easily substitutable. Interdependence exists where there is a relatively equal or balanced exchange of such goods. If country A has good coking coal while country B has ore, and each makes its own steel, they are interdependent in the steel-making process. If capital is in surplus and can find no profitable investment in C, whereas D has rich and potentially profitable resources and no capital, an exchange between them may also indicate a basic interdependence. (p. 483)

Is interdependence in this sense of mutual dependence increasing? To answer this question it is useful to distinguish between two dimensions of interdependence--a sensitivity dimension and a vulnerability dimension. Sensitivity can be defined as the degree of responsiveness of one country to developments in another. Vulnerability can be defined as the degree to which there are alternatives to the transactions that generate sensitivity and the relative cost of these alternatives. These two dimensions of interdependence can be combined in the following way:



When a transaction falls into quadrant 4, that is, when both the sensitivity and vulnerability of the societies involved in the transaction are low, there is interconnectedness but no interdependence. Tourist travel between the United States and Japan is an example of this. Tourist travel has been increasing rapidly, thus Japan and the U.S. are becoming more interconnected in this respect. However, neither country is highly sensitive or vulnerable to changes in tourist travel. The economies of neither nation would be greatly damaged by a cession of tourist travel. (However, some sectors of local economies such as the tourist business in San Francisco, Washington, New York, and Tokyo would be adversely affected.)

When transactions between nations fall into the other three quadrants a condition of interdependence exists. This interdependence can be of three types: (1) interdependence characterized by high sensitivity but low vulnerability, (2) interdependence characterized by high vulnerability but low sensitivity, and (3) interdependence characterized by both high sensitivity and high vulnerability.

It is difficult to measure the extensiveness of these three types of interdependence. However, most scholars of international relations believe that there has been an increasing level of all three types of interdependence. At least it is easy to cite examples illustrating different kinds of interdependence. Keohane and Nye write:

> An example of sensitivity dependence is the way the United States, Japan, and Western Europe were affected by increased

> oil prices in 1971 and again in 1973-74 and 1975. In the absence of new policies, which could take many years or decades to implement, the sensitivity of these economies was a function of the greater costs of foreign oil and the proportion of petroleum they imported. The United States was less sensitive than Japan to petroleum price rises, because a smaller proportion of its petroleum requirements was accounted for by imports, but as rapid price increases and long lines at gasoline stations showed, the United States was indeed sensitive to the outside change. Another example of sensitivity interdependence is provided by the international monetary situation prior to August 15, 1971. Given the constraints on policy created by the rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European governments were sensitive to changes in American monetary policy, and the United States was sensitive to European decisions whether or not to demand the conversion of dollars into gold.
>
> Sensitivity interdependence can be social or political as well as economic. For example, there are social "contagion effects," such as the trivial but rapid spread of the fad of "streaking" from American to European society in 1974, or, more significant, the way in which the development of radical student movements during the late 1960s was reinforced by knowledge of each other's activities. The rapid growth of transnational communications has enhanced such sensitivity. Television, by vividly presenting starvation in South Asia to Europeans and Americans about to sit down to their dinners, is almost certain to increase attention to and concern about the issue in European and American societies. Sensitivity to such an issue may be reflected in demonstrations or other political action, even if no action is taken to alleviate the distress (and no economic sensitivity thereby results). (pp. 12-13)

Keohane and Nye go on to note that when we focus solely on the sensitivity dimension we obscure the most important political aspects of interdependence. They write:

> Using the word <u>interdependence</u>, however, to refer only to sensitivity obscures some of the most important political aspects of mutual dependence. We must also consider what the situation would be if the framework of policies could be changed. If more alternatives were available, and new and very different

> policies were possible, what would be the costs of adjusting to the outside change? In petroleum, for instance, what matters is not only the proportion of one's needs that is imported, but the alternatives to imported energy and the costs of pursuing those alternatives. Two countries, each importing 35 percent of their petroleum needs, may seem equally sensitive to price rises; but if one could shift to domestic sources at moderate cost, and the other had no such alternative, the second state would be more vulnerable than the first. The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.
>
> Under the Bretton Woods monetary regime during the late 1960s, both the United States and Great Britain were sensitive to decisions by foreign speculators or central banks to shift assets out of dollars or sterling, respectively. But the United States was less vulnerable than Britain because it had the option (which it exercised in August 1971) of changing the rules of the system at what it considered tolerable costs. The underlying capabilities of the United States reduced its vulnerability, and therefore made its sensitivity less serious politically. (p. 13)

The economic interrelationships of the advanced industrial nations particularly in respect to trade are a partial example of interdependence characterized by both high sensitivity and high vulnerability. I say these are a partial example, because the degree of both vulnerability and sensitivity varies among the industrialized nations. The Netherlands and Belgium for example are both more sensitive to and vulnerable in international trade than is the United States because the portion of gross national product accounted for by international trade is much smaller than is the case with the Netherlands and Belgium. However, the median portion which trade represents of GNP has been fluctuating between 30 and 40 percent for the past several decades, thus suggesting a generally high level of economic interdependence.

Science and the humanities are other areas that appear to evidence considerable international interdependence. Alex Inkeles observes:

> Beyond trade, it is likely that the national science establishment of all countries would be seriously hampered, and might indeed be rendered relatively sterile in all but the largest nations, were it not for the continuous interchange of ideas and personnel among the several countries important for scientific productivity. Some great literature would probably continue to be produced by authors, and some vital new paintings by painters, if we cut off all international contacts among creative artists around the world, but a substantial case can be made for the critical role which such exchange plays in stimulating and sustaining innovation and vitality in aesthetic creation. (p. 486)

Probably the single best example of pure interdependence in the contemporary world is to be found in the strategic military relations of the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet society is highly sensitive and vulnerable to an American nuclear attack, and conversely American society is equally sensitive and vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack. Thus, we Americans are dependent for our security upon the rationality of the people in the Kremlin and Soviet citizens are in turn dependent for their security upon the rationality of the people in the White House.

Dependence. Interdependencies are not always symmetrical in the sense that all parties to a transaction are equally sensitive and/or vulnerable. When such equality does not exist there is dependence but not interdependence. Dependence exists when transactions are vital to one partner but of relatively casual significance to the other. For example, I noted that in the case of American-Japanese tourist relations

this transaction was not particularly vital to either nation. The situation is very different in the case of tourist travel between the United States and nations like Jamaica, Mexico, and Spain. In this case tourism is of little economic significance to the U.S., but of substantial significance to the economies of Jamaica, Mexico, and Spain. That is to say, the latter countries depend much more on tourist dollars from the other countries. Tourism, in short, creates in these cases dependence relations. As I noted in discussing the growth of a global economy dependence tends to characterize North-South relations. Inkeles makes and elaborates upon the same point.

> . . . there is plenty of evidence of the pervasive dependence of the overwhelming majority of the less developed countries. They are dependent on the more advanced countries for all manner of more sophisticated machinery including complex machines of war; for scientific knowledge of all sorts and the related training of specialists in a host of fields; for the technical and organizational know-how vital to large-scale, complex productive enterprises; and for the investment capital essential to purchase, borrow, rent, or otherwise employ those resources.
>
> Again, the situation may be vividly illustrated by the statistics on students sent abroad to study. In 1968, less than a thousand students from North America went to study full time in South America, but more than ten thousand went in the opposite direction. For Asia, the contrast was even more dramatic, since 63,000 students came from Asia to North America, compared to only about a thousand North Americans studying in Asia. These exchanges are wildly disproportionate not only in absolute numbers, but also in terms of the ratio which students studying abroad represent of all university students enrolled at home. Less than 1 per cent of North American students study abroad, as do slightly more than 1 per cent of European students. By contrast, Africa and the Arab states were, as late as 1968, obliged to send 15 and 19 per cent, respectively, of their students abroad for university-level education. It is evident then, that many of the smaller and poorer nations

are heavily dependent in this respect.

> The dependency is all the more obvious if we examine particular fields, especially the scientific and technical. For most of the youths from the advantaged countries the act of going abroad is an indulgence; they usually could do as well at home. For comparable students from the less developed countries going abroad may be an absolute necessity--the only way to obtain the desired training. This is reflected in the distribution of specialities chosen by students studying abroad. In 1966 almost two-thirds of all North Americans studying abroad took "arts" subjects, whereas some 55 per cent of students from the developing countries were studying the more applied and critical fields of science, engineering, medicine, and agriculture. The dependence is even more evident when we consider the contribution which study abroad makes to the supply of critically needed specialists in the composition of their respective professions in certain countries. Thus, in 1966 some 28 per cent of Africa's science students were obtaining their training abroad, as against a mere .3 per cent of North American students of science seeking <u>their</u> training abroad. (pp. 487-488)

<u>Integration</u>. While there probably has been no substantial increase in the overall level of integration at the global level, increased integration has occurred at regional levels in respect to economies. This is particularly true of Europe with the development of the European Common Market. Regional economic integration has also increased in Africa and Latin America, but not to the same degree or extent as in the case of western Europe.

<u>Hegemony</u>. There is no question that western hegemony has been the dominating theme of much of modern world history. Never before in world history did people from one part of the planet dominate so extensively the political, economic, and cultural life of the rest of the planet. As Arnold Toynbee observes of the modern era:

> In the encounter between the world and the West that has been going on by now for four or five hundred years, the world, not the West, is the party that, up to now, has had the significant experience. It has not been the West that has been hit by the world; it is the world that has been hit--and hit hard--by the West.

Theodore H. Von Laue (1969) vividly captures the character of western hegemony in the use of a simile. He writes:

> The magnitude of western ascendancy and the flood tide of its revolutionary consequences can perhaps best be visualized by a simile that grasps in one bold image the massive flow of global power in recent world history and at the same time helps to clarify some of the ambiguities afflicting the term "westernization." Let us think then of the West as a conelike volcano which spouts forth, in a continuous fiery outpouring, an endless variety of cultural achievements which spread, by a peculiar gravity of their own, downslope into the lower regions along its base, transforming all cultures and ways of life that lie in their path according to their own image. Over the decades and centuries the volume and intensity of the outpouring from the summit have risen and fallen; yet the outflow has never yet ceased. On the slopes the older deposits that have blended into the local scene are constantly overlaid by new ones, regardless of the obstacles put in their path. Traditional ways, earlier forms of westernization, and the most up-to-date imports exist side by side in dissonance and tension.
>
> The cultural volcano . . . has been erupting for centuries, sending its essence out to the fringes of Europe, to the littoral of other continents, and into the "new world" of the western hemisphere. Its overtowering global height, however, was not established until the late nineteenth century. While looking both forward and back in time, let us here concentrate on the Great Outpouring of the quarter century before the First World War when the gigantic capacity of this volcano was first revealed, when it first covered the globe with its unifying crust. The changes that have occurred since cannot be understood without reference to that age. At the same time, however, we must recognize that the process of eruption and dispersion is still very much at work. (pp. 67-68)

There is considerable debate as to whether the era of western hegemony has ended, or at least is ending. Some scholars argue that 1914 marked the beginning of the end of western hegemony and that the dominating theme of the Twentieth Century is the progressive decline of the west and the restoration of the autonomy of the non-west. Others argue that such is not the case. Western hegemony has in the middle and late Twentieth Century changed its face and assumed more subtle forms. Old forms of colonization and imperialism have disappeared only to be replaced by neo-colonialism and imperialism without colonies to cite the labels that are often used in describing a continuing western hegemony.

I do not want here to take sides in this debate if only for the reason that I suspect the only people who can resolve the issue will be the historians of the late Twenty-First Century. Nor is a resolution of the issue critical to my line of argument. Regardless of whether it is receding or continuing unabated, the fact is that never before in history have intersocietal relations been structured by the scale and degree of hegemony that has characterized the relations of the West to the rest of the world in modern history.

Summary. In the last several pages I have been discussing the growing interrelatedness of societies. Using a set of indicators borrowed from Alex Inkeles I have argued that increasing interrelatedness among the world's national societies is evidenced in six ways:

1. In the modern era ecological and cultural autarky has been declining to the point where autarky is virtually nonexistent.

2. In the modern era and particularly within recent contemporary history interconnectedness among societies has been growing very rapidly.

3. In the modern era and particularly within recent history interdependencies among societies have been increasing.

4. In the modern era and particularly within contemporary history intersocietal dependence has been increasing.

5. In recent history some degree of increased integration is evidenced at regional levels.

6. In the modern era and particularly within contemporary history a historically unprecedented degree of hegemony has characterized intersocietal relations.

The reason for reviewing these sociological developments relates to the central thesis of this section of the paper; namely, a global culture is emerging. Increasing interrelatedness, I have argued, is one of two historical processes producing a global culture. The other process I have characterized as increasing cultural congruence among societies. It is to this matter that I now turn.

Increasing Cultural Congruence Among Societies

As the level of societal interrelatedness increases rates of cultural diffusion between societies also increase. The hegemonic status of the west in modern history has meant that during this era the diffusion of elements of European culture to the rest of the world has been particularly extensive and rapid. F.L.K. Hsu as well as many other scholars, argues that the dynamics of the diffusion of western culture lie both in the imperialism of a previous era and reactions against imperialism in more recent times. To cope with western intrusion the

non-west has been forced to imitate the west. Hsu (1953) writes:

> The western world is today the arbiter of mankind's fate. It is paradoxical but true that the reaction against Western physical domination has gone far to complete the conquest of the world by Western culture. To ensure its own survival the rest of the world has been obliged to imitate the West. It is Western methods, beliefs and goals that have been accepted and utilized to combat Western control.

And what has diffused from the west? L. S. Stavrianos (1971) has developed a very useful answer to this question. He argues that during the modern historical era Europe went through three great revolutions--the Industrial, the scientific, and the political. Western expansion coupled with reactions against western expansion, Stavrianos argues, served to diffuse these three great revolutions to the rest of the world.

> The Industrial Revolution spread in the nineteenth century from England to Europe and the United States, and in the first half of the twentieth century to Japan and the British Dominions. Following World War II, this diffusion accelerated rapidly. As each new country became independent, its first and foremost task was to promote economic development. All over the world a wide assortment of economic plans was being formulated and implemented, with varying degrees of success. . . .
>
> Science also spread rapidly from Europe, and, indeed, has become the one body of knowledge that all peoples have been anxious to acquire. Its objective methodology has made it acceptable to non-Western peoples who, by contrast, may not be interested in European art or religion or philosophy. Science has been eagerly sought after also because it constitutes the basis for advance in technology and general economic development. Thus, Europe has lost its monopoly on science; in the mid-sixties, more scientific work was being done in the United States and the Soviet Union than in any Western European country. By 1970, the United States had won 81 Nobel Prizes in science, as against 7 and 6 respectively for the nearest rivals, Britain and Germany.

The scientific revolution also has begun to make itself felt in non-Western countries, though the obstacles here have been formidable because of the interrelatedness of science and industry. While it is true that research in pure science can be undertaken independently of industry, the development of scientific discoveries depends upon a considerable industrial base. Even if a scientist has mastered the theory of breaking up the atom and has evolved a technical process for doing so, the production of atomic energy could only be undertaken by a society with large financial and industrial resources. Consequently, advanced scientific work is possible only in an advanced industrial country.

Many of the new Afro-Asian states have been trapped in this vicious circle, so that even the most modest scientific progress has been virtually impossible in the poorer and least developed of the new countries. Others of them, however, have had the requisite material and human resources, and have utilized them to the utmost. This is especially true of the two giant states, India and China, which by 1964 had won one and two Nobel Prizes respectively in science. India began with the strongest base in science, for the British has established certain technical institutes, and, more important, the industrial magnate Jamshedji Tata had founded the Indian Institute of Science in 1905. The scale of operations has been expanded since the winning of independence, so that Indian science has begun to make significant contributions in various fields. This is also true of China, where the government, like most Communist regimes, has allocated an extraordinary percentage of the national income to scientific research.

As significant as the formal plans and institutes for the advancement of science has been the gradual diffusion of scientific knowledge and practices among the masses of people in non-Western areas. . . .

Europe's third revolution, the political, also has been sweeping the entire globe. The most obvious manifestation of this political awakening has been the burgeoning nationalism expressed in the colonial revolutions and the end of empires . . . . But nationalism has by no means been the only wind blowing from the West. A variety of other isms have been enveloping the globe, including constitutionalism, communism, socialism, and military authoritarianism. The first of these enjoyed a brief vogue with the wave of democratic enthusiasm immediately after World War II. In country after country, however, the parliamentary regimes succumbed to military dictatorships or to Marxist, one-party rule. This trend, it should be noted, also had ample precedent in

> Europe. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, every country in Central and Eastern Europe was by 1939 under one form or another of authoritarian government. Nasser, Sukarno, and General Ne Win had their counterparts in Stojadinović, Metaxas, and Marshal Pilsudski. In both cases, corrupt and ineffective parliamentary systems together with the lack of the necessary economic and social foundations led to the imposition of dictatorial rule.
>
> Despite the variety of institutional forms, all the new countries have had one common political characteristic: the gradual awakening and activization of the masses regardless of whether they were participating formally in their governments. This is the essence of the political revolution--the passing of the age-old concept of a divinely ordained division of humanity into rulers and ruled. In more general terms, it means replacing the isolation, ignorance, and acquiescence of traditionalism with the participation, knowledge, and initiative of modernism. (pp. 646-649)

To dwell solely on the diffusion of western culture is to understahd only part of the process that is leading to increased cultural convergence. While western culture is widely and extensively diffused throughout the world, it has by no means eradicated non-western cultures. Our time in history is not simply an era of western dominance. It is, as Theodore Von Laue (1969) says, "the age of the Great Confluences." He notes:

> All cultures, all diverse ways of life developed locally, regionally, or continentally, hardened by time over hundreds and even thousands of years, bred into the faces of men and dyed into their very skins, are now thrust together in an inescapable . . . interaction . . . . (p. 17)

Thus, there has developed a kind of world wide cultural market. Western men have dominated much of this market place but they have never monopolized it. Hence the west is buying from the non-west as well

as the other way around. Indeed, the rate of cultural exchange between East and West and between South and North is increasing.

The effect of massive and rapid cultural diffusion (both one way and multilateral) is to reduce cultural differences between societies at the same time cultural differences within societies increase, thus, resulting in a significant structural change in cultural variability. Charlotte Anderson (1976) illustrates the point very well:

> When cultural entities are exchanged on a global scale, each nation-state has access to a vast storehouse of human invention. Each nation-state that enters the exchange system adds to the resources from which all other nation-states draw. As each nation expands the scope of its exchange, the globally accessible resources expand for other nation-states as well as for itself. Since all are drawing upon the same universe, the cultural variety within any one nation increases while the difference between it and other nations decrease. The system can, perhaps, best be illustrated diagramatically:



> The diagrams symbolize the entire nation-state system, the entire world. The four large circles represent nation-states. The symbols within represent one type of cultural artifact, e.g., church, language, role, etc.
>
> At T_1 no diffusion has occurred, at T_2 optimum diffusion has occurred. From T_1 to T_2 we see two things happen: (1) a decrease in the variation between nation-states and (2) an increase in the variation within individual nation-states. At T_1 all the variation is accounted for by between group variation. At T_2 all the variation is accounted for by within group variation. Of course both of these conditions are

> ideal constructs which do not necessarily represent empirical reality. However, the data available on cross-national interaction supports the hypothesis that while the classical nation-state system more nearly fits the conditions of T_1, the global system today more closely resembles the conditions represented in T_2. (pp. 37-38)

This process of decreasing cultural variability between societies and increasing cultural variability within societies appears to result in increasing cultural congruence. This is a process through which initially divergent cultural forms change and as they change converge toward a more common form. Alex Inkeles (1975) has examined five possible areas of cultural convergence in the modern world and reaches these conclusions:

(1) Modes of production and patterns of resource allocation. There is an increasing dependence of all societies on inanimate power, resting on technology and applied science. The technologies of industrial societies are quite distinct from one another. And as the trend is toward industrialization, the technologies of more and more nations are conforming to this model.

(2) Institutional arrays, forms, and processes. There is a standard array of institutional structures associated with this technological development. We are seeing within these institutions what Inkeles calls bureaucratization and the rationalization of administration. He concludes that the world is being cast in this mold.

(3) Structure and patterns of social relationships. Inkeles writes, "Substantial and rather convincing documentation is available in-

dicating that worldwide family patterns are converging on a norm common to urban-industrial socities. There is equally extensive evidence to sustain the argument that the stratification systems of all large-scale complex societies have come to resemble each other in substantial ways. Although the facts are less well documented, a case can probably also be made for convergence in the use of leisure within comparable segments of urban-industrial societies" (p. 491).

Here Inkeles makes the point that not all social structures do or will come to conform to a common standard but that there is definitely convergence in some elements of what he terms "the cultural system."

(4) Systems of popular attitudes, values, and behavior. Inkeles (1975) refers to his study reported in Becoming Modern for evidence that certain psychological and behavioral characteristics of people in industrial societies are converging. He writes, "...I was able to demonstrate, quite unambiguously, I believe, that in six quite diverse developing nations each increment of increasing contact with modern institutions moved men a corresponding degree along a composite scale of modern attitudes and values. I read this evidence as arguing strongly that, as human life experience becomes more alike, attitudes, values, and basic dispositions will also become more alike" (p. 492). Once again Inkeles cautions that he does not suggest that people will converge on all dimensions of their psychic life -- just those directly associated with the industrial organizational complex.

(5) Systems of political and economic control. Inkeles is less certain about patterns of convergence in this final category. Will governments become more democratic and less autocratic or more autocratic? Will the Soviet and American systems converge? What does the divergence of Chinese from Soviet ideological interpretation of Marxism suggest? He raises more questions than he provides answers. However, he does make the point that throughout the nation-state system one can see "the growing power of the state to control the lives of its citizens."*

V

The Making of a Global Culture

The elements of the argument I have been developing over the past several pages needs now to be put together. I have argued that:

1. There currently exists a global culture.

2. The creation of a global culture is the result of two historical processes characteristic of the modern era and particularly of contemporary time. These are:
   (a) increasing interrelatedness between societies and
   (b) increasing cultural congruence among societies.

Now let me indicate how these two processes serve to globalize human

---

*General support for Inkeles' conclusion about cultural convergence in the modern world is found in a variety of social science research. Some relevant discussions of this matter are: John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967; Wilbert E. Moore, Order and Change: Essays in Comparative Sociology, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967; Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, particularly pp 82-88; Carle C. Zimmerman, "Convergence of the Major Human Family Systems During the Space Age," in Edward A. Tiryakian, editor, Sociological Theory, Values and Socio-Cultural Change, New York: Harper and Row, 1957; Arnold S. Feldman and Wilbert E. Moore, "Are Industrial Societies Becoming Alike?" in Alvin W. Gouldner and S. M. Miller, editors, Applied Sociology, New York: Glencoe Free Press, 1965, pp. 260-265.

culture. Imagine that in 1500 the cultural map of the world looked like the following.

The World



A...L = world cultures

The earth's surface is divided into N number of territorial units. (1) Each unit has one culture and one culture only. (2) The culture of any one unit is different from the culture of any other unit. (3) There is no culture shared by all units. This, of course, is a gross oversimplification of the cultural universe of 1500. For one thing, it ignores the millennia old pattern of cultural interaction in Eurasia. On the other hand, it is not a completely false or misleading representation of the global organization of human culture in 1500.

Increasing interrelatedness between societies and increasing congruence among societies has altered the cultural map of the world in three ways. First, increasing interconnectedness creates within the structure of human culture a dimension of shared culture. Second, increasing congruence creates within the structure of human culture domains of common culture. Let me indicate what I have in mind by

shared vs. common culture with a couple of illustrations. My neighbor and I have identical cars, but he does not use my car nor do I use his. On the other hand when he goes to Chicago, he uses the elevated train and when I go to Chicago I also use the elevated train. Our cars are common technology and the elevated train is a shared technology. The Soviet Union and the U.S. have highly similar missile technologies, but these are not shared (as far as I know!). In contrast, the hot line between Moscow and Washington is a shared technology.

Taken collectively dimensions of shared culture and domains of common culture constitute a world or global culture. The four components of culture that I distinguished earlier--technologies, social institutions, languages, and beliefs--are elements of a global culture when they meet two criteria:

1. They "belong" to the human species in the sense that their use is not owned or controlled by one territorial sub-group.
2. They are diffused on a global scale.

Take as an example of global technology the technology of air travel. While it is true that particular individuals and groups own in an economic sense particular airplanes, hangers, and other tools comprising this technology, airline technology itself does not belong to the United States or Russia or Panama or any other nation. It is one item in a planetary tool shed. What is true of air travel technology is also true of most of the technologies of the modern world. Radio, television, computer, mining, agricultural, industrial, automotive, military technologies--to name but a few of many--are global

technologies.

Calculus, Fortran, traffic signs, rock music, classical music, cubist sculpture, meteorological symbols, the metric system are examples of global languages. And French, English and Spanish are examples of traditional languages that have become globalized.

There are many examples of global beliefs. The world of science abounds with them--germ theory of disease, the theory of relativity, the theory of evolution are obvious cases in point. Marxism, Christianity, Buddhism, a commitment to economic growth are examples of other kinds of belief systems that make up global culture.

The social institutions that make up global culture are as plentiful as technologies, languages, and beliefs. Here we can usefully make use of the distinction between shared and common culture. All the transnational organizations discussed earlier--IGOs, NGOs, multinationals, political movements--are shared social institutions. Social forms like bureaucracies, legislatures, courts, committees, and procedures like elections, representation, diplomatic negotiations are a few examples of many globally common institutions.

Let me return to the cultural map of 1500 presented earlier. Recall that the map depicts a world in which the earth's surface is divided into a number of territorial units and that:

1) Each unit has one culture and one culture only.

2) The culture of any one unit is different from the culture of any other unit.

3) There is no culture shared by all of the units.

So far I have noted that the growth of a global culture has transformed the world's cultural map in two ways. The growth of shared culture changes the third principle noted above. There are now elements of culture shared by all societies. The growth of common culture alters the second principle. Now the culture of every society has some elements in common with the culture of all other societies.

We now come to a final point about the emergence of a global culture, and a very critical one. The first principle noted above reads: Each unit has one culture and one culture only. The emergence of a global culture has dramatically altered this principle of Sixteenth Century cultural geography just as it has the other two principles.

You may recall that I argued when I first introduced the notion of a global culture that the culture surrounding most people in the modern world is a global culture. I contrasted the structure of culture in the contemporary world with the structure of culture in the era in which my fictional Uncle Lief lived in the following way.



Recall that I also noted that this depiction of the contemporary cultural universe was grossly oversimplified and hence seriously distorted reality. Let me try now to correct this distortion. To do this, two points need to be stressed.

First, to say that most human beings in contemporary times live out their lives in the context of a global culture is not to say that global culture is the only cultural system in which we live. In biological evolution change is more a process of accretion than displacement. For example, I do not cease to be a vertebrate because somewhere way back my genetic ancestors also became mammalian. Nor do I cease to be a mammal because somewhere in the more recent past my genetic ancestors became primates, and so on. The development of human culture would appear to be governed by somewhat similar laws of change. The new adds on to, and sometimes transforms the old, but it does not completely replace what has come before. Thus, the cultural universe in which we live is structurally very complex.

Unfortunately, we have no entirely satisfactory way of conceptually mapping this complexity. The most commonly used conceptual maps portray the cultural universe of the contemporary era in terms of some kind of dualism. On the one hand, there is global culture and on the other hand local, national, provincial, or traditional cultures. Let's look at three recent efforts to characterize the structure of contemporary culture.

Kenneth Boulding has developed a conceptual map built around

the idea of systems. He talks about "the separation out in the world of two cultural systems, the super-culture on the one hand, and traditional culture on the other hand" (Boulding, 1969).

> It is hardly too much to say that all the major problems of the world today revolve around the tension between these two cultural systems. The superculture is the culture of airports, throughways, skyscrapers, hybrid corn and artificial fertilizers, birth control, and universities. It is worldwide in its scope; in a very real sense all airports are the same airport, all universities the same university. It even has a world language, technical English, and a common ideology, science.
>
> Side by side with the superculture, and interpenetrating it at many points, are the various folk cultures, national, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and so on. The tensions between the superculture and traditional cultures are felt at a great many points. We see it, for instance, in the international system, where the superculture has given the traditional cultures of the national states appalling powers of destruction which are threatening the whole future of man. We see it in race relations, where the superculture moves towards uniformity, the absence of discrimination, and differentiation by roles rather than by race or class or other ascribed category. We see it in education, where formal education tends increasingly to become the agent of transmission of the superculture, leaving the transmission of folk culture to the family, the peer group, and more informal organizations. We see it in religion, where the superculture tends towards the secular and traditional culture preserves the sacred.
>
> At a great many points, these tensions between the superculture and traditional cultures produce challenges to traditional values and even disintegration of these values. Family loyalties are replaced by loyalties to larger and more abstract entities; national loyalties are eroded by inconsistencies between the national state and the world order which the supercultural requires; religious loyalties are eroded by new views of man and the universe; political loyalties are eroded by new images of the social system arising out of social sciences.
>
> The picture, however, is not merely one of constant retreat and erosion of traditional values in the face of the superculture. There is also the transformation and regeneration of traditional values under the impact of the superculture. A strong case can be made,,indeed, for the proposition that the superculture itself does not generate the values and preferences which will support it. . . .

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

As an integrative system, the superculture is really very weak. Fellow scientists kill each other in national wars almost as enthusiastically as co-religionists. Scientists have not raised money very much to help other scientists, and while they have a certain sense of occupational community, this does not usually go much beyond the rather tenuous bond of the professional association. People die for their countries, even for their faith, but very few people have died for biochemistry. Up to now at any rate, therefore, the ethical values of mankind on the whole have arisen out of the traditional cultures rather than out of the superculture. There is something to be said for the proposition, indeed, that it is only countries which have strong traditional cultures and as a result strong ethical systems which are able to create or adapt to the superculture, and that where the traditional culture is weak, the society will have great difficulty in making adjustments to the superculture. . . .

From the point of view of this paper, communism is a curious phenomenon which represents on the one hand a vehicle for bringing traditional societies into the superculture and which expresses many of the values of the superculture, such as education, equality of status for women, the abolition of castes, and so on. On the other hand, ideologically it represents what is really a prescientific view of society, and it results in a curious fixation of the socialist countries on the attitudes and ideologies of the nineteenth century. Ideologically it is a kind of folk science lying somewhere between an unsophisticated folk image of society on the one hand and empirically based scientific concepts on the other. At certain points, therefore, it may assist, and at other points it may hinder the transition and adaptation of a society to the superculture.

The inability of the superculture to produce adequate values of its own and the adaptability of certain aspects of traditional culture is reflected strongly in the continuing strength of the religious institution in the developed societies. This is nowhere more striking than in the United States, which is at the same time perhaps the furthest advanced towards the superculture and yet is also a society whose history has been characterized by the rise of the numerical strength and power of the churches. What we seem to face in the future, therefore, is a very complex set of mutual adjustments, in which an adapted traditional culture transmitted in the family, the peer group, and the church will create ethical values and preferences which are consistent with the world superculture. If the superculture simply destroys the traditional culture in which it is embedded, it may easily destroy itself. On the other hand, if the traditional culture does not adapt to the superculture, it too may destroy itself. This is a precarious balance, and not all societies may achieve

it. The costs of a failure to achieve it, however, are very high, and there is a great need, therefore, for widespread self-consciousness about the nature of the problem, and a willingness to put resources into solving it. (pp. 347-50)

Robert Harper has developed a conceptual map of the cultural universe using the concept of "man-earth equation" (Harper, 1969).

> Our world today is made up of two very different equations for human life on the earth: (1) the traditional locally-based culture which depends primarily on the knowhow of a particular small group out of the total population of the earth and on the resources of a time fragment of the full earth environment, and (2) the new worldwide interconnected system that draws on the resources of parts of the whole varied earth and, we might add, is building its own distinctive culture by incorporating bits and pieces from the many different culture areas that it touches, even though its European origins appear to be still dominant. . . .
>
> Surely the two systems impinge upon one another. As we have noted, no primarily locally-based community is completely isolated from contacts with the worldwide-interconnected network. Someone from the interconnected system -- doctor, missionary, scientists, or tax collector -- has entered the community. Eskimos drink tea and carry firearms; primitive Africans raise cotton to sell, or leave the village to work in mines. All of the centers of the worldwide network, not only have contacts today with some fundamentally locally-based communities, but, in fact, have developed out of locally-based communities of the past. Thus, they carry vestiges of locally-based values in their culture -- political and social ideas, thoughts about what is 'right' and 'wrong,' about God, about what to eat. The fact that we tend to teach social sciences emphasizing the 'cultures of the world' approach, rather than of the two models of human life, is an indication of our locally-based tradition, as is our view of a political state necesarily covering contiguous territory and expecting the primary loyalty of all peoples within that territory.
>
> It can be said that social scientists have recognized the two different systems and already deal with them. We regularly talk of 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' areas, sometimes using other terms such as 'industrial and nonindustrial' or 'technologically advanced and technologically less advanced.' But such a division tends to follow the old mosaic tile approach, separating the world into really homogenous pieces.

The point is that the two different systems are not found side-by-side in the traditional mosaic patterns; rather, the interconnected network has spread over the mosaic touching down in particular points, but not in others. Thus, in any given part of the earth one can find the two different systems in close juxtaposition. In the Congo, most people may still live in the locally-based system focused on their own piece of earth real-estate, but Leopoldville is a city with regular communication and traffic with the worldwide network as are the Katanga copper region and other producing areas. Mexico is both Mexico City, with its rather important position in the interconnected world, and the Indian village, that is only peripherally tied to the world beyond walking distance from the village. In the United States, at first glance, the whole country might be considered part of the interconenected network, but what about the Navajos or even the rural European stock in parts of Appalachia or the Ozarks?

It may appear that the two systems have been largely defined in economic terms. This is because the problem has been seen particularly in terms of two different solutions to the problem of how to live in this world and living depends first of all upon a system of economic sustenance. But the two systems, as we know, in reality touch on all aspects of man's life. This is easy to see in the locally-based model. There the social group has been largely isolated, so it has had to work out all of the questions of life: what to eat, what to wear, what is right, what is the meaning of life, and all the rest. The easiest index to the problem of isolation is language, where each group in its isolation had to develop its own words for objects common to other cultures.

But, the worldwide interconnected system, too, is more than just an economic system. Language problems must be resolved and there is developing something of a common culture within the system. Interest in jazz in communities throughout the system, or in miniskirts, or in zen or yogi is evidence of this.

Paul Bohannan has devised a conceptual map of the cultural universe using the concept of level (Bohannan, 1973).

Young people today, like almost everyone else, live in a two-story culture. There is a large-scale culture, which is shared by much of the world. It has many versions -- such as the varieties of democracy, the varieties of communism, and the varieties of third-world socialism -- but all these versions

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

interlock into an international, world-wide, large-scale culture.

There is, at the same time, a small-scale world of family and community, mediated by common interest, sympathy, and trust in face-to-face relationships. The many varieties of small-scale culture need not be in touch; they are many worlds, some of them quite isolated from the others. Whether they be tribal, peasant, or urban, they can operate quite independently of one another -- so long as they coexist with some version of the large-scale culture, or macroculture.

In differing degrees most of us today live in both the macroculture and in one or many microcultures. All of these cultures may be more or less in or out of phase with one another and with the over-all state of the world.

Certainly both the large-scale and the small-scale world have become complicated: the first by sheer size, the second by sheer variety. We must, all of us, learn to deal with the large-scale culture; we may not seek active participation, but we cannot ignore it. We must also deal with the fact that most people today, at least those who live in industrialized society, belong to many small intimate groups or special interest groups, and that these groups are no longer space-bound territorial groups and hence not 'local' cultures. So, although a two-part culture is not new, it has been developed to a degree of complexity that demands intricately programmed and self-aware people to live in it with pleasure or even to survive in it.

The large-scale culture -- the upstairs culture -- is about power. All the versions of the macroculture are interconnected. Men -- and increasingly women -- meet in the market place and the polling place, at the conference table and on the battlefield. The political and economic tasks carried on in the macroculture demand large-scale organization to deal with larger groups of people than the world has ever before known.

The small-scale cultures -- the microcultures "downstairs" -- are about love and trust, or else about special interests like chess, sewing, divorce, or boats. They are <u>not</u> connected -- or rather, they are interconnected only by individuals who participate in several of them. They are not interconnected by institutions in which each is a recognizable entity; they do not form parts of any whole. Some are based on religion, some on propinquity, some on a shared technology. Some small-scale cultures are exclusively about race or ethnicity. But today even more are based on the choice or subscription of individuals, and are in that sense 'voluntary.' The basis for the choice may be rock music and pot or it may be Masonic ritual.

Although the small groups with their microcultures all share a realm of culture -- intimacy and security -- they <u>are not</u> all versions of the same thing in the way the various versions of

the macroculture are all versions of the same thing. One microculture is not, by and large, necessary in determining the shape and content of another. They can go on without each other. But the various versions of the macroculture are closely interrelated, and all have a common interest in a scarce commodity -- power.

Obviously, we not only have both the macroculture and many microcultures, but we need both. Consumption aside, the economic and political tasks cannot be done by small-scale groups; welfare aside, providing care, intimacy, and relaxation cannot be done by large-scale groups.

Complaints of minorities are not about the existence of the macroculture, per se, but rather about the fact that some of the people who are most powerful in the macroculture fail to distinguish the values of that macroculture from the values of microcultures. Television, as a medium, is a part of the macroculture; but its programming reflects only a very few of the American microcultures, which is what the other microcultures complain about.

The respective conceptualizations of Boulding, Harper and Bohannan might be diagramatically represented in the following ways.

Boulding



Harper



Bohannan



Micro-Cultures

Each of these images have their respective strengths in helping to understand the structure of the cultural universe in the contemporary era. Boulding's image highlights the fact that this universe has a temporal dimension and at those points in time when the new emergent superculture and inherited traditional cultures intersect tension is created. Harper's image highlights the fact that the cultural universe has a territorial dimension, and that every square mile of the earth's surface is not equally affected by the global culture. Bohannan's image highlights the fact that the cultural universe has a social dimension, and that people move back and forth between different social settings some of which are more deeply enmeshed in the global macroculture than are other settings.

In my judgment all of these images are useful in helping make sense out of the world as we experience it. For example, there are many "time points" in my life space when I feel the tension of living simultaneously in a global superculture and local traditional cultures. Similarly, it takes only a few minutes after arriving in a small rural area in Missouri where one of my sisters lives to realize that I, as a resident of one of the world's big cities, am more enmeshed in a global culture than is my sister. Moreover, when I am sitting in my living room quietly relishing the beauty of my daughter, I am less involved in global culture than when I am sitting in my office at a university arguing with a student from Nigeria about the power of Marxism as an explanation of U.S. imperialism.

Thus, what we need is a three-dimensional map of the cultural universe that would enable us to simultaneously visualize that: (1) everyone on all parts of the earth is not equally involved in global culture, (2) there are periods of time in which each of us is involved in global culture more than at other times, and (3) each of us moves among different social settings some of which involve us in global culture more than others. Unhappily, as far as I know, no one has yet developed such a three-dimensional map of the cocoon of culture in which we live. But it is precisely this kind of map that we need if we are to comprehend the structure of the multilevel cultural universe in which today's four billion human beings live out their lives.

Implicit in the foregoing discussion is another correction that needs to be made when speaking of a global culture. Global culture is not an entirely uniform and homogenized mass. Millennia old cultural diversity interacts with recently imposed cultural uniformities to produce a global culture with regional, national, and local variants. This is diagramatically depicted by D. P. Singhal (1969) in his outstanding study of India's place in world civilization.



Singhal writes:

> If the evolution of world-civilization could be reduced to a simple graphic illustration, the above symbol would perhaps be an accurate representation. The symbol's base is a solid figure, a pyramid, representing the community of those early cultures in which man sought to solve the problems of his environment. From the top of the pyramid spring divergent branches, bending first away from each other and then back again to form a new conjunction in modern times. These branches represent the diffusion of cultures and their later gradual reunification by new scientific and technological advances. Between these branches, even at their point of greatest dissociation, run slender criss-cross filaments linking them together, and representing the various ideas and skills which the civilizations of the world continued to borrow from one another throughout history. After the branches rejoin a cluster of divergent radians appear, representing the many unique developments which have resulted from the new cross-fertilisation of cultures, reaching out towards the future. (pp. xiii-xiv)

Industrialization is a world wide force, but Japanese factories differ from Soviet, American, and Nigerian factories. Mechanization of agriculture is taking place everywhere, but an American family farm is different from an Israeli agricultural kibbutz, which in turn is different from a Soviet collective farm. Students of comparative politics often note the role played by distinctive national histories in producing specific variations in forms taken by such phenomena as representative democracy, bureaucratic decision making, and authoritarianism in the contemporary world.

Internation variations in culture may seem large when looked at from a cross sectional perspective at one point in time. However, when looked at from a longitudinal perspective these internation variations often turn out to be minor compared to the magnitude of historical discontinuities. In this connection L. S. Stavrianos (1971) quotes an observation of Jaroslav Prusek, an eminent sinologist, "all new Asian literatures have closer affinities with world literature of today than with their own literatures [of the past]". Stavrianos goes on to note:

> The same basic point can be made about developments in other fields. Modern American and Russian farmers operate their lands in very different ways, yet their practices and ways of living have more in common between them than either have with their forefathers on their respective frontiers. In political matters the institutional forms vary widely, and yet, as noted above, all countries share the awakening and activization of the masses, regardless of whether they are actually participating in their governments. Likewise, the spread of industrialization has led to varying forms of factory organization, but at the same time certain basic aspects of life have been uniformly affected, including acceptance of labor discipline,

gearing of life to the clock, discarding of traditional costume, and living in large urban concentrations.

It may be concluded that homogeneity indeed is taking place, though with regional variations reflecting the heterogeneity of cultural backgrounds. The global diffusion of Europe's three revolutions, though proceeding today under varying auspices, seems nevertheless to be creating at accelerating speed a world culture that will be uniform in basic characteristics, though diverse in detail. (p. 654)

VI

Summary

This chapter has been devoted to a discussion of the globalization of the human condition when viewed from a sociological/anthropological perspective. I have argued:

1. There currently exists a global culture.

2. The creation of a global culture is a result of two historical processes characteristic of the modern era and particularly of contemporary history. These are (a) increasing interrelatedness between societies and (b) increasing cultural congruence among societies.

3. Increasing interrelatedness between societies is evidenced in six ways: (a) decreasing autarky, (b) increasing interconnectedness, (c) increasing interdependence, (d) increasing dependence, (e) increasing regional economic integration, and (f) a history of western hegemony.

4. Increasing cultural congruence among societies is evidenced in cultural convergence in respect to: (a) modes of production and patterns of resource allocation, (b) institutional arrays, forms, and processes, (c) structures and patterns of social relationships, (d) systems of popular attitudes, values, and beliefs, and (e) systems of political and economic control.

5. Increasing interrelatedness combined with increasing cultural congruence serves to globalize human culture by creating dimensions of shared culture and domains of common culture.

Together these dimensions of shared and domains of common culture constitute a global culture.

6. The emergence of a common global culture does not eradicate all of traditionally diverse regional, national, and local cultures. Rather the development of a global culture creates a structurally complex cultural system in which global culture co-exists in uneasy relationship to traditional, local and microcultures.

7. Global culture evidences regional, national and local variations, but these variations are variants on a common theme.

CHAPTER NINE

THE WORLD AS A GLOBAL SOCIETY

I

Overview

In the last several chapters I have tried to do three things. First, I illustrated the global character of life in the contemporary world. Second, I provided a historical overview of the globalization of the human condition. Third, I examined this process from several different vantage points and argued that the history, the geography, the economics, the politics, and the sociology of the human condition have become progressively more globalized. In this chapter I shall try to pull these separate strands of argument together. What it all adds up to is the issue that concerns me here. Specifically, I will argue that the historical trends discussed in the past several chapters have created a global society. It is a society in an embryonic stage of development, but nonetheless it exists. Let me make clear what I am saying. I will not be arguing that a global society is a future possibility. To the contrary I argue that the existence of a global society is a current reality. Indeed, the existence of a global society has been a historical reality for some time. The birth process began in the Sixteenth Century and has been painfully underway since then. As Etienne Wilson says of our time in history:

> The throes of the contemporary world are those of a birth. And what is being born with such great pain is a universal

> human society. . . . What characterizes the events we witness, what distinguishes them from all preceding events back to the origins of history is . . . their global character.

II

A Rationale for Viewing the World as a Global Society

People across the face of the globe have become aware in some degree or another of the changes in the human condition that were discussed in the previous chapters. As Alex Inkeles (1975) observes:

> In the second half of the twentieth century, laymen and professional intellectuals alike have frequently expressed the sense that the relationship of all of us, all humankind, to each other and to our world, has been undergoing a series of profound changes. We seem to be living in one of those rare historical eras in which a progressive quantitative process becomes a qualitative transformation. Even when, in more sober moments, we recognize that we are yet far from being there, we have the unmistakable sense that we are definitely set off on some new trajectory, and that we are not merely launched but are already well along toward an only vaguely identified destination. The widespread diffusion of this sense of a new, emergent global interrelatedness is expressed in numerous ideas, slogans, and catchphrases which have wide currency, such as "world government," "the global village," "spaceship earth," "the biosphere," and the ubiquitous cartoon of a crowded globe with a lighted fuse protruding from one end, the whole labelled "the world population bomb." Although the pervasiveness of the response to this emergent situation certainly tells us that something is happening, its diversity highlights our confusion as to exactly what it is that is happening.

Inkeles is right. There is a good deal of confusion about what is happening to the modern world. There is no way to end once and for all this confusion, because its source lies deep in the profound transformation through which the human species is passing, and hence

it will take the historical perspective of future centuries to resolve the confusion and to perceive clearly what did happen to the world in the modern era. However, this fact does not satisfy one of humankind's most basic needs--the need for prophetic vision when caught up in times of crisis and turmoil. Theodore Von Laue (1969) correctly notes:

> There are times when the external framework of man's social existence is secure and he can put his energies into an ever more minute investigation of all that is within his reach. There are other times when the outward security has broken down and he must reset the basic coordinates of his existence. Ours is a time for returning to the unfamiliar and abstract superlatives of fundamentals, for opening up once more the prophetic dimension. (p. 17)

To argue that we can reduce some of the confusion of which Inkeles writes and render our age a bit more intelligible by viewing the world as a global society is to indulge in prophesy in the sense of putting forward a historical hypothesis that can be neither proved nor disproved in our lifetimes or even in the lifetimes of our children and grandchildren. But even though it is a hypothesis that submits to neither verification or disconfirmation, it still is a hypothesis for which a supporting rationale can be developed. What is that rationale? It consists of two lines of reasoning, one negative and the other positive.

The negative case on behalf of the claim that a global society exists is simple. The image of the world as a global society seems to be the single least defective of any of the prevailing alternative

images of the world. Clearly, the two major images that we have inherited from the past are seriously defective. One is the image that portrays the world as a collection of isolated geographical regions supporting separate and distinct cultures. For millennia this was a more or less accurate portrait of the world, but within the short time space of a few centuries this image has become progressively more inaccurate. To view the contemporary world this way obscures at least eighty per cent of reality and distorts the remaining twenty per cent.

The second of our inherited images is an image that portrays the world as a system of nation states. This image is better than the first in the sense that it partly captures the "systemness" characteristic of the world. But this image is far from adequate for the world system includes but is by no means confined to nation states interacting with one another.

In recent years several new images of the world have been added to our repertoire of traditional images. "Spaceship earth" is popular in some circles. But as several ecologists have pointed out, while useful, it is a misleading and excessively restrictive image of the world. For example, Miller (1975) argues that to liken earth to human-made spacecraft is an "upside-down" view of reality.

> We should be considering not how the earth is like a spaceship but how a spaceship is like the earth. On our man-made spaceships every natural function can be performed with the utmost deliberation and rigid control. There is little room for novelty, spontaneity, freedom, or most of the things that make life rich, vivid, and poignant. To survive on a man-made spaceship, everything must be programmed. Our lives would be managed and manipulated by experts, swathed in artificiality, and surrounded by gadetry. How would you like to spend your entire lifetime on such a voyage? (p. 38)

"Global Village" is another current image of the world. It, too, is useful in several respects but is likewise misleading. As L. S. Harms (1973) notes:

> The . . . world communication networks link the inhabitants of the earth together. Some say we are now members of a global village. More exactly, each of us who develops a world-view is a member of a global world and a local village. . . . The fact that we can be both global man and village man should not lead us to conclude we are global village men. (p. 22)

"World community" or "global community" are examples of still other currently popular images. Like "spaceship earth" and "global village" these images have their utility, but also their drawbacks. Charlotte Anderson (1976) has observed that,

> "community" suggests a oneness of purpose, of commitment to brotherhood. It is a normative term. While the goal of community of all peoples on earth may be quite acceptable to the majority of people, reality tells me it remains just that--something out there, not at hand. (p. 45)

In addition to all of these there are also images that make use of the term society. "International society" is one of these. This has a long lineage in international law and for this reason is a useful label in some respects, but for the same reason it is also a misleading label. It implies that the only actors in the world system are legally sovereign nation states. This is misleading and wrong.

In recent years many people have come to talk of the world as a "world society." Of the images reviewed to date this is the single

most useful one in my judgment, but it, too, suffers some defects. The adjective "world" fails to connote the total scope of the planetary environment. Historically, we have associated "world" with phrases describing subworlds, e.g., the "old world," the "new world," the "known world," the "third world" in contrast to the planet-wide world.

What is needed, it seems to me, is an image that is at once highly descriptive and heuristically powerful in the sense that it permits us to apply to the globe as a whole what we have learned about human social organization at the sub-global level. The image of the world as a global society seems to fit this bill. The use of the noun "society" points to an evolving social reality and the adjective "global" points to the planetary scale of this reality.

Is the evolving social reality to which I refer a society? For the world as a whole to be considered a society one must be able to answer affirmatively three questions. These are:

1) Is the world a system? If yes,

2) Is the world system a social system? If yes,

3) Is the world social system a society?

III

The World as a System

A system is broadly and minimally defined as any set of interrelated elements. Thus, we commonly call a furnace, a thermostat, and a mechanism for heat transfer, a heating system, indicating that these

three elements are functionally related to one another. Or we speak of a network of interconnected roads as a highway system or more broadly we refer to the totality of a society's interrelated institutions, technologies, and languages involved in transporting people and things through space as a transportation system.

Today there is widespread agreement that the world viewed as a totality is a system, albeit a vast, very complex, and little understood system. Robert Hanvey (1976) makes the point very well:

> How does the world work? It is a vast, whirring machine spinning ponderously around a small yellow sun? Is there a lever we can push to avert famine in South Asia, or one that will cure world inflation, or one to slow the growth of world population? Is it our ignorance of which levers to move that results in tragedy and crisis? Is it our ignorance of how the gears intermesh that causes breakdowns in the stability of the system?
>
> Or is the machine useful as a metaphor? Is it perhaps better to think of the world as an organism, evolving steadily in response to the programming in its germ plasm? Are wars and famines merely minor episodes in the biological history of a planet serenely following a script already written?
>
> The latter view is not a comfortable one for people in industrial societies, raised to believe that almost anything can be engineered, including the destiny of the world. But the machine image doesn't quite work, either, although we continue (as I have done) to speak of "mechanisms." The idea of a machine suggests an assembly of parts that interconnect in a very positive fashion, so positive that when you manipulate one part you get immediate, predictable, and quantifiable response in other parts. That does not seem to describe the world as we know it.
>
> But both machines and organisms are systems of interconnected elements and it is the idea of <u>system</u> that now prevails. How does the world work? As a system. (p. 13)

While there is widespread consensus that the world as a totality can be conceived of as a world system, there is no single, widely

accepted conceptual mapping of the world system. All of us have seen Sixteenth Century maps depicting the world as cartographers of the time understood it. The conceptual cartography of the world system is at this same comparable level of development. But we are beginning to make and to refine conceptual maps of the world system and that is a step forward. One of the most comprehensive and insightful of currently available cartography is a conceptual map of the world system developed by Kenneth and Elise Boulding (1977). They argue that:

> We can think of the earth . . . as a set of interacting systems, often called 'spheres' because of the shape of the planet. Thus, we have the 'geosphere' of inanimate matter, comprising the rocks ('lithosphere'), the water ('hydrosphere'), and the air ('atmosphere'). This we study in geology and physical geography. For at least three billion years there has been a biosphere, that is, a system of populations of living things, from the microscopic viruses to humans. This we study in biological sciences.
>
> With the development of humans another system begins to spread over the face of the globe, which we call the 'sociosphere.' This is the sphere of all human beings, their inputs, outputs, communications, knowledge, habits, organizations, and so on. Physiologically, of course, humans belong to the biosphere like any other form of life. Our capacity for knowledge, language, communication, and organization, however, goes so far beyond that of any other living creature that it has virtually created a new level of systems, as distinct from the biosphere as it is from the sphere of inanimate matter. . . .
>
> Just as we can distinguish within the geosphere the somewhat distinct spheres of the rocks, the water, and the air, so within the sociosphere we can distinguish certain subsystems. There is first of all the <u>sphere of knowledge</u> as it exists in all human minds in the form of structures within the human nervous system which correspond to some kind of images of the world. Our memories, our values, and our beliefs are all part of this sphere. It includes all human languages, all images of time, space, history, geography, rocks, crystals, and living creatures, ideas of cause and effect relationships, knowledge of other persons and social organizations, knowledge of a job, skills at work and at

play, and so on. The total of what is known by the human race is far larger than the contents of any one mind. Yet because of our capacity to communicate the sphere of knowledge does act as a total system, even though there may be some parts of it that may be relatively isolated. The great Jesuit philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, has called this system the Noosphere.

We can also distinguish the sphere of organizations -- families, governments, churches, corporations, and other such groups. These can be thought of as species, just as we have species of animals in the biosphere. Savings banks or communes are species in the sociosphere just as pack rats and gophers are species in the biosphere.

Another closely related sphere is the sphere of human artifacts -- buildings, roads, automobiles, commodities of all kinds, machines, books, libraries, farms, stocks of wheat, and the like. These, again, like organizations, are species of the sociosphere.

These three subsystems interact very closely with each other. The maintenance of the sphere of knowledge, for instance, depends on organizations such as schools, universities, and families, which transmit knowledge from one generation to the next. Knowledge is always disappearing through aging and death, and even if the sphere of knowledge is to be maintained in its present state, a great deal of activity and organization must go on to transmit knowledge from old minds into young ones. Artifacts such as books, libraries, computers, tapes, and school buildings are also very important in this process. Organizations depend so closely on the sphere of knowledge that it is hard to separate them, for organizations exist really only in people's minds. Something like the United States only exists because people believe that it does and act accordingly. Nobody any longer believes in the existence of Burgundy, which was a perfectly good country at one time, and so it no longer exists.

The sphere of artifacts, likewise, is very closely related both to the sphere of knowledge and to the sphere of organizations. All artifacts originate in some idea in the human mind. Capital, which is the economist's name for artifacts, consists essentially of human knowledge imposed on the physical world. Thus, without physics, chemistry, electronics, and the application of these in engineering, there could be no radios. The production of radios, however, also requires organization in manufacturing firms, wholesalers, and retailers. They could also probably not come into existence except on a very small scale without the existence of money, which enables us to exchange almost anything for almost anything else....

IV

The World as a Social System

Obviously not all systems are social systems. What of the world system? Is it a social system? Following the logic of the Bouldings a world social system can be said to be a component sub-system of the larger world as a planetary system. The world social system consists of that totality of human activity that the Bouldings call the sociosphere. As a result of the globalization of the human condition, we have reached a point in time when the only true social system on planet earth is the global sociosphere.

A social entity to be considered a social system must evidence two characteristics: (1) life in the system must be largely selfcontained and (2) the dynamics of development or change must be internal to the system. Using these criteria it is easy to see that only the global sociosphere is a true social system. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) notes, "most entities usually described as social systems--'tribes,' communities, nation-states--are not in fact total systems" (p. 348). The reasons why this is true are evident in the discussion of the past several chapters. With the possible exception of a few isolated "tribes" the two criteria enunciated above are not met in the contemporary world by any social entity at the sub-global level whether it be a community or a nation state.

One, no sub-global entity meets the test of self-sufficiency or self-containment. Two, no sub-global entity meets the test of change or development through dynamics that are exclusively or largely internal to the system. Samir Amin (1974) makes the point well:

> Apart from a few "ethnographical reserves," such as that of the Orinoco Indians, all contemporary societies are integrated into a world system. Not a single concrete socioeconomic formation of our time can be understood except as a part of this world system. (p. 3)

V

The World as a Society

Is the world social system a society? If we accept conventional definitions of society the answer to this question is logically derived from the concept of the world as a social system. Social scientists utilize varying definitions of society but the existence of self-sufficiency seems to be a common denominator in many definitions. For instance, Talcott Parsons (1951) defines a society in this way: "A social system . . . which meets all the essential functional prerequisites of long term persistence from within its own resources will be called a '<u>society</u>'" (p. 19). If all human associations were to be judged strictly by this definition, then one could make a good case that the only extant society on planet earth is global society.

But let's move beyond definitional argument and look at some basic indicators of the societal character of the contemporary world. Ecologically, all peoples have become dependent, albeit in varying

degrees, upon a global resource base. Moreover, we are beginning to experience at a global level a problem that throughout history has been experienced by the vast majority of all societies at the sub-global level. This is resource scarcity and a confrontation with the limits of growth. In the past some societies have successfully coped with these problems by expanding. Today there is no place to expand--at least in the forseeable future. Thus, the problem of scarcity that once was solved by global expansion must now be solved, if it is solved at all, through sub-global contraction.

What is true of us ecologically is also true of us socially. As the previous chapters make clear humankind is becoming ever more deeply enmeshed in a cobweb of global relationships. James Nathan (1975) provides a succint summary of many of the developments discussed in the last few chapters that are confering on the world a society like quality.

1. An expanding volume of worldwide trade and a dominance of the multinational corporation.

2. An expanding network of cross-national organizations and associations--fraternal, scientific and educational--that have developed a worldwide system of human interaction.

3. The inability to insulate domestic politics from foreign politics either within countries or between countries. Thus, the domestic politics of Arab nations or the Soviet Union can very much affect American relations with Russians.

4. The internationalization of social problems. The problems of survival, ecology, disease, scarce resources

and the like are not manageable by nations. International cooperation is also necessary to combat the universal problems of urbanization, population control and crime.

5. An expanding homogeneity in humankind's culture and social institutions. Mass society, its artifacts, management and appeal now seem global in scope. International norms of individual conduct and State conduct are also becoming more uniform.

6. The appearance of alliances and economic unions which have formed the infrastructure for unifying wider portions of the globe. The European Economic Community now negotiates with the OPEC or Arab States as if each were sovereign. Moreover, the Common Market has been seen by many as the prototype for a politically united Durope. Many see the same pattern for the Soviet bloc and Latin America. The world's regional and transregional groupings are diminishing the role of individual nation-states in many of its historic functions. (pp. 51-52)

Psychologically, we see evidence of the growth of a planetary or global consciousness. This represents a profound change in our perception of the world. Traditionally, the world has been perceived as an aggregation of disparate lands and peoples. Today a growing number of people are beginning to perceive the world as a single planetary system.

The growth of a global consciousness is manifest in many ways. It is manifest in documents such as the "Declaration of Interdependence" by Henry Steele Commager.

> When in the course of history the threat of extinction confronts mankind, it is necessary for the people of The United States to declare their interdependence with the people of all nations and to embrace those principles and build those institutions which will enable mankind to survive and civilization to flourish.
>
> Two centuries ago our forefathers brought forth a new nation; now we must join with others to bring forth a new world

order. On this historic occasion it is proper that the American people should reaffirm those principles on which the United States of America was founded, acknowledge the new crises which confront them, accept the new obligations which history imposes upon them, and set forth the causes which impel them to affirm before all peoples their commitment to a Declaration of Interdependence.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that the inequalities and injustices which afflict so much of the human race are the product of history and society, not of God or nature; that people everywhere are entitled to the blessings of life and liberty, peace and security and the realization of their full potential; that they have an inescapable moral obligation to preserve those rights for posterity; and that to achieve these ends all the peoples and nations of the globe should acknowledge their interdependence and join together to dedicate their minds and their hearts to the solution of those problems which threaten their survival.

To establish a new world order of compassion, peace, justice and security, it is essential that mankind free itself from the limitations of national prejudice, and acknowledge that the forces that unite it are incomparably deeper than those that divide it--that all people are part of one global community, dependent on one body of resources, bound together by the ties of a common humanity and associated in a common adventure on the planet Earth.

Let us then join together to vindicate and realize this great truth that mankind is one, and as one will nobly save or irreparably lose the heritage of thousands of years of civilization. And let us set forth the principles which should animate and inspire us if our civilization is to survive.

It's evidenced in the title and content of many new books: This Endangered Planet; Only One Earth; International Relations on the Planet Earth; The World System. It is manifest in the emergence of new symbols like "spaceship earth" and the "global village."

The source of this growing and deepening global consciousness are many and varied. Our everyday experiences with the increasing interconnectedness of the world is one source undoubtedly. Space exploration is another. On July 20, 1969, we actually saw for the first time in human

history that the earth is a small, round, and finite planet of infinite beauty. Our global awareness is fed also by the availability of information on the "state of the planet." The statistical reporting of governments and transnational organizations provides a constant flow of information about global patterns in such matters as population, urbanization, military spending, natural resource use, pollution, health, education, violence, and so on. Moreover, this kind of information when linked to computer technology allows us to construct models of the world and simulate alternative futures.

In sum, there are many empirical as well as conceptual reasons for viewing the world as a society. But this is not easy to do. For one thing, some people find it difficult to stretch our inherited conceptualization of "society" to incorporate the world system into its purview. This is not just a "layman's" difficulty. Many social scientists experience the same difficulty and are chastized by other social scientists for this. Mayhew, for example, in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) writes:

> ....The society is not the population but the complex systems of action in which the units of the population participate....
>
> Historically, conceptions of society have had ideological implications and overtones. Perhaps this conception of society as a set of overlapping process systems is not an exception for it seeks to call attention to the problems of the emergence of larger and more inclusive networks of social organization. As man has expanded his ecological niche there has been a continuous growth of national organization that transcends the less inclusive traditional solidarities. At the same time, cosmopolitan and international organization has outrun national boundaries.

> The modern world is regularly upset by shock waves reverberating from local traditional cleavages through national political systems, sometimes these shock waves reach the international arena. If sociological analysis is adequately to represent the constraints imposed by this emergent global level of social reality, its analytical conceptions must not be inflexibly tied to the concept of the national boundary. [emphasis mine] (p. 585)

Both laymen and social scientists seem to have at least two specific conceptual/perceptional/emotional difficulties in applying the concept of society to the world systems. Some people associate society with the presence of a centralized government. Therefore, if you believe that the world as a whole ought not have a central government and/or that there never will be a world government, then it is inaccurate to speak of a global society. I have argued previously that I think this argument rests on an excessively parochial conception of society and I continue to believe that (Lee Anderson, 1968).

> The fact that the societies we know best (Western nation-states) are characterized by elaborate and centralized legal and political systems does not mean that all societies must be so characterized any more than it follows that since some fruit is round in shape that all fruit must be round. Some of the societies we conventionally dub "primitive" are stateless societies; that is, they do not have centralized political systems.* But one need not go to exotic lands for examples of stateless systems. In many respects we can usefully think of metropolitan areas in the United States as societies, for they are certainly a more significant kind of social unit then many nation-states. For example, the societies of metropolitan New York or Chicago are stateless systems comprised of hundreds of legally sovereign municipalities, special districts, counties, unincorporated areas, etc., whose interaction is a matter of negotiation, bargaining, conflict and compromise not unlike the same social processes in the international arena.

---

*Relevant discussions include: John Middleton and David Tait, editors, Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958; Ralph W. Nicholas, "Segmentary Fractional Political Systems," in Marc J. Schwartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden, editors, Political Anthropology, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966, pp. 49-59.

A second difficulty lies in the fact that some people equate in their minds society and peace, and hence view any talk about global society as sentimental nonsense since it is patently clear that the world system is not a conflict-free, harmonious system. They are right in the latter regard.

Seyom Brown (1974) concludes his analysis of New Forces in World Politics by observing and probably correctly so:

> The forces now ascendant appear to be leading toward a global society without a dominant structure of cooperation and conflict -- a polyarchy in which nation-states, subnational groups, and transnational special interests and communities would be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals, and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting context of power relations. (p. 186)

VI.

Summary

This chapter has been devoted to an examination of what all the changes discussed in the preceding chapters add up to. I have said that no one knows for certain what the cumulative, overall impact of these changes is. But there is one particular historical hypothesis that seems to warrant very serious scrutiny. This hypothesis consists of the claim that the progressive historical globalization of the human condition has brought into being a human society on a planetary scale. I have briefly reviewed some of the conceptual arguments and empirical warrants that can be set forth in support of this claim.

PART THREE:

CHAPTER TEN

CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZEN COMPETENCE IN A GLOBAL AGE

I

Overview

The progressive globalization of the human condition has far-reaching implications for citizenship and citizen competence. This chapter is devoted to an examination of these implications. Specifically, I will be arguing that: The demands of citizenship in a global age call for the development of competencies that have not been traditionally emphasized by schools. This argument will be developed in the following way. First, I shall discuss the meaning of citizenship. Second, I will note four major ways in which citizenship is being altered by the globalizations of the human condition. Third, I will outline what appear to be the kinds of citizen competencies necessitated by the changing character of citizenship in a global era.

II

The Meaning of Citizenship

Citizenship refers to the decisions, the judgments, and the actions through which individuals link themselves--knowingly or unknowingly, deliberately and inadvertently--to the public affairs of the groups of which they are members.* There are five elements of this formulation that need to be remarked upon.

---

*This conception of citizenship is adopted from Rosenau (1977, p.1). However, my formulation departs from his in ways that he may find unacceptable.

First, note that this conception does not restrict citizenship to any one type of group such as a nation. To the contrary, this conception highlights the fact that individuals are citizens of all the groups in which they participate. Thus, a person can simultaneously be a citizen of such diverse groups as a family, a labor union, a religious organization, a school, a profession, as well as a citizen of overlapping governmental communities like cities, states, and nations.

Second, note that just as citizenship is not restricted to a particular type of group, its exercise is not constricted by a narrow band of activities such as voting, obeying laws, paying taxes, serving on juries, etc. Rather, citizenship encompasses the full range of decisions, judgments, and action through which individuals link themselves to the public affairs of the various groups in which they live out their lives.

Third, note that the exercise of citizenship can be unknowing and inadvertent as well as conscious and deliberate. For example, if I purchase a car that consumes a great deal of gas, and I am unaware of the relationship of this decision to the future supply and costs of energy, my decision in fact links me to the public affairs of society even though I am not aware of the linkage. This is a significant point to keep in mind. Citizenship is an inextricable part of human sociability. We never have the choice of whether to be or not to be a citizen of the groups to which we belong. Our only choice concerns the quality displayed in the exercise of citizenship.

Fourth, note a very important fact illustrated by the example of cars and energy. This is the fact that in large scale groups like

societies the mechanism that links an individual's decisions, judgments, and actions to public affairs are aggregative processes. For example, the future supply and price of energy is not a direct result of the decisions made by any one person or even any one organization. Availability and price are rather a cumulative consequence of aggregating the energy-related decisions and actions of millions of people. This is an important point in understanding the character of citizenship in the contemporary world, and I will return to it again.

Fifth, I should note what I mean by public affairs. Public affairs involve the creation and distribution within social groups of such human values as wealth, security, respect, health, power, affection, and enlightenment. For example, a child counselling his or her classmates that it is not right to ridicule a fellow classmate who stutters is linked to the public affairs of the classroom. The child is involved in the public affairs of the classroom precisely in the sense the term is defined above. The child's actions are helping to determine how widely the values of respect and affection are shared (distributed) among members of the class. This child is also linked to the public affairs of a much larger community through the process of aggregation referred to above. The amount of respect enjoyed by so-called handicapped people in the society is a function of the aggregated actions taken by millions of individuals as they relate to handicapped people in the course of their everyday lives.

Let's look at another example, an individual walking on a public street who observes an assault and does nothing to either aid the victim

or alert the public authorities is linked to the public affairs of the community since this inaction affects both directly and systemically the distribution of an important human value; namely, security from violence. The direct and immediate consequence of the inaction is obvious; the victim is left unaided. But the indirect or systemic effects are no less important. One individual's inaction enhances the probability that other individuals will also not take action in the face of assaults they observe. As the frequency of inaction increases, it is likely that the frequency of assaults will also increase, and hence the level of security enjoyed by all members of the community declines.

In summary, let me recapitulate the main features of the conception of citizenship I have just outlined. Citizenship, I have said, refers to decisions, judgments, and actions through which individuals link themselves to the public affairs of the various groups of which they are members. In the case of small, face-to-face groups the links between an individual and the group's public affairs are often direct and immediate. In the case of large impersonal collectivities, it is aggregative processes that link individuals to the public affairs of large groups. Citizenship may be self-conscious and deliberate or unknowing and inadvertent, but in any case individuals cannot escape from their citizenship in the network of human groups that make up their social universe. Knowingly or unknowingly each of us make decisions, reach judgments, and take actions that personally or systemically involve us in the shaping and sharing of human values in social contexts that range in size, intimacy, and complexity from families to large, remote,

and complicated collectivities such as the City of Chicago, the State of Illinois, the United States of America.

III

The Effect on Citizenship of the Advent of a Global Age

Having discussed the meaning of citizenship let me now turn to this question: How has the advent of a global era affected, altered, or otherwise influenced citizenship? I think we can identify four interrelated ways citizenship is being altered by the progressive globalization of the human condition.

1. The scale of sociability has been expanded beyond the boundaries of traditional human groups to encompass the whole of humankind. Whether for good or ill, it is a fact that our planet and our species have been progressively transformed into a world system, and hence by virtue of living in the Twentieth Century individuals are members of a global society.

2. Growing involvement in the world system increases the number of occasions in which individuals make decisions that are at once influenced by and in turn influence the public affairs of global society.

3. Growing involvement in the world system increases the number of occasions in which individuals reach judgments about matters, issues, and problems central to the public affairs of global society.

4. Growing involvement in the world system increases the number of occasions in which individuals must seek to influence the public affairs of global society in order to protect and further values and interests important to them.

Each of these changes in the character of citizenship is a historic fact. We may become aware of these facts or we may remain

unaware of them; we can greet them with approval or disapproval; embrace them enthusiastically or admit them reluctantly; see in them a promise or detect within them a threat. All of these responses are possible. What is not possible is to escape from these facts. In the Twentieth Century to be human is to be a citizen in a global context.

But if the global character of citizenship is a constant, the quality displayed in the exercise of citizenship is a variable. One can be a good or bad--or more accurately, a better or worse--citizen within a global context just as one can be within the context of a family, a workplace, a local community, or a nation. The quality of citizenship in any context depends upon the competencies individuals bring to the exercise of citizenship. Thus, it is appropriate to ask what competencies are relevant to the exercise of citizenship in a global age. It is to this matter that I now turn.

IV

Citizen Competencies in a Global Age

The first thing to be noted about competencies appropriate to citizenship in a global age is another simple but fundamental fact. That fact is this. The competencies requisite of decent citizenship in a global context are not different from, substitutes for, or replacements of competencies requisite of decent citizenship in sub-global contexts. To the contrary, competencies of global citizenship are extensions of and elaborations upon the basic human competencies that go into the making of good citizenship within the contexts of such

diverse groups as families, work places, communities, and nations. What are these basic human competencies? They would seem to include a self conscious awareness of one's membership in a group coupled with a set of cognitive, emotional, and social skills that allow and encourage individuals to make decisions, reach judgments, and take actions with an eye to their relationship to the public affairs of the group. Let us look at what these basic citizen competencies look like within a global context.

Competence in Perceiving One's Involvement in Global Society*

As the discussion in Chapter Two suggests each of us as an individual is involved in global society in a myriad of specific and concrete ways. For our purposes here, it may be useful to reduce this complexity by noting a few basic dimensions that underlie the specifics of an individual's involvement in global society. These include a biological, an ecological, a socio-cultural, a historical, and a psychological dimension.

Biologically, we are involved in global society because we are members of a single, common species of life and hence we share with all humanity many commonalities. Ecologically, we are involved in global society because we are a part of the earth's biosphere and hence inescapably linked to our planet's material and energetic structure. Culturally, we are involved in global society because we are enmeshed in the human-created environment we call culture, and in the modern world human culture has become a global environment. The technologies,

*The following discussion of competencies is adapted from Lee Anderson (1976).

the institutions, the languages, and the beliefs that make up human culture link us, our communities, and our nation to people, communities, and nations elsewhere in the world. Through these cultural linkages, we influence the lives of people elsewhere in the world and they, in turn, influence our lives. Historically, we are involved in global society because much of the culture that surrounds us is an amalgamation of technologies, languages, beliefs, and institutions initially created by members of our species who lived elsewhere in both space and time, and conversely, much of the culture surrounding others is of our creation. Psychologically, we are involved in global society by virtue of the fact that the world external to our nation is an object of our perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs; and reciprocally, we are the object of the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of others.

This somewhat simplistic characterization of the basic dimensions of an individual's involvement in the world suggests that we might usefully think of a competence in perceiving one's involvement in global society to be a complex, multi-dimensional compound of certain cognitive, perceptual, emotional, and social capacities. In turn these general capacities can be broken down into more specific abilities. In the following chart I have tried to identify the capacities and in turn the abilities that appear to make up a competence in perceiving one's involvement in global society.

Competence in Perceiving One's Involvement in Global Society

requires the CAPACITY to ...	which involves the ABILITY to ...
1) perceive oneself and all other individuals as members of a single species of life--a species whose members share: --a common biological status; --a common way of adapting to the natural environment; --a common set of biological and psychological needs; --common existential concerns; and --common social problems...	a) identify human beings as living things with characteristics which distinguish living from nonliving systems; b) locate the human species in a taxonomy of life; c) compare the human species with other life forms and identify points of similarity and difference; d) recognize that all humans create culture; perceive culture as our species' peculiar way of adapting to its environment (this also involves being able to identify those elements of culture which are universal, despite different geographical or historical settings); e) identify major historical events and trends that have shaped the global development of human culture; f) identify similarities and parallels in the historical experience of different groups and societies; g) identify certain common problems in different cultural settings; h) recognize that people culturally different from oneself have needs, behaviors, concerns, and life experiences similar to one's own; i) identify in one's own life needs, behaviors, concerns, and experiences common to all humanity.

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
2) perceive self and all humans as a part of the earth's biosphere...	a) conceive of the natural environment as a single, integrated global system; b) perceive that the satisfaction of all human needs (psychological as well as biological) depends directly or indirectly upon the natural resources in the earth's biosphere; c) think of oneself as only one consumer of resources and to recognize that these resources come from geographically different parts of the biosphere; d) comprehend that the supply of many of the world's most critical natural resources is finite; e) understand that the activities of all humans, individually and collectively, affect the earth's biosphere; f) see that different lifestyles have different impacts on natural systems; g) perceive that there are alternative ways of acting out human/environment relations and that these alternatives have differing effects on environmental health.
3) see how each person, and the groups to which that person belongs, are participants in the world's socio-cultural system...	a) identify in one's own life space the technologies, institutions, languages, and beliefs which link one to people in other parts of the world; b) identify ways in which one's own community or region are involved in transnational flows of goods, services, information, money, and people; c) identify the interdependent networks (economic, social, military, ecological, and technological) which link the United States and other nations; d) conceive of a world system made up of many different entities such as international organizations (public and private), multinational corporations, as well as national governments and subnational organizations;

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
	e) perceive that most groups and organizations to which one belongs (e.g., churches, business firms, banks, youth groups) are involved in a variety of international activities, with consequences both for Americans and people in other countries.
4) perceive that people at all levels of social organization--from the individual to the whole society--are both "cultural borrowers" and "cultural depositors"; they both draw from and contribute to a "global bank of human culture" that has been and continues to be fed by contributions from all peoples, in all geographical regions, and in all periods of history...	a) conceptualize culture as a human creation varying among particular groups and societies, but serving universal objectives; b) trace the historical and geographical origins of --the technologies --the languages --the institutions --the beliefs that are important to oneself or one's community or nation; c) identify contributions (technologies, beliefs, institutions, languages) made by one's own community, nation, religion, or ethnic group to the "global bank of human culture."
5) perceive that people have differing perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about the world system and its components...	a) identify and describe one's own opinions, attitudes, beliefs, etc., about such questions as war and peace, inequalities in the distribution of the world's wealth, and other societies; b) identify the sources of one's own orientation toward the world; c) reflect on the possible consequences for one's self and others if one had different world views;

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
	d) recognize that others may view one's own nation or culture from another perspective; e) identify possible sources of the views others have of us.

Competence in Making Decisions

Each of us is a decision maker in the sense that as individuals we constantly confront the task of making choices from many alternative courses of action. Each of us is also a decision maker in the sense that we participate in the process of collective or social decision making. This is to say, we are involved in the processes through which the groups to which we belong make decisions. For convenience sake, let's label these two aspects of experience our "decision making life."

It is becoming increasingly evident that the growing globalization of the human condition is affecting our decision making life in two significant ways. One, the impingement of the external world on our lives is creating new conditions to which we, as individuals and as members of different groups, must adapt. This process of adaptation requires decisions.

Two, the decisions we make as individuals, as well as the collective decisions made by the groups to which we belong, increasingly affect the well-being of both the ninety four percent of humanity that lives beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States in

addition to the well-being of yet to be born generations. In a word, the boundaries of our decision making life are expanding both spacially and temporally. Matters that were once issues about which we could make decisions with an eye only to their immediate or short term consequences for ourselves, or our local communities, or our nation are becoming matters about which our decisions have consequences that reach well beyond the boundaries of our personal lives, our communities, and our nation and well into the future.

In short, we live in a time when our decision making life, and even more importantly, the decision making life of students now in our schools, is becoming complicated by the dual need to simultaneously adapt to new conditions and to accommodate the fact tnat an increasing number of both personal and collective decisions have transnational and transgenerational consequences. Competency in coping with this dual need would seem to involve the kinds of capacities and abilities outlined in the following chart.

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
1) make "creative" personal decisions regarding one's own lifestyles, in adjusting to "imposed and uncontrollable" changes...	a) recognize intellectually and accept emotionally the need for changes in lifestyles; b) identify and/or create alternative lifestyle possibilities; c) identify one's basic values and long-term interests; d) evaluate alternative lifestyles in terms of one's basic values and interests; e) become committed to specific changes in lifestyle which best meet one's own values and needs.
2) perceive and identify the transnational consequences of one's personal decisions and of the collective decisions of the groups to which one belongs...	a) perceive that personal and collective decisions made by Americans have consequences for other parts of the world; b) discriminate among decisions and identify those with transnational consequences; c) identify the specific consequences of such kinds of decisions.
3) "take into consideration" the interests of others when making decisions with transnational consequences...	a) empathize with others and to recognize their needs, feelings, and interests; b) hold others' interests to be as legitimate and valuable as one's own interests.
4) perceive and identify long term consequences of individual and collective decisions...	a) perceive that actions have consequences over time and can --ramify --accumulate or aggregate; b) perceive that actions can have consequences difficult to identify or predict, especially over the long term.

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
5) "take into active consideration" the interests of future generations when making personal and collective decisions...	a) identify basic needs and interests of future generations; b) identify emotionally with the yet unborn; c) hold the interests of future generations to be as legitimate and as valuable as one's own interests.

Competence in Reaching Judgments

What are judgments? What do we do when we make judgments? Let us begin to answer these questions by looking at some examples of judgments relevant to the public affairs of global society.

> The gap between rich nations and poor nations is widening each year.
>
> I think arranged marriages are inhumane. Individuals should have the right to decide for themselves who they're going to marry.
>
> There will always be war. There is nothing people can do about war.
>
> All the talk about running out of natural resources is nonsense. Science and technology will come up with synthetic substitutes for scarce natural resources.
>
> There is a need to establish a new international organization that can assess the global environmental impact of industrialization.

Each of these statements expresses judgments. While they are different kinds of judgments about different kinds of things, all of these judgments share three things in common. First, they are all beliefs. To assert that the gap between rich nations

and poor nations is growing each year is to set forth a belief. Similarly, to claim that war is inevitable and nothing can be done about it is to state a belief.

Second, each of these judgments represents a choice from among alternative beliefs. To believe that arranged marriages are inhumane is to choose from among alternative beliefs about marriage, e.g., there are many different forms of marriage and no form is any more or less humane than any other; arranged marriages are the most humane of all forms of marriage; arranged marriages are humane in some settings and circumstances and not in other settings and circumstances, etc. Or, to believe that the gap between rich and poor nations is widening each year is to choose among alternative possible beliefs, e.g.; the gap is narrowing each year; the size of the gap fluctuates over time; the gap is widening for some nations and narrowing for others; the gap remains stable from year to year, etc.

We could look at other examples, but perhaps the two general points I wish to make have been made. First, judgments are beliefs. Second, when we make judgments we choose from among alternative beliefs. This is to say, judgment making is a process of subscribing to one belief from among a universe of alternative beliefs. (Needless to say, this need not be, in fact most often is not a conscious, deliberate process. All of us hold many beliefs that we acquired without any self consciousness of acquiring them at all, let alone a consciousness of the fact that they represent choices from among several alternatives. I shall return to this

point later. Here I simply wanted to note that the model of judgment making as a process of choosing from alternative beliefs does not logically presuppose or demand self consciousness or deliberation.)

The examples of judgments cited above have a third thing in common. They point to six interrelated issues in the public affairs of global society about which very critical judgments must be made in the years ahead. These issues can be characterized in a summary fashion as (1) problems in managing cultural diversity, (2) problems in managing conflict and violence, (3) problems in managing cultural change, (4) problems in managing inequalities in the distribution of such human values as wealth, health, respect, safety, education, power, (5) problems in managing human-biosphere relations, and (6) problems in managing population growth.

When I refer to these as problems about which critical judgments must be made I am referring to judgments by citizens. I am arguing that the judgments citizens make about these issues are critical for two reasons. One, the future of these problems will be determined in part by the aggregation of individual actions taken by millions of citizens. Two, critical organizational actions relating to problems will be taken by such institutions as business firms, religious organizations, educational institutions, governments, and international organizations. These organizational actions will be constrained and shaped by the kinds of judgments reached by thousands, indeed millions, of citizens in this nation as well as elsewhere in the world.

Let's take one illustration. Take the matter of managing cultural change, and more specifically, the matter of managing technological change. Little doubt remains that the management of technological change is one of the critical problems of our time. How well or poorly this problem is managed will be determined in part by judgments citizens reach about technology. For example, we can choose to believe that any and all advances in technology are to the human good. Or, alternatively, we can choose to believe that there are circumstances and settings in which human welfare is much better served by low energy, high labor intensive technologies. I could go on multiplying illustrations, but perhaps the logic of the argument is clear: Major premise: Capacity to manage technological change depends in part upon what citizens believe about technological change. Minor premise: There are different beliefs about technological change. Conclusion: Therefore, citizens must make choices from among those alternatives, and the judgments they reach influence how well or poorly technological change is managed.

What is true of technological change is also true of other dimensions of cultural change, e.g., change in institutions, change in values, etc. In turn what is true of cultural change is also true of the other basic phenomena noted above--diversity, conflict, inequalities, human-biosphere relations, and population growth. In each case critical decisions must be made; these

decisions will be affected by judgments citizens make about those phenomena; and this judgment making is a matter of choosing from among alternative beliefs. If this line of argument holds up under the weight of evidence and logic then it becomes very important to ask: What kinds of capacities and abilities enhance the likelihood of competence in reaching judgments about issues central to the public affairs of global society?

This is a tremendously complex and complicated question, and a full discussion is well beyond the scope of this paper and indeed well beyond the limits of my intelligence. But let me take a stab at it anyway.

I will begin by noting some of the deficiencies or handicaps that most of us have probably experienced as we have gone about the business of reaching judgments. To begin with, many of us are handicapped by underdeveloped skills in acquiring and processing information. This can take many forms. For example, an inability to read maps, graphs, or charts designed to give us some general awareness of the state of the planet, or an inability to critically consume information communicated by TV or other technologies of mass communication, or an inability to make complex comparisons or logical inferences.

If many of us suffer from underdeveloped skills in acquiring information and in critical thinking, many of us also confront another kind of handicap when it comes to making judgments. This is underdeveloped moral reasoning skills. For example, we may judge that a given action should be taken because it furthers one of our

important values, and not realize that the same action is destructive of another equally important value.

At another level, all of us suffer in some degree from the absence of a well developed state of self-awareness or self-consciousness. In its most primitive form this handicap manifests itself in a kind of egocentrism in which we are incapable of recognizing that our opinions about the external world are just that--opinions about reality, not reality itself. Our self unawareness is evidenced in a more subtle form when we recognize our opinions to be opinions but are not capable of exploring the cognitive foundations on which our opinions rest--basic conceptions, perceptions, and explanations that we unconsciously assume to be true or valid, and hence, never subject to examination.

Still another handicap in making judgments is our tendency to view the world from ethnocentric perspectives. We cast the culture of the group to which we belong into the center of the universe of human experience and scale and rate the culture of all others in reference to ours. Not only can this lead to intolerance of cultural diversity, it can lead to a kind of epistemological parochialism in which we assume that while others may learn from us there is nothing we can learn from the experience of human beings who live elsewhere in the world or who lived before us in "less progressive" eras of human history.

At still another level, our judgment-making often suffers from a tendency to think about the world as if it were not a complex

system at all, but rather just a collection of simple algebraic equations. Thus, we assume that if X is the cause of problem Y then we can simply change X and so solve problem Y. But in fact both X and Y may be interrelated to A, B, and C, and thus by changing X not only do we not solve problem Y, but we also create new problems related to A, B, and C.

To further complicate matters, most of us have a hard time imagining futures which are more than simple extrapolations of the present. We can easily imagine a world of, let us say, 2000 that is characterized by incessant warfare, massive violations of human rights, and extensive starvation--because that is the world we experience simply projected into the future. But it is much more difficult to conjure up in our minds a vivid and detailed image of a substantially changed and better world. In short, most of us are not very creative or imaginative in constructing alternative futures that depart much from the status quo. One of the reasons for this is that our creativity is trapped in an unexamined logic that posits what is must be and thus any future must be conceived in terms of past and present patterns of behavior.

Finally, most of us at one time or another have felt immobilized in making judgments by an inability to analyze the controversy and hence to cope with the ambiguity that surrounds a given issue or problem. We are bombarded by a barrage of apparently mutually contradictory expertise, facts, forecasts, and opinions, and we have no way of sorting heads from tails or deciding what is up and what is down.

Undoubtedly this particular laundry list of handicaps encountered in the process of reaching judgments is not exhaustive. Nor does it highlight all the problems peculiar to different kinds or classes of judgments--empirical judgments, moral judgments, prescriptive judgments, and judgments about what could be. Inherent in each of these kinds of judgments are difficulties peculiar to its class. But despite these and other deficiencies I hope this analysis is suggestive of major types of capacities and abilities associated with competence in reaching judgments about the public affairs of global society. These are outlined in the following chart.

Competence in Reaching Judgments

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
1) perceive the choices confronting individuals, communities, nations, and the human species, with respect to major world problems...	a) identify choices and alternative actions in respect to problems of managing: --cultural diversity --conflict and violence --cultural change --human/biosphere relations --population growth
2) acquire and process information analytically and to use reflective moral reasoning when making judgments about world problems...	a) use standard references--maps, graphs, charts, documents, etc.--as sources of information; b) acquire information from direct observation and interviewing (in real or simulated settings);

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
	c) make systematic comparisons; make and judge logical inferences; create and test hypotheses; categorize, classify, and conceptualize; d) justify a specific value judgment by reference to a more general value; e) relate general values to specific situations.
3) identify, describe, and analyze one's own judgments about world problems...	a) articulate one's empirical, moral, and prescriptive beliefs; b) perceive one's beliefs as choices among alternative beliefs; c) identify alternative beliefs; d) compare the empirical and ethical assumptions underlying different beliefs.
4) perceive that human experience, earlier and elsewhere, may possibly be more useful for dealing with contemporary problems than beliefs dominant today...	a) perceive one's own and other societies within a frame of reference relatively free of ethnocentric bias; b) develop "progressively deeper levels of cross-cultural awareness"; c) engage in cross-societal and cross-cultural communications to learn about world problems; d) "use" the "traditional wisdom of humankind"--religion, literature, myths, and the visual arts--as a source for new insights, perceptions, and modes of thinking about contemporary problems.

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
5) perceive the world system in a systematic manner...	a) identify interrelationships among trends, changes, and problems in the world system; b) perceive that any given action or change can have --multiple consequences --different consequences for different countries or for different groups within one country --different consequences for particular groups within one country --different consequences for particular human values, e.g., wealth, power, safety, health.
6) analyze, evaluate, and create models of alternative futures...	a) identify explicitly values one would like to see maximized in future world systems; b) identify alternative ways of organizing the world social system; c) portray these alternatives in scenarios, simulations, role-playing, exercises, short stories, models, etc.; d) evaluate the consequences, for different value structures, of alternative forms of world social organization.
7) analyze controversy surrounding an issue, problem, or policy...	a) identify and distinguish disputes over definitions, value claims, and factual claims; b) analyze the relative "validity" of alternative factual claims and definitions of values; c) tolerate, intellectually and emotionally, conceptual, factual, and moral ambiguities.

Competence in Exercising Influence

What does it mean to exert influence in the context of the global society? How does or can the "ordinary citizen" exercise any influence in this system? To some these may appear to be meaningless, silly, or useless questions. Is not the world system so vast and complex as to preclude any meaningful exercise of influence on the part of people who are not heads of state or foreign ministers or executives in the world's large multinational corporations? Indeed, is not the system beyond the control of even the world's most powerful political and economic elites? Is the cluster of interrelated world problems--population growth, resource depletion, environment overload, violence, social injustice--susceptible at all to human intervention? These and many other questions like them are good and hard questions that demand careful thought in any serious analysis of citizenship in a global era. It may be that enhanced competence in exerting influence is an unattainable end. But I prefer to think not. To the contrary, I believe that the enhancement of the competence of the citizenry to exercise a greater degree of control or influence over the institutions, processes, and problems that affect their lives and shape the quality of life enjoyed by their children and grandchildren is both an attainable and a critical component of citizenship in a global age. On this article of faith let me return to the query--what does it mean to exercise influence in the context of global society?

At a minimum this competence would appear to imply two things, both of which are suggested by the previous discussions

of competence in making decisions and reaching judgments. First, competence in exercising influence implies some degree of self-conscious and deliberate control over the social and pyschological consequences for self of "forces" that one cannot control. I may not be able to exercise any immediate control over escalating energy costs, but I can adapt to this reality in more rather than less creative and constructive ways. This is to say there are things I can do to make expensive energy less painful to me and my family. Similarly, there may be nothing I can immediately do about inflation, but there are things I can do to minimize the level of psychological and inter-personal stress generated by reduced purchasing power.

Second, competence in exerting influence implies a reduction in the number of unintended and undesired consequences that flow from one's personal choices and from the decisions made by the groups to which one belongs. If it is true, as the previous analysis argues, that each of us is enmeshed in a global network in which our actions and choices do, in fact, impact on the lives of others, then to the extent we succeed in making decisions which have a minimum number of unintended and undesired consequences, we are exerting influence.

These then are two minimal meanings of the notion of competence in exerting influence. Competence includes adapting to the realities over which one has no immediate control in ways that minimize their negative consequences for self, and it means making decisions that minimize the number of unintended and undesired consequences for others. Thus to the degree education succeeds in

enhancing the decision making and judgment making competence of individuals, it also enhances their competence in exerting influence.

Beyond this minimal sense of competence, what does it mean to exercise influence in the context of world affairs? At its most simple but basic level, it means that an individual develops goals in respect to some situation, issue, or problem and then takes action intended to further these goals.

Let's look at an example of a family (the Jones family, of course) whose members are involved in efforts to exert influence over the public affairs of global society. On Tuesday, the family buys a car. They decide to purchase a compact, which is a much smaller and less elegant car than they would personally like to have. They did so on the grounds that the bit of additional space, comfort, and speed they would ideally like to have in a car are less important values to them than a contribution to energy conservation. On Wednesday, Mrs. Jones, who is an agronomist, decides to leave her present position and take a job with a firm that is working in research on substitutes for toxic fertilizers. On Saturday, the Jones' teenage children spend the day in a church sponsored "hunger march." On the following Monday, Mr. Jones sends a small check to Amnesty International along with a letter endorsing the organization's efforts to pressure a national government into staying the execution of twenty political prisoners. On the same day, a neighbor's child tells one of the Jones' teenagers that he had seen her in a march on Saturday and inquired about what she was doing. She explained to the child that there are many people in the world who do not have enough to eat and the people who were

marching were raising money to buy food for them.

Each of these events in the life of the Jones family are examples of individuals engaged in efforts to exert influence in the context of global society. The examples also point to five ways or modes of influence potentially open to individuals. Within the context of global society, individuals can endeavor to exert influence: (1) through life style decisions, (2) through occupational or professional activities, (3) through social action, (4) through political activity, and (5) through modelling and other kinds of education.

The case of the Jones family also illustrates another important point. This is that efforts to exercise influence over the fate of our nation, species, and planet begins at home--in one's family, religious organization, labor union, school, club, etc. As Chadwick Alger puts it . . . "Global citizenship begins, although it does not end there, in the home, business and school" (Alger, 1974).

The reason this is true is because in an increasingly interdependent world each of us lives out our lives in a complex setting with many points of contact with the world system. Each of these points of contact affords individuals potential opportunities for action--action in the form of life style decisions and/or professional and occupational activities and/or political activity.

In concluding this brief and somewhat superficial analysis of a very complex issue, it may be useful to highlight the fact that this line of argument casts both conceptions of citizenship and of

foreign policy in a new light. As noted before global citizenship is not something apart from citizenship in subglobal communities such as cities, states, and nations. To the contrary, effective and responsible involvement in the global society implies--indeed demands--quality citizenship at all other levels of human social organization. Chadwick Alger illustrates this very well.

> Global citizenship is vitally dependent on the quality of citizenship in city, state, and nation. If cities cannot handle aspects of pollution within their control, mankind will drown in human waste. If international government cannot control aspects of pollution that must come within its authority--such as the seas--then cities will suffer. Thus, global citizenship must include simultaneous attention to responsibilities in the context of a diversity of territorial units. (Alger, 1974)

Similarly, this line of reasoning puts "foreign policy" in a new light. Again I quote Alger.

> Foreign policy is no longer something to be left to distant elites, if we still take our democratic values seriously. Indeed, the very concept "foreign" policy has outlived its usefulness. There may be some policies that can best be handled by neighborhoods and others by cities, still others by larger units and others by global bodies. But the notion that any of these policies are "foreign" is misleading. Perhaps this term should now be reserved for yet undiscovered beings on other planets. (Alger, 1974)

Let us now turn our attention to the question of what kinds of capacities appear to be implied by the concept of competence in the exercise of influence. The previous discussion of alternative modes of influence that are potentially available to individuals suggests one way of delimiting these capacities and their component

abilities. These are outlined in the following charts.

Competency in Exercising Influence

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
1) Exercise influence through lifestyle decisions	a) perceive relationships between elements in one's own lifestyle and problems, situations, or circumstances one wants to change or affect; b) identify concrete ways in which one can change or modify "undesirable" elements in one's lifestyle; c) commit oneself emotionally to making these changes; d) handle the emotional and philosophical issues arising from the realization that one's personal actions have only minuscule systemic effect.
2) Exercise influence through work-related activities	a) identify relationships between one's job and/or profession and problems, situations, or circumstances one wants to change or affect; b) identify opportunities for action within one's occupation.
3) Exercise influence through social action	a) identify groups and organizations in one's life-space which engage in activities related to problems, situations, or circumstances one wants to change or affect; b) arrange one's time and responsibilities to allow for participation in these activities; c) commit oneself emotionally to involvement in these activities;

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
	d) identify potential opportunities for social action within groups and organizations of which one is a member and where one has the opportunity to advocate, initiate, and/or organize programs or projects; e) deal emotionally and philosophically with the problems which arise when given action programs 1) fail and/or 2) are recognized as having limited impact.
4) Exercise influence through political activities	a) perceive that there are "alternative routes to international participation," i.e., organizations and institutions at local, state, national, and international levels through which individuals can exert influence regarding a given problem, situation, or issue; b) identify the organization(s) or institution(s) most relevant to the problem, situation, or issue with which one is concerned; c) assume an active organizational role, such as that of a supporter, advocator, or organizer of activity; d) deal emotionally and philosophically with situations and dilemmas inherent in all political activity (e.g., frustration, disappointment in the face of failure to achieve one's ends, moral ambiguities).

requires the CAPACITY to...	which involves the ABILITY to...
5) Exercise influence through modeling and other forms of education	a) perceive that there are individuals who model their behavior on yours; b) identify situations and settings in which one can deliberately model competencies associated with effective and responsible participation in the world system, or engage in other forms of education.

Summary

In this chapter I have tried to do three things. First, I discussed the meaning of citizenship. Second, I indicated four ways in which citizenship has been altered by the globalization of the human condition. Third, I have discussed four kinds of competencies that appear to be central to the exercise of citizenship in a global age.

In conclusion let me make an important point about the array of competencies, capacities, and abilities outlined in this chapter. No one individual can, or should be expected, to possess all of these. Moreover, this is not important. What is important for citizenship in a global age is that these competencies and their component capacities and abilities be widely distributed within the society. Robert Harvey makes this point very well. He refers to the kind of competencies discussed in this chapter as a "global perspective" and notes:

A global perspective is not a quantum, something you either have or don't have. It is a blend of many things and any given individual may be rich in certain elements and relatively lacking in others. The education goal broadly seen may be to socialize significant collectivities of people so that the important elements of a global perspective are represented in the group. Viewed in this way a global perspective may be a variable trait possessed in some form and degree by a population, with the precise character of that perspective determined by the specialized capacities, predispositions, and attitudes of the groups' members. The implication of this notion, of course, is that diversified talents and inclinations can be encouraged and that standardized educational effects are not required. Every individual does not have to be brought to the same level of intellectual and moral development in order for a population to be moving in the direction of a more global perspective. (Harvey, 1975)

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Educational Change and the Development of Citizen Competence in a Global Age

I

Overview

Historically, the nation's schools have been charged with the responsibility of preparing children and adolescents for citizenship. Schools continue to bear this responsibility, but under changing circumstances. As was argued in the last chapter, the advent of a global age has altered the nature of citizenship, and the changing character of citizenship calls for the development within the citizenry of competencies that schools have not traditionally emphasized. This chapter is concerned with types of educational changes that are required if schools are to become more effective institutions in developing a citizenry evidencing the competencies examined in the last chapter. I will be arguing that: Certain changes must take place in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education if schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age.

More specifically, I shall argue that the task of citizen education in a global era confronts the educational profession and the larger society with three major challenges. These may be summarily characterized as:

The challenge of globalizing the content of education.

The challenge of personalizing the methods of education.

The challenge of internationalizing the social context of education.

Let me emphasize from the onset that these three challenges are not new. They have been with us for some time, and even more importantly many teachers, school administrators, curriculum developers, teacher educators, and educational policy-makers have been constructively responding to these challenges over the course of the past few decades. Hence, to talk of the educational changes that need to occur in order to make schools more effective institutions of citizen education in a global age is not to talk of changes that have no history. Quite to the contrary, the three challenges I shall be discussing in this chapter are challenges to our ingenuity and perseverance in supporting, encouraging, and extending certain changes that are all ready under way in many American schools as well as within the schools of other nations.

II

The Challenge of Globalizing the Content of Education

The Nature of the Challenge. I will begin a discussion of the challenge of globalizing the content of education by noting what lies at the very center of this challenge. This is the need for a Copernican-like revolution in how we adults customarily think about the world and in turn socialize children and young people to think about the world. In short, our basic need is no less than the need to scrap the existing intellectual paradigm that shapes and structures much of our current thinking and teaching about the world and to fashion a new paradigm to replace the old.

Perhaps I can best begin to communicate what I have in mind

when I speak of such things as Copernican-like revolutions and paradigm change by starting with a story. There is in the heart of Illinois a school system where students learn to view the United States in the way that is depicted by the following kind of map.



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

As this map suggests the students in this school system learn that:

1. The United States is a collection of fifty states.

2. Each one of the fifty states has its own peculiar geography, history, and culture; no element of which any one state shares with any other state.

3. Illinois is at the center of this assortment of states. All the other states occupy a peripheral status. Some are more like Illinois than others. Some are more friendly toward Illinois than others, but in any event all the other 49 states are foreign to the people of Illinois.

4. Nothing much happens in the other 49 states that is of any substantial interest or concern to Illinoisians.

5. There are some relations between Illinois and the other states but these are conducted for the most part by the Governor of the state, and common, ordinary Illinoisians do not get involved in these foreign relations or even take much interest in them.

Join me in an imaginary visit to some classes in this school system. We walk into the first day of an eighth grade U.S. history class. The teacher is previewing the year's work: "We will begin our study of American history by spending two weeks on an examination of the history of Alabama. This will be followed by a two week unit on the history of Alaska. We will proceed with studies of each of the states concluding in June with a day devoted to an examination of the history of Wyoming. By the end of the year I am sure all of you will have developed a firm understanding of American history."

Later in the day we visit an American literature class. The teacher is also previewing the year's work: "By Christmas break

we will have completed our study of the literature of the midwestern states. After the holidays we will begin to study the literature of the western states. We will start with the literature of Idaho and conclude in the spring with a unit on the poetry of Hawaii--the most western of the states."

The following morning we drop in on an economics class and pick up a copy of the textbook the students are using. The Table of Contents reads:

<u>Part One</u>: <u>The Economic System of Illinois</u>

Chapter 1 The Economics of Illinois Agriculture

Chapter 2 The Economics of Illinois Transportation

.

.

.

<u>Part Two</u>: <u>The Economic Systems of Some Other States</u>

Chapter 14 The Economic System of Texas

Chapter 15 The Economic System of Maryland

.

.

.

<u>Part Three</u>: <u>Economic Systems in Comparative Perspective</u>

Chapter 20 The Strengths of the Economic System of Illinois

Chapter 21 Problems Confronting the Economic Systems of Other States

.

.

.

That afternoon we visit a third grade class that is beginning a unit of study on transportation in the United States. The teacher informs us that the students are working in small group reports that subsequently will be made to the whole class. We inquire about the substance of the reports and are informed that Group A will report on roads in Illinois, Group B will report on roads in Indiana, Group C will report on roads in Maine, and the members of Group D are still trying to decide if they most want to study and report on the roads in Georgia or the roads in North Dakota.

I suspect that it would not take very many observations of teaching and learning in this school system before we would reach the unanimous conclusion that the students were getting a very bad "American education." And because they were getting a bad education about the United States they were also getting a bad education about the State of Illinois. Furthermore, I suspect that we would have no difficulty in identifying the root cause of this bad education. We would immediately see that the School system's whole approach to teaching about the United States was premised on an image of the United States that is fundamentally wrong. American studies in this school system are based on the assumption that the United States is no more than a collection of separate, disparate, and largely unrelated states. Of course, such an image of what the United States is like deviates dramatically from reality. The United States is not a simple collection of fifty states each with its own peculiar history, geography, and culture. To the

contrary, the United States is a single social entity that has a history, a geography, and a culture of its own which incorporates but at the same time is greater than the sum of the particular histories, the peculiar geographies, and the unique cultures of each of the fifty states that currently make up the United States. Thus, outside of this odd school district in central Illinois, we do not find American history teachers who teach U.S. history as if it were but a collection of the separate histories of the fifty states. Nor do we find teachers of economics who treat the American economy as if it were nothing more than a collection of the economic systems peculiarly characteristic of each of the states. We do not find teachers of American literature who treat the literature of the United States as a collection of separate and unrelated literatures of fifty equally separate and culturally unrelated states. We do not find third grade teachers who socialize their children to perceive Indiana's roads to be entirely different from and unconnected with the roads of Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, and so on.

Of course, there is no Centerville, Illinois, with the kind of educational system I have portrayed. Centerville and its weird approach to the study of the United States are artifacts of my imagination created to make a point. That point is this. A good deal of the education about the world that takes place in actual elementary schools, in actual high school classes, in actual college courses, and in actual post-graduate seminars resemble in essential features the education about the United States that took place in the

fictional system of Centerville, Illinois. Like the "American education" in imaginary Centerville, "world education" in many real schools, colleges, and universities is bad education. Like the education in Centerville, it is bad education because it communicates to students inaccurate, incomplete, and parochial images of the world. Moreover, the basic reason why a good deal of education about the world is bad is the same as why Centerville's education about the United States is bad. It is bad because it is grounded in an erroneous premise about what the world is like and how it works. What is this faulty premise?

The premise appears to consist of a set of twin assumptions, one about the world and the other about our place in the world. The first assumption is that the world is simply a collection of largely unrelated lands and diverse peoples. As I have noted elsewhere (Lee Anderson, 1968):

> A survey of the curriculum guides, teaching materials, and approaches used in many schools suggests that much of our past and present teaching is grounded on an image of the world as a mosaic of richly varied lands and peoples. An anthropologist examining the artifacts of American education in an effort to reconstruct the culturally shared world-view of Americans might well conclude that we tend to see the world as a kind of pool table on whose green surface are found an array of scattered and self-contained billiard balls of various colors.

The second assumption is that the United States is located at the center of the pool table with the balls representing other lands and peoples rotating around us like the sun and the other stars were seen to rotate around the earth in a Ptolemaic universe.

Education proceeding from these twin assumptions inevitably distorts reality. The world is not simply a collection of unrelated lands and people. To the contrary, as I tried to document in Chapter Three, the contemporary world is a complex, highly interconnected global system. And the United States is not the center of the world system nor for that matter is the Soviet Union or any other nation, because the world system has no one single center. In short, we, like other nations, are a part of the world; the world is not an extension of us nor of any other nation.

If this analysis is correct, then the basic problem we confront in developing education appropriate to the demands of citizenship in a global age is not so much a matter of adding new courses to an already overcrowded school curriculum. Rather our basic need is at once more simple and more difficult. This is the need to fashion a new approach to teaching and learning about the world that is grounded in a different premise about what the world is like and how it works.

J. David Singer (1961) has pointed out that in viewing any phenomena we have a choice of perspectives.

> . . . the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system. He may, for example, choose between the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or the neighborhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang... (p. 77)

The choice we make in selecting a perspective is a function of what

we want to do. If our aim is to understand trees as such, then we need to pay little or no attention to whether the particular trees we study are or are not parts of a forest. But if our purpose is to understand a forest, then we must also study trees; but in this case they must be studied as parts of a larger whole.

This choice between alternative perspectives is critical as we contemplate the kind of education required of people becoming citizens in an era of history that has witnessed the transformation of the world from a collection of isolated geographical regions and separate cultures and civilizations into a world system or global society. It seems to me that in order to foster the growth of the competencies demanded of citizens in a global age we must devise an approach to educating children and young people that focuses their attention upon the world as a whole. This is not radical. It simply means that we develop the same kind of intellectual orientation toward teaching about the world as we have in teaching about the United States. We do not teach and hence our students do not learn to see the United States as a motley collection of different and separate states. Rather they learn to see it as a single, complex society in which they are participants. Similarly we need to fashion an approach to teaching students about the world that leads them to see that the world as a whole is a single, complex system or society and that they are inescapably involved in the public affairs of the world system and hence participants in a global society.

Two points need to be made immediately about this call for a global system or societal approach to education about the world.

First, it needs to be made clear that such an approach would not detract from the development within students of a special identification with and love for their own country. Almost all of us were educated about the United States within the context of a particular state, and most of us developed and have retained a special identification with the state of our birth and childhood even though we may now live in other states. In my case, it is the state of Idaho. My teachers did not have to distort my education about the United States and the place of Idaho in American society in order for me to develop a deep emotional identification with and special loyalty to Idaho. I am now separated by more than a quarter century and thousands of miles from my school days in Idaho, yet to hear Idaho's official state song can bring tears to my eyes. I continue to take pride in the athletic, political, scientific, and cultural achievements of my fellow Idahoans. And in God's good time it is in a small cemetery on a windswept plateau in southern Idaho that I wish to be buried beside my parents and among the old friends and neighbors with whom I am forever linked in an unbreakable bond of special affection.

I note this only to personalize a very important fact. We human beings have always been capable of multiple loyalties. This has not been changed by the advent of a global age. Cognitively and emotionally, we are very capable of combining a special loyalty and affection for our country or nation with an honest and realistic comprehension of the larger world in which we have been cast.

The second point that needs to be made about a global system or societal approach to citizen education is equally simple and basic. At this point in time no one is capable of drawing a detailed blueprint of such an approach. However, thanks to the labors of countless educators over the past several decades we do know what are some of the major kinds of changes that must occur in the content of education in order to move us toward a time when Americans are better prepared to enjoy the benefits and to assume the obligations of citizenship in a global age. Moreover, American education has begun to move in the directions of needed change. The challenge for us is one of supporting, extending, and clarifying changes in the content of American education that are underway. What are these changes? In the next section I will note and briefly discuss what I see to be eight promising types of curriculum change in American education.

Change in School Curriculum

School curriculum, both the formal and informal, communicates to students images or perspectives on what the world is like and how it works. Thus, one can ask of the pervading curriculum in any nation at any point in history: How does the curriculum portray the world? What are the kinds of images of and perspectives on the world that are being communicated to children and young people by the curriculum of the schools?

If we were to go back in time thirty or forty years and examine the then prevailing curriculum in American schools, I

suspect that our examination would reveal that the curriculum portrayed the world from:

An Euro/North American-centric perspective

A region-centric perspective

A group-centric perspective

A past-centric perspective

An anthropo-centric perspective

An information-centric perspective

A spectator-centric perspective.

Singularly and collectively these perspectives are detrimental to the development within students of competencies required by citizenship in a global age. Over the past few decades this has been recognized by an increasing number of teachers, curriculum developers, school administrators, and educational policy-makers. This growing awareness in turn has stimulated a wide-range of efforts to change school curriculum in ways that would communicate to students a more global perspective. In the following pages we shall briefly review this bit of contemporary educational history. I do this not because this history is marked by stunning accomplishments or radical transformations from where we were forty years ago. The scope and rate of change is not great. But there has been change, and this is encouraging if one is an optimist and judges glasses filled to 50 percent of maximum volume to be half full rather than half empty. Even more importantly, the changes in school curriculum characteristic of the past few decades point the directions in which we must continue to try to move now and in the future if schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age.

Moving from an Euro/North American-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

One of the more well developed curriculum change efforts of the past two decades consists of endeavors to move American education from an Euro/North American-centric perspective on the human experience toward a more global perspective. An Euro/North American perspective can be characterized as one in which: (1) students' attention is focused overwhelmingly upon Europe and North America, (2) the "non-Western" world is treated only in relation to the "western world" and Latin America only in relation to North America and (3) the human experience in the non-west is studied within a western frame of reference. Mark Krug (1964) has characterized this perspective very well within the context of the study of history.

> World history has been and is, to a large extent, being written and taught today from "an unbiased Western point of view." The Western bias is often not intentional but results from a limited focus and a wrong perspective. Someone has wisely said that our students always begin the study of the non-Western world "from the deck of a gunboat." India becomes a subject of instruction with the conquests of Clive and the study of Japan begins with the mission of Commodore Perry. The story of Western Civilization is considered the mainstream of world history and the "East" remains, as it has for centuries, silent and isolated, emerging only with the imperialist conquests of European powers in modern times.
>
> According to the Western image of Western history, the cradle of world history was in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Palestine. The center of civilization then moved to Greece and Rome whose cultures formed the basis for the Christian civilizations in Western Europe in medieval and modern times. There was during the Middle Ages a period of Moslem influence, and a flourishing Islamic culture and science which extended from the Middle East to parts of Europe and spilled over into Asia, especially to India, but the cultural and political hegemony of

> the world was firmly returned to Western Europe by the "scientific revolution" of the seventeenth century. The dominant position of Western civilization became steadily stronger until the first decades of the twentieth century. (p. 547)

In the recent history of American education there are at least three discernable efforts to move from an Euro/North American-centric perspective toward a more global perspective on the human experience. One is the introduction into the curriculum of more content focused upon Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

A second is efforts to reduce Western bias in teaching about the non-West. The Asia Society's study of the treatment of Asia in American textbooks is an excellent example of this type of effort (Asia Society, 1976). Another example is the "outreach activities" of many of the NDEA supported language and area study centers. Many of these centers are evaluating extant instructional materials, creating new materials, and conducting teacher education programs aimed at enhancing the quality of instruction about particular regions or nations of the world.

A third type of effort to move American education toward a more world-centered treatment of humankind are found in efforts to create a global approach to the study of world history. Lefton Stavrianos (1964) has succinctly described a global approach:

> It means the perspective of an observer perched on the moon rather than ensconced in London or Paris or Washington. It means that for every period of history, we are interested in events and movements of global rather than regional or national significance. More specifically, it means the realization that in the classical period Han China was the equal of the Roman Empire in every respect; that in the medieval period the Mongols were infinitely more significant than the Magna Carta; that in early modern times Russia's expansion overland and Western Europe's expansion

> overseas were likewise more noteworthy than the Reformation or the Wars of Religion; and that today the globally significant developments have to do not with...the passing of Western hegemony and the reversion to the traditional autonomy of the regions of the world.
> (p. 617)

Some examples of instructional materials based on a global approach to history include A Global History by L. S. Stavrianos; The Human Experience by David Weitzman and Richard Gross; and People and Civilization by John Thompson and Kathleen Hedberg.

Moving from a Region-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

Curriculum based in a region-centric perspective portrays the world's nations and geographical regions as if they were isolated and self-contained units with no relations with one another. In contrast, curriculum embodying a global perspective treats individual nations and regions as parts of a larger whole and highlights interconnections between nations and among world regions. Robert Harper (1966) makes the point well:

> ...The whole world is more important than its parts. It is understanding of the world-wide system of humanity living on the earth that we want the student to grasp, not just an understanding of the parts -- the regions that have been the center of the geographer's attention. The important thing is to see how they fit into the larger world system.
>
> This calls for a whole new approach in geography. No longer can we study the United States just in terms of learning its own characteristics and of comparing those characteristics with those of other parts of the ... world with the aim of seeing similarities and differences. We must now see the United States as part of the world-wide system of ideas, goods and peoples.
>
> Of course, to understand the world as a whole, we must scrutinize the parts, but the aim is always to see the part in the context of the bigger whole. (p. 183)

Harper's own book, Between Two Worlds: A New Introduction to Geography, is a good example of instructional materials based on a global, in contrast to a regional, approach to the study of world geography.

Moving from a Group-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

Curriculum grounded in a group-centric perspective portrays humankind as a collection of culturally different, distinct, and unrelated groups. It emphasizes differences among cultures and civilizations and encourages students to view their own culture and civilization as inherently superior to other cultures and civilizations. In contrast curriculum grounded in a global perspective treats humankind as a unit of analysis. In so doing it emphasizes commonalities shared by all of humankind and at the same time it encourages students to tolerate and even applaud cultural differences within the human species.

There are several related but distinguishable kinds of curriculum reform efforts aimed at moving education away from a group-centric toward a more species-centered treatment of humankind. One consists of efforts to make humankind a focal point of comparative study in which students systematically explore similarities and differences between the human species and other forms of life. MACOS--Man: A Course of Study is an excellent example of this. Designed for middle schools this course involves students in the observation of animals that help students think concretely about what being human means. Topics such as physical structure, group behavior, parental care and animal communication are included. Throughout these materials, emphasis is upon comparisons. For example, studies of the salmon and the herring gull provide contrasting views of parental care and a close look at a baboon troupe offers insights into group organization,

baboon growth patterns and the limitations of animal communication. The overall aim of these materials is to encourage students to explore the questions: What makes us human? How did we become human? How can we become more human?

Another example of a set of instructional materials for elementary schools that engage students is a comparative study of human beings and other life forms, Windows on our World (Houghton-Mifflin, 1976). This K-6 program is organized around four overall themes. One of the four is the development of children's understanding of themselves as human beings. In this connection students explore three questions: How are human beings like all other living things? How are human beings more like some kinds of living things than others? How are human beings unique?

A second type of attempt to move away from a group-centric perspective and toward a global perspective is found in efforts to organize study around pan-human phenomena which are then examined on a global basis. An excellent example of this is materials developed for junior high geography by B'Ann Wright and her colleagues in the Global Studies Project at Indiana University. The topics of the units include: "Planet Earth in a Global Age"; "Families in a Global Age." As the titles suggest these materials represent a departure from the traditional regional approach to geography with its focus upon the natural environment and cultures of specific parts of the world. In these materials "the level of analysis is the entire globe rather than separate parts, and . . . the unit of analysis are important human phenomena which are then examined through the world" (B'Ann

Wright and Paul Armstrong, 1976, pp. iii-iv). At the high school level a good example of this approach is Weissman and Gross's world history material entitled the Human Experience which I noted previously.

A third type of attempt to move toward a species-oriented treatment of humankind is found in efforts to develop comparative analysis of historical phenomena. This resembles the approach just described above in that the level of analysis is global, but in this case the units of analysis are historically specific phenomena. Thompson and Hedberg's materials, People and Civilizations, is a good example of this. In this world history program one finds many efforts to involve students in comparative history such as a comparison of values in the classical Greek and Chinese civilizations, a comparison of feudalism in Europe and Japan, a comparison of artistic styles of medieval Europe and Japan.

Still another kind of effort to move away from a focus upon specific groups to a focus upon the species as a whole is represented in attempts to engage students in the study of the global impact of particular historical events. Thompson and Hedberg's world history materials again provide good examples of this. For example, they explicitly and extensively treat the global impact of the rise of nationalism and industrialism in Europe.

Moving from a State-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

Curriculum characterized by state-centric perspective portrays the international system as being comprised solely of nation-states that interact with one another only through the foreign policy of

their national governments. By way of contrast, curriculum grounded in a global perspective portrays the international system as an organizationally complex arena comprised of a multiplicity of subnational and transnational organizations in addition to the governments of nations. Each of these organizations, e.g., cities, states, business firms, voluntary associations, religious organizations, professional associations, governmental and nongovernmental international organizations are viewed as actors in the international system and each is seen to have its own "foreign policy".

There are many ongoing efforts to move curriculum from a state-centric towards a more global and realistic analysis of the international system. Many new, and in some cases excellent, materials are now available for use in teaching about international organizations. Multinational corporations are beginning to receive some attention. American Government: Comparing Political Expenses (1978), a senior high political science course developed by Judith Gillespie and Stuart Lazarus, contains an excellent unit on multinational corporations. The Illinois Council on Economic Education has developed a set of materials entitled "The World Economy and Multinational Corporations."

Materials designed to engage students in the study of their local communities, states and ethnic groups are also available. These include an extensive case study of Columbus, Ohio's links to the world in Windows On Our World, previously mentioned. Charlotte Anderson and Barbara Winston (1977) have developed a detailed set of strategies teachers can use in engaging elementary and junior high students in studies of the international involvement of their own local communities. Sally Wallen has devised a program for using

local newspapers in the study of community-global links. James Becker and several of the Teacher Associates at the Social Studies Development Center at Indiana University have developed materials on Indiana's involvement in world affairs; David Victor has designed similar materials focused upon the State of Illinois, and the Kentucky State Department of Education has developed under the leadership of Helen Worthington an excellent set of materials entitled "Kentucky in the World, the World in Kentucky"; Andrew Smith has designed materials dealing with ethnic groups and world affairs.

All these materials have their intellectual origins in Chadwick Alger's pioneering research on the interrelations of cities and their global environments. Recently, Alger has adopted the research strategies used in this research for use in a freshman level course at Ohio State University. This course is adaptable for use in secondary schools.

Moving from an Anthropo-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

I use the awkward term "anthropo-centric" perspective to describe an image of humankind in which we perceive our species as standing apart from the rest of nature and capable through technology of governing the remainder of nature as an absolute sovereign. In contrast education grounded in a global perspective portrays humankind as belonging to the earth and the earth not to us. This alternative image highlights at least four things about human-natural environmental relations: (1) the absolute and ultimate dependence of humankind upon resources found in nature, (2) the limited and finite characteristic of many natural resources, (3) the global nature of the planet's ecosystem, and (4) the importance of trying to

adapt human culture to the imperatives of ecological laws which humankind cannot amend or repeal.

Here, too, one sees evidence of change in American education. Two decades ago environmental studies were confined for the most part to token tributes to the importance of conservation. Ecology was an unheard of term outside the confines of advanced science courses. Today there is a vast array of new instructional materials relating to environmental education and ecology. Indeed, the materials have become so abundant as to make brief illustrative reference to them impossible in this chapter.

Moving from a Past-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

Put simply, a past-centric treatment of the world portrays time as if it were three disconnected line segments. There is "past" which students study about in schools. There is "present" which students experience outside of schools. There is "future" which no one need think about. By way of contrast curriculum based on a global perspective treats time as an interactive system in which images of past, present, and future mutually influence one another, and hence the past, the present, and the future are parts of a single human history.

There are at least two kinds of efforts visible in American education that are beginning to move us away from a past-centric toward a more realistic understanding of the relationship of past, present, and future in an era of global history. One is the growing use of "historical flashbacks" and similar techniques designed to enhance students' perception of the relation of past to present. The other is the currently growing popularity of "future studies"

the best of which are designed to enhance students' ability to see that human choices in the present are linkages between present realities and possible alternative futures.

To my knowledge so far, these studies of the "past in present" and "the future in the present" have not been successfully wedded. But I am optimistic. Some time in the not too distant future, bright educators will create the first generation of what might be called "global geo-histories" of the human experience. These histories will be representations of the space/time manifold in which we exist and will be designed to help us and our students to locate ourselves in a three dimensional field of past/space, present/space, and future/space. I am optimistic about the emergence of such histories because the basic ingredients seem to exist in current trends in history and geography education. We need wait only the coming of a Darwin-like mind to synthesize these ingredients into a new whole.

Moving from an Information-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

In a curriculum dominated by information-centric perspective, the world is treated as a depository of inert and discrete bits of information waiting to pass into and subsequently out of human memories in each new generation--information like the names of the capital cities of the world's nations; the chief exports of country X; the mean annual rainfall in region Y; the current population of nation Z, and so on. A curriculum grounded in a global perspective, in contrast, emphasizes not the passive memorization of facts but rather the active utilization of factual information in conceptual, ethical, and policy analysis of global problems being experienced by humankind.

American education is moving towards a more global perspective. More and more teachers are involving their students in the study of global problems. As demand increases, the supply of quality instructional material also increases. Several organizations are engaged in the development of instructional materials dealing with global problems like population growth, environmental deterioration, the management of violence, the protection of human rights, and inequities in the distribution of the world's wealth.

Moving from a Spectator-centric Perspective toward a Global Perspective

Curriculum grounded in the first of these perspectives treats world affairs as if they were a professional football game in which the "average citizen" can be no more than a spectator. This is to say, the world is something to be observed, to be studied, to be worried about and even prayed for, but world affairs is not an arena in which individuals can actively participate. Curriculum grounded in a global perspective portrays the world not only as an object of study but an arena in which individual citizens can actively participate through personal, social, and political action.

There is evidence that American education has begun to move, albeit slowly, away from a spectator and toward a more participatory model of world affairs education. For a long time many teachers have involved their students in pen-pal arrangements and other similar modes of transnational participation. Many teachers

have organized or encouraged student participation in UNICEF and other types of international fund-raising activities.

Currently there is growing consciousness of both the ethical and pedagogic importance of self-conscious participation in world affairs. This is combined with a growing awareness that opportunities for such participation do exist. Gerald Marker (1977) has made this point very clearly. He begins by identifying five alternative orientations schools might take toward the current world crisis.

Option 1

> The situation facing the world is too complex, too disturbing, and too hopeless for young minds. Since there isn't much anyone can do to turn things around, we should let them enjoy their childhood. The dismal facts of the world's plight will become apparent to them all too soon.

Option 2

> While the experts disagree concerning what the future holds, we should at least acquaint students with these various points of view, and let them draw their own conclusions. What is important is that they realize the nature and substance of the debate which is in progress.

Option 3

> In addition to making students aware of the debate concerning what the future holds, teachers should encourage students to take individual actions, such as supporting the move to smaller cars and families, lower thermostat settings, non-aerosol sprays, etc.

Option 4

> Students should be made familiar with the debate over where the planet seems to be headed, but they must also be taught to realize that problems as vast and complex as those we face really rest in the hands of powerful agencies, such as national and international governments. There is no need deluding ourselves into believing that what one or two individuals do will make any difference in terms of the fate of the planet.

Option 5

This whole business is "much ado about nothing." The "oil crisis" is simply the market adjusting itself; technology is progressing at a rapid rate and, when the time comes, we will have developed new foods, new sources of energy, etc. History is full of dire predictions, most of which never came to pass. The "global dilemma" is a passing fad which will only distract us from the basic content and issues which should constitute the social studies.

Marker goes on to argue that Option 3 is our most prudent choice.

There are other options, and these five are overly simple. Still, they are typical of the views one encounters when discussing the issue of global education and are illustrative of the point at which we find ourselves. A decision to simply ignore the warning signals . . . would, in our opinion, probably be the last important decision made by humankind. Fortunately, it appears that policy makers and educators are not going to ignore the situation in the hope that it will go away.

From an educational standpoint, it seems important to keep the options open. Certainly the data are not all in -- and, for that matter, never will be. Nor are we faced with an either-or situation, as some current critics contend. A decision to inform students of the situation facing us in no way precludes teaching our national history; nor does it mean advocating world government or that the growing interdependence of nations is a necessarily desirable development. This is hardly the time to impose new dogmas in the curriculum.

What is being advocated here is a form of Option 3 . . . .

We believe that equally as important as informing students of the situational dilemma is activity on the part of the teachers. They must demonstrate that individual actions are an important means of influencing world events, and provide students with experiences designed to show that they too can make a difference. For example, tens of thousands of consumers, each taking individual action, have played a large part in the decisions of a growing number of companies to switch from aerosol sprays to hand operated pumps for products such as deodorants, cleaning products, etc. Projects such as "Columbus in the World/The World in Columbus" have dramatically demonstrated that communities have more links to the world than many persons typically assume. Students have many opportunities for local involve-

> ment in a wide area of "international" activities. The point is that international relations is not something done only by the State Department in Washington. Many actors are involved, and individual actions can influence the shape of the world! (pp. 117-118)

Toward a Curriculum Grounded in a Global Perspective

Imagine, if you will, a major battle that begins in the dark of the night. There are many different armies and each army begins an assault upon the beaches of what the soldiers perceive to be an island. When dawn breaks and the beaches are secure each army looks to its right and to its left and sees other armies. The word spreads and a new awareness emerges. What was seen at the start of the battle to be separate assaults on separate islands is now perceived to be a common assault on a single continent.

This is a crude analogue to what appears to be taking place in American education. Each of the eight developments in recent educational history that I have so cursorily outlined in the past few pages was begun by people who perceived themselves to be assaulting specific and seemingly self-contained educational problems. They saw themselves as setting out to tackle such tasks as improving instruction about Africa, Asia or Latin America; or enhancing the quality of instruction about international relations; or improving students' education in history or anthropology; or furthering environmental education. Now in retrospect it is becoming increasingly evident that the specific and particular educational problems many curriculum reformers have been addressing over the past two or three decades are not separate, isolated,

and unrelated problems. To the contrary, the specific problems are facets or aspects of a single over-reaching problem. That problem is no less than a problem of abandoning an outmoded intellectual paradigm and creating in its place a new paradigm more congruent with the demands of education for citizen competence in a global age. As I have already said no one pretends to know in any detail what this new paradigm will be or should be. On the other hand, a review of recent educational history provides us with some notion of what the basic elements of the newly emerging paradigm are. These can be simply stated:

> Individuals need to begin in childhood and to expand in adolescence an understanding of the fact that the world is a singular, complex system.
>
> Individuals need to begin in childhood and to expand in adolescence an understanding of the fact they are participants in the global system.

Moreover, we have some notion of what must be changed in order to make it more likely that children and young people will learn these elemental facts about the nature of the world into which they have been cast and about their place and role in this world in the course of their schooling. We know that changes are needed in what students learn about their own species. We know that changes are needed in what students learn about their planet. We know that changes are needed in what students learn about the global social order. We know that changes are needed in what students learn about themselves in relation to the world.

We know that we must continue to move away from a curriculum that deliberately or inadvertently socializes students to look out upon the world from perspectives that distort reality. Not only do we know from whence we must move, we also have some notion of the destination toward which we must try to move. This is the creation of a curriculum grounded in a global perspective for it is only such a curriculum that can begin to prepare young human beings for citizenship in a global age.

Moreover, I think we know enough to identify the basic elements of a curriculum grounded in a global perspective and these turn out to be few in number.

(1) It is a curriculum that engages students of all ages in the systematic and sustained study of humankind as a species of life among many.

(2) It is a curriculum that engages students in all ages in the systematic and sustained study of the earth as humankind's cosmic birthplace and for the foreseeable future our only planetary home.

(3) It is a curriculum that engages students of all ages in the systematic and sustained study of the global social order as one dimension of human social organization.

(4) It is a curriculum that engages students in the systematic and sustained study of themselves as members of the human species, as inhabitants of planet earth, and as participants in the global social order.

A Humankind Centered Curriculum

The first mandate of a curriculum grounded in a global perspective is that students must be involved in the study of human-

kind as a whole. This is to say, the curriculum makes the human species the basic unit of study in contrast to particular nations, cultural areas or civilizations. To develop such curriculum is critical. To believe, as we have done in the past, that by adding to the extant curriculum a bit more study about foreign areas or other cultures, schools can adequately prepare students for citizenship in a global age is nonsense. And it is nonsense not because the curriculum is already overcrowded with more things than any decent teacher can teach or any decent student can learn. This is true, but even if the curriculum were an infinitely expandable container into which we could pour an unlimited number of new units on Africa, China, Latin America, Ancient Rome, Canada, Japan, Paris, the Bushman, the Eskimos, the Indians, the new and old cities of Europe, etc., etc., etc., this approach would still be nonsensical. As Edwin Reischauer (1973) correctly observes; "The net result might be simply to impress the child with the idea that others do things differently, which in his perceptions, as encouraged by his home and local environment, is likely to mean the wrong way." Reischauer goes on to also correctly note:

> A more basic reform in education will be necessary. This I believe should be a conscious effort to get away from the assumed, even if unspecified, unit of our own nation and its culture as the almost exclusive focus of education. To put it in more positive terms, we should broaden the focus to include all humanity and the whole of the human experience. Basically what is needed is a profound change in the underlying assumptions of the curriculum planners, the textbook writers, and teachers. Change in the specific content of education would automatically follow, and students would find no difficulty in adjusting in turn. If they can understand the great abstraction of the nation, they can certainly understand humanity too, for it is a much less arbitrary unit. (pp. 180-181)

What are the essential elements of a curriculum whose focus is "all of humanity and the whole of the human experience"? It is a curriculum that is structured around a few basic themes.

The comparative study of the human species and other forms of life--The purpose of such inquiry is not to make students into little evolutionists or little creationists. Nor is it to make them into little biologists or for that matter little sociobiologists. Nor is it to unduly dwell on humanity's nobility, or to wallow in humanity's bestiality. The purpose of encouraging students to examine humankind in comparative perspective is a much more modest ambition than any of those. The purpose is essentially two fold. First, in such inquiry students of all ages easily grasp the fact that the unit of analysis is the human species as a whole not some part thereof. Intuitively, they ask not: How are Americans, or Europeans, or Indians alike and different from dogs or cats or monkeys? Rather they naturally ask: How are people or human beings alike and different from other forms of life? Thus when cross-species comparative studies are done systematically and continuously through different levels of sophistication, students develop a habit of mind that enables them to conceptualize the fact that humankind is in fact a single entity, and because of this humanity and the human experience can be a focus of study.

Secondly, comparative study highlights the fact that all forms of life have specific and distinctive ways of adapting to their

natural environment, and in the case of our own species this process of adaptation consists of the creation and use of culture. This leads to a second theme.

The study of culture as a pan-human phenomenon--Currently most students learn to think of culture as if it were a property of particular groups, and thus various human groups are seen as having separate and distinctive cultures. This is an inappropriate conceptualization of culture. Culture is a creation of the human species as a species and hence is a pan-human phenomenon. We do students a grave disservice when we teach them to conceive of culture as "ways of life unique to particular peoples"--to borrow a definition of culture found in the glossary of one social studies text. The correct definition would read that culture is "the way of life unique to the human species". By proceeding from a good rather than bad definition of culture curricula could then treat cultural diversity in a much more conceptually powerful way than we currently do in most schools and colleges. This brings me to a third theme of a humankind centered curriculum.

The study of cultural diversity--Imagine that we met and you discovered that I had less hair than you and you became curious about this difference. Which of the following formulations of the problem is best?

Why are you different from me?

Why am I different from you?

Why are we different from one another? What is there about the human species that makes some of us have lots of hair and some of us very little hair?

Obviously the last formulation is the superior one, since only by formulating the question this way can we develop an answer that is consistent with the elementary principles of logically valid explanations.

This is analogous to the task of helping students to understand cultural diversity. Students need to develop an understanding of cultural diversity as a characteristic of the human species in order to constructively deal with the specific manifestations of cultural diversity they encounter in life. For someone to have learned how French culture is different from American culture or conversely how American culture is different from French culture is not of much help when he or she is working for a company doing business in Japan and must deal with cultural diversity in this context. Nor is it of much help to have learned to think of cultural diversity as something that distinguishes nations when one is caught up in the culture shock that can accompany a move from a small town to a big city or vice versa. What would be of help in these situations is to have learned to think of cultural diversity as a general phenomenon characteristic of the human condition much as one learns to think of gravity as a general phenomenon characteristic of the physical universe which is manifest in thousands of specific ways in hundreds of different contexts.

The study of cultural change--What is true of cultural diversity is also true of cultural change. This has become a universal and ubiquitous feature of the contemporary human condition. As

in the case of cultural diversity it is cultural change as a general phenomenon that students need to understand in order to be able to constructively cope with the specific cultural changes they are destined to experience in life.

The study of major historical events and long range trends in the historical development of human culture--To understand the cultural universe in which they happen to live students need to learn to see how this universe came into being. This means they must learn to view world history from a global perspective and become familiar with the events and long term forces that have created and shaped the cultural universe they inhabit.

The study of alternative cultural futures--This theme is an extension of the last theme. Not only do students need to learn to cast their eyes backward over the long vistas of human history, they must also learn to cast their eyes forward. In so doing they need to examine alternative futures, contemplate the futures that they find desirable and the ones they find undesirable, and consider what can be done in the here-and-now to maximize the likelihood of desirable futures and to minimize the likelihood of undesirable futures coming into being.

A Planet Centered Curriculum

The second mandate of a curriculum grounded in a global perspective is that students must be involved in a study of the geography and ecology of the planet as a whole. The basic elements

of a planet centered curriculum, like the basic elements of a humankind centered curriculum, are simple but basic.

The study of the earth's atmospheric resources--The earth's atmosphere is a single global system. Students need to study weather, climate, the human uses, and human pollution of the atmosphere from a planetary perspective.

The study of the earth's water resources--Like the atmosphere, the world's hydrosphere is a single planetary system. Accordingly, the study of the geography of water and the ecology of its use need to proceed from a planetary perspective.

The study of the earth's land resources--As in the case of air and water, students need to learn to see land as a global resource. Land use decisions in one part of the world have consequences for people in other parts of the world.

The study of the earth's mineral and energy resources--Like air, water, and land, students need to learn to think of the earth's mineral and energy resources within a global frame of reference, and in so doing come to see that these resources are global resources.

The study of the earth's plant and animal resources--To learn to see the planet's plant and animal resources from a global vantage point is vital in an age of increasing starvation.

A Global Social System Centered Curriculum

The third mandate of a curriculum grounded in a global per-

spective is that students must be involved in the study of the global social system as an all pervasive dimension of human social organization. The elements of such a curriculum are simple. In fact they are reducible to one basic principle. That principle is this: the study of any and all human groups and organizations should include an examination of the role and place of these groups and organizations in the global social system. For example, the study of families in a first grade classroom should include the study of how families are linked to the global system. The study of state history in a fourth grade classroom should include the study of how that state is involved in the global system. The study of Africa, the study of China, the study of Latin America, the study of the United States--all should include the study of the place and role of particular regions and nations in the global system.

A Self Centered Curriculum

The fourth mandate of a curriculum grounded in a global perspective is that it involves students in the study of themselves in their identity as members of the human species, as inhabitants of the earth, and as participants in the global social system. In some respects this is the most critical of the four mandates of a global perspective curriculum. The reason for this is found in the fact that teaching and learning about the world are not final ends in and of themselves. Teaching and learning are means in the

education of children and youth for citizenship. Citizenship is not a matter of knowing about the world in an abstract and passive way as one might know about a distant galaxy. To the contrary citizenship is a matter of relating oneself in active, deliberate, and concrete ways to the world around us. Therefore, education for citizenship must engage students in an active examination of themselves in relation to the world. This is to say, in addition to learning about the human species, students must learn about themselves as human beings. In addition to learning about the earth, students must learn about themselves as inhabitants of the earth. In addition to learning about the global social system, students must learn about themselves as participants in this system.

Learning about oneself as a member of the human species--To learn about oneself as a human being is to learn at least three things about oneself. One is the commonalities you share with all other human beings. A second is the ways in which you are linked through space and time to all of humankind. A third is the fact that you are the product of a particular configuration of human culture and the bearer of a particular perspective which is not shared by all other human beings. Let me briefly discuss each of these.

As a species of life we humans share many things in common. To begin with we occupy a common place in nature. We are living systems in contrast to non-living systems. As such, we share with one another and with all other living things a set of behavioral characteristics that collectively distinguish living from non-living

things, e.g., reproduction, stimulus sensitivity, etc.

Within biological space we humans share membership in the animal kingdom, in the phylum chordata, in the class mammalia, in the order carnivora, in the order primate, and the genus homo sapiens.

As members of the species homo sapien, we share a common set of physiological and anatomical attributes whose constellation in a single organism is peculiarly human--upright stance and freed hands, opposable thumbs, stereoscopic and color vision, a multi-channel perceptual system linked to a large and complex brain. As members of this species we also share a common set of biological needs together with a common and peculiarly human way of living, namely, we adapt to our natural environments, through the creation and use of culture.

Still another dimension of our commonality is a shared history. Each of us shares with all other humans a common biological history. We also share a great deal of common cultural history. The great revolutionary transformation in human culture--the rise of agriculture, the development of cities, the creation of territorial-based political systems, the development of the great classical religions, the rise of modern science--all are events in a common and shared history of humankind. Needless to say, human history is also comprised of particular histories peculiar to specific localities and regions. But even here we share in one another's histories. For example, in some respects the American Revolution

is a peculiarly American experience. In many other respects the American Revolution is a human experience and as such it has features common to all revolutions in humankind's political life. In short, there are parallels, analogies, and similarities in the historical experiences of all human groups.

We humans also share a common cosmic and planetary geography. On a grid of cosmic time and space, all of humanity is found within the boundaries of a very small dot. With the minor exception of the handful of men who have travelled to the moon and back, humanity has a common home and that home is a tiny speck of rock located within a very narrow band on the spectrum of cosmic space and time.

We also share a local planetary geography. A geological map of our planet readily reveals that almost all of earth is uninhabited and uninhabitable. As the diagram following shows, humankind's life space is a very thin film formed at the point of overlap in our planet's hydrosphere, lithosphere, and atmosphere.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

THE EARTH'S BIOSPHERE



The biosphere is that thin film of air, earth and water around the globe within which most living organisms are found. Within this 'life space' are all the energy patterns and processes of interaction which sustain our major activities. Though extending vertically about seven miles into the air and for thousands of feet below the earth and oceans its most densely populated region is just above and below sea level.

Source: McHale, 1969, p. 79

So far I have noted that each of us share with other members of humankind a common biology, a common history, and a common geography. Also, human beings are social animals and because of this we share many common experiences inherent in our species' sociability. There are commonalities in the social experience surrounding the birth, growth, and death of human beings. These are common functional requisites of social and political order in

all groups in all times. Underlying cultural variations in the production and exchange of goods and services, are structural commonalities in humankind's economic life. Everywhere children must be nurtured and the young instructed. We do this in different ways, in different places and times, but these differences, like all cultural differences, are variations on a common theme.

If there are commonalities in the social experiences of human beings, so there are also commonalities in our psychological life. Each of us shares with all others a set of common psychological needs. Each of us experiences an array of common emotions. Each of us confronts a shared agenda of existential concerns endemic to the human condition in all times and places--the mysteries of life and death, the co-existence of good and evil, and so on.

Developing an active, existential awareness of the commonalities one shares with all of humankind is one dimension of developing an understanding of yourself as a human being. Another dimension is to discover how one is linked to other human beings across space and over time. The primary linkage mechanisms are a global system of cultural exchange and a common fate.

The system of cultural exchange that links together members of the human species can be usefully thought of as a "global bank of human culture" that has been evolving since the birth of humankind. We relate to the global bank of culture as depositors in the sense that the culture surrounding others contains many elements that we or our American forbearers created. We also relate to

this bank as borrowers in the sense that the culture surrounding us is an amalgam of technologies, languages, beliefs, and institutions initially created by members of our species who lived elsewhere in both space and time. Ralph Linton has illustrated this point delightfully (1936):

> Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East, but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.
>
> Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilization of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croatians. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.
>
> On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a canteloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows

> and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.
>
> When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.

In addition to being plugged into a global system of cultural exchange, members of the human species also are now linked by an increasingly common fate. This manifests itself in the emergence of a set of social problems with three dominating characteristics. One, the problems pose an increasingly serious threat to the quality of life and beyond this to the survival of humankind. Two, these are problems increasingly common to all regions of the earth. Three, these are increasingly shared problems in the sense that they transcend or cut across the boundaries of all of humankind's political jurisdictions.

The problems to which I am referring are familiar to all of you. Generically they are problems relating to the management of cultural diversity; the management of conflict and violence; the management of cultural change; the management of the distribution

of human values, such as wealth, health, respect, and power; the management of human-biosphere relations; and the management of population growth. Let's look at one example. Violent crime and the fear of violent crime appears to be increasing in every region of the globe and particularly within the world's large cities. Clearly, this is a problem that adversely affects the quality of life for a large segment of humankind. Also, it is not an "American problem" or a "German problem" or a "Japanese problem." It is a problem common to institutions responsible for managing violence, e.g., police departments, courts, prisons, etc., the world over. Thus, policemen from New York travel to Tokyo to see if their Japanese colleagues know things they do not know, and Japanese policemen travel to Amsterdam also in search of enlightenment. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that the crime problem is a multi-level problem in respect to solution. Successful management of the problem of crime in Chicago depends upon action taken at the local, state, national, and international levels of human political organization.

What is true of crime is also true of such problems as the protection of human rights, the reduction of poverty, the maintenance of environmental health, the control of contagious diseases, the limiting of population growth. In each instance the structure of the problem is such that it creates a common fate linking together geographically scattered members of the human species.

An active awareness of the commonalities one shares with all of humankind and an awareness of how one is linked to the rest of humankind are two facets of an understanding of oneself as a member of the human species. A third facet is something that Robert Hanvey (1975) aptly characterizes as a "perspective consciousness." This, Hanvey says is:

> The recognition or awareness on the part of the individual that he or she has a view of the world that is not universally shared, that this view of the world has been and continues to be shaped by influences that often escape conscious detection, and that others have views of the world that are profoundly different from one's own. (p. 4)

Hanvey goes on to observe:

> Few of us in our lives can actually transcend the viewpoint presented by the common carriers of information and almost none of us can transcend the cognitive mapping presented by the culture we grew up in. But with effort we can at least develop a dim sense <u>that we have a perspective, that it can be shaped by subtle influences, that others have different perspectives</u>. (p. 4)

<u>Learning about oneself as an inhabitant of the earth</u>--To learn about oneself as an inhabitant of the earth is to become self conscious of at least three things. The first is one's absolute and inescapable dependence upon the planet's air, water, soil, mineral, plant, energy and space resources in meeting basic needs. A second is a self consciousness of the cultural uses one makes of natural resources in such daily routines as travelling, working, relaxing, and so on. A third is a recognition of the finite and increasingly limited character of many vital natural resources and the limited waste absorption capacity of the planet combined with a self aware-

ness of how one's own life impinges upon the ecological health of the planet. This latter point is particularly important, if one is a member of the world's middle class. As G. Tyler Miller (1975) notes of us:

> . . . the Western nations plus Japan and the USSR account for only about one-fourth of the world's population but use 80 to 90 per cent of its natural resources. The United States with less than 6 per cent of the world's population uses almost one-third of the world's resources and produces about half the world's pollution . . . . Each of us uses 10 tons of copper, 130 tons of steel, 22 tons of concrete, 13 tons of coal, 3 pounds of pesticide, and 322,500 gallons of water per year.
>
> As a result, the average American consumer has from 25 to 50 times as great an impact on our life-support system as a peasant in an underdeveloped country . . . . For example, the average American consumes 50 times as much steel, 56 times as much energy, 170 times as much synthetic rubber and newsprint, 250 times as much motor fuel, and 300 times as much plastic as the average citizen of India . . . . So, based on environmental impact, the United States can be viewed as the most overpopulated country in the world . . . . With an impact factor of 25 to 50 times that of poorer countries, our population of 214 million is equivalent to a pollution population of somewhere between 5 and 10 billion--2 to 3 times the present world population. (pp. 13-14)

<u>Learning about oneself as a participant in the global social system</u>--I have stressed at many points throughout this paper that in a global age no one escapes involvement in the global social system. Chadwick Alger (1976) illustrates the point very well:

> One who observes his own daily life carefully, quickly becomes aware that he is personally linked to international processes . . . . An effort to keep a diary of these links soon becomes an overwhelming task as the full range becomes clear:
>
> Awakened by a Japanese clock radio..
> a Swiss watch provides a double-check on the time..
> morning coffee from Brazil..
> ride to work in a Fiat..
> on tires made of Malayan rubber..
> while listening to the Beatles..

> on a German-made radio..
> buying Saudi-Arabian gas..
> and diamonds from South Africa.
>
> All these linkages implicate the individual in relationships that extend to all areas of the globe--to Japanese factory workers, Swiss craftsmen, laborers on Brazillian coffee plantations, miners in South Africa, etc. These linkages are not only related to our lives as consumers:
>
> Money in our savings accounts is reinvested in an apartment complex in Chile..
> investment in a local industry helps produce weapons that kill people in distant places..
> money dropped in the church collection plate helps to build a school in Nicaragua..
> research is dependent on imported books..
> foreign students in our classes..
> films from abroad in our theaters.
>
> The linkages involve us in housing policy in Chile, death in distant places, education policy in Nicaragua, international scientific networks, and international artistic exchange. Actually, the relationships of humankind clothe the globe in a giant cobweb. (p. 2)

To learn about oneself as a participant in the global social system is to do at least two things. One is to develop a perceptual competence that permits one to see, as Alger does, the specific manifestations of the global system in one's everyday life. The other is to develop "the analytic abilities with which to trace the innumerable links in the innumerable causal chains that entwine our lives" in the global system. This phrase is quoted from a paper by James Rosenau in which he stresses, as I have been trying to do, that education for citizenship in a global age is "not simply a matter of providing new and up-dated information about the human condition". Rosenau (1977) notes:

Ideally, to be sure, it would be desirable to expand student knowledge about the activities of multinational corporations, the demands of Third World countries, the imbalanced trading patterns of the United States, and the growth of dissident movements in Iran, Canada, and the Soviet Union. Yet, higher levels of factual information do not necessarily conduce to good citizenship, at least not in a time of mounting interdependence. For recognition and comprehension of the proliferating complex aggregative processes in which all of us have become participants is not a matter of knowing the facts. It is rather a matter of possessing the analytic skills with which to trace the innumerable links in the innumerable causal chains that entwine our lives. To know, for example, that the United States consumes daily more oil than it produces and that it does so through increasing imports from the Middle East is not necessarily to be able to appreciate how daily choices in getting to work, discarding old newspapers, buying new appliances, or keeping money in savings accounts might thereby be relevant. To understand that Italy's politics are divisive or that few governments of the industrial world are run by clear-cut majorities is not necessarily to be able to grasp how one's actions upholding or contesting the policies of one's union, ethnic association, or veterans organization might further enhance or diminish the stability of one's government. To be acquainted with the fact that the underpriviledged in Third World countries are restless and demanding a redistribution of the wealth is not necessarily to be able to discern the implications for Ghana in drinking cocoa for breakfast or for Brazil in drinking coffee at dinner. To have insight into the growing importance of multinational corporations in world affairs is not necessarily to be able to sort out one's loyalties if one is a businessman whose company's policies in a foreign land conflict directly with those of one's country. To be informed that everywhere subgroups are pressing for more autonomy is not necessarily to be able to cope with requests that one support professional colleagues abroad if one is an international airline pilot urged to protest insensitivity to hijackings in Algeria or a scientist pressed to condemn oversensitivity to intellectuals in the Soviet Union. To understand that governance is more complex than it used to be is not necessarily to appreciate why a chief executive can treat energy policies as "the moral equivalent of war" or to know what to think about a newspaper editorial that suggests Navaho leaders may be less than patriotic by entering into talks with OPEC officials. (pp. 9-10)

III.

The Challenge of Personalizing Methods of Education

The last section of this chapter dealt with the challenge of globalizing the content of education. This is one dimension of a three dimensional challenge involved in transforming schools into more effective agents of citizen education in a global age. In this section I turn to a second dimension of this overall challenge. I have elected to term this, the challenge of personalizing methods of education. It is not a very good name for what I have in mind, but I could not come up with anything better, so I will live with it in the hope it captures some of the meaning of what I wish to convey.

Let me begin to spell out what I mean when I speak of the challenge of personalizing methods of education by noting three facts obvious to teachers of students of any age. Fact one is that it is easy to teach about the world in ways that cast students into minor and passive roles within the drama of their own education. Conversely it is very hard to teach about the world in ways that give to students a major and active role in shaping their own learning.

Fact two is that it is easy to teach about the world in ways that make the world beyond the narrow boundaries of personal experience appear to students to be remote, removed, and personally irrelevant. Conversely, it is very hard to teach about the world in ways that transform the geographically removed, the historically distant,

and the socially foreign into matters that spark curiosity, that stimulate interest, and that generate personal concern.

Fact three is that it is easy to teach about that tiny fraction of the world that students personally experience in ways that render their own experiences trivial and non-problematic. Conversely, it is very hard to teach about students' immediate and personal experiences in ways that illuminate the linkages between these experiences and the larger more remote world lying beyond the realm of immediate, first-hand experience.

These three obvious, and all too painful, facts about the vocation of teaching point to what I have in mind when I speak of personalizing methods of education. The advent of global age elevates into positions of new importance the hard tasks of instruction. This is so because the learning environments that seem most conducive to fostering the growth of the competencies demanded of citizens in a global age are learning environments with at least three very prominent characteristics:

1. They are environments in which methods of instruction cast students into active rather than passive roles in the process of learning.

2. They are environments in which methods of instruction transform the geographically removed, the socially foreign, and the cognitively abstract into concrete learning, experiences appropriate to the particulars of students' age, levels of development, and scope of social experience.

3. They are environments in which the methods of instruction enable students to discover the global characteristics of their everyday experiences and to perceive the global impact of the decisions made, the judgments reached, and the actions taken in the course of routines of everyday life.

Looking back on my own education it is fair to say that much of the formal instruction I received about the world failed to embody the characteristics summarized above. For the most part I was cast in the role of a passive, not an active participant in the life of the mind. The human experience outside of the narrow frame of my personal experience came to me as vague abstractions to be memorized but not internalized. On the other hand, my personal experiences were left largely unanalyzed and their relationships to the larger universe of human experience left unexplored. I think it is fair to say that in these respects my children's formal education has been better than mine, and I suspect this difference is less a matter of place and more a matter of time.*

In short, the job of creating learning environments characterized by methods of instruction outlined above is like the job of globalizing the content of education. American education has come a long way in a short time. On the other hand, there is still a long

---

*In describing my school experience as I have done here, I have also distorted it. Were I to meet in an after life, Mrs. Arms and Miss Sato (two of my former high school teachers), they will chastize me for indulging in a sophomoric debating tactic. And well they should. My experience in their literature and sociology classes were quite the opposite of the stereotypic generalizations I have just advanced about my formal education. They not only allowed, they demanded, that I take an active role in my own education. And they showed me that there existed a bridge across which I could commute back and forth between the tiny island of my personal experiences and the gigantic land mass of species' experience.

way to go. In respect to the first facet of the challenge of personalizing methods of education, it is encouraging to see the number of teachers who are creating and testing strategies designed to engage students as active participants in the dramas of moral deliberation, empirical inquiry, and philosophical analysis. It is also discouraging to see the number of students who pass through our nation's schools and colleges having never experienced the joys and frustrations inherent in an active involvement in the life of the mind.

In respect to the challenge of overcoming the barriers to comprehension imposed by distance, time, social space, and cognitive abstractness, there also have been encouraging developments in recent educational history. The number of teachers making use of such devices as case studies, simulations, role playing exercises is increasing, and when well designed and skillfully managed, these devices clearly help in transforming the distant and abstract world into personally relevant and intellectually concrete occasions for learning. But here too there is bad news as well as good. The use of such techniques to personalize learning about the continents of human experience distant and remote from the immediate life of children and adolescents is often the first thing to go when teachers feel the political pressure to "get back to the basics." Of course, many of the people who call most vociferously for a return to the basics see this as good medicine for other children but not for their own. But a recognition of this self-serving

bias is of little comfort to the beleaguered teacher, school administrator, or educational policy maker.

Progress as well as problems can also be reported in regard to the third facet of the challenge of personalizing methods of education. This is the need for methods of instruction that enable students to self-consciously discover and deliberate upon the global dimensions of their everyday lives. Thanks to labors of several educators who have built on the work of Chadwick Alger there now exists, as I indicated in the last section, a growing array of instructional strategies and techniques for engaging students in an exploration of the involvement of their local communities and states in the global system. But at least two problems exist in regard to this matter.

One is the familiar problem of limited utilization. While a growing number of students in the last few years have become involved in the studies of the international relations of their own communities and states, all of this is still foreign to the vast majority of students. A second problem relates to personalizing instruction about the aggregative processes I noted in the last chapter when discussing the meaning of citizenship. To my knowledge we still are lacking an array of instructional techniques that will enable teachers to help students: (a) to identify the range of aggregative processes of global significance in which they are personally involved, and (b) to identify and self-consciously ponder the ethical issues and the problems of political action that are inherent in one's involvement in aggregative processes, the consequences of which are remote.

IV.

The Challenge of Internationalizing the Social Context of Education

I began this chapter by noting that the task of transforming schools into more effective agents of citizen education in a global age involves us in a three-fold challenge. So far I have discussed two dimensions of that challenge--the challenge of globalizing the content of education and the challenge of personalizing methods of education. I now turn to a third dimension. This is the challenge of internationalizing the social context in which teaching and learning take place.

Again, if we go back three or four decades in history and this time examine the social context of American education one observes three striking characteristics of that context. The context is nation-bounded. The context is culture-bounded. The context is school-bounded.

The first of these characteristics is manifest in at least four important ways. School personnel were overwhelmingly mono-national. The same was true of the student body of schools. The curriculum was developed solely by Americans. Finally, the legal structure in which schools operated channeled time and attention toward the study of the United States and away from the study of the world outside of the United States; and it often fostered, if not required, ethnocentric treatment of the United States' place in the world.

The culture-bounded social context of education was manifest

in the political dominance of a single American subculture. The cultural orientations of white, middle class, and largely Protestant America permeated the curriculum. Furthermore, dominance of WASP culture was reinforced by teachers and school administrators since they were overwhelmingly recruited from this segment of the population.

The school-bounded context of education was evidenced in the growing isolation of schools and community. The separation of school, family, and work place was becoming one of the most visible of the unplanned and unintended consequences of urbanization and technological change. The significance for the citizenship education of students lies in the fact that the increased isolation of schools from the larger community deprived both students and teachers of access to the rich array of international resources that exist in almost all communities.

This picture has not radically changed in the course of the past twenty or thirty years. But to say there has been no radical change is not to say there has been no change at all in social context of schooling. There has been minor but still notable change in some aspects of the situation and substantial and even more notable change in other aspects.

The context of American education continues to be primarily nation-bounded. Most teachers and school administrators are native born U.S. citizens. Few have had extensive education in world affairs and few have travelled or studied outside of the U.S.

Few are members of transnational educational associations. And few non-Americans teach in American schools.

What is true of teachers is also true of students. Only a small fraction of American students have lived and studied elsewhere in the world even counting students in overseas dependent schools. And most American schools below higher education continue to have few if any foreign students.

School curriculum, too, is largely nation-bounded. Most of the instructional materials to which students are exposed are developed by Americans. Most students never encounter materials developed by people in other nations nor materials created by transnational curricular development projects.

But this is not to say there has been no movement at all. There has been. The social context in which teaching and learning take place is becoming less nation-bounded, albeit slowly. The number of teachers and other school personnel who have some type of professionally oriented travel or study experience in other nations is increasing. Student exchange programs are taking American students into schools of other nations and bring students from other nations into American schools. Increased migration from Latin America in particular together with migration from the Third World in general is increasing the number of foreign born students in American schools. Instructional materials produced in other nations are being used in some American schools, and transnational curriculum development projects are underway. Bits and pieces of

governmental action at both the national and state levels are legitimating and stimulating international studies. In short, while the social context in which American students are educated continues to be largely nation-bounded, there are a number of ongoing efforts and trends whose cumulative effects are to reduce the mono-national character of American schools.

The mono-cultural character of American education is also changing toward a greater degree of cultural pluralism. The ethnic studies movement is shattering the once dominant WASP control of the curriculum. Racial integration has served to enhance the cultural heterogeneity of the student body in many schools, and school personnel have become substantially more heterogeneous in respect tc race, sex, ethnic background, and social class origins.

The school-bounded character of American education observable three decades ago has intensified. But it has intensified to the point where counter reactions have begun to set in. These take on a variety of forms. One is the recurrent demand for greater decentralization and community control of schools. Another is the growth of alternative schools and schools without walls. Another is an increase in school programs that take students outside of the school and into the community in work-study projects, in internships, and in social and political action projects. It also seems very likely that one of the systemic consequences of the configuration of declining school enrollments, escalating school costs, and tax payer revolts will be enhanced community involvement

in the educational process. There is also a growing awareness that schools, however good they are, are incomplete learning environments. It is becoming painfully evident that schools cannot be expected to do everything that needs to be done in the education of young human beings growing up in terribly complex societies. More and more people are recognizing the necessity for other institutions in the society to shoulder more responsibility in the education of children and youth.

V.

Summary

This chapter has focused upon the types of educational changes that are needed if the schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age. I have suggested that we confront a three faceted challenge. One facet is the challenge of globalizing the content of education. A second facet is the challenge of personalizing methods of education. A third facet is the challenge of internationalizing the social context of education.

In respect to the first challenge I discussed eight kinds of curricula change that seem to be involved in globalizing the content of education, and I outlined what I see to be four basic elements of a curriculum grounded in a global perspective. In respect to the second challenge I indicated three types of changes involved in personalizing methods of education. And in regard to the third challenge I noted three kinds of change involved in internationalizing

the social context of education.

I argued that American education has been constructively responding to each of these challenges over the past few decades. The problem now confronting us is a problem in sustaining and extending changes that are already underway. We might usefully picture the situation this way. Imagine a set of continua along which education is moving in respect to content, methods, and social context.

Globalizing the Content of Education

From		Toward
A Euro/North American-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
A Region-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
A Group-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
A State-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
An Anthro-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
A Past-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
An Information-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective
A Spectator-centric Perspective	→	A Global Perspective

Methods of Education

Moving		Toward
Methods that cast students in passive roles	→	Methods that cast students in active roles

Methods that transmit vague abstractions	→	Methods that engage students in concrete learning
Methods that treat the larger world as removed from the personal experiences of students	→	Methods that link study of the larger world to students' personal experiences

Social Context of Education

From		Toward
A Mono-national Context	→	A Multinational Context
A Mono-cultural Context	→	A Multicultural Context
A School-bounded Context	→	A Community-involving Context

In principle it would be possible to locate the position of American education on each of these continua at different points in time and hence measure change through time. Such an analysis would undoubtedly reveal that we have moved further along some of the continua than others. For example, American education probably has moved further from a Euro/North American-centric perspective than it has moved from a spectator-centric perspective. Similarly, such an analysis is likely to reveal that different schools are at different points along the different continua. And within the same school different courses and different teachers are at different points.

In a word, the analysis would show progress over the past few decades and the analysis would reveal the need to continue to push on.

CHAPTER TWELVE

A LOOK AT GLOBAL EDUCATION IN ACTION

I

Overview

This is the final chapter so let me briefly recapitulate the line of argument that has been developed in the past several chapters. I began with the question: What is global education? In response I said that:

> Global education consists of efforts to bring about changes in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education in order to better prepare students for citizenship in a global age.

I acknowledged the simplicity of this definition, but noted that it contained three major propositions that have far reaching implications for education. The first of these propositions is:

> The students now in the nation's schools are becoming citizens within the context of a global era in human history.

In connection with this proposition I tried to do four things. First, I illustrated the global quality of life in the contemporary world. Second, I provided a brief historical overview of the globalization of the human condition. Third, I discussed how the history, the geography, the economics, the politics, and the sociology of the human condition had become globalized. Fourth, I argued that the cummulative consequence of these developments is the creation of a global society.

The second proposition is:

> The demands of citizenship in a global age call for the development of competencies that have not been traditionally emphasized by schools.

In regard to this proposition I tried to do three things. First, I

discussed the meaning of citizenship. Second, I indicated four ways in which citizenship has been altered by the globalization of the human condition. Third, I outlined four kinds of competencies that appear central to the excercise of citizenship in a global age.

The third proposition concerns the types of changes in education that seemingly must occur if schools are to become more effective agents in developing citizen competence in a global age. This proposition is:

> Certain changes must take place in the content, in the methods, and in the social context of education if schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age.

In this connection I argued that three types of changes are occuring and must continue to occur if schools are to become more effective agents of citizen education in a global age. There is a need, I said, to globalize the content of education, to personalize the methods of education, and to internationalize the social context of education.

So what began as a simple definition of global education turns out to be a definition of a very complex and multifaceted phenomenon. As is inherent in all analytical discourse, the warm is made cold, the dynamic is made static, and the concrete is made abstract. What does global education look like when we stop the analysis and simply observe it in operation? In this chapter you will visit, through the eyes of an educational journalist, schools that are self consciously committed to educating their students for citizenship in a global age. The city and

the schools are fictional. However, it should be noted that the specific activities and practices are real. The scenario simply puts together in one school system things that are being done in many different schools across the nation.*

- -

A Letter of Invitation

When I received the invitation from Middleston's Superintendent of Schools to come and observe what he called their World-Centered schools, my initial response was to reply with a polite but firm no, thank you. As a former teacher and principal who had left the schools to become a journalist specializing in educational writing, I felt that I had visited my fair share of schools. Besides, I had come to resent publicity-hungry educators who, after having installed some new "educational fad" in their system, then wanted me to portray their schools as "lighthouses" pointing the way to the salvation of American education. But the more I read of

*The scenario is adapted from Lee and Charlotte Anderson (forthcoming).

the Superintendent's letter, the more I warmed up to the idea of visiting District 209.

The Superintendent's letter informed me that Middleston has a unified K-12 district comprised of six elementary schools (K-5), three middle schools (6-8), and one large high school sub-divided into "three schools within a school." The schools fall into three alternative types with parents exercising the option of selecting the type of school their children attend. The Superintendent described one type of school as self-consciously traditional in curriculum and organization. He characterized a second type as providing the kind of schooling currently found in most American schools.

The third type of school -- the one I was invited to visit -- was the "World-Centered schools." I learned that two of the six elementary schools and one of the middle schools were this type, and at the high school level one of the "three schools within a school" was a World-Centered school. "The World-Centered schools," the Superintendent wrote, "endeavor to furnish their students with the best possible global education that the District is capable of providing."

By this time my curiosity was sparked. What does the process of teaching and learning look like in schools explicitly committed to global education? What do students study? How is the curriculum organized? What kind of climate characterizes a school devoted to global education? What do teachers do? What role does the community play? These were the questions that came to mind as I dictated a letter informing the Superintendent that I would be delighted to visit Midleston's World-

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Centered schools. I indicated that, if convenient for them, I would like to come during the week of April 24.

The City of Middleston

On Sunday morning, I arrived at the airport serving the metropolitan area in which Middleston is located and drove a rented car the 25 miles to the city whose schools I had come to see. That afternoon I spent touring the city.

I discovered that Middleston is a community of about 80,000 that can best be described as a rich mixture of urban and suburban U.S.A. A variety of residential neighborhoods cluster around five commercial areas of differing size and economic function. On the periphery of the city, encircling the residential neighborhoods and commercial areas, are a dozen or so small manufacturing plants specializing in the production of office equipment and light-weight industrial goods.

Demographically the city is about 65% white. The "non-white" residents are mostly Blacks, many of whose families have lived in Middleston for three or more generations. A growing number of Spanish speaking people are migrating to Middleston, most of whom are first or second generation families from Mexico or Puerto Rico. There is a sizable college student population attracted to Middleston by a university, two small colleges, and a theological seminary. The student population includes several hundred foreign students, most of whom are working on advanced degrees at the university.

Sociologically, Middleston is a middle to upper middle class

community. Nearly 65% of the labor force are employed in skilled and semi-professional occupations. Approximately 15% of the population is professional and the remaining 20% of the labor force are unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

An Evening Briefing

After my tour I returned to the motel where I was lodged and prepared for dinner. Dinner that night was an informal buffet at the home of the Superintendent. Besides myself, the guests consisted of two members of the Board of Education, the principals and several teachers from the World-Centered schools, four or five individuals associated with community organizations and business firms, and about a dozen children and teenagers. I initially assumed the latter to be children of the adult guests. But when introduced, I learned they were students in the World-Centered schools, and, like the adults themselves, guests of the Superintendent. The composition of the group struck me as being somewhat unusual, but I refrained from either question or comment. Soon I was to discover that the mixing of individuals of differing ages and positions is very common in the life of the World-Centered schools.

Early in the evening's conversation I was given an account of how Middleston had come to develop a system of alternate schools. "Like so many educational changes," the Superintendent observed, "our system evolved in response to political conflict in the community." One of the Board members went on to explain that for several years District 209 had a Committee on Curriculum Review and Planning. This group, which was

composed of representatives from the teachers' union, the administration, and the community, met throughout each school year to review particular areas of the curriculum. One year the math program would be examined; another year, the reading program; another year, the science program and so on. "About eight years ago," one of the principals noted, "the Curriculum Committee decided to look at international education. After completing their study, it set forth a number of recommendations. I don't recall all of them now, but they included such things as a call for elementary schools to teach more about people outside of the United States and the creation of non-western area studies programs in the middle schools. The Committee recommended a course in world history at the high school level that did not focus exclusively on the development of the West. The Committee suggested that a course in comparative government and politics replace the traditional ninth-grade civics course. It recommended that a class in international relations be added to the elective courses available to high school students. Oh, yes, the Committee also suggested that language classes in Russian and Chinese be added to the traditional foreign language offerings at the high school."

"On their own merits, the Committee's recommendations were relatively innocuous," one of the teachers continued. "But, in the context of the time in which they were put forward, they uncapped a conflict that had been building up for some time. A sizable faction of the community seized upon the Committee's recommendations as an issue around which to organize a traditionalist attack upon the schools. This group felt that the schools had already departed too much from solid, traditional education

with its emphasis upon the 3 R's combined with the study of American geography and U.S. history. On the other side of the fence were a group of parents and community leaders who felt school reform was coming too slowly. They believed that the Committee's recommendations left a great deal to be desired. This group launched a campaign for a more humanized and world-centered educational program. Between these two camps stood another portion of the community and, I should add, of the school staff. This faction was generally content with the District's educational program as it stood and were opposed to the demands of the other factions."

I learned that this turmoil went on for nearly two years and that finally the Board, in collaboration with several community leaders, was able to negotiate what came to be called "The Peace Treaty of Middleston." This was the agreement to establish within the District the system of alternative schools that the Superintendent had told me about in his letter.

Following the account of the historical origins of the District's system of alternative schools, the conversation shifted to a discussion of the World-Centered schools that I had come to observe. Some of the guests who had been instrumental in the initial creation of these schools described the rationale behind their efforts. One of the businessmen noted that the schools' founders believed a watershed had been reached in human history. He cited Rene Dubos' observation that humankind had reached a planetary stage in its evolution and now each person had two countries -- his own and planet Earth. "All of us involved in the creation of the World-Centered schools," one of the community leaders went on, "believed that schools should be transformed from being simply agents

of nation states into institutions that served the interests of humanity as well as the society." Pushing this strain of thinking, one of the high school students pointed out that the students now in school would live out most of their adult lives in the twenty-first century. "If our species does not commit suicide before then, this will be the global age of human history. We believe it is imperative that we begin to learn what it means to be a citizen of the planet."

The rest of the evening's conversation focused directly on the World-Centered schools. The children and the teenagers took an active part in the discussion. They described for me some of the things they did in their schools and told me about what they felt were the strengths and weaknesses of the education they were getting. By the end of the evening it was clear to me that whatever else the World-Centered schools did, they encouraged students to be reflective observers of, as well as active participants in, their own education. As I walked to my car for the drive back to the motel, I remarked to one of the teachers that the students were better philosophers of education than many adults I had met. Her response was simple. "We believe that if children and young people do not learn to think critically and creatively about their everyday lives, they will never learn to think this way about the problems that confront our nation and our planet." I could not disagree.

A Day at Terra School

On Monday morning I drove to Terra School, one of the two elementary World-Centered schools. Upon entering the school my attention was

immediately called to the rich array of art work that decorated the halls and stairwells. Paintings, drawings, photographs, and small sculptures representative of human art in different parts of the world and from different historical eras were on display throughout the school. A good deal, but not all, of the art was the work of children. It was also obvious that the children at Terra School were responsible for the selection, the organization, and the mounting of the art.

Walking down the hallway, I saw that the children were a mixture of racial and ethnic groups. There was an unusually large number of adults, older children, and teenagers in evidence. As I wandered by one room, I saw a group of pre-school children grouped around two students that looked to be of high school age. In another room, I noticed a circle of what I took to be children about the ages of seven to nine involved in a discussion with a boy of twelve or thirteen. In still another area, I observed a very elderly man and woman responding to questions being asked by a group of nine or ten year old students.

After ten or fifteen minutes of wandering, I came to an office in which three children were working. One child was answering the telephones while a boy of about eleven was putting forms in a filing cabinet. A girl of about the same age was speaking to a smaller child and typing information he gave her on a form. I asked these children where I could find the principal's office and was told that this was it. The boy at the telephones introduced himself and ushered me into the principal's quarters.

After settling into a very comfortable chair and happily accepting the offer of a cup of coffee, I answered the Principal's query of

where I would like to begin. I said that I had already begun my observation of the school and would like to inquire about some of the things I had noticed on my way to her office. I mentioned the display of art work and the wide range of people that I had seen in the school as well as the fact that her office staff appeared to consist of children. She informed me that all I had noted were parts of an overall strategy designed to implement the educational philosophy of the World-Centered schools.

A Philosophy of Education for World Citizenship

I told her that I had picked up bits and pieces of this philosophy in last evening's discussion but that my comprehension of it was far from complete. The Principal told me that the philosophy of the World-Centered schools is perhaps most succinctly expressed in a memorandum prepared for the Board of Education. The relevant portion of the memo reads:

> The staff associated with the World-Centered schools believe that to prepare children and young people for citizenship in a global age two things must be done. We must help students understand their identities as individuals, as members of the human species, as inhabitants and dependents of planet Earth, and as participants in a global society. We must also help students develop the competencies needed to cope with the problems, tensions, and tasks inherent in these identities and in conflicts among them. From this belief flow five major, overarching purposes that the World-Centered schools seek to further. These are:
>
> * To develop students' understanding of themselves as individuals.
>
> * To develop students' understanding of themselves as members of the human species.
>
> * To develop students' understanding of themselves as inhabitants and dependents of planet Earth.

* To develop students' understanding of themselves as participants in global society.

* To develop within students the competencies requisite to living intelligently and responsibly as individuals, human beings, earthlings, and members of global society.

The staff of the World-Centered schools believe that in order to accomplish these purposes we must be concerned with our schools as total institutions since a student's preparation for citizenship is affected by the informal, as well as the formal curriculum. Thus, we endeavor to create in World-Centered schools the kind of social order, the organizational climate, and the physical environment, as well as the formal curriculum that support and further the purposes of global education. Furthermore, we realize that schools working alone cannot achieve the goals we seek since students learn outside of schools as well as within them. Accordingly, the World-Centered schools try to break down boundaries separating school, families, and the larger society. We strive to create an educational commonwealth in which the community is part of the schools and the schools are a part of the community.

"We take this philosophy seriously," the Principal told me when I had finished reading the memo. "We try to implement it in every aspect of the operation of Terra School. You saw some evidence of this on your way to my office."

The Instructional Staff

"You noted the people of differing ages. In Terra, as in each of our other World-Centered schools, there is a good deal of cross-age teaching. Indeed, we look upon teaching as an important learning process in the lives of people of all ages. Thus, you will see in the World-Centered schools older children working with younger children. You will also see a good number of students from the middle school and the high school working with our children. The high school students you saw

working with the pre-school children are doing so as part of their study of human development.

"The adults in Terra School as well as in the other schools you will visit fall into three major groups. The World-Centered schools are staffed by what we call 'Learning Managers.' These are equivalent to teachers in other schools. They work full time and are paid by the school district. Supplementing the 'Learning Managers' are 'Instructional Specialists.' These are individuals who work part-time with students as part of their regular job with one of the private or public institutions in the community. Sometimes these people come to the schools, but very often they work with students in the place of their employment. For example, the banks, several business firms, the labor unions and the university in Middleston have worked out an arrangement whereby some ten to fifteen people associated with the city's economic life instruct in the general area of economic education. The political parties in Middleston along with the university, the city council, and several political action groups support the part-time efforts of about five people who work with students in the area of political education. There are several other areas of learning in which people from the community work with the Learning Managers of the World-Centered schools. Over the years this program has grown and there are now in the neighborhood of two hundred Instructional Specialists associated with our schools.

"Then there is a third group of adults deeply involved with the World-Centered schools. These are volunteers that range in age from college students to the very elderly. This corps of volunteers is linked to

the schools in several ways. Some work within the school as tutors. Some work as resource personnel for the Learning Managers. For example, the two elderly people you saw on your way to my office are lifetime residents and experts in the local history of Middleston. They frequently come to the school to be interviewed by students. They take small groups of children into the community to visit sites of historical interest. These particular individuals, together with some of their friends and with the assistance of some high school students, are developing a small museum and library of local history.

"Still other volunteers are linked to the schools through a learning exchange program. The individuals in this program advertise skills or other things they are willing to teach children and young people. Interested students arrange to work with them in the late afternoon, evening, or on weekends. Conversely, we encourage our students to reciprocate by advertising things that they are able to teach adults or other children. The large chart behind my desk shows the learning exchanges in which Terra students are currently involved either as teachers or learners."

Work and Service

I noticed on the chart that typing was one of the skills being taught. This prompted me to remember the children I had seen working in the Principal's outer-office. I asked her about them. "What you see," she informed me, "is but one example of many kinds of work that Terra students do around the school. We believe it is very important for

children to develop a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the groups in which they are citizens. Since the school is one of the most salient of these in the lives of the children, we involve children extensively in the on-going operation of Terra School, both as a social system and a physical plant. I can remember my own school days when many of us worked as crossing guards. In our World-Centered schools we have simply tried to extend the logic of responsible involvement to many more aspects of the school's operation. Routine clerical work is largely done by older children. Children of all ages are largely responsible for day to day janitorial work. As you walk around the World-Centered schools you will also see a lot of furniture and equipment that has been made or reconstructed by students. In fact, the chair you are sitting in was an old discard that two Terra students refurbished with the help of a volunteer. He is an old gentleman who used to work in the furniture repair business and now spends a good deal of time working with students in the schools' production shop."

"Is all of this emphasis upon student work and upon the use of refurbished equipment part of the school's educational philosophy or is it just a way of saving money?" I inquired. "It's both," the Principal said. She went on to explain that Middleston moved to its system of alternative schools when the era of constantly expanding school budgets was coming to an end. As far as she was concerned, the budget squeeze turned out to be a blessing in disguise. "One of our hopes is that in developing an understanding of themselves as inhabitants of Earth, our students will come to see that they are passengers on a small cosmic

space ship whose limited resources must be carefully utilized. Moreover, many of us anticipate that scarcity rather than expanding affluence will be a hallmark of the future that our students will inherit. Thus, many of us who started the World-Centered schools felt very strongly that the schools should be models of how both individuals and organizations can creatively deal with problems of scarcity and limited resources."

The Curriculum in the Elementary Schools

I inquired about the curriculum in the World-Centered schools. She told me that at the elementary level the curriculum is structured around the five overarching purposes stated in the World-Centered schools' philosophy. There is an instructional program designed to implement each of the purposes. These programs operate out of what the schools call "learning centers."

"For example," she noted, "in the learning center for helping children understand themselves as human beings, children are guided through specific learning experiences designed to develop that understanding. In addition to the learning experiences provided within the center, each center's staff assumes the responsibility for identifying opportunities in the rest of the school and larger community for children to continue their exploration of their human identity."

The Me and You Room

"Probably the best way for you to understand all of this is to visit the different learning centers," I was told. I readily agreed and

the Principal asked a couple of Terra School students to serve as my guides. They led me down a hall to a door with a sign reading "The Me and You Room." I presumed that this was the learning center for the program to develop students' understanding of themselves as individuals.

When I entered the room I saw a mixed aged instructional staff working with several small groups of children. In one corner of the room were a half dozen five and six year olds sorting pictures. The teenage boy working with them asked, "OK, does each of you have your pictures in the order you want them to stay? Remember you are to put the thing you would like to do best on a Saturday morning first, the thing you would like to do next best second, and so on until your least favorite thing is last. All of you had the same six pictures to work with. Let's see if you all put the same picture first."

As I watched, a child of about ten came up and explained to me that this was one of the ways younger children began to identify their own attitudes and then to see that others may not feel the same way about something that they do. "After they've spent some time discussing the reason for their different choices, they'll probably watch that new tape that came in today," he said. "This week it is my job to take care of the films, tapes and other media that come into the Me and You Room. When I checked it in I wondered who had sent for the videotape from that school in Sydney, Australia. The label on the tape said: Some Sydney Children Tell About Their Favorite Things. What do you want to bet? I bet each of these kids find out that some kids in Australia like some of the things they like but that some Australian kids like some things they

don't."

I grinned but refused to take the bet, for that was just what I figured, too. The idea of having a videotape of other children in another part of the world exploring the same dimensions of their identity intrigued me. I stepped over to one of the adults who was sorting through some books to satisfy my curiosity.

"Oh, yes," she said. "We make a concerted effort to expose our children to one-to-one relationships with other people around the world. It is not really so hard to make contact with schools around the world today. In a community like ours, there are several hundred people who either regularly travel abroad or have friends and relatives living abroad. We simply describe to these people the type of contact and exchange we would like to make and these people act as the liaison between us and our sister schools around the globe. You may have missed the camera focused on that little group of children," she said as she pointed to a spot just above and to the side of the group. "These children are being videotaped as they do their attitude analysis. In this particular case, this tape will then be carried by a local banker to Sydney this Friday. So the kids on the Sydney tape we see today will be watching our kids on tape next week. Of course, we can't afford to make videotapes all the time, but we do it as often as we can."

The Human Being Room

As I stepped out of "The Me and You Room," I was taken in tow by my young guides. "We decided to take you to the 'Human Being Room'

next," they said as they led me upstairs to the learning center for developing children's understanding of themselves as members of the human species. When I entered, I was once again struck by the variety of people. The children were obviously of mixed ethnic backgrounds. Some were involved in mixed-age groups. Others appeared to be working mostly with children of similar age. It was not easy to distinguish the "teachers" from the "students." But those who were obviously assuming the teacher role ranged from a quite elderly gentleman to a girl who wasn't much older than the "students" around her.

Children were busy at one wall assembling a chart entitled Tools Help the Human Body. One section was headed by a silhouette of a hand. Under the hand were scattered pictures including a typewriter, a hammer, a pencil, a shovel, a bulldozer, a glove, a mitten, a bucket, a screwdriver. The children had just put up a large pair of eyes. Under it they had begun to place tools associated with human eyes. So far they had a microscope, a telescope, a TV. A heated argument was going on about a picture of a camera. The issue seemed to be whether to put it here under the eyes or to save it to put under the brain. The argument for the brain seemed to be that like the brain, a camera stored information. Finally, one child dug up another picture of a camera, and it was agreed to put one under the eyes and save the other for the brain section.

As I watched, a Learning Manager stepped up to me. "As you can see, most of the tools the children have identified so far are ones they are fairly familiar with. Over the next week, each child is supposed to find out about a tool they are not familiar with that is used in another

part of the world. They will report on this tool and add a picture of it to the appropriate category on their chart."

She then directed me to another group of children sitting around a large table. "This week these children are exploring the needs common to human beings and other living things," she told me. "Right now they are matching pictures of other animals engaged in protective behaviors with pictures of human beings of varying ages and in different cultural settings who are also engaged in protective behaviors." I saw that one girl had a picture of a baby elephant walking under the belly of its mother. Lurking on the periphery of the elephant herd was a tiger. Next to this picture she had placed a picture of an adult human holding a child's hand as they crossed the street. Another picture showed a human mother holding her child while he was getting an innoculation. I inquired why she had put this latter picture here. She told me this human mother was protecting her child from germs and sickness just as the elephant mother was protecting her child from the tiger.

As I was leaving the room, the Learning Manager directed my attention to a large highly illustrated chart that flanked the left side of the door.

What Do You Know About Being Human?

1. How are human beings like all other living things?

2. How are human beings more like some living things than others?

   Are you more like animals than plants? How?
   Are you more like a jelly fish or a bird? How?
   Are you more like a bear or a lizard? How?
   Are you more like a monkey or a cow? How?

3. How are human beings unlike all other living things?

The Learning Manager explained, "Here you see the three basic questions children explore in this program. The two activities you observed this morning were, of course, related to questions two and three. In seeking answers to those questions the children are guided to study themselves and to search for data across the total spectrum of human life on this planet. Through such processes we hope children will learn to see themselves as members of the human community."

By this time the afternoon had ended. Many of the children in Terra school were heading for their homes. Those who were part of Monday's clean-up detail stayed to begin their work. Several other children who were involved in learning exchange activities at the school also lingered behind. I returned to the Principal's office and she asked if I would like to stay and look at some of the learning exchange activities. I thanked her but said no. I needed to get back to my motel room and put in order my notes and reflections on the day's experiences.

A Day Begins at Futura School

I was scheduled to spend Tuesday visiting Futura School, the other World-Centered elementary school. I arrived at Futura school just as a few children were raising the flags located in front of the building. Besides the U.S. flag, there was a U.N. flag, a flag displaying an ecology emblem, and two others that I did not recognize. In response to my query, I was told that the blue and white flag was Middleston City's flag and the orange and brown one was Futura School's flag.

As the Principal of Futura School approached, I asked him about

the display of multiple flags and was told that the World-Centered schools tried to symbolize in as many ways as possible the multiple loyalties the schools endeavor to nurture within their students. "We strongly believe," he told me, "that citizenship in a global age entails loyalty to many kinds of human groups. An active concern for the welfare of one's nation, community, family, church, school or professional association is very much a part of being a good world citizen."

When we arrived in the school the Principal asked me what I would like to do first. I told him that I would like to visit the learning center for the instructional program concerned with developing children's understanding of themselves as inhabitants of Earth.

The Planet Earth Room

He took me to a room called "The Planet Earth Room." When we entered a large group of children were singing. As I listened, I discovered that the songs were all about water. The Principal informed me in a whisper that this group of students were engaged in a study of water as part of humankind's natural environment. Currently, the children were looking at the feelings human beings had about water as those feelings were expressed in children's music from different parts of the world.

As we listened we quietly wandered about the room. The room was virtually a "water museum." Maps, charts, graphs, and pictures all dealing with water and its human uses (and misuses) lined the walls. On the tables were models, clearly constructed by children, of a variety of tools used by human beings around the world in their relation with water.

There were canals, many kinds of boats, fountains, sewage disposal systems, steam engines, and hydrologic generators. I was particularly attracted to one picture display. A large bulletin board entitled "Water and Human Needs" was divided into columns with each column headed by the name of a particular human need such as "The Need for Beauty," "The Need for Fun," "The Need for Protection," and so on. Each column consisted of a collage of photos, magazine pictures, and children's drawings that depicted ways human beings around the world used water in meeting the particular need. "The Need for Beauty" collage contained, for example, pictures showing the use of water in Moslem temples, ice sculpture, ponds in urban areas, mountain streams, rainbows, cloud formations, fountains, colorfully lighted aquariums, and so on. I was also impressed by a large diagram that covered almost a full wall of the global hydrologic system.

The Principal interrupted my observation to note that if I were to come later in the year I would see in the same room comparable displays dealing with air, with land, with plant and animal life, and with the earth's energy resources.

Shortly afterward, a Learning Manager joined us and I asked him about the rationale behind the program. "The purpose of this part of the World-Centered schools' curriculum is essentially four-fold," he informed me. "We try to show our kids how we humans depend upon the planet's natural resources for gratifying all of our needs. These include our psychological needs such as our need for affection, beauty, self-actualization, and learning, as well as biological needs for food, water, air, and protection. Closely related to this is our effort to foster

children's respect for nature and their sense of ecological responsibility. Also at the elementary level we begin to develop students' understanding that the earth's geosphere is a global system.

"You might be interested in looking at these projects. They were done by some nine year old students." He pointed out two projects. One was a set of "thank you" cards children had written to the rain forests in Brazil expressing appreciation for the oxygen the forests had contributed to the air they breathed. The other was a combination map and story depicting the trials and tribulations of a drop of water as the drop made its round-the-world journey through the planet's hydrologic system.

"Also in this program," he concluded, "the children are exposed to a bit of earth history and astronomy in an effort to start them on their way toward an understanding of their own place in the vast reaches of cosmic time and space. In this connection, a group of our students are going to a local observatory tonight as part of a project directed by three undergraduate student volunteers from the university. I am sure they would be delighted if you wanted to accompany them." I thanked him for thinking of me but excused myself from the trip.

The Principal told me he had to leave to attend a staff meeting and wondered if he could direct me to the learning center of another program before leaving. I accepted his offer and we proceeded to another part of the building where he pointed out a room labeled "The World Community Room."

The World Community Room

I entered the room with a group of children of about six or seven. Each was carrying one or two toys they had brought from home. They went to one end of the room where a large plastic world map covered the floor and put their toys down on different places on the map. I learned from a girl of middle school age who was directing this particular project that the children were engaged in a study of where their toys had been made. "For the past three days the kids have been bringing from home one or more toys they no longer play with," she told me. "After we have located their place of origin on this map, the children box the toys and a couple of the group's members take them to a day care center where the toys are used by younger children."

Elsewhere in the World Community Room another group of students was working on a scrap book of photos and letters. One of the children told me that his group had visited a local factory that manufactured office equipment. In an interview with the sales manager they found out the names of firms in different parts of the world that were using equipment made in Middleston. Then they wrote these firms for information on what products the firms produced as well as for photographs of people using the equipment. The group was organizing the information in a scrap book they had entitled "Middleston's Machines in Offices Around the World."

The "World in Middleston and Middleston in the World" Project

I spotted an elderly man who seemed to have a free moment, so I approached him. The introductions revealed that he had been, until his

retirement, an officer in a small multinational corporation whose main office was located in Middleston. Now, he spent a good deal of his time as one of the Instructional Specialists associated with the World-Centered schools. He informed me that he was particularly interested in the schools' efforts to develop students' understanding of themselves as participants in global society. I asked him about the two projects I had just observed. "What you saw," he explained, "were small parts of a large, on-going project operated jointly out of the World Community learning centers of Terra and Futura Schools. The project is named 'The World in Middleston and Middleston in the World.' Beginning with the youngest children and going through to the oldest, Terra and Futura Schools involve their students in a continuous exploration of all the ways they are linked to people in all parts of the world." My informant went on to explain that one of the university professors, who was also a volunteer in the project, calls the project a study of the international relations of everyday life. "I think this is a good description," he said. "For like all of the educational programs in the World-Centered schools, our efforts to develop students' understanding of themselves as participants in global society is grounded in the child's everyday world. We try to enhance each child's awareness of how he or she personally, along with their families, friends, and other people in Middleston, is affected by and in turn affects the remainder of the planet's people."

At this point he directed my attention to a group of students who were organizing to leave the school and suggested that I might enjoy going with them. I asked one of the group where they were headed and was

told they were off to interview the ministers in three local churches. The students explained that the interview was part of a study they were doing of how the churches in Middleston linked their congregations to the world outside of the United States.

Riding in two cars, one driven by a high school student and the other by a middle aged woman who I discovered to be the chairperson of the World Affairs Committee of the Middleston League of Women Voters, we soon arrived at the Middleston Community Church. After the introductions were completed, I stepped into the background and watched the students interview the church's minister.

"How many people from outside of the United States visited your church last year? Where did they come from?" one of the children asked. Another inquired, "Did any members of the church travel outside of the United States on church-related business?" "Are any members of your church from other countries?" a third asked. Another child asked a series of questions about money and goods that the church sends abroad. Still another student quizzed the minister as to whether there were any groups within the church that study about world problems like war and peace, hunger, or pollution. When the interview was over, one of the students asked the minister if she could borrow a copy of the hymnal used by the church. She explained that she was doing a special study of where in the world the composers of the music used in local churches had lived.

The interviews in the other two Middleston churches went much the same way. On the way back to Futura School, the children told me about some of the other things they had done in the Middleston and the

World project. I learned that last month a group of Futura and Terra students, with the help of undergraduate students from one of the local colleges, had constructed a random sample of Middleston families and sent questionnaires to this sample inquiring about the ways these families were linked by relatives, friends, and acquaintances to people elsewhere in the world. I also discovered that another group of students was currently engaged in a study of how books in the Middleston's Children's Library linked their readers to the global community. Another group was constructing an inventory of imported goods sold in Middleston stores. Still another group, equipped with a list of the largest 200 multinational corporations, was identifying the goods and services produced by these firms that were consumed by Middleston residents.

When we arrived back at Futura School and I was leaving the car, it dawned on me to ask the high school student who had accompanied the children on their field trip how she happened to be involved in this particular project. She told me she was working with the children as part of a seminar called "The Individual and Global Society" that she was taking at the high school.

Upon entering the school building, I was greeted by some children who invited me to join them in a vegetarian lunch. While eating a cold and very tasty casserole dish, I found out that the meal had been prepared by some members of the Vegetarian Cooking Club. This club, which was run as part of the learning exchange program, taught children about vegetarian diets from different parts of the world.

The sole adult at the lunch table, besides myself, was a young

woman agricultural economist from Jordan who was spending several months in the U.S. She told me she had started the club as one step in her efforts to educate Americans to the adverse consequences of their excessive reliance on meats for the world food shortage. She informed me that the club was preparing a slide/tape show they could use in presentations to adult groups. The show was entitled "What We Eat Can Make Other People Hungry."

The Skills Center

After lunch I rejoined the Principal and we chatted a bit about all the things I had seen in the elementary schools these past two days. "This afternoon," he said, "I imagine you will want to visit our learning center for skills development." He went on to explain that there was a unified skills development program for all World-Centered schools, kindergarten through high school, in the District. "This program," he said, "is designed to foster skill growth in four major areas. One area consists of what we've termed information acquisition and thinking skills. A second focuses on language and math skills; a third on affective skills, such as role-taking and the ability to empathize. The fourth area focuses on those skills which probably best fit under the umbrella term 'political skills.' For example, these include decision making and conflict management skills."

As an after-thought he added, "Of course, you understand we place a heavy emphasis upon skill development in each of our other learning centers. Our skills center is, in a way, our skills' insurance policy.

There skill development can be reinforced in a systematic way. Children who are having difficulty with any skill can get help, and, finally, the skill development in the other parts of the educational program can be extended and enriched." With that he signalled a girl to show me the way to Futura's skill center.

She guided me to a cluster of three large rooms adjoined by some smaller ones and a maze of what I learned were individual study carrels. A large sign dominated this section of the building. It read "I Can Do It."

In one of the small rooms children were working with all sorts of maps, charts, graphs, and tables. My attention was drawn to an array of world maps on one wall. Something about them puzzled me but at first I couldn't figure out what. Then, I realized when I had last sat in a student's desk facing that very familiar world map on the wall, it had been a projection that placed the United States in the center or near-center of the world. In contrast, these maps were more often polar projections than equatorial and eastern-hemisphere centered than western centered. It was then I saw the five globes in the room were each set at differing angles and the printing was shifted to accommodate each angle. The children seemed quite at home with what for me was an "upside-down" world and could as easily identify the silhouette of a "sideways" Australia as a "right-side-up" one.

While I was still puzzling over an "upside-down" globe, a boy of about ten came up to me. "Do you think that globe is as strange as my father does?" he asked. When I admitted that I was a bit confused by it he led me over to a box in the corner and told me to look through the

peep hole. A little shiver went up my spine. There, suspended in the center of a black void, a miniature replica of planet Earth spun like an irredescent blue jewel. As I watched, a miniscule space craft came into view and passed over Earth and out of sight once again. When I finally tore my eyes away, my beaming guide explained he and some classmates had constructed the model. "Now," he said, "if you saw Earth from that space ship, do you think it would have an "up" or a "down" and do you think the United States would look to be in the center of the world?" At that point I began to grasp the full significance of the world map projections and globes in this room. They, too, carried the message "You are a rider on earth ship."

As I wandered through the rest of the skill laboratories, I saw that the kind of learning that obviously was occurring in the map room pervaded all other skill development areas. Whenever it was natural to do so, skills were taught in the context of a global perspective.

That night I fell asleep trying to identify all the ways my perception of the world had been inadvertently distorted by the maps that had dominated my childhood. When sleep finally came, I was trying to convince myself, but to no avail, that the South Pole was just as much "up" as it was "down."

World Middle School

The next day was Wednesday and I was scheduled to spend it at the World Middle School. When I arrived, I was politely stopped at the door by a girl who handed me a card. "Sir," she said, "my name is Carol.

I wonder if you would mind taking a few minutes to fill out this card before you leave the school. Please drop it in a box you will see by the door when you leave." When I inquired about the card, she elaborated, "A few other students and I are doing a survey this month of adults who come into our school. The information we get from these cards will tell us where the adults come from, why they've come to our school, what they did while here, and so forth. This project will help me fulfill part of this month's 'Institutions contract.'" I said that I'd be happy to help and asked to be directed to the Principal's office.

Here, as in the elementary schools, students were working side-by-side with adults keeping the central office functioning. The Principal beckoned me into his office and introduced me to a boy of about thirteen who was sitting behind the second desk in the room. "Tom, here, is the student Principal for this month," the Principal explained. "We feel that one of the best ways our students can learn how an institution such as this school works is to experience different roles within the institution. We have found that a student needs at least a month in the role of student Principal to really begin to get a 'feel' for the Principalship. Unfortunately, this means only a few students can experience this role. The Student Council has the responsibility of naming the student Principals from the members of each year's graduating class. Two student vice-principals are chosen in the same way, as is the student head-custodian."

Tom, the student Principal, asked me what my impressions were of World-Centered schools now that I was beginning my third day in them. I

responded that I was still sorting it all out and was very anxious to see how a World-Centered middle school functioned. After a brief exchange between themselves, the two Principals agreed on the best way to initiate me. They pulled a large chart down from a wall.

	HUMAN CULTURE			
APPROACHES	Institutions	Language	Beliefs	Technology
Study				
Skills				
Social Action/ Service				

"The major focus of the program of World Middle School is on human culture," the Principal explained. "You have undoubtedly read the philosophy behind Middleston's World-Centered schools. You will recall that one of the overarching purposes of our schools is to develop children's understanding of what it means to be a human being, and since the single most distinctive thing about humans is that we create culture, the middle school focuses on an examination of human culture."

I soon learned that organizing the curriculum in this way facilitated the study of the total human experience around the world. It also meant that the skills program I had learned about earlier could be easily implemented. The Principal next directed my attention to the vertical axis of the chart.

"We have identified what we call three basic approaches to the

development of the children's understanding of human culture," he noted. "As you can see, these are study, skills, and social action/service. When children first enter World Middle School, major emphasis is put on the study of human culture as it is manifested around the world. For almost one whole school term these children are immersed in our program called 'The Human Way of Living.' Many different regions and many historical periods are studied in developing our students' understanding that human beings everywhere and in all times share a common way of living -- that is, culture."

The Contract System

"At the close of this study," he continued, "children move into our contract system that they will follow for the remainder of their time at World Middle School."

The mention of contract reminded me of my encounter with Carol. So that was what she meant by contract. The Principal went on to say that through the contract system each child was exposed to each component of culture every month. A student was free to choose the approach they wanted as they focused on each of the four components.

At this point Tom interrupted, "This month the part of my contract dealing with Institutions calls for me to work along side the Principal. While I learn about the school from this perspective, I am gaining certain administrative skills and, at the same time, serving my school. Thus, sometimes all the 'Approaches' really happen at once."

I asked if it would be possible to get a copy of a student contract and was given this replica:

NAME: Terri J. Williams

MY CONTRACT FOR OCTOBER

-462-

Focus on Human Culture

Institutions	Language	Beliefs	Technology
Study of World Middle School --Write history of school's founding.	Take an inventory of the languages used in W.M.S. that can be understood by others around the world. --mathematics --music --smiles --etc.		
Survey instrument construction. Who visits our school? What do they learn? How do they feel about it? (See Beliefs.) Historical data analysis. Interview expert informants --people involved in creation of W.M.S.	Work with my dance group to develop a dance interpretation of how people are alike and different at the same time.	Analyze opinion survey for beliefs visitors hold about our school following X number of visits.	Construct a map showing major world transportation arterier which connect W.M.S. to Asia. Will begin map with street in front of school on to Highway 10 leading out of town, to Interstate 66, etc. Will include roads; airways; waterways.
Participate in orientation program for foreign visitors. 1. (See Language.) 2. Seek visitors' help in setting up communication between W.M.S. and schools in visitors' home cities. Write letter of introduction and inquiry to that school and give to visitor for delivery.	1. Identify languages visitors speak/locate needed interpreters.		Work with a group of five other students and adult at W.M.S. to identify public body responsible for traffic in front of school and take action to correct hazardous situation.

Resource Centers

I was told that the physical organization of the school reflected and facilitated the focus on human culture. The school had six major resource centers -- one for each of the four components of culture, one for skill development, and one for learning through social action/service activities.

The rest of the day was spent visiting these resource centers and watching the children and staff in action. I learned that the personnel in each resource center is responsible for developing a basic, structured program for all students at W.M.S. For example, in the Institutions resource center, I observed a class studying sex roles in various societies. In a skills lab one group of students was practicing interviewing techniques. Another group, in the technology resource center, was immersed in the study of the effect of fuel-powered machines on the global water system. In addition to providing these structured courses, the personnel in the resource centers serve each student's individual needs as they go about fulfilling their monthly contracts.

At the end of the day I returned to the Principal's office to thank my hosts for the full and informative day. As I left the building I dropped my card in the box as Carol had requested that morning. I made a mental note to check with Carol, Terri, and their colleagues at the end of the month. Their study of World Middle School should prove a valuable item in my growing file on World-Centered schools.

Century 21 High School

Wednesday night I dined with the co-principals of the World-Centered high school. We chatted about many things including the school's name. When they told me that the name symbolized the future-oriented education to which the school was dedicated, I remembered the high school students I had met in my first night in Middleston and their acute awareness of the fact that most of their lives would be lived in the twenty-first century.

When the dinner ended, I was given a brief brochure describing Century 21's curriculum which I read before going to bed. I discovered that the high school's curriculum was organized around six major programs. These were:

> The program for Studies of Individual Development and Behavior
>
> The Program for Studies of the Human Species
>
> The Program for Studies of Humankind's Planetary and Cosmic Environments
>
> The Program for the Development of Human Competencies
>
> The Program for Social Service, Political Action and Work-Study

The brochure informed me that during their first two years in high school all students took an intensive year-long lecture/seminar/lab course in each of the first four programs. Following the year-long course each of the programs offered a rich array of "mini courses," independent study projects, student initiated and directed seminars, and field experience projects of varying lengths and levels of sophistication. At the start of every three-month period students would construct for

themselves a program of study comprised of "modules" which they selected from one or more of the program areas. The only requirement was that in submitting this program of study each student was required to accompany it by a statement which set forth his or her personal educational philosophy and a rationale explaining why his or her self-designed program did, in fact, further the educational goals they had set for themselves. A system of advisory committees comprised of students, school staff, and adults from the community reviewed each student's study program and statement of educational philosophy. If a committee felt that a student's program was unsound in light of their educational aspirations and/or these aspirations were ambiguously formulated, the student would meet with an advisor from his committee and discuss the matter. Following the discussion, the student had the option of proceeding with the program he or she had proposed or modifying it in light of insights or information acquired in the course of the discussion.

In addition to work in the first four programs, Century 21 School expected each student to engage in activities provided by both the Program for the Development of Human Competencies and the Program for Social Service, Political Action, and Work-Study. The brochure pointed out that normally students elected activities that related directly or indirectly to one or more of the "academic" topics they were studying or, conversely, students elected to take a particular academic module because it related directly to a competency or action activity in which they had a particularly intense interest. For example, a student who was learning a language such as Spanish or Russian might couple this with a mini course, or

seminar, or independent study project in linguistics offered by the Program for Studies of the Human Species. Or, a student who was deeply engaged in a work-study project in the international division of a bank might combine this experience with a study of economic institutions. Similarly, students working part-time in a photography shop in the city and doing photography skill development activities might combine this work and skill development with a mini course on the physics of light offered by the Program for Studies of Humankind's Planetary and Cosmic Environments and an independent study project in the psychology of visual perception available under the auspices of the Program for Studies of Individual Development and Behavior.

A Day in the Life of a Century 21 Student

After reading about the educational programs at Century 21 school, I decided that perhaps I could best get a flavor of the school by spending my time observing how one of the students spent his or her day. When I arrived at the school, I asked one of the co-principals if this would be acceptable. She graciously told me that the school was mine to visit as I wished and called Quannie Lee, a third year student, to ask if she would be willing to spend the day with me. I discovered that Quannie was a Japanese girl who had spent the last six years in Middleston's World-Centered schools. Her mother and father were dead and she lived with an uncle who was a U.S. sales representative for a Japanese based electronics firm. I asked her if there were many non-American students in the school and was told that counting exchange students who usually

spend a year at Century 21 about 60 members from a student body of 750 were citizens of other nations.

Quannie told me she had about twenty minutes before she was due at one of her mini courses and asked if I would like to join her for coffee in the student/staff lounge. I took the opportunity to ask her about her first two years at Century 21 High. She told me that in the first year she took the basic courses offered by the Program for Studies of Individual Development and Behavior and the Program for Studies of the Human Species. Then in the next year she took the two basic courses offered by the Program for Studies of Humankind's Planetary and Cosmic Environments and the Program for Studies of Global Society.

I inquired about the general content of these courses. She told me that the course dealing with individual growth and development was an interdisciplinary mixture of material from biology, the health sciences, and the social sciences. One part of the course focused upon the biological, cognitive, and emotional processes involved in human growth from conception to death. Quannie reported that one of the highlights for her of this part of the course was the time she spent in a cross-societal study of infancy. For the field experience component of this study she spent her late afternoons babysitting for a family that had a six-month-old boy and a girl just turning two. At the same time she took a short independent reading project on the methodology of participant observation. "Just the other day," she remarked, "I looked at the notes I made on my observations of these children. I am still proud of them." I discovered that the other part of the course dealt with a variety of basic human

behaviors including attitude formation, the psychology of prejudice and stereotyping, social learning, hostility and aggression, and the ethics of inter-personal relations.

Quannie then described her course in the Program for Studies of the Human Species. I learned that it was roughly divided into three parts of varying durations. The course began with an overview of the place of the human species in the taxonomy of life. Quannie pointed out that an emphasis was placed on students personally identifying their own physical features, biological functions, and psychological and social behaviors that can be traced to different parts of their pre-human biological heritage. This part of the course was followed by a period in which students engaged in a comparative study of the behavior of human beings and other animals. Particular attention was focused on learning, communication, and social organization. Quannie told me she had done an observational study of play among kittens and human children. The rest of the course, Quannie informed me, focused on the global history of humankind. She indicated that the students' work was organized around the study of points of revolutionary change in the human condition and long term historical trends. She revealed that she had been particularly interested in studying the agricultural revolution and trends in world population growth.

The basic course Quannie had taken in the Program for Studies of Humankind's Planetary and Cosmic Environments combined and mixed studies of topics drawn from the earth sciences, ecology, and astronomy. I detected in her description that this course, like the other basic courses

she had taken, succeeded in personalizing the subject matter to a much greater degree than is true of most high school courses that I had observed over the years. In addition to the knowledge it imparted, the course had obviously enhanced Quannie's self awareness of her identity as a part of the fragile life support system of one small planet adrift in a universe of awesome size and eternal mystery.

Our coffee break at an end, Quannie and I left for one of the school's resource centers. As we walked she briefly described the course she had taken the previous year in the Program for Studies in Global Society. She told me that they had begun the year by studying about the socio-political organization characteristic of human history prior to the rise of nation states.. They had looked at hunting and gathering bands, ancient empires, city states, and various forms of feudal organizations. Attention then turned to the evolution of the nation-state system in Europe and its subsequent diffusion to the rest of the planet. She told me the class had spent a good deal of time constructing a simulation depicting the structural characteristics of the classical nation-state system and then systematically modifying and changing the model to illustrate the historical innovations that were transforming the classical system into a global society. Quannie, I learned, had been responsible for adding global corporations and the growth of international organizations to the simulation while some of her classmates worked on modifying the simulation to represent such changes as the growing permeability of nations to the diffusion of beliefs, information, people, and goods from other nations; the impact of nuclear and missile technology in doctrines

of warfare; the decline in the ideologies of sovereignty, national loyalty and non-intervention; and the development of global systems of rapid communication and transportation. Then, after overviewing some of the major problems confronting contemporary global society such as the war system, run-away population growth, resource depletion, environmental pollution, and economic inequalities, the course ended with an exploration of alternative planetary futures.

The mini course Quannie was headed for turned out to be an extension of the latter. I discovered that the particular course she was taking was part of a cluster of mini courses and independent study projects all sharing in a common task. This was the construction of a social planetarium. When completed the planetarium would enable students and townspeople to immerse themselves in a bombardment of visual and auditory stimuli depicting alternative world futures that ranged along a continuum from highly desirable to highly undesirable futures. The planetarium was being constructed in a large, abandoned warehouse on loan to Century 21 School from one of Middleston's manufacturing firms.

The particular mini course Quannie was taking was working on the problem of social justice. Specifically, I learned that the students were constructing two alternative slide/tape shows. One depicted a world in which a network of small political elites scattered across the globe systematically discriminated against the mass of humankind. The other depicted a world in which most of humanity enjoyed a high level of respect in their relation with governments as well as in relations with one another. The students in the seminar informed me that they had been

working on the project for a month and expected to complete it in the next four weeks. They also told me that ten or twelve other mini courses were involved currently in the social planetarium project along with about 35 students engaged in independent study projects.

Following the mini course Quannie took me with her to a seminar she was taking. The seminar, also offered under the auspices of the Program for Studies in Global Society, focused on the intellectual history of the ideas of global community and world citizenship. This particular Thursday morning the students in the seminar were engaged in a discussion of the idea of world community implied in the United States' Declaration of Independence. At the end of the class I was introduced to the adult who had led the discussion. I learned he was a local lawyer specializing in international law and one of the Instructional Specialists who worked with Century 21 School.

When noon came, Quannie told me she would have to leave me to my own devises as far as lunch was concerned. This was her week to work the lunch period in the school's cafeteria. She suggested that I meet her at the student/staff lounge at 1:30 and she would take me to an afternoon class on world literature.

Left on my own, I took the opportunity to wander about the school plant. I saw that like the lower schools I had visited, the physical environment of Century 21 had been designed to further the philosophy of the World-Centered schools. I was particularly attracted to the photographic display along one of the hallways. The wall was lined with photos showing human faces, some revealing happiness and joy and

others grief and sadness. The display, I learned from reading a plaque, was entitled, "The Language of Smiles and Tears," and had been created by a student photography club. What the students had done, I discovered, was to match pictures of Middleston residents with pictures of individuals elsewhere in the world whose faces expressed the same emotion.

At the appointed time I met Quannie and we proceeded to her world literature course. I saw from a copy of the syllabus she loaned me, that the course was organized around topics relating to the cycle of life with the students studying short stories, poems, novels, myths, folk tales and films dealing with the different "crises" of life. On this particular day, they were ending the section of the course that dealt with birth. One of the students had written a short essay dealing with similarities and differences in attitudes toward the birth of children as revealed in the literatures the students had read, and today the class discussed and criticized the young man's essay.

The world literature class ended Quannie's afternoon in Century 21 School as such. The rest of her afternoon was devoted to a work-study job in the pediatrics ward of a hospital in a nearby city. I accompanied her and two other students who were also working in the same hospital on the four mile bus ride. I discovered that, like Quannie, these students had a particular interest in children and planned to follow some kind of career that involved work with children.

Returning back to Middleston in the late afternoon, I learned that Quannie's school day continued into the evening. As part of its career education, Century 21 School ran a program entitled "Jobs and

World Citizenship." As its name implied, the program focused on the concrete ways different people in various occupations could constructively participate in global society. Currently, the program was dealing with child care related occupations, and Quannie was attending the sessions. Thursday's session turned out to be a discussion led by three nurses. They described ways in which they could participate as individuals, as members of their professional associations, as citizens of the city, state, and nation, and as participants in transnational institutions in efforts to enhance the quality of the health care enjoyed by the world's children. In the course of the evening's discussions, I counted no less than 20 alternative ways that a professional in child health care could become involved in local, national, and transnational activities aimed at improving the health of the planet's "next generation."

It had been a long day, and I slept well. The next day I paid a departing visit to the staff of the World-Centered schools that I had met in the course of the week, and left Middleston on my journey home.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alger, Chadwick, "'Foreign' Policies of U.S. Publics," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 1977, pp. 277 - 318.

Alger, Chadwick F., "Liberating Publics to Perceive, Evaluate and Control the International Dimension of Their Daily Lives," Program in Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

Alger, Chadwick F., "Local, National and Global Publics in the World: A Challenge to International Studies" Report No. 23, Febuary 24, 1978, Mershon Center and Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University.

Alger, Chadwick F., "People in the Future Global Order," in Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 1978.

Allison, Graham. Essence of Decisions. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971.

Alker, Hayward R., Lincoln P. Bloomfield, and Nazli Choucri. Analyzing Global Interdependence. Volume I. Analytical Perspectives and Policy Implications. Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974.

American Council on Education (The International Education Project). Education for Global Interdependence: A Report with Recommendations to the Government/Academic Interface Committee, 1975, circa.

Amin, Samir. Accumulation on a World Scale. A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (translated by Brian Pearce), Vol. I & II. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Amin, Samir. Unequal Development. An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Anderson, Charlotte C. "Conceptualizing and Implementing Global Education: A Rationale, Curriculum Materials, and Teaching Strategies for Elementary Schools". Dissertation submitted at Northwestern University in August 1976.

Anderson, Lee F., "An Examination of the Structure and Objectives of International Education," in Social Education, November 1969.

Apt, Leon J. (ed.) Issues in Western Civilization. 1700 A.D.-- The Present, Vol. 2. Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1974.

Ashworth, William. A Short History of the International Economy Since 1850 (3rd ed.). London: Longman Group Limited, 1975.

Bailey, Stephen K. "International Education: An Agenda for Interdependence," International Educational and Cultural Exchange, Vol. XI, Fall, 1975.

Barnet, Richard J. and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach. The Power of the Multinational Corporation. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.

Barraclough, Geoffrey. An Introduction to Contemporary History. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1967.

Basiuk, Victor. Technology and World Power. Headline Series, No. 200. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1970.

Black, C. E. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study of Comparative History, New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Blake, David H. and Robert S. Walters. The Politics of Global Economic Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976.

Boesch, Hans. A Geography of World Economy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974 (2nd ed.).

Brookstone, Jeffrey M. The Multinational Businessman and Foreign Policy. Entrepreneurial Politics in East-West Trade and Investment. New York: Praeger, 1976.

Brown, Lester R. The Interdependence of Nations. Headline Series, No. 212. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1972.

Brown, Lester R. The Twenty Ninth Day. Accommodating Human Needs and Numbers to the Earth's Resources. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1978.

Brown, Lester R. World Without Borders. New York: Random House, 1972.

Brown, Seyom, New Forces in World Politics. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974.

Caldwell, Lynton N. In Defense of Earth. International Protection of the Biosphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972.

Cipolla, Carlo M. The Economic History of World Population. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1974 (6th ed.).

Cipolla, Carlo M. (ed.) The Fontana Economic History of Europe. The Emergence of Industrial Societies, Part Two. London: Collins/Fontana Books, 1973.

Carlton, David and Carlo Schaerf (eds.). International Terrorism and World Security. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975.

Cherry, Colin. World Communication: Threat or Promise? A Socio-technical Approach. London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1971.

Christensen, Cheryl, "Food and National Security" in Economic Issues and National Security. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager. (eds.) Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977.

Contemporary Civilization Staff, Columbia College (ed.). Chapters in Western Civilization. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.

Cooper, Richard N. The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968 (published for the Council on Foreign Relations series on "The Atlantic Policy Studies").

Coplin, William D. and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (eds.) Analyzing International Relations. A Multimethod Introduction New York: Praeger, 1975.

Coplin, William D. and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (eds.) A Multi-Method Introduction to International Politics. Observation, Explanation, and Prescription. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971.

Cousins, Norman, "Needed: A New World Theme Song" in Saturday Review, July, 1968.

Crane, Diana, "Transnational Networks in Basic Science" in Transnational Relations and World Politics. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Crowe, Kenneth C. America for Sale. New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1978.

Cutler, Lloyd N. Global Interdependence and the Multinational Firm. Headline Series, No. 239. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1978.

Cuzzort, R. P. and E. W. King. Humanity and Modern Social Thought. Hinsdale, Ill.; The Dryden Press, 1976 (2nd ed.)

Davison, W. Phillips. International Political Communication. New York: Praeger, 1965 (published for the Council on Foreign Relations).

de Cecco, Marcello. Money and Empire: The International Gold Standard, 1890 - 1914. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.

East, W. Gordon and J. R. V. Prescott. Our Fragmental World. An Introduction to Political Geography. London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1975.

Erb. Guy F. and Valeriana Kallab (eds.). Beyond Dependency. The Developing World Speaks Out. New York: Praeger, 1976 (2nd ed.) (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.)

Farb, Peter Humankind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.

Feld, Werner J. Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics. A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups. New York: Praeger, 1972.

Feldman, Arnold S. and Wilbert E. Moore, "Are Industrial Societies Becoming Alike?" in Alvin W. Goulner and S. M. Miller, eds., Applied Sociology, New York: Glencoe Fress Press, 1965.

Ferguson, Yale H. and Walter F. Weiker. (eds.) Continuing Issues in International Politics. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1973.

Finberg, H. P. R. (ed.) Approaches to History. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

Finlay, David J. and Thomas Hovet, Jr. 7304: International Relations on the Planet Earth. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

Frey, F. W., "Communication and Development," in Handbook of Communication. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973.

Galbraith, John N. The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967.

Gilpin, Robert. "Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective" in Economic Issues and National Security. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager. (eds.) Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977.

Greenstein, Fred I. and Nelson W. Polsby. International Politics. Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 8. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975.

Guback, Thomas H., "Film as International Business," in Journal of Communication, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 1974, pp. 60 - 101.

Hanvey, Robert G., An Attainable Global Perspective. Published by the Center for War/Peace Studies, 218 East 18th Street, New York, NY 10003.

Harper, Robert, "Geography's Role in General Education" in Journal of Geography, Vol. 65, April, 1966.

Holsti, K. J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. Third Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Hopkins, Raymond F. "The International Role of 'Domestic' Bureaucracy," in International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 3, Summer 1976, pp. 405 - 432.

Hoselitz, Bert F. (ed.) Economics and the Idea of Mankind. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

Howe, James W. Interdependence and the World Economy. Headline Series, No. 222. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1974.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," in World Politics, April 1973, pp. 332 - 367.

Ingram, James C. International Economic Problems. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970 (2nd ed.)

Institute for Contemporary Studies. (eds.) The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978.

Jacoby, Neil H.; Peter Nehemkis; and Richard Eells. Bribery and Extortion in World Business. A Study of Corporate Political Payments Abroad. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1977.

Johnson, Harry G. "The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of International Cooperation," in Kindleberger, ed. The International Corperation.

Kaiser, Karl, "Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics," in International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn 1971, pp. 790 - 817.

Kapoor, A. and Phillip D. Grub (eds.). The Multinational Enterprise in Transition. Selected Readings and Essays. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1972.

Katzenstein, Peter J., "International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes," in International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4, Fall 1975, pp. 1021 - 1034.

Kenwood, A. G. and A. L. Longheed. The Growth of the International Economy, 1820-1960. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Kindleberger, Charles P. America in the World Economy. Headline Series, No. 237. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1977.

Krause, Lawrence B., "The International Economic System and the Multinational Corporation," in The Annals of the American Academy, September 1972, pp. 93 - 126.

Kreinin, M. E., International Economics: A Policy Approach. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.

Kriesberg, Louis. (ed.) Social Processes in International Relations, A Reader. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968.

Krause, Lawrence B. and Salant, Walter S. (eds.) Worldwide Inflation. Theory and Recent Experience. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977.

Leestma, Robert, "Global Education," in American Education, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare/ Office of Education, June 1978, pp. 6 - 13.

Levi, Werner. International Politics. Foundation of the System. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974.

Lewis, W. Arthur. The Evolution of the International Economic Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

Little, Jane S., Euro-dollars. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1975.

McHale, John. The Ecological Context. New York: George Braziller, 1970.

McHale, John. The Future of the Future. New York: Ballantine, 1971.

McHale, John. World Facts and Trends (2nd ed.). New York: Collier Books, 1972.

McNeill, William. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Magdoff, Harry. Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

Mansbach, Richard W., Yale H. Ferguson, and Donald E. Lampert. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978.

Marker, Gerald W., "Global Education: An Urgent Claim on the Social Studies Curriculum." Social Education, Vol. 41., January, 1977.

Marsh, Robert M. Comparative Sociology. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967.

Mazrui, Ali A. A World Federation of Cultures. An African Perspective. New York: Free Press (MacMillan), 1976.

Meadows, Dennis L. and Donella H. Meadows (eds.) Toward Global Equilibrium: Collected Papers. Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, Inc., 1973.

Mesarovic, Mihajlo and Edward Pestel. Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1974.

The Mid-America Program for Global Perspectives in Education, "Mid-America Trades with the World," January 1978, Social Studies Development Center, 513 N. Park, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 4701.

Middleton, John and David Tait, (eds.) Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958.

Miller, Jr., G. Tyler, Living in the Environment: Concepts, Problems, and Alternatives. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1975.

Modelski, George, "Multinational Business: A Global Perspective," International Studies Quarterly, 1972, pp. 407 - 432.

Moore, Wilbert E., "Global Sociology: The World as a Singular System," and The Utility of Utopias," in Wilbert E. Moore, Order and Change: Essays in Comparative Sociology, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.

Morehouse, Ward, A New Civic Literary: American Education and Global Interdependences. Series #3. Published by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Rosedale, P. O. Box 2820 Princeton, N. J., 1975.

Morse, Edward L. Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations. New York: The Free Press 1976.

Morse, Edward L., "Transnational Economic Processes" in Transnational Relations and World Politics. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Munro, J. Forbes. Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976.

Musgrave, Peggy B., "Direct Investment Abroad and the Multinationals: Effects on the United States Economy," prepared for the use of Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D. C.: US Govt. Printing Office, 1975.

Myrdal, Gunnar. An International Economy: Problems and Prospects. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1956

Nesbitt, William A., (ed.) "Data on the Human Crisis: Teacher's Guide," The University of the State of New York, The State Education Department, Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies, Albany, New York 12224, 1972.

Nicholas, Ralph W., "Segmentary Fractional Political Systems," in Political Anthropology, Marc J. Schwartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden (eds.). Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966.

Nye, J. S. Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S., "Multinational Corporations in World Politics," in Foreign Affairs, October 1974, pp. 153 - 175.

Overly, Norman V. and Richard D. Kimpston (eds.) Global Studies: Problems and Promises for Elementary Teachers. 1976. Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1701 K Street, N. W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20006.

Packenham, Robert A. Liberal America and the Third World Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Payer, Cheryl. The Debt Trap: The International Monetary Fund and the Third World. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974

Platig, Raymond, International Relations Research. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1966.

Quigg, Philip W. Environment: The Global Issues. (No. 217, Headline Series) New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1973.

Reid, William H. "Multinational Media," Foreign Policy, No. 18, Spring 1975, pp. 156 - 167.

Reischauer, Edwin O. Toward the 21st Century: Education for a Changing World. New York. Vintage Books, 1974.

Remy, Richard C., James A. Nathan, James Becker, and Judith V. Torney. International Learning and International Education in a Global Age. Bulletin 47. Washington, D.C.: The National Council for the Social Studies, 1975.

Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?", in World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 October 1973, pp. 1 - 27.

Rosenau, James N. (ed.) Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Rosenau, James N., "Teaching and Learning in a Transnational World" a paper prepared for the American Political Science Association's Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, 1978.

Rostow, W. W. The World Economy. History & Prospect. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978.

Sachs, Moshe Y. (ed.) United Nations, Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations. New York: Harper & Row, 1971 (4th ed.), Vol. 1.

Sachs, Moshe Y. (ed.) United Nations, Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations. New York: Harper & Row, 1965 (3rd ed.), Vol. 5.

Schiller, Herbert I. Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1976.

Scott, Andrew. The Functioning of the International Political System. New York: The McMillan Co., 1967.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.

Singer, J. David, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.) The International System: Theoretical Essays. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Spero, Joan Edelman. The Politics of International Economic Relations. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.

Spiro, Herbert J. World Politics: The Global System. Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1966.

Steel, Ronald. Pax Americana. New York: The Viking Press, 1970.

Stavrianos, L. S. The World since 1500. A Global History. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971, 2nd ed.

Sterling, Claire, "The Terrorist Network," The Atlantic, Vol. 242, No. 2 (November 1978), pp. 37 - 47.

Sterling, Richard W. Macropolitics. International Relations in a Global Society. New York: Knopf, 1974.

Strange, Susan, "International Economics and International Relations," in International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2. April 1970, pp. 304 - 315.

Stremlau, John J. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Sampedro, J. L. Decisive Forces in World Economics (translated from the Spanish by S. E. Nodder). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967.

Singer, Milton, "On Understanding Other Cultures and One's Own" in The Journal of General Education, Vol. 19, No. 1, April 1967.

Spencer, J. E. and W. L. Thomas, Introducing Cultural Geography. New York: Wiley, 1973.

Taylor, Philip A. M. (ed.) The Industrial Revolution in Britain, Triumph or Disaster? Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1958.

Teune, Henry and Zdravko Mlinar. The Developmental Logic of Social Systems. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, No. 60, Sage Library of Social Research, 1978.

Thompson, David. World History from 1914 to 1968 (3rd ed.). London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Tilly, Charles (ed.). The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Tinbergen, Jan. Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.

Tuma, Elias H. European Economic History. Tenth Century to the Present. Theory and History of Economic Change. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

Tung, William L. International Organization under the United Nations System. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969.

Ulich, Robert (ed.). Education and the Idea of Mankind. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964.

Varis, Tapio, "Global Traffic in Television," in Journal of Communication Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 1974, pp. 102 - 109.

Varis, Tapio, "Aspects of the Impact of Transnational Corporations on Communication," International Social Science Journal, XXVIII, No. 4 (1976), pp. 808 - 830.

Von Laue, Theodore H. The Global City. Philadephia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1969.

Wagar, W. Warren. The City of Man. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1967.

Wagar, W. Warren (ed.). History and the Idea of Mankind. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Walter, Ingo. International Economics of Pollution. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1975.

Wood, Robert S. (ed.) The Process of International Organization. New York: Random House, 1971.

Woodruff, William. Impact of Western Man. A Study of Europe's Role in the World Economy 1750-1960. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.

Worthington, Helen. Kentucky in the World, The World in Kentucky. Kentucky Department of Education, James B. Graham, Superintendent, October, 1977.

Wriggins, W. Howard and Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. Reducing Global Inequities. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. (1980s Project Studies/Council on Foreign Relations.)

Young, Oran R., "Interdependencies in World Politics," in International Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 1969, pp. 726 - 750.

Zimmerman, Carle C., "Convergence of the Major Human Family Systems During the Space Age," in Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., Sociological Theory, Values and Socio-Cultural Change. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

Zimmerman, L. J. Poor Lands, Rich Lands. The Widening Gap. New York: Random House, 1965.